Decentralization and political institutions

Does fiscal decentralization lead to more efficient governance, better public goods, and higher economic growth? This paper tests Riker's [Riker, W. (1964) “Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance,” Little, Brown and Co, Boston, MA.] theory that the results of fiscal decentralization depend on the level of countries' political centralization. We analyze cross-section and panel data from up to 75 developing and transition countries for 25 years. Two of Riker's predictions about the role of political institutions in disciplining fiscally-autonomous local politicians are confirmed by the data. 1) Strength of national political parties significantly improves outcomes of fiscal decentralization such as economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision. 2) In contrast, administrative subordination (i.e., appointing local politicians rather than electing them) does not improve the results of fiscal decentralization.     

Corruption and local democratization in Indonesia: The role of Islamic parties

Indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from firms. This paper examines whether corruption is affected by local democratization and by the party composition of local assemblies. Democratization occurred in 1999 and decentralization in 2001. We have firm-level data for 2001 and 2004. The 2001 data benchmark corruption at the time of decentralization. We find that corruption declines between 2001 and 2004 overall, but much less so in districts with more secular party as opposed to Islamic party representatives in district assemblies. For a larger sample of districts, correspondingly, we find that corruption in 2004 is more in districts which voted more in favor of secular party representatives in the first elections in 1999. We argue that the effects seem to be causal, over above any effects of changing religiosity and economic circumstances across districts.     

It is not easy being a Green party: Green politics as a normal good

An extensive body of literature shows that voters often credit or blame ruling political parties for economic successes and failures, respectively. This paper presents a related, but new possibility: whether local economic conditions impact Green party electoral outcomes. According to the environmental Kuznets curve, high-income countries will see decreased environmental degradation as they become wealthier, but it is yet to be seen whether this relationship is carried over to environmentally friendly political parties. Using a panel data set that includes over 250 elections from 26 European countries, we find that elections held during times of economic growth increase the vote share that Green parties win. This effect is especially robust for national elections, as opposed to elections for the European Parliament. The magnitudes are large enough to potentially alter the number of seats Green parties have in national legislatures. This provides evidence that Green parties are most likely to gain seats when the economy is growing, and support for the existence of an environmental Kuznets curve.     

The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Corruption: A Non‐linear Hypothesis

This study advances the literature on the effect of decentralization on corruption by proposing a theoretical motivation for the hypothesis that the corruption‐minimizing decentralization arrangement prescribes intermediate decentralization degrees: a ‘middle’ decision‐making power of local governors may mitigate the tradeoff between the rent‐seeking incentive for local politicians and the effectiveness of their voters’ monitoring. The estimation of a non‐linear empirical model strongly confirms that a decentralization degree between 15% and 21% minimizes corruption even through different estimation procedures, introduction of control variables and the use of internal and external IV and of alternative decentralization and corruption measurements.     

Exposure to corruption and political participation: Evidence from Italian municipalities

This paper aims to study the effects of exposure to corruption on all the aspects of political participation. Focusing on Italian municipalities in the period 1999–2014, we generate a daily and local measure of exposure to corruption, screening newspaper articles of the main Italian press agency. We concentrate on local elections and, in an event-study analysis, we find three main results. First, corruption exposure affects citizens' participation in election by reducing voter turnout. Second, corruption impacts on politicians’ participation: the number of candidates and electoral lists decreases after a scandal and candidates with political tenure are more likely to run. Finally, these changes affect local political outcomes as tenured politicians are more likely to be elected, while freshmen lose ground. These results suggest that exposure to corruption has general and negative effects on political participation, leading people to lose interest in politics.     

Voter turnout and the principle of ‘one person,one vote’: empirical evidence from the constituency freeze in India

This article uses panel data from national and state elections in India during the period 1977–2007 to examine the effect of inequality in constituency population size on voter turnout. During this period, constituency boundaries in India remained fixed. As a result, differences in population size between constituencies increased, thus changing the value of a single vote. Using this large variation in population size and informative data, this article carefully distinguishes the effect of population size from other factors. We find that an increase of one million electorates decreases voter turnout by 12–27%. In addition, we find that the share of votes gained by national political parties is greater in small-population constituencies. This suggests that political parties direct their efforts in electoral campaigns preferentially to less populous constituencies; as a result, voters in small constituencies are more likely to participate in elections.     

Migration and political institutions: Other side of the hill

The present paper examines the effect of migrant population on political institutions in their host societies using data from the local elections in Hong Kong. The share of the population that has migrated from mainland China is found to have a positive effect on the pro-government votes in local elections. This effect continues to exist after demographic characteristics are controlled. Further investigation suggests that the effect of migrant population on voting patterns varies across periods of migration to Hong Kong. These findings contribute to the published literature in two ways. First, they provide evidence that the effects of migration on political development are two-way. Migration not only influences the political institutions in migrants’ home countries, but also shapes the political institutions in their host regions. Second, they also pave the way for future research on why and how periods of migration influence migrant populations’ voting patterns in their host regions.     

The Effect of Political Alignment on Transfers to Portuguese Municipalities

I investigate if political alignment between central and local governments brings financial benefit to local governments, using financial data from Portuguese municipalities (1992–2005). I use regression discontinuity design to determine the effect of political alignment per se on transfers to municipalities. Municipalities aligned with the central government receive 19% more targetable transfers than unaligned municipalities. I test for electoral motivation of this transfer bias: extra transfers increase the vote share of incumbents in local elections for one of the two Portuguese major parties; however, municipal incumbency does not lead to better results in national elections.     

Decentralization of firms in a country with weak institutions: Evidence from Russia

The paper studies evidence from Russian firms to explore whether the decentralization of firms can be successful under weak institutions. The paper distinguishes between two strategies for decentralization of firms in an environment with weak institutions: decentralization of decision-making authority to professionals hired through open competition (real decentralization) and decentralization to people hired through connections (cautious decentralization). The paper argues that real decentralization has the potential to significantly improve the efficiency of firms and therefore can have economic payoff for firms even under weak institutions. However, the higher the distortionary effect of corruption on fair market competition in an environment with weak institutions, the lower the firms’ returns to being economically efficient. Therefore, the lower the returns to real decentralization, and, hence, the firms’ willingness to really decentralize. The empirical analysis presented in the paper demonstrates that really decentralized Russian firms are, on average, more successful compared to other firms in a range of activities: they are more likely to invest, to bring to the market innovative products that are new to the Russian or global market, and to export. The gap between really decentralized and other firms in the probability of investment and introduction of new products to the market is very substantial under low or moderate levels of corruption. However, the gap shrinks as corruption grows and disappears under very high levels of corruption. Correspondingly, real decentralization is less popular in Russian regions with higher corruption.     

经济发展中的地方官员行为研究——基于政治晋升、财政分权与腐败的视角

本文同时考虑财政分权、政治晋升和腐败三个因素对地方官员行为的影响,进而构建了理论模型。从中得到的主要结论是,在基本模型中,地方官员对政治晋升的偏好程度越高,则其努力程度越高、腐败程度越低。而财政分权程度越高,官员的努力也越高,但对腐败水平影响却是不确定的。在进一步假设腐败会被惩罚的拓展模型中,基本模型的大部分结论都没有发生太大变化,只是分权程度的对努力的影响也变得不确定了。除此之外,我们进一步研究了,对官员腐败惩罚的力度和对官员腐败的惩罚准确程度的影响,相关命题表明,如果对官员腐败惩罚的越严厉,并且对官员腐败的惩罚越准确,官员努力水平和官员腐败程度都会变低。通过对研究结论的分析,我们还对以往文献的结果进行了重新解释。     

The size of public employment: An empirical study

Previous empirical studies of government have focused primarily on aggregate financial measures of size. This analysis examines a different measure: the share of public employment in total employment. In empirical tests on OECD countries for 1970 and 1980, the level of public employment is shown to be a clear reflection of voter demand for public goods, electoral support for socialist parties, and political response to the problems of unemployment. In contrast, variables that measure characteristics of the political process, such as degree of government decentralization, strength of interest groups, and voter participation in elections, are not statistically significant.     

Pre-colonial ethnic institutions and party politics in Africa

We examine the role of ethnic institutions on party politics in African democracies. We combine geo-referenced data from 15 countries, 32 parliamentary elections and around 2700 electoral constituencies. First, we document a strong negative association between the degree of pre-colonial ethnic institutional centralization and the local level of competition between political parties in democratic elections today. Second, to address concerns about unobservable differences in geography or history, we show that results hold true when leveraging for identification the redrawing of constituency boundaries over time. Pre-colonial ethnic institutions shape local electoral outcomes and matter for the present and future of African democracies.     

Does political competition lessen ethnic discrimination? Evidence from Sri Lanka

The impact of political competition on ethnic discrimination remains largely unexplored. To address this gap, this paper explores the relationship between the level of political competition and the probability of receiving government transfers among ethnic minorities in Sri Lanka in the run up to the national elections of 2000. The paper shows that making politicians dependent on the votes of members of ethnic groups other their own can encourage moderation in discriminatory practices towards ethnic minorities. Specifically we find that political competition positively influenced the distribution of government food stamps among Sri Lankan Tamils, who otherwise are less likely to receive food stamps relative to the Sinhalese majority. The negative impact of political competition on discrimination is higher when minorities form part of swing constituencies than when they form part of the base support for political parties. Lessons learnt here suggest that having built-in incentives in the design of the electoral process for intergroup bargaining and cooperation in countries with ethnically heterogeneous societies can be an effective restraint on ethnic discrimination. This is consistent with other research that considers political institutions to be a key lever for making ethnically divided societies more inclusive.     

Corruption and legislature size: Evidence from Brazil

This paper studies whether and how legislatures affect political corruption. Using a regression discontinuity design in the context of Brazilian municipalities, we find a positive causal impact of council size on corruption levels, as detected by random federal audits. This indicates that an extra councilor represents an additional political actor potentially interested in diverting public resources, which we define as a rent extraction effect. However, we find further evidence that, in some contexts, larger councils enhance the representation of opposition parties and effectively increase monitoring over the executive, attenuating the rent extraction effect. Namely, in municipalities where opposition parties are typically underrepresented, the additional seat in the council is absorbed by the opposition and corruption outcomes do not worsen. In addition, only in such context, mayors are more commonly sentenced for misconduct in office by judicial authorities, whose investigations anecdotally often originates from councilors denouncing mayors to local courts. Overall, our findings show that legislature size is detrimental to corruption outcomes but less so where the representation of opposition parties improves with the enlargement of the legislature.     

Is polarization bad?

The adverse effects of political and social polarization on government policies are empirically well documented, yet some democracies seem to cope well or even benefit from diversity. In this paper we develop a theoretical model to show how elections in polarized societies contribute to improve quality of government. We consider both polarization among citizens and political actors (political polarization), where the second is endogenously determined by parties competing to win the support of the majority of voters. We find that more heterogeneous societies are more likely to be politically polarized, but that the divergence of positions in the political arena helps the electorate control government corruption by raising electoral stakes. Our results, which are consistent with the findings of a substantial empirical literature, suggest that, when funneled into political competition, polarization may help improving quality of government and policies.     

Immigration,Ethnic Diversity,and Political Outcomes: Evidence from Denmark

I study the impact of immigration and increasing ethnic diversity on political outcomes in immigrant‐receiving countries, focusing on immigration and election outcomes in Danish municipalities between 1981 and 2001. A novel instrumental variable strategy based on historical housing stock data addresses issues of endogenous location choices of immigrants and a rich set of control variables is employed to isolate ethnic diversity effects from those of other immigrant characteristics. Increases in local ethnic diversity lead to rightward shifts in election outcomes by shifting electoral support away from traditional “big government” left‐wing parties and towards anti‐immigrant nationalist parties. This holds for both local and national elections.     

Political turnover and the accumulation of democratic capital

Certain democratic institutions tend to persist in some countries whereas they are frequently reversed in others. Focusing on strong constraints on executive power as one such institution, this paper theoretically studies the cross-country differences in the costs of relaxing these constraints. The model features two political parties that stochastically alternate in office according to a political uncertainty parameter. In each period, the incumbent can make reversible investments into the future government's ability to reform executive constraints. The main results indicate that more competitive elections and higher degrees of policy polarization between the political parties lead to high and persistent levels of investment into the society's stock of “democratic capital”. These higher costs of institutional reform in turn result in durable strong executive constraint-regimes.     

Political Business Cycles,Elections and Entrepreneurial Finance: A Framework

Political processes affect the real economy. An important channel through which politics affects economics is uncertainty. It has been observed that political uncertainty is high around national elections and negatively affects corporate investments and foreign capital inflows. If national elections affect corporations and foreign investors, we should expect them to also affect entrepreneurial finance provided by investors like venture capitalists (VCs). To add to that, in a complex federal democracy, state level politics is a significant source of political uncertainty. This is the first paper to examine the impact of national and state elections on entrepreneurial finance and provides a framework of VC investment behavior in the face of political uncertainty. We find that VC investments decrease significantly due to political uncertainty around national and state elections. VCs respond strongly to national elections by decreasing the total investment value and the number of deals in election years. However, they give a softer response to regional political uncertainty around state elections by decreasing only the average deal size. The findings have important implications for governments, regulators and policymakers, and open up an opportunity to examine a variety of new questions which can provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the impact of elections on VC investments.

     

Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world

How does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials? Previous empirical studies, using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization, have suggested conflicting conclusions. In search of more precise findings, we combine and explore two new data sources—an original cross-national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms' concrete experiences with bribery. In countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and (given local revenues) a larger number of local public employees, reported bribery was more frequent. When local—or central—governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue, bribery was less frequent. Overall, the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking as government structures become more complex.     

Effects of runoff voting rules on number of parties and candidates' political experience: Evidence from a law change in Peru

We study the effect of a change in electoral rules on political competition, measured by the number of candidates and their political experience. We explore the effects of a change in legislation, introduced a year before the gubernatorial elections in Peru on the number of parties that participated in these elections. We also investigate how the legislative change affected the political experience of the candidates. Given that the legislative change did not apply to elections for provincial mayors, we use those elections as a control group, in a difference-in-differences design. Our estimates show the number of parties registered increased by a margin of around 2.2 after the legislative change. The change also increased the candidates' years of accumulated political experience, particularly in the subsequent gubernatorial elections.