To be or not to be all-equity for firms that eliminate long-term debt

Despite the advantages of debt, a significant number of firms that have an established leverage policy deliberately become all-equity. These firms eliminate a substantial amount of long-term debt as the average firm’s leverage ratio is approximately 30 percent at the year-end prior to debt elimination. Firm-level “shocks” such as CEO turnover and changes in credit ratings cannot explain the dramatic recapitalization decision. Consistent with the tradeoff theory, firms that eliminate debt have lower benefits (less tax shield benefits, agency costs) and higher costs (probability of financial distress, access to capital markets, etc.) of leverage in the three prior years compared to a matched sample. We also find that the factors influencing the decision to eliminate all debt is different from those to significantly reduce leverage or to have very low debt levels. Firms primarily finance the approximately $70 million of average long-term debt eliminated using proceeds from sales of relatively unproductive assets and from equity issues. Interestingly, over half of these firms issue significant amount of new debt within three years of becoming all-equity. Firms with lower liquidity and non-debt tax shields, higher potential overinvestment agency costs, and those that issue equity at the debt elimination year are more likely to relever quickly.     

Voluntary sovereign debt exchanges

We show that some recent sovereign debt restructurings were characterized by (i) the absence of missed debt payments prior to the restructurings, (ii) reductions in the government's debt burden, and (iii) increases in the market value of debt claims for holders of the restructured debt. Since both the government and its creditors are likely to benefit from such restructurings, we label these episodes as “voluntary” debt exchanges. We present a model in which voluntary debt exchanges can occur in equilibrium when the debt level takes values above the one that maximizes the market value of debt claims. In contrast to previous studies on debt overhang, in our model opportunities for voluntary exchanges arise because a debt reduction implies a decline of the sovereign default risk. This is observed in the absence of any effect of debt reductions on future output levels. Although voluntary exchanges are Pareto improving at the time of the restructuring, we show that eliminating the possibility of conducting voluntary exchanges may improve welfare from an ex ante perspective. Thus, our results highlight a cost of initiatives that facilitate debt restructurings.     

From Financial Repression to External Distress: The Case of Venezuela

Recent work suggests a connection between domestic debt and external default. We examine potential linkages for Venezuela, where the evidence reveals a nexus among domestic debt, financial repression, and external vulnerability. The financial repression tax (as a share of GDP) is similar to OECD economies, in spite of higher debt ratios in the latter. The financial repression “tax rate” is higher in years of exchange controls and legislated interest rate ceilings. We document a link between domestic disequilibrium and a weakening of the net foreign asset position via private capital flight. We suggest these findings are not unique to Venezuela.     

行业特征、金融加速与企业债务融资

在政策择优供给、产业转型升级的关键阶段,考察特定行业的企业债务融资及其宏观、微观层面的影响因素,对于资金、资源的行业优化配置意义重大。本文以我国2003~2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本,检验企业受到货币政策冲击时行业特征对其银行债务获取的影响。研究发现,对于行业劳动力越密集、行业竞争越激烈的企业,货币政策紧缩对于债务融资的不利影响会被显著削弱。进一步研究发现,行业劳动要素在货币政策紧缩时引起的企业债务融资效应随着行业资本密集度的下降而增强;对于产出是耐用品的行业,货币政策的企业债务融资效应与产品市场竞争较弱的行业一致。本文是对货币政策传导机制下金融加速分析的拓展,补充了货币政策行业债务融资效应的经验证据。     

Treasury Safety,Liquidity, and Money Premium Dynamics: Evidence from Debt Limit Impasses

Treasury securities enjoy a “money premium” because they are ultra-safe and liquid. However, during debt limit impasses, the safety and liquidity of Treasury securities temporarily deteriorate, eroding the money premium. Using past impasses, we find the money premium eroded by roughly six basis points across all Treasury securities and up to 50 basis points for the shortest maturities at the greatest risk of a delayed principal payment. Safety and liquidity each accounted for about half of the erosion. The deterioration of safety and liquidity also appears to interact, consistent with theories of default-driven liquidity risk and the information sensitivity of debt.     

Analysis of the seeds of the debt crisis in Europe

This paper presents an analysis of the seeds of the recent debt crisis that occurred in the Eurozone area using a variant of Fleming and Stein [2004. “Stochastic Optimal Control, International Finance and Debt.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 28: 979–996] model. This model has two risk drivers arising from uncertainties in the return on capital and the effective rate of return on net foreign assets. Given the risk drivers, we model the net worth value process of an economy under a stochastic setting and show that opening to the rest of the world by pursuing the growth maximizing leverage strategy is better than remaining closed, as that strategy enhances the growth of the net worth process. Second, we provide an extra condition to show when the excessive leverage poses a threat to the sustainable growth of an economy. In this way, we improve the model introduced by Fleming and Stein as a signal of possible debt crises. Finally, we conduct an econometric analysis for the group of countries considered under this study, and show that there is a long-run relationship between the capital stock and the total external debt justifying the use of the structural model we employ.     

Ireland’s 2010 EU/IMF intervention: Costs and benefits

This paper examines the costs and benefits of the EU/IMF rescue package for Ireland, on November 29, 2010. We analyze the costs of the intervention and the subsequent increase in value of debt and/or equity issued by Irish banks, the Irish government, and European banks with substantial holdings of Irish debt. The total initial value increase around the announcement amounts to €5.59bln at a realized taxpayers’ cost of €4.23bln. While the value increase depends on somewhat generous assumptions, it further increases by €2.8bln up to Ireland’s exit in December 2013. About €3.1bln of the value created indirectly supports the European banking sector, indicating that substantial benefits arise from systemic risk containment.     

Optimal Capital Structure,Endogenous Bankruptcy,and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads

This article examines the optimal capital structure of a firm that can choose both the amount and maturity of its debt. Bankruptcy is determined endogenously rather than by the imposition of a positive net worth condition or by a cash flow constraint. The results extend Leland's (1994a) closed-form results to a much richer class of possible debt structures and permit study of the optimal maturity of debt as well as the optimal amount of debt. The model predicts leverage, credit spreads, default rates, and writedowns, which accord quite closely with historical averages. While short term debt does not exploit tax benefits as completely as long term debt, it is more likely to provide incentive compatibility between debt holders and equity holders. Short term debt reduces or eliminates “asset substitution” agency costs. The tax advantage of debt must be balanced against bankruptcy and agency costs in determining the optimal maturity of the capital structure. The model predicts differently shaped term structures of credit spreads for different levels of risk. These term structures are similar to those found empirically by Sarig and Warga (1989). Our results have important implications for bond portfolio management. In general, Macaulay duration dramatically overstates true duration of risky debt, which may be negative for “junk” bonds. Furthermore, the “convexity” of bond prices can become “concavity.”     

The Performance of Long-run Stock Returns Following Issues of Public and Private Debt

This study uses a balance sheet-based method to identify both public and private debt issues. This feature is important because there have been no studies of the information content of private debt issues, while private debt is substantially more prevalent than public debt. We find no abnormal returns following straight debt issues. However, convertible debt issuers under-perform the market on the order of 50 to 70 percent in the following five years. In pursuit of explanations, we find that convertible debt issues signal a deterioration of future profitability, which accounts for at least part of the stock price underperformance.     

The impact of corporate fraud on director‐interlocked firms: Evidence from bank loans

We examine the impact of corporate fraud committed by one firm (the “fraudulent firm”) on other firms with interlocking directors (the “interlocked firms”), focusing on the debtholder side. We argue that the revelation of a fraudulent firm's fraud can damage the reputation of the interlocked firms because corporate governance can propagate via director interlocks. Empirically, we find that the interlocked firms' cost of debt is higher and the loan covenants become stricter after the fraud cases of the fraudulent firms are revealed. Consistent with the corporate governance propagation explanation, our results are weaker (stronger) for interlocked firms that have better (worse) pre‐event corporate governance standards. Our findings suggest that corporate fraud of fraudulent firms can affect other firms through director‐interlocks beyond shareholder value.     

债务置换改善了地方政府债务可持续性吗？

2015年后实施的债务置换对地方政府债务可持续性的影响值得关注。为此,将债务置换作为准自然实验,以2008—2020年285个城市为样本,检验债务置换对债务可持续性的影响。结果发现：债务置换对隐性债务和经济增长产生了双重不利影响。其一,债务置换降低债务利息负担,拉长债务期限,虽然缓解了流动性风险,但债务置换助长地方政府道德风险,强化金融机构救助预期,导致隐性债务继续增加,总体上不利于债务可持续性。其二,债务置换产生明显挤出效应,也降低了地方政府债务支出效率,损害了经济增长,同样不利于债务可持续性。鉴于此,应重点防范债务置换过程中产生的负面作用,以提高地方政府债务治理的有效性。     

Executive risk-taking and the agency cost of debt

Firms compensate managers to maximize shareholder value, yet these same incentives affect bondholder risk. We investigate the relation between executive equity pay and the cost of debt. Our findings indicate a “u-shaped” relation between bond yields and equity pay. These results are consistent with the notion that bondholders prefer a moderate amount of executive equity pay and above or below that level, bondholders increase yields to protect their interests. These findings suggest that moderate levels of equity pay mitigate the agency costs between firm shareholders and bondholders.     

Poison Put Bonds: An Analysis of Their Economic Role

This article examines the effect of issuing debt with and without “poison put” covenants on outstanding debt and equity claims for the period 1988 to 1989. The analysis shows that “poison put” covenants affect stockholders negatively and outstanding bondholders positively, while debt issued without such covenants has no effect. The study also finds a negative relationship between stock and bond returns for firms issuing poison put debt. These results are consistent with a “mutual interest hypothesis,” which suggests that the issuance of poison put debt protects managers and, coincidentally, bondholders, at the expense of stockholders.     

CEO inside debt and corporate debt maturity structure

This paper examines the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and corporate debt maturity. We provide robust evidence that inside debt has a positive effect on short-maturity debt and that this effect is concentrated in financially unconstrained firms that face lower refinancing risk. Our analysis further shows that CEO inside debt helps reduce the cost of debt financing. Overall, our results indicate that managerial holdings of inside debt facilitate access to external debt financing and reduce refinancing risk, thus incentivizing managers to use less costly shorter term debt.     

The Determinants of Debt Maturity at Issuance: A System-Based Model

We examine the determinants of corporate debt maturity while taking into account the interdependent relation between maturity and leverage. We do this by estimating a simultaneous-equations model on debt maturity and leverage for a sample of bond-issuing firms. To compare with previous studies, we also estimate a single-equation model on debt maturity using OLS. We define debt maturity as either the maturity of bonds at issuance (incremental approach), or the percentage of a firm's total debt that matures in more than three years (balance-sheet approach). Corroborating the findings of many previous studies, our single-equation OLS results support the underinvestment hypothesis purporting that firms with greater growth opportunities have shorter-term debt. However, under the simultaneous-equations model, the negative relation between a firm's debt maturity and its growth opportunities ceases to hold. Instead, it is the leverage decision that is influenced by growth opportunities. This suggests that existing models may overestimate the effect of growth opportunities on debt maturity.     

Enhanced Debt Management: Solving the eurozone crisis by linking debt management with fiscal and monetary policy

Unconventional approaches to suit unusual circumstances have become acceptable in monetary policy, a formerly highly conservative discipline. In this paper it is argued that unconventional approaches should also be considered in sovereign debt management, in order to contribute to resolving the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. First, the Troika crisis lending to indebted sovereign borrowers in the eurozone is reviewed and compared with standard IMF post-crisis lending. The main difference and shortcoming is the unsustainable character of the eurozone approach, due to the omission of demand stimulation components. To address this and other shortcomings, the features of an ideal alternative funding tool are identified. It would solve the funding problems of affected sovereigns, help stabilise the banking system, but most of all stimulate domestic demand and hence end the vicious downward spiral. It is found that this funding method can be implemented as part of enhanced public debt management by each nation's debt management office.     

Optimality of project financing: Theory and empirical implications in finance and accounting

During the 1980s a fairly active market developed in the private placement of limited recourse project financing. Although this form of financing is gaining in importance, we know very little about it. This article presents a theoretical analysis of project financing. In the model of the firm presented, outstanding risky debt gives rise to agency costs of underinvestment that are offset by the benefit of debt-related tax shields. The tradeoff specifies the optimal leverage for a firm. Within this framework, we consider the optimality of financing a new project with a nonrecourse project financing arrangement. We derive implications for 1) the characteristics of a new venture that will be project financed, 2) the wealth gains from project financing over that of financing with straight debt, and 3) the optimal allocation of debt across the different assets (the sponsor firm vs. the new venture). It is shown that a project financing arrangement, where the debt is optimally allocated to the sponsor firm and the new venture, increases value by reducing agency costs and increasing the value of tax shields (compared to the case of straight debt financing). The optimal allocation of debt in project financing involves assigning to the sponsor firm and the new venture debt levels equal to their individual optimal capital structures. Several testable empirical implications in finance and accounting are developed.     

Debt/Equity Ratio and Expected Common Stock Returns: Empirical Evidence

The expected common stock returns are positively related to the ratio of debt (noncommon equity liabilities) to equity, controlling for the beta and firm size and including as well as excluding January, though the relation is much larger in January. This relationship is not sensitive to variations in the market proxy, estimation technique, etc. The evidence suggests that the “premium” associated with the debt/equity ratio is not likely to be just some kind of “risk premium”.     

Identifying the effects of an exchange rate depreciation on country risk: Evidence from a natural experiment

A natural experiment is used to study exchange rate depreciation and perceived sovereign risk. France suspended coinage of silver in 1876 provoking a significant exogenous depreciation of all silver standard countries versus gold standard currencies like the British pound – the currency in which their debt was payable. The evidence suggests an exchange rate depreciation can significantly increase sovereign risk if a country is exposed to foreign currency debt. We implement a difference-in-differences estimator and find that the average silver country's spread on hard currency debt increased over ten percent relative to non-silver countries.     

Canadian Business Trusts: A New Organizational Structure

The focus of this paper is a subset of income trusts called business trusts, a Canadian financial innovation that has experienced remarkable success in the Canadian market, but not in the U.S. At theendof2005, there were more than 170 business trusts (most of them in Canada, but a handful in the U.S.) with an aggregate market value of over $90 billion. Like income trusts generally, which include REITs and oil & gas trusts, business trusts are designed in large part to avoid taxation at the corporate level by distributing a substantial proportion of a business's operating cash flow. The business trust structure provides investors (called “unit holders”) with what amounts to a combination of subordinated, high‐yield debt and high‐yielding equity. But unlike the subordinated debt in most highly leveraged transactions (HLTs), the “internal” debt in a business trust unit is effectively “stapled” to the equity part of the security. And this kind of “strip financing” (which was a common practice in U.S. LBOs during the‘80s) means that, besides providing stable cash‐generating companies with a tax‐minimizing way of paying out excess cash, the business unit structure also limits the “financial distress costs” associated with HLTs. In the event of financial trouble, the unit holders are likely to be much more cooperative than ordinary subordinated debt holders in restructuring interest payments since the benefits of so doing accrue to the equity portion of their units. The original income trust structure has also been used by a number of U.S.‐based companies that listed their shares on the TSX. But, in the attempt to make the securities suitable for listing on the AM EX, and in response to auditor demands intended to address potential IRS concerns, the instruments were modified in ways that sacrificed one of the important benefits of the original structure. The changes were designed to make the subordinated debt issued as part of a package with equity look more like external, third‐party debt. And in so doing, the low‐cost restructuring feature built into the Canadian version was lost, and the U.S. trusts failed to gain acceptance.