Risk sharing in the Middle East and North Africa

This study investigates welfare gains and channels of risk sharing among 14 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, including the oil‐rich Gulf region and the resource‐scarce economies such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. The results show that for the 1992–2009 period, the overall welfare gains across MENA countries were higher than those documented for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations. In the Gulf region, the amount of factor income smoothing does not differ considerably when output shocks are longer lasting rather than transitory, whereas the amount smoothed by savings increases remarkably when shocks are longer lasting. In contrast, both factor income flows and international transfers respond more to permanent shocks than to transitory shocks in the non‐oil MENA countries. The results also show that a significant portion of shocks is smoothed via remittance transfers in the economically less‐developed MENA countries, but not in the oil‐rich Gulf and OECD countries. Finally, for the overall MENA region, a large part of the shock remains unsmoothed, suggesting that more market integration is needed to remedy the weak link of incomplete risk sharing.     

International Environmental Agreements as Evolutionary Games

This paper applies evolutionary game theory to international environmental agreements (IEAs). Contrary to stage game models (Barrett in J Theor Politics 11:519–541, 1999, Eur Econ Rev 45:1835–1850, 2001), in an evolutionary equilibrium (EE) no signatory prefers to be outside the IEA and the EE is robust to trembles. With two populations, there is a unique interior EE when there is decreasing returns to abatement and small asymmetry in the externality differences across populations. At the interior EE, transfers from the poor to the rich can increase payoffs for all nations, but come at the expense of greater payoff inequality. Transfers can also eliminate the basin of attraction for the payoff inferior EE with decreasing returns to abatement and large asymmetry. Thus IEAs, such as the Kyoto Treaty, predicated on the polluter-pays and ability-to-pay principles may result in Pareto inferior outcomes.     

Poverty and pollution abatement: Evidence from lead phase-out

An extensive literature suggests that poverty prevents nations from abating many forms of pollution. Considerable research also proposes a competing claim, that poverty delays but does not prevent pollution abatement. Neither position enjoys persuasive empirical support. Data describing the phase-out of leaded gasoline allow for empirical investigation and they support the latter claim—that poverty delays but does not prevent pollution abatement. Many poor nations have solved the problem of vehicular lead pollution and they have tended to follow rich nations in doing so. The phase-out achievements of richer nations have generated much of the ability and will that has enabled poor countries to solve the problem. The pattern of abatement sequencing and its root causes present important implications for environmental policy and research.     

Free trade: what are the terms-of-trade effects?

Changes in trade policy affect a nation’s economic welfare through terms-of-trade and volume-of-trade effects. A move to global free trade would imply higher world economic welfare equal to the sum of all nations’ volume-of-trade, or efficiency, effects. Since the sum of the terms-of-trade effects across all nations is zero, terms-of-trade effects are contentious. Konishi, Kowalczyk and Sjöström (2003) have shown that if customs unions do not affect trade with non-member countries, immediate global free could be achieved if free trade were proposed together with international sidepayments equal to the terms of trade effects. How large would these terms of trade effects, and hence transfers, be? This paper presents estimates from a simple computable general equilibrium model of a world economy of perfect competition. We show that, in some cases, terms-of-trade effects are small compared to efficiency gains, and transfers are not necessary for free trade. In other cases, terms-of-trade gains may account for more than 50% of a country’s gains from free trade and transfers could be large.     

Convergence in a Dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin Model with Land

Convergence among nations that share the same preferences and technologies is a key result of the closed‐economy neoclassical growth framework that has received substantial support in the data. However, Heckscher–Ohlin versions of the two‐sector neoclassical growth model predict that nations that differ in their capital–labor ratios may not converge to the same steady state, even if they are identical in all other aspects. This is a puzzling result that warns us about potential dangers of international trade. In this paper we show that when land, an input in fixed supply, is introduced into the model, international trade in goods no longer limits the capacity of poor nations to catch up with the advanced world.     

Lifetime vs Annual Tax-Transfer Incidence: How Much Less Progressive?

Annual fiscal incidence studies have found that income taxes and cash transfers are highly progressive and that their net effect is to redistribute income from rich to poor. Yet many argue Jhat such studies overstate the redistribution achieved by governments and that lifetime analysis is needed New results suggest that both income taxes and cash transfers are progressive on a lifetime basis, although they are much less progressive than annual studies suggest. The Australian tax-transfer system thus generates some lifetime redistribution from rich to poor, while also enforcing intra-personal redistribution across the life cycle of individuals.     

Sovereign Risk, FDI Spillovers, and Growth

This paper studies the effect of sovereign risk on capital flows from rich to poor nations in the context of a two-country model, where Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) creates positive externalities in domestic production. We show that if externalities are large, a developing country never expropriates foreign assets, and behaves as under perfect enforcement of foreigners' property rights, jumping to the steady state in one period. If externalities are absent, a developing country always expropriates foreign assets and, then, there are no capital flows in equilibrium, as occurs in autarky. If externalities are of a medium size, our model can account for scarce capital flows from rich to poor nations, as well as other key features of the data, such as rising-over-time patterns of foreign capital and FDI in developing countries. In addition, the model offers an economic rationale for the FDI restrictions observed across nations.     

Motives for household private transfers in Burkina Faso

Resource transfers among households have received considerable interest among economists in recent years. Two of the main reasons for the surge of interest in household transfers are the information on human nature conveyed by transfer behavior and the implication on income redistribution policy that private transfer might have. Empirical studies, however, provide mixed results on transfer behavior. This is because previous inquiries were confronted with several estimation issues and have focused on data from developed countries where private transfers are already small. This paper contributes to the literature on transfer behavior by using a multifaceted econometric approach to examine the motives of household transfers in Burkina, a low-income country with a well-documented tradition of gift exchanges. The findings suggest that risk sharing is not central to transfers. Altruistic transfers are apparent for the middle income class, but not at low income level. The evidence implies that crowding out may be minimal at low income level, suggesting that public transfers targeting poor households may be effective.     

The political economy of global carbon emissions reductions

The discussion about what reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are required and how the emissions rights might be distributed globally has fostered the belief that there is a fundamental conflict between the rich nations of the “North” and the poor but populous nations of the “South.” The argument is that grandfathering the rights will only reinforce existing global inequalities, while per capita distribution of the rights would lead to such huge transfers of wealth to the South as to be unacceptable to the North. However, a very simple general equilibrium model highlighting key elements of the global economy shows that this perception is incorrect under a plausible interpretation of the goal of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to “avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Instead of using an economic damage function to determine the optimal level of emissions reductions, the model's utility functions are calibrated to reflect scientific understanding of what would be required to stabilize the atmosphere at safe concentrations of greenhouse gases. Among policy options that would accomplish this, the United States has a preference for grandfathering the allocation of emissions rights over a per capita allocation, but this preference is not strong and could be offset by other geopolitical considerations.     

Protection and skills: Does trade policy favor low‐skill workers?

Many believe that international trade barriers in rich nations help low‐skill workers. Also, the empirical endogenous protection literature strongly implies that protection decreases with skill levels. This paper presents evidence against this conventional wisdom. Regressions based on a political economy model with search frictions and unemployment imply that protection and skill levels actually have a mound‐shaped relationship: industries with skills in the middle range get more protection than industries at either end of the distribution. Apparently, the politics of trade policy trump social concerns, rendering protection less “progressive” than is commonly believed.     

Accounting for the Changing Role of Family Income in Determining College Entry

In this paper, I analyze the determinants of college enrolment and the changes in these determinants over time. I propose a quantitative life‐cycle model with college enrolment. Altruistic parents provide financial support to their children. Using counterfactual experiments, I find that 24 percent of all households are financially constrained in their college decision. Constraints become more severe over time. I show that my model is consistent with a narrow college enrolment gap between students from rich and poor families, as previously reported in the empirical literature. The estimation of enrolment gaps is a popular reduced‐form approach for measuring the fraction of constrained households. My results suggest that these reduced‐form estimates are misleading, and that a structural model of parental transfers is needed to correctly identify constrained households. Further, I show that parental transfers are an important driver behind the changing role of family income as a determinant of college entry, a fact that is well documented for the US economy.     

Analysis of Bilateral Trade Patterns With Panel Data

Bilateral trade flows are examined to investigate whether trade patterns are consistent with a simple model of trade in differentiated products. In contrast to previous results in the literature, it is shown that the simple model of trade in differentiated products is often not appropriate for trade among the poor nations. Demand differences among the poor countries are shown to be at least a partial explanation for the deviations from the theoretical predictions.     

Social norms and gift behavior: Theory and evidence from Romania

In many developing and transitional countries with limited public income redistribution, inter-household transfers in general, and gifts in particular, are sizable and very important. We use unique Romanian survey data that enables us to isolate pure gifts from other private transfers. We explicitly focus on the importance of community-wide social norms, and find that they indeed play a major role for both the occurrence and the values of gifts. More exactly, our results suggest that the overall predominant gift motive among Romanian households is a norm of reciprocity. Moreover, this norm seems to be dominating for gifts to middle- and high-income households. Even though poor households receive to the same extent, norms of both impure altruism and reciprocity tend to be important. Hence, although the poor may not reciprocate gifts to the same extent as the rich, they still receive, since there is a social norm to give, especially to the poor.     

Strategic Inter–Regional Transfers

We derive the equilibrium level of redistribution from one mobile factor (say, the rich or capital) to another possibly mobile factor (say, the poor or labour) when regions choose both their inter–regional transfers and redistributive policies non–cooperatively. It is shown that inter–regional transfers are always desirable (to mitigate the fiscal competition), but cannot be sustained (as a Nash equilibrium) when chosen simultaneoulsy with the redistributive policy. On the other hand, if regions can pre–commit to inter–regional transfers before setting their redistributive policy, their strategic effect makes efficient inter–regional transfers sustainable. However, there are also equilibria with inefficiently small inter–regional transfers or no transfers at all. The effects of regional asymmetries and additional regions on these results are also analyzed.     

Capital Mobility—Resource Gains or Losses? How,When, and for Whom?

This paper investigates which of the two types of countries—resource‐rich or resource‐poor—gains from capital market integration and capital tax competition. We develop a framework involving vertical linkages through resource‐based inputs as well as international fiscal linkages between the two types of countries. Our analysis shows that capital market integration causes capital flows from resource‐poor to resource‐rich countries and improves global production efficiency. However, such gains accrue only to resource‐poor countries, and capital mobility might even negatively affect resource‐rich countries. Furthermore, we show that resource‐rich countries can exploit the gains when taxes on capital are available.     

Free trade agreements without delocation

Small nations fear that FTAs with larger, richer nations will erode their industrial bases. These concerns are recognized in FTA and multilateral talks: small nations may explicitly or implicitly maintain higher trade barriers. Using a model where symmetric liberalization de-industrializes small, poor nations, we characterize the path of protection-asymmetries that allow liberalization without delocation. In welfare terms, the large nation prefers this no-delocation liberalization scheme only when barriers are sufficiently high; the small nation's ranking is reversed. An anti-delocation scheme involving international income transfers is also evaluated and found infeasible.
Accords de libre-échange quand il y a délocalisation. Les petits pays craignent que les accords de libre-échange avec des pays plus grands et plus riches n'entament leur base industrielle. Ces malaises sont reconnus dans les négociations bilatérales et multilatérales: on permet aux petits pays de maintenir explicitement ou implicitement des barrières commerciales plus élevées. A l'aide d'un modéle où la libéralisation des échanges engendre une désindustrialisation des petits pays pauvres, les auteurs identifient les niveaux d'asymétrie dans le niveau de protection qui permettent d'engendrer une désindustrialisation sans délocalisation. En termes de niveau de bien-être, le grand pays préfère cet arrangement sans délocalisation seulement quand les barrières commerciales sont suffisamment élevées; la préférence des petits pays est à l'inverse. On évalue un arrangement sans délocalisation impliquant des transferts internationaux de revenus, et on montre qu'il est impraticable.     

Public education and redistribution when talents are mismatched

In democratic countries, elected policymakers determine public spending. The level of public spending depends on taxes that are decided by a voting mechanism. Policymakers also decide how to allocate funds among different policies, such as public education and pure redistributive transfers. How are the levels of funding for public education and redistribution determined in the political process? What impacts do votes on these two policies have on inequality, growth and social mobility? We develop a politico-economic model that highlights a novel mechanism: public education provides opportunities for the children of the poor to be recognized for their talent. This reduces the probability of a mismatch, which takes place when individuals with low talent who come from rich families find jobs that should go to people with high talent (and vice versa). Hence, the poor may prefer public spending on education to direct redistribution, while the rich prefer redistribution, as education implies more competition for good jobs from the poor.     

Domestic institutions,agglomerations and foreign direct investment in Europe

Recent developments in the economics of location emphasise the endogeniety of locational advantages during the process of European integration. We explore the relative importance of host country labour institutions and agglomerations using an industry-level panel data set on the location of investments by US multinational firms in Europe. The results indicate that centripetal and centrifugal forces are both important. New growth theories also suggest that international transfers of technology and knowledge through FDI may affect the performance of host economies. We consider the benefits from inward investment in four EU economies and present empirical evidence of significant spillovers from inward investment on technical progress. The potential for agglomerations to attract new investments which then influence the growth process has important implications for national policies, as it means that the size of nations is to be determined in the process of European integration, not just taken as given.     

Poverty Dynamics in Turkey

This paper examines poverty dynamics in Turkey using a nationally representative panel data covering the 2005–08 period. The aim is to understand mobility in and out of poverty and its correlates. We find that almost a quarter of the poor are persistently poor. The conditional and unconditional exit rates that we estimate are within the range of values reported for developed countries in the literature. That the income events—but not transfers—dominate both poverty entries and exits is indicative of the major role labor markets play in the lives of the poor. In particular, we argue that given the characteristics of the poor and modest levels of social assistance, the reason for mobility rates close to European averages must be sought in the informal economy.