More on Marriage,Fertility, and the Distribution of Income*

According to Pareto (1896) , the distribution of income depends on “the nature of the people comprising a society, on the organization of the latter, and, also, in part, on chance.” In the model developed here the “nature of the people” is captured by attitudes toward marriage, divorce, fertility, and children. Singles search for mates in a marriage market. Married agents bargain about work, and the quantity and quality of children. They can divorce. Social policies, such as child support requirements, reflect the “organization of the (society).” Finally, “chance” is modeled by randomness in income, marriage opportunities, and marital bliss.     

Demography, growth, and inequality

We extend the single-sector endogenous growth model to allow for a general demographic structure. The model shows that due to the “generational turnover term,” the equilibrium growth rate is less than that of a representative agent model. We find the local dynamics about the balanced growth path (bgp) to be unstable, implying that the bgp is the only viable equilibrium. Using numerical simulations, we analyze how economic consequences of a change in the population growth rate differ, depending on the source of the demographic change. In addition, we analyze the relationship between changes in the demographic structure and what we call the “natural rate of wealth inequality”. Finally, we use our model to study how the demographic transition experienced by the United States has affected the economic growth rate and the degree of wealth inequality.     

Incremental and Average Control Costs in a Model of Water Quality Trading with Discrete Abatement Units

This paper answers three questions related to the discrete nature of pollution abatement: (i) does a source’s incremental control cost (as defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) necessarily exceed its average control cost, (ii) is incremental control cost a better approximation of a source’s willingness to pay for abatement credits than average control cost, and (iii) exactly how does trading in discrete and continuous abatement markets differ? We find that the answer to the first two questions are both “no”, suggesting that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency needs to refine its reliance on incremental control cost as the sole measure upon which to assess the financial feasibility of water quality trading. In answer to the third question, we show that the outcome of bilateral trading in the presence of discrete abatement is determined by comparing the gains from trade associated with the full sequence of possible “sunk cost trading” scenarios. For the most common case where trading partners’ average control cost curves “cross,” the trading outcome with discrete abatement is inherently sensitive to the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities.     

Reducing farmers' poverty vulnerability in China: The role of digital financial inclusion

This paper applies exogenous shocks to investigate the impact of digital financial inclusion (DFI) on farmers' poverty vulnerability in China. We find that farmers in highly developed DFI areas are less vulnerable to the poverty trap. The result is robust to various checks, including propensity score matching and difference-in-differences method and the instrumental variable approach. Moreover, we find that income diversification is the possible economic channel through which DFI affects farmers' poverty vulnerability. Further analyses show that DFI has a “targeting” effect on those who are poor and vulnerable, and a synergistic effect by working with medical insurance and informal finance in terms of reducing farmers' poverty vulnerability. Our research findings provide new theoretical insights and useful guidance in enhancing financial inclusiveness and sustainable development in the post-COVID-19 era.     

An experimental investigation of Hobbesian jungles

Hobbes's state of nature serves as the analytical starting point for much of what economists have written on anarchy and the formation of government. Unfortunately little historical evidence exists about how men behaved in a “state of nature”, if such a situation ever even existed. We conducted a laboratory experiment to create a Hobbesian state of nature and observe the level of economic efficiency subjects achieve. We also investigate Buchanan's conjecture that people would unanimously agree to a social contract against theft.     

Gender Bias in Education: the Role of Inter-household Externality, Dowry and other Social Institutions

We analyze gender bias in school enrollment by developing a two‐period model where women become part of extended families of their in‐laws. Each family decides how many sons and daughters are sent to school and thus become skilled. Gender bias occurs due to failure of the families to internalize inter‐household externalities. “Groom‐specific” dowry worsens the situation. Under “bride‐specific” dowry, bias exists if and only if the skill premium in the labor market is bigger than that in the marriage market. A specific discriminatory “food‐for‐education” policy is shown to reduce bias, but increase total enrollment.     

On the political economy of minority rights. Three ways to manipulate a minority: Goals,rules, and border poles

Language rights for speakers of minority languages are analyzed as well-defined policy measures that are implemented in given jurisdictions. For the implementation of such rights in some countries, certain rules concerning the number and geographical distribution of the speakers of a minority language have to be fulfilled. We discuss, how a policy maker with a given attitude towards the minority can manipulate the policy to further his or her goals. We first provide a normative background for this type of language policy, a benchmark, analyzing language policy on the basis of welfare economics, first discussing why language policy is but one type of public policy, then defining and discussing the benefit or “demand” side assuming that benefits are basically proportional to the number of beneficiaries of the planning measure. We then argue that the costs of a planning measure can be described as a function of two variables, “number of beneficiaries” and “size of area of application”. This lets us analyze planning measures in a two-dimensional model fully characterized by the number of beneficiaries and their geographical distribution in the jurisdiction under consideration. Finally, we characterize the optimal size and extension of the jurisdictions where the language rights are to be implemented. It is then shown, how the policy maker can manipulate the goals of the policy, the implementation rules, as well as the borders of the jurisdictions in order to achieve her or his political goals when they differ from the cost-benefit optimum.     

Economic growth,corruption and tax evasion

In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We develop a Ramsey model of economic growth with a rival but non-excludable public good which is financed by taxes which can be evaded via corrupt tax inspectors. We prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax collection, in a dynamic framework, is not unique, but is different depending on the relevance of the “shame effect”. We show that in all three cases — “low, middle and high shame” countries, the growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value, after which the growth rate begins to decrease as the tax rate increases. But, for intermediate tax rates, the rate of growth for “low shame” countries is lower than that of “uniform shame” countries which is, in turn, lower than that of “high shame” countries. This happens because the growth rate is more sensitive to variations of t in an honest country rather than in a corrupt country.     

Indecision Theory: Weight of Evidence and Voting Behavior

In this paper, we show how to incorporate weight of evidence, or ambiguity, into a model of voting behavior. We do so in the context of the turnout decision of instrumentally rational voters who differ in their perception of the ambiguity of the candidates' policy positions. Ambiguity is reflected by the fact that the voter's beliefs are given by a set of probabilities, each of which represents in the voter's mind a different possible scenario. We show that a voter who is averse to ambiguity considers abstention strictly optimal when the candidates' policy positions are both ambiguous and they are “ambiguity complements.” Abstaining is preferred since it is tantamount to mixing the prospects embodied by the two candidates, thus enabling the voter to “hedge” the candidates' ambiguity.     

The Reverse Direct Investment: The Case of the Korean Consumer Electronics Industry

This paper discusses the nature of foreign direct investments by firms from developing countries in industrialized country markets, which is coined as “reverse direct investment.” On the basis of the experiences of the Korean consumer electronics firms operating in the U.S., this paper identifies the nature of the investment as “defensive” and “premature“ strategic moves of firms in their internationalization process. There investment are made not to exploit firms' monopolistic firm-specific advantages, but to protect their export markets at an earlier time than economic forces might have led them to do. However, in the process, firms try to convert their home country-specific advantage (e.g. low labor cost) into firm-specific ones as much as possible. [440]     

Production and financial linkages in inter-firm networks: structural variety, risk-sharing and resilience

The paper analyzes how (production and financial) inter-firm networks can affect firms’ default probabilities and observed default rates. A simple theoretical model of shock transfer is built to investigate some stylized facts on how firm-idiosyncratic shocks are allocated in the network, and how this allocation changes firm default probabilities. The model shows that the network works as a perfect “risk-pooling” mechanism, when it is both strongly connected and symmetric. But the “risk-sharing” does not necessarily reduce default rates, unless the shock firms face is lower on average than their financial capacity. Conceived as cases of symmetric inter-firm networks, industrial districts might have a comparative disadvantage in front of heavy crises.     

Technological regimes and demand structure in the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry

This paper examines how the nature of the technological regime governing innovative activities and the structure of demand interact in determining market structure, with specific reference to the pharmaceutical industry. The key question concerns the observation that—despite high degrees of R&D and marketing-intensity—concentration has been consistently low during the whole evolution of the industry. Standard explanations of this phenomenon refer to the random nature of the innovative process, the patterns of imitation, and the fragmented nature of the market into multiple, independent submarkets. We delve deeper into this issue by using an improved version of our previous “history-friendly” model of the evolution of pharmaceuticals. Thus, we explore the way in which changes in the technological regime and/or in the structure of demand may generate or not substantially higher degrees of concentration. The main results are that, while technological regimes remain fundamental determinants of the patterns of innovation, the demand structure plays a crucial role in preventing the emergence of concentration through a partially endogenous process of discovery of new submarkets. However, it is not simply market fragmentation as such that produces this result, but rather the entity of the “prize” that innovators can gain relative to the overall size of the market. Further, the model shows that emerging industry leaders are innovative early entrants in large submarkets.     

Identification of Dynamic Models of Rewards Programme

“Frequent‐buyer” rewards programmes are commonly used by companies as a marketing tool to compete for market share. They provide a unique environment for studying consumers’ forward‐looking behaviour. The consumer's problem on accumulating reward points can be formulated as a stationary infinite horizon discrete choice dynamic programming model. We show that the parameters of this model, including the discount factor, are well‐identified. In particular, it is possible to identify state‐dependent discount factors (i.e. discount factors can vary with the number of reward points). We discuss how this identification result is related to the goal‐gradient hypothesis studied in the consumer psychology literature.     

The Return of Geopolitics in the Era of Soft Power: Rereading Rudolf Kjellén on Geopolitical Imaginary and Competitive Identity

This paper looks at how Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922) conceived of the relationship between nature and culture, between material and immaterial power as well as the role of soft power, geopolitical imaginary and competitive identity in off-setting potentially unfavourable geopolitical conditions for small and medium-sized states. It is argued that with regard to small states, Kjellén did not maintain a consistent separation between “soft” cultural resources of power and “hard” laws of nature. Rather, he placed the mutually constitutive tension between geography (nature) and politics (culture) at the centre of his politico-scientific analysis, arguing that active “biopolitics” could supplement geopolitics. In Kjellén’s conception, cultural and natural resources are instruments of an otherwise integrated notion of power which challenges the contemporary separation between hard and soft power.     

GATT,DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATION*

This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost in addition to retaliatory actions that might be induced by the violation. We interpret this cost as arising from “international obligation”, a phenomenon frequently mentioned in the legal literature on GATT. We focus on how international obligation affects two aspects of GATT-DSP: unilateral retaliation and the effect of inordinate delays in the operation of DSP.     

基于人力资本价值链理论的中国城市国际人才集聚研究

城市国际人才争夺战由来已久并不断升级，但针对中国城市国际人才集聚水平、影响因素和差异化政策供给的研究鲜见。以“国际人才集聚指数-国际人才集聚影响因素-国际人才集聚政策”为研究主线，以中国36个主要城市为研究对象，创新性地通过构建人力资本“投入-过程-产出”价值链理论模型进行实证研究，结果表明：中国城市国际人才集聚指数排名分为3个差异显著的层级。其中，第二和第三层级之间无较大差距，但与由北京、上海组成的第一层级相比大幅落后。中国城市国际人才集聚影响因素分化明显，第一类城市的主要影响因素为全球城市品牌文化；第二类城市为创新型经济发展；第三类为外资传统工商业企业和产业集聚。对应地，中国城市国际人才集聚政策供给围绕外资传统工商业国际人才集聚、高端生产性服务业国际人才集聚、多样性和包容性国际人才文化氛围营造存在三大差异化选择。首次构建人力资本“投入-过程-产出”价值链模型，为从机理上深入探索中国各类城市国际人才集聚模式及提升路径奠定了基础。     

基于人力资本价值链理论的中国城市国际人才集聚研究

城市国际人才争夺战由来已久并不断升级，但针对中国城市国际人才集聚水平、影响因素和差异化政策供给的研究鲜见。以“国际人才集聚指数-国际人才集聚影响因素-国际人才集聚政策”为研究主线，以中国36个主要城市为研究对象，创新性地通过构建人力资本“投入-过程-产出”价值链理论模型进行实证研究，结果表明：中国城市国际人才集聚指数排名分为3个差异显著的层级。其中，第二和第三层级之间无较大差距，但与由北京、上海组成的第一层级相比大幅落后。中国城市国际人才集聚影响因素分化明显，第一类城市的主要影响因素为全球城市品牌文化；第二类城市为创新型经济发展；第三类为外资传统工商业企业和产业集聚。对应地，中国城市国际人才集聚政策供给围绕外资传统工商业国际人才集聚、高端生产性服务业国际人才集聚、多样性和包容性国际人才文化氛围营造存在三大差异化选择。首次构建人力资本“投入-过程-产出”价值链模型，为从机理上深入探索中国各类城市国际人才集聚模式及提升路径奠定了基础。     

Psychology,Stock/FX Trading and Option Prices

The financial crisis of 2008 had many putative causes where psychology was an important driver for human decisions. However, quantitative financial models have no “knobs” to dial psychology parameters, and so arguably cannot possibly cope with financial crises. Here we take a first step by considering how a particular aspect of psychology can influence an underlying security and subsequent option prices, in a quantitative model. We investigate how psychological regret and fear impact trading selling behavior and induces changes in underlying security prices. We then consider the resulting changes in option prices with empirical evidence.     

Anonymous social influence

We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes modeled by ordered weighted averaging operators, which are anonymous: they only depend on how many agents share an opinion. For instance, this allows to study situations where the influence process is based on majorities, which are not covered by the classical approach of weighted averaging aggregation. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence to consensus and characterize outcomes where the society ends up polarized. Our results can also be used to understand more general situations, where ordered weighted averages are only used to some extent. Furthermore, we apply our results to fuzzy linguistic quantifiers, i.e., expressions like “most” or “at least a few”.     

Elections, Opportunism, Partisanship and Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries

We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations explain election‐period decisions by credit rating agencies (“agencies”) publishing developing country sovereign risk‐ratings (“ratings”). Analyses of 391 agency ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987–2000, initially suggest that elections themselves prompt rating downgrades consistent with opportunistic PBC considerations, that incumbents are all likely to implement election‐period policies detrimental to post‐election creditworthiness. But more refined analyses, integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations in a unified framework, suggest that election‐period agency downgrades (upgrades) are more likely as right‐wing (left‐wing) incumbents, become more vulnerable to ouster by challengers. Together, these results underscore the importance of integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations into any explanation of election‐period risk assessments of agencies and, perhaps, other private, foreign‐based financial actors important to the pricing and allocation of capital for lending and investment in the developing world.