Trade creating free trade areas and the undermining of multilateralism

This paper indicates that the consequences of regional trade agreements for the world trade system may be deceiving—an arrangement's apparent virtue may constitute the source of its drawback. In a model where governments have political, as well as economic, motivations, I show that a free trade area induces its members to reduce protection against the non-members, and to do so sufficiently deeply to generate overall trade creation. Trade creation amplifies the excluded countries’ access to the integrating markets, but also reduces their extra gains from multilateral liberalization. Thus, trade creation can reverse the support of the excluded countries to liberalization on a multilateral basis. This is more likely to happen when governments outside the free trade area are more responsive to special interests.     

How reasonable are assumptions used in theoretical models? Computational evidence on the likelihood of trade pattern changes

Abstract .  In theoretical literature it is common to make the assumption that in a multi-country, multi-good world, the direction of trade (import and export by commodity) is predetermined and fixed for each good for each country. We consider a simple three-country, three-good, pure-exchange model with CES preferences. We compute free trade competitive equilibria, three-country non-cooperative Nash equilibria, and customs union equilibria for randomised parameterizations, and find that trade pattern changes between free trade and customs union equilibria in around 35% of cases.     

Trade in intermediate inputs,customs unions,and global free trade

In a three‐country customs union (CU) formation game, I introduce international trade in intermediate inputs and rules of origin (RoO) restrictions. In the case of symmetric countries, I show that as countries become more involved in global supply chains, global free trade is less likely to be a stable equilibrium outcome. RoO can help solve this problem. In the case of asymmetry, depending on the degree of the globalization, free riding (for high degree) or exclusion motive (for low degree) prevents global free trade. Correspondingly, I show that RoO can have helpful or detrimental effects on attaining global free trade.     

Customs Union or Free Trade Area? The Role of Political Asymmetries

When trade policy is determined endogenously by lobbying, it matters whether countries are arranged into a customs union or a free trade area. This paper compares the two regimes when the member governments are asymmetric in their susceptibilities to lobbying and in their bargaining power within a customs union. In the model, a customs union never leads to lower tariffs for both countries, whereas it can lead to higher tariffs for both.     

Fortress Europe: Jericho or Château d’If?

Traditional analysis of customs union formation suggests that it leads to an increase in members' external tariffs. This paper stresses two aspects of European trade and trade policy—a large volume of intra-industry trade between similar countries and a political motivation for tariffs—and highlights a role for tariff coordination in a model of differentiated products in which tariffs affect domestic costs and thus export prices and the magnitude of monopolistic rents. We show that when workers choose the tariffs and receive but a small portion of tariff revenues, the union's tariff wall falls.     

PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION*

Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) building or stumbling blocks for multilateral trade liberalization? I address this question in an infinitely repeated tariff game between three countries engaged in intraindustry trade under oligopoly. The central result is that when countries are symmetric, a free trade agreement (FTA) undermines multilateral tariff cooperation by adversely affecting the cooperation incentive of the nonmember whereas a customs union (CU) does so via its effect on the cooperation incentives of members. However, when countries are asymmetric with respect to either market size or cost, there exist circumstances where PTAs facilitate multilateral tariff cooperation.     

The endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area criteria in East Asia

The Asian financial crisis in mid-1997 has increased interest in policies to achieve greater regional exchange rate stability in East Asia. It has renewed calls for greater monetary and exchange rate cooperation. A country's suitability to join a monetary union depends, inter alia, on the trade intensity and the business cycle synchronization with other potential members of the monetary union. However, these two Optimum Currency Area criteria are endogenous. Theoretically, the effect of increased trade integration (after the elimination of exchange fluctuations among the countries in the region) on the business cycle synchronization is ambiguous. Reduction in trade barriers can potentially increase industrial specialization by country and therefore resulting in more asymmetry business cycles from industry-specific shocks. On the other hand, increased trade integration may result in more highly correlated business cycles due to common demand shocks or intra-industry trade. If the second hypothesis is empirically verified, policy makers have little to worry about the region being unsynchronized in their business cycles as the business cycles will become more synchronized after the monetary union is formed. This paper assesses the dynamic relationships between trade, finance, specialization and business cycle synchronization for East Asian economies using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach. The dynamic panel approach improves on previous efforts to examine the business cycle correlations — trade link using panel procedures, which control for the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables. Based on the findings on how trade, finance and sectoral specialization have effects on the size of common shocks among countries, potential policies that can help East Asian countries move closer toward a regional currency arrangement can be suggested. The empirical results of this study suggest that there exists scope for East Asia to form a monetary union.     

西方关税同盟贸易效应的理论与实证研究

关税同盟理论是西方区域经济一体化理论的核心。区别于现有关税同盟的综述文章,作者将目前西方探讨关税同盟贸易效应的观点按照逻辑关系分成三个方面进行阐述:其一是关税同盟的利益来源;其二是关税同盟的产生原因;其三是最优对外关税的决定。本文也归纳了西方对关税同盟贸易效应进行经验分析的常用方法,并对已有的理论和实证观点进行评价。     

Does a currency union affect trade? The time-series evidence

Does leaving a currency union reduce international trade? We answer this question using a large annual panel data set covering 217 countries from 1948 through 1997. During this sample a large number of countries left currency unions; they experienced economically and statistically significant declines in bilateral trade, after accounting for other factors. Assuming symmetry, we estimate that a pair of countries that starts to use a common currency experiences a near doubling in bilateral trade.     

Small Countries and Preferential Trade Agreements: How Severe is the Innocent Bystander Problem?

In this paper the welfare implications of preferential trade agreements (PTA) are examined from the perspective of small countries in the context of a multi-country general equilibrium model. We calibrate our model to represent one relatively small country and two symmetric big countries. We consider two cases. In one case, the small country is an 'innocent bystander', that is, it is left out of a PTA between the two large countries. In the second case, the small country signs a PTA with one of the large countries. We simulate the model and calculate consumption allocations, prices, trade volume, and tariffs in these two cases considering three different equilibria: free trade (FT), free trade association (FTA) and customs union (CU). We find that free trade is the best outcome for the small country. If the large country PTA takes the form of a CU then the cost of being an 'innocent bystander' is very large. If it is an FTA then the cost of being an 'innocent bystander' is relatively modest. In fact, the small country prefers to be an 'innocent bystander' to being a member of an FTA with one of the large countries.     

How much do tariffs matter? Evidence from the customs union of Belarus,Kazakhstan and Russia

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the early impact of the formation of the customs union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, and associated changes in import schedules on the structure of imports. Relying on an original data-set of statutory tariffs we find that trade creation effects were significant only in trade between Russia and third countries, but that there was some trade destruction, with a significant negative impact on imports from China to Kazakhstan and Russia, and on imports from the EU to Belarus. However, the magnitude of this effect is relatively small, suggesting that the benefits of the new tariff policy per se are limited at best.     

Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs, and Subsidies to High-Technology Industries

This paper explores the links between international trade theory and the practice of trade and industrial policy in open economies, with special attention to three areas where theoretical lessons have been misunderstood in policy debates. I argue that the "concertina rule" for tariff reform justifies reductions in high tariffs but not moves towards uniformity and particularly not increases in low tariffs. I show that the basic principles of tariff reform are the same in unilateral, multilateral and customs union contexts. Finally, I suggest that the theory of strategic trade policy does not justify subsidies to high-technology industries.     

Regionalism in standards: good or bad for trade?

Abstract.  Regional agreements on standards have been largely ignored by economists and blessed by multilateral trade rules. Using a constructed panel data that identifies the different types of agreements at the industry level, we find that such agreements increase the trade between participating countries but not necessarily with the rest of the world. Harmonization of standards may reduce the exports of excluded countries, especially in markets that have raised the stringency of standards. Mutual recognition agreements are more uniformly trade promoting unless they contain restrictive rules of origin, in which case intra-regional trade increases at the expense of imports from other countries.     

European monetary union, adjustment, and exchange rate variability

This paper uses a three-country, three-good, factor-specific model of trade with wage rigidities to investigate how European Monetary Union is likely to affect exchange rate variability. Focusing on international macroeconomic adjustment under both exogenous and optimizing monetary policies, it shows that the relative variability (against external currencies) of the euro and a basket of predecessor currencies depends on the relative sizes and specialization patterns of countries and the relative importance of different shocks. Monetary union is likely to decrease (increase) aggregate European exchange rate variability for shocks to industries in which large (small) euro area countries specialize.     

The Effect of Customs Unions Among Specialized Countries on International Capital Flows*

This paper examines the effect on international capital flows of a customs union formed by specialized countries. We assume no economies of scale, and use a general equilibrium model with internationally mobile capital. It is shown that integration among countries with characteristics generally associated with having specialized economies will lead to a flow of capital into the union. These characteristics specifically concern the types of goods they trade among themselves, and with the rest of the world, and their ability to absorb capital inflows.     

FTA关系网络的第三国效应研究进展

随着自由贸易协定的蓬勃发展,出现一个国家(区域)与多个国家(区域)分别缔结自由贸易协定的重叠现象,学术界开始关注多个自由贸易协定与关税同盟共存下的关系网络。通过梳理学术界关于自由贸易协定的主要研究和当前关注热点,以期对该领域的进一步研究有所裨益。     

Equilibrium Unemployment Rate and Customs Union

This paper utilizes the macroeconomics concept of the equilibrium rate of unemployment for theorems on free trade and the formation of customs union. The notion of an equilibrium rate of unemployment appears in the literature on labour, macroeconomics, business cycles and trade theory. Such an equilibrium rate can be derived in a number of ways, for example, by introducing labor–leisure choice in the utility functions of the workers; a labor turnover model and/or by introducing shirking. We extend the two sector-two factor Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model for a small open economy by relaxing the assumption of inelastic labor supply. Specifically, we consider the classical labor supply function obtained from the representative consumer's utility maximisation problem. This consideration allows for the existence of unemployment and we analyse the effects trade policies have on the equilibrium unemployment rate. Given the movement towards free trade (either via the implementation of GATT and/or formation of customs union) it is important to examine its implications for the equilibrium rate of unemployment.     

Trade between symmetric countries,heterogeneous firms,and the skill premium

Abstract This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization between symmetric countries on the skill premium. I introduce skilled and unskilled labour in a model of trade with heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003) and assume a production technology such that more productive firms are more skill intensive. I show that the effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality crucially depend on the type of trade costs considered and on their initial size. While fixed costs of trade have a potentially non‐monotonic effect on the skill premium, a drop in variable trade costs unambiguously and substantially raises wage inequality.     

WHY A FREE TRADE AREA? THE TARIFF ALSO RISES*

This paper considers the choice between a customs union (wherein partners share a common external tariff) and a free trade area (wherein each partner chooses its own tariff against non-members). Following the result that a customs union dominates a free trade area, with coordination of domestic tax policies, we show that a free trade area may nevertheless be chosen if tariffs are determined endogenously through industry lobbying. This is so even when the free trade area equates producer prices within its borders and induces tariff revenue competition and whether or not there is domestic free-riding in lobbying.     

Endogenous trade bloc formation in an asymmetric world

This paper investigates how variations in endowments and the structure of preferences impact on the coalition formation decisions of asymmetric countries. There exist relatively few general results on the relationship between country characteristics and trade bloc formation. Here, new light is shed on this issue by systematically simulating bloc formation and by explicitly analysing the blocking behaviour of coalitions. A general equilibrium model of world trade is implemented with equilibrium coalition formation being modelled using the equilibrium concept of the core. It is found that global free trade is observed when all countries are similar. Customs unions tend to form between countries with ‘adjacent’ consumer preferences or with ‘adjacent’ endowments of their export commodity. Finally, in contrast to the existing literature but consistent with observed behaviour, it is found that free trade areas often Pareto dominate customs unions, provided consumer preferences differ sufficiently.