The impact of government ownership on dividend policy in China

We investigate the impact of State ownership on Chinese corporate dividend policy. We find that Chinese firms' dividend payout rates respond fairly quickly to earnings changes, and the average actual payout ratio for Chinese firms falls between the payout ratios for emerging-market and developed firms. These results are consistent with the dividend policies of developing economies in general. We also find that dividend payouts among dividend-paying firms, and the likelihood that a firm will pay a dividend, are increasing in State ownership. Our findings are consistent with the State's need for cash flow as a partial motivation for continued State ownership of a significant portion of the corporate economy, and support the agency and tax clientele explanations for dividend policy.     

The impact of family-CEOs and their demographic characteristics on dividend payouts: Evidence from Latin America

We investigate the effect of family-CEOs and CEO demographic characteristics on firms’ dividend policy in Latin America. We show that family-CEO firms pay less amount of dividends and invest more in capital expenditures than nonfamily-CEO firms do. Direct family ownership (ownership concentration) negatively (positively) affects dividend payouts. Among the CEO demographic characteristics, CEO tenure has a consistent and significant negative effect on the dividend payout. Firms in a strong corporate governance environment pay more dividends and are less likely to appoint family members as CEOs, suggesting that strong corporate governance forces firms to pay more dividends and restrains firms from appointing CEOs based on family ties.     

Yes, dividends are disappearing: Worldwide evidence

This study examines the patterns in payout policies worldwide. Utilizing data from a sample of more than 17,000 companies from 33 different countries, we find evidence in support of a significant worldwide decline in the propensity to pay dividends. Most of the decline is due to the payout policies of smaller and less profitable firms with comparatively more investment opportunities. We find that larger firms, those with higher profitability, and firms with low growth opportunities have a greater propensity to pay dividends. The proportion of dividend payers varies substantially across industries as well. However, the proportion of firms paying dividends has declined over time, even after firms’ characteristics have been controlled for. Moreover, aggregate dividends are highly concentrated in that they are paid only by a small group of firms. Our findings indicate that there has been a significant decline in the average dividend payout ratios over the years. The decline in the mean dividend payout ratios as well as the proportion of payers is much more pronounced in civil law countries.     

Payout Policy with Legal Restrictions

We hypothesize that firms that face limitations on debt may use increased dividend payments to mitigate the free cash flow problem. Limitations on debt are implicit in state laws that restrict the firm from making payouts when the asset‐to‐liability ratio is low. We find that: 1) firms incorporated in states with stricter payout restrictions pay more dividends, 2) the probability of paying dividends or repurchasing shares decreases as firms approach a binding payout constraint, and 3) bonding with dividends is less prevalent with increased managerial equity holdings. In addition, antitakeover and director liability laws have a less consistent effect on payout policy.     

Taxes and dividend policy under alternative tax regimes

This paper examines changes in corporate dividend policy around the introduction of a dividend imputation tax system. This represented a significant change to the Australian tax framework and allows us to test the effect of differential taxation on corporate dividend policy. Consistent with the tax preference for the distribution of dividends, we find dividend initiations, all dividend payout measures and dividend reinvestment plans increased with the introduction of dividend imputation. Similarly we find that gross dividend payouts are more volatile under dividend imputation. Finally, we find that the increase in dividend payout and initiations differs across firms. In particular, we find that the higher the level of available franking tax credits the higher the firm's gross dividend payout and the more likely the firm is to initiate a dividend.     

Tax reform and payout policy: Do shareholder clienteles or payout policy adjust?

Changes in taxation of corporate dividends offer excellent opportunities to study dividend clientele effects. We explore payout policies and ownership structures around a major tax reform that took place in Finland in 2004. Consistent with dividend clienteles affecting firms' dividend policy decisions, we find that Finnish firms altered their dividend policies based on the changed tax incentives of their largest shareholders. While firms adjust their payout policies, our results also indicate that ownership structures of Finnish firms also changed around the 2004 reform, consistent with shareholder clienteles adjusting to the new tax system.     

Family control,institutional environment and cash dividend policy: Evidence from China

Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004–2008, this study empirically tests the impact of family control, institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. Our results indicate that (1) family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms; (2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies; and (3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem I (the owner–manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem II (the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder conflict), and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy. In contrast, a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem I and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends.     

Corporate payout policy in dual-class firms

We examine corporate payout policy in dual-class firms. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out less to shareholders because entrenched managers want to maximize the value of assets under control and the associated private benefits. The pre-commitment hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out more to shareholders because firms use corporate payouts as a pre-commitment device to mitigate agency costs. Our results support the pre-commitment hypothesis. Dual-class firms have higher cash dividend payments and total payouts, and they use more regular cash dividends rather than special dividends or repurchases, compared to their propensity-matched single-class firms. Dual-class firms with severe free cash flow-related agency problems and few growth opportunities rely even more on corporate payouts as a pre-commitment mechanism. We also rule out the alternative explanation that dual-class firms pay out more because super-voting shareholders lack the ability to generate home-made dividends by selling shares since super-voting shares are often non-tradable or very illiquid.     

Nonnegotiable shares, controlling shareholders, and dividend payments in China

China has some unique institutional features. For example, the shares of listed firms are segmented into negotiable and nonnegotiable ones. The controlling shareholders, usually connected to the government, hold nonnegotiable shares. We examine how these institutional features affected cash dividend payments in China during the period 1994-2006. We find that dividend payments are positively associated with the proportion of nonnegotiable shares in a firm and the proportion of nonnegotiable shares held by the controlling shareholder; moreover, the 2001 China Securities Regulatory Commission stipulation requiring cash dividend payments does not benefit negotiable shareholders. However, we also find that dividend payments are downside flexible, and controlling shareholders cannot force firms to pay or to pay more dividends when firms' earnings decline significantly. The conventional factors, especially profitability or the capability to pay, still play an important role in determining the dividend policy. The propensity to pay and the payout ratio in China are not high compared to those of other countries.     

Corporate governance,life cycle,and payout precommitment: An emerging market study

We analyze the role of firm‐level corporate governance in determining the precommitment payout policy of emerging market firms and investigate whether there is a precommitment life‐cycle effect. Unlike previous studies of U.S. firms, we find evidence of precommitment only among relatively well‐governed firms, which combine good governance with large dividend payouts to shareholders and large debt‐related repayments to creditors. We also document a strong precommitment life‐cycle effect. Firms in the growth and mature stages of their life cycle tend to use both debt and dividends to precommit to investors, with an increasing proportion of dividends in total payout measures. Our results are robust to an array of control variables, alternate payout proxies, market setting, and firm‐level corporate governance, and it addresses potential endogeneity concerns in the sample.     

Dividend payouts and catering to demands: Evidence from a dividend tax reform

Utilizing the 2012 dividend tax reform in China, this paper examines how firms make dividend payout decisions that cater to the controlling shareholders' demand, especially when controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders have different dividend preferences. We find that firms increase dividend payouts when controlling shareholders demand higher dividends after the dividend tax reform. In particular, firms pay higher dividends when facing increased demand from controlling shareholders than when the demand is from minority investors. In addition, we find that firms that increase dividend payments due to the controlling shareholders' demand subsequently have more debt financing and poorer firm performance, suggesting that catering to the demands from controlling shareholders is subject to the Type II agency problem.     

Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy

We examine the relation between institutional holdings and payout policy in U.S. public firms. We find that payout policy affects institutional holdings. Institutions avoid firms that do not pay dividends. However, among dividend‐paying firms they prefer firms that pay fewer dividends. Our evidence indicates that institutions prefer firms that repurchase shares, and regular repurchasers over nonregular repurchasers. Higher institutional holdings or a concentration of holdings do not cause firms to increase their dividends, their repurchases, or their total payout. Our results do not support models that predict that high dividends attract institutional clientele, or models that predict that institutions cause firms to increase payout.     

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence from New Zealand

Using a model based on Bhattacharyya (2007), we predict a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. We use tobit regression to analyse data for New Zealand firms' dividend payouts over the period 1997–2015 and find results consistent with Bhattacharyya (2007). These results hold when the definition of payout is modified to incorporate both common dividends and common share repurchases. Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy among New Zealand firms is perhaps best understood by considering the dividend payout ratio, rather than the level of, or changes in, cash dividends alone.     

What do firms do when dividend tax rates change? An examination of alternative payout responses

This paper investigates whether investor-level taxes affect corporate payout policy decisions. We predict and find a surge of special dividends in the final months of 2010 and 2012, immediately before individual-level dividend tax rates were expected to increase. We also find evidence that immediately before the expected tax increases, firms altered the timing of their regular dividend payments by shifting what would normally be January regular dividend payments into the preceding December. To our knowledge this is the first evidence in the literature about changes in the timing of regular dividend payments in response to tax law changes. For both actions (specials and shifting), we find that it was more likely for a firm to respond to individual-level tax rates if insiders owned a relatively large amount of the firm. Overall, our paper provides evidence that managers consider individual-level taxes in making corporate payout decisions.     

Corporate social responsibility and dividend policy

Using a sample of 22,839 US firm-year observations over the 1991–2012 period, we find that high CSR firms pay more dividends than low CSR firms. The analysis of individual components of CSR provides strong support for this main finding: five of the six individual dimensions are also associated with high dividend payout. When analyzing the stability of dividend payout, our results show that socially irresponsible firms adjust dividends more rapidly than socially responsible firms do: dividend payout is more stable in high CSR firms. These findings are robust to alternative assumptions and model specifications, alternative measures of dividend, additional control, and several approaches to address endogeneity. Overall, our results are consistent with the expectation that high CSR firms may use dividend policy to manage the agency problems related to overinvestment in CSR.     

Government Ownership and Dividend Policy: Evidence from Newly Privatised Firms

In this paper we examine the relationship between government ownership and dividend policy. Using a multinational sample of newly privatised firms from 43 countries, we find strong and robust evidence indicating that dividend payout is negatively related to government ownership, consistent with the predictions of agency theory. We also find that country‐level corporate governance affects the relationship between government ownership and dividend policy. Specifically, the adverse effects of government ownership on dividend policy are more pronounced in countries with weak law and order and a lower level of checks and balances. Our results are important, as they show that government ownership, as well as the institutional environment, does in fact affect the critical corporate policies, such as dividend policy, of newly privatised firms.     

Financial reporting quality and dividend policy: New evidence from an international level

This study examines the link between financial reporting quality and dividend payout across 76 countries. We find that financial reporting quality increases dividend payout after controlling for firm and country specifics. We also investigate different channels that moderate the relation between financial reporting quality and dividend payout. We find that the positive association between high-quality financial reporting and dividend payout is more pronounced when firms have free cash flow problems, face severe information asymmetry, and are located in countries with weaker minority shareholder protection rights. Interestingly, we find evidence that high reporting quality enhances firms' payment of dividend even when these firms already overpaying their shareholders. However, the relation becomes weaker when firms overpass the optimal level of dividend payout. The findings remain consistent after several robustness checks, thus highlighting the effectiveness of more transparent disclosure of financial information in reducing information asymmetry related to firms' internal agency costs and their relationships with external parties.     

Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout Policy: A Test Using Antitakeover Legislation

Managers strongly prefer not to pay dividends as dividend payouts reduce the amount of cash subject to managerial discretion ( Easterbrook, 1984 ; Jensen, 1986 ). Previous empirical tests of the relationship between corporate governance and dividend payout policy employ endogenous measures of this agency problem. Using a relatively exogenous measure that incorporates state antitakeover laws and the differences‐in‐differences approach, our analysis indicates that dividend payout ratios and propensities fall when managers are insulated from takeovers. The impact of antitakeover laws on dividend payouts is more pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance and small firms.     

Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy: A Factorial Analysis

This paper re-examines the dividend policy issue by conducting a simultaneous test of the alternative explanations of corporate payout policy using a two-step procedure that involves factor analysis and multiple regression. Several new proxies for theoretical attributes that have appeared in the literature are introduced, including the role of managerial dimensions in determining dividend policy. Strong support is found for the transaction cost/residual theory of dividends. pecking order argument, and the role of dividends in mitigating agency problems. Strong support is also found for the role of managerial consideration in affecting the firm's payout policy; specifically, firms that maintain stable dividend policies and firms that enjoy financial flexibility pay higher dividends. The results appear to support the tax clientele argument.     

An International Analysis of Dividend Payment Behavior

Abstract:  This study investigates patterns in dividend payment across nine common law and sixteen civil law countries over 1994-2007. We begin by examining whether the recent decline in the number of dividend payers is solely a US phenomenon or part of a more global trend. We find that at the beginning of our sample period, 72% of our sample firms pay dividends, but by 2007, this percentage decreases to 55%, with the decline more acute in common law countries. Our analysis further shows that the growing incidence of non-dividend paying firms can be explained by an increase in the percentage of firms that have never paid dividends. We find that common law firms are less likely to initiate new dividend programs than those in civil law nations, although they tend to have more abundant growth opportunities. We further establish that this global decline in the propensity to pay dividends is more pronounced in firms incorporated in common law jurisdictions. Finally, we find that both the percentage increase in aggregate dividends and the dividend payout ratio is higher in civil law countries.