河北省农村社会养老保险的现状及策略探析

农村社会养老保险是国家的基本保险,是政府的一项重要政策,是我国农村社会保障体系的重要组成部分。建立和推行农村社会养老保险制度是解决我国农民人口老龄化趋势带来的后顾之忧,降低农村老龄人口晚年生活风险,增强社会保障功能,实现社会养老和家庭养老相结合,推进我国经济体制改革,加快农村社会经济发展的有效途径。文章以河北省农村社会养老保险的现状为例,探讨完善农村社会养老保险的策略。     

关于农村社会养老保险法律问题再思考

中共十七大强调国家应当积极探索建立农村养老保险制度和改善民生.传统的家庭养老模式受到了严峻的挑战,农村社会养老保险应当成为农民养老的重要方式.我国农村社会养老保险法律制度不健全,直接影响许多农民的养老权益.本文以云南为例,分析了政府主导建立农村社会养老保险制度的法理依据和现状,提出服务型政府保障农民"老有所养"的若干立法建议.     

农村社会养老保险制度:构建农村和谐社会的重要保障

建立和完善农村社会养老保险制度是构建和谐社会的重要保障,农村社会养老保险本身就是和谐社会的要素之一,而家庭养老功能的不断弱化也在要求尽快建立农村社会养老保险制度。提出了加快建立农村养老保险制度的对策。     

农村社会养老保险对象与模式的双梯模型分析

近年来,随着农村剩余劳动力向非农领域转移的规模与速度不断增加以及农村人口老龄化趋势的加快,使得农村传统的以家庭保障为主体的养老模式不能为继,农村社会养老愈显迫切。2009年,国家开始进行新型农村社会养老保险试点,但这种模式从保障水平上来说相对于城镇养老保险制度仍有较大差距。本文从农村社会养老保险的现状出发,结合农村养老保险对象的人群特点,将农村养老保险对象分为三个人群,并以此为基础设计出农村养老保险的双梯模型。     

农村社会养老保险体系建立分析

现阶段，我国农村人口呈现老龄化趋势。农业经营风险增加、家庭的小型化、农村人口城市化进程加快，使农村传统的依赖土地和家庭养老保障功能大幅弱化。本文在对我国农村现实社会经济条件进行剖析的基础上，深入探讨我国当前建立农村社会养老保险制度的可行性，为进一步的制度设计提供必要的支持。     

农村养老保险国际经验及中国选择

农村养老保险制度的建立是健全养老保障体制进程中的重要一环,从发展趋势来看,各国都是先在城市建立社会养老保险制度,然后才逐步延伸到农村地区;经济发展水平和人口结构是影响农村社会养老保险发展的重要因素。并提出在中国建立城乡统一的社会养老保险制度体系的政策建议。     

山东省欠发达地区农村养老保险模式研究

农村计划生育的实施和农村居民寿命的延长,在使家庭养老功能削弱的同时,也造成了农村养老问题的严重化。山东省西部经济欠发达地区农民收入低、收入不稳定,是制约当前新型农村养老保险难以实施的主导性因素;要解决该地区农村养老保险问题,只有从当前该地区的现实情况出发,建立政策性的机构(例如农村养老保险公司)并设计出适合该地区农民的险种,才能最终解决该地区农村养老保险的问题。     

云南农村社会养老保险制度建设初探

以家庭联产承包责任制为核心的农村改革推行以来，农村养老保险的经济社会基础发生了深刻变化，一方面是以集体经济为基础的集体养老功能严重退化，甚至完全丧失，另一方面是以完全的家庭养老保障为模式的农村养老保险面临着诸多难以解决的现实问题。在人口老龄化日趋严重的今天，如何解决农村的养老保险问题事关农村社会经济的稳定和农村的可持续发展。云南省的农村老龄化问题并非比全国其他省区严重，但作为相对落后的地区，及时探讨农村的养老保险问题，提前做好各方面的准备则显得十分重要。本文认为，在诸如云南这样的边远省区，尤其是分散落后的农村，制定和实施有关农村社会养老保险的计划并纳入制度建设的轨道，是现在和将来解决农村养老保障问题的战略选择。     

农民对农村社会养老保险的心理预期及其影响因素——对武汉市J区农民的调查分析

以问卷调查所得的462份调查资料为基础,对农民社会养老保险的心理预期及其影响因素进行了实证分析。农民对农村社会养老保险的心理预期相对比较低,年龄等个人特征和家庭子女数、家庭年净收入等家庭特征对农民社会养老保险的心理预期影响显著。提出了增加政府对农村社会养老保险的投入、在完善农村社会养老保险制度的同时有步骤地构建多支柱的农村养老体系、将当前正在实施的"农村部分计划生育家庭奖励扶助养老制度"逐步过渡到"普惠型"的农村养老保障制度等对策。     

我国农村社会养老保险制度分析

一、我国农村社会养老保险中存在的问题我国目前拥有世界上数量最多的老年人口,其中75%在农村。据统计,未纳入社会保障的农村人口还很多。就目前我国农村普遍存在的养老保险模式而言,无论是家庭养老、社区养老、商业养老还是政府养老,都不能单独、有效的解决农村养老问题。首先     

On a generalization of a class of production functions

In Appl. Econ. Lett. 18 (2011), 1777–1784, as a natural generalization of some famous production models with two inputs, C.A. Ioan and G. Ioan introduced a new class of production functions with constant return to scale, called sum production function, and proved three theorems of characterization for such production models. In this article, we give new and more simple proofs of these theorems, extending also the results to the case of increased/decreased return to scale. The generalization to the case of an arbitrary number of inputs is also discussed.     

Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game

Refining an algorithm due to Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel, we show how to apply Lemke’s algorithm for solving linear complementarity programs to compute a quasi-perfect equilibrium in behavior strategies of a given two-player extensive-form game of perfect recall. A quasi-perfect equilibrium is known to be sequential, and our algorithm thus resolves a conjecture of McKelvey and McLennan in the positive. A quasi-perfect equilibrium is also known to be normal-form perfect and our algorithm thus provides an alternative to an algorithm by von Stengel, van den Elzen and Talman. For the case of a zero-sum game, we devise variants of the algorithm that rely on linear programming rather than linear complementarity programming and use the simplex algorithm or other algorithms for linear programming rather than Lemke’s algorithm. We argue that these latter algorithms are relevant for recent applications of equilibrium computation to artificial intelligence.     

Optimal size of a residential area within a municipality

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal size of a residential area within a municipality under different market structures. We find that under a private duopoly the optimal size of the residential area depends on the ratio between transportation costs and a negative externality due to congestion. The optimal size is the whole municipality when the ratio is low enough and a small area of the municipality when the ratio is high enough. The transition from a flat residential area to a more compact one is not continuous, so some large-enough residential areas are never optimal. Under a mixed duopoly the transition from a flat residential area to a more compact one is continuous as the ratio increases. By comparing the two cases we find that for intermediate values of this ratio a flat city is optimal for a private duopoly while compact cities emerge under a mixed duopoly.     

Existence of a continuum of equilibria in a monetary random-matching model

In this paper, we study a monetary random-matching model where both goods and money are perfectly divisible, production is costly, and there is no exogenous upper bound on agents' money holdings, information on which is private to the agent. We show that there is a continuum of stationary equilibria where agents have either no money or a set amount, and buyers spend all their money. As in the previous studies, the equilibrium value function is step-like, which emerges as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The endogenous upper bound on agents' money holdings is the result of private information on agents' money holdings. Buyers post an offer that is accepted only by sellers without money, who set a higher value on money.     

Commercialization of a demand-enhancing innovation: The release of a new apple variety by a public university

The upsurge of patented fruit varieties developed by university plant-breeding programs motivated this re-examination of optimal commercialization strategies when an innovator cares about profits for both itself and the licensees. Our theoretical findings suggest that the optimal licensing arrangement that maximizes weighted joint profits depends on the innovation level size, number of firms, and the weights assigned to the innovator and licensee profits. We designed an experiment to test the case with a small number of firms and found that the joint profits are the greatest under an exclusive per-unit royalty scheme. However, when the number of firms is large, as may be the case for a varietal introduction into the U.S. apple industry, our model suggests that the joint profits will be the largest under a nonexclusive contract, either with a two-part tariff, if the innovation level is high, or a per-unit royalty if the innovation level is low.     

Robustness of a fixed-rent contract in a standard agency model

Summary. It is well known that there are infinitely many incentive contracts that achieve the full information outcome in the standard agency model when the agent is risk-neutral. However, since Harris and Raviv (1979), the fixed-rent contract has been the focal point among those infinitely many first-best contracts. This paper examines whether the fixed-rent contract is robust or not in various circumstances.Received: 6 June 2002, Revised: 9 June 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: J41, D82.Correspondence to: Susheng WangThe first authors work was supported by the Brain Korea 21 Project in 2003, and the grant for the Reform of university Education under the Brain Korea 21 Project of S.N.U. in 2001.     

更宽的视角下研判加工贸易

加工贸易在促进贸易增长和创汇方面,发挥了不可替代的作用,但是实证分析发现加工贸易就业弹性不断减弱。我国各省市、各行业加工贸易所占比重以及增值率指标存在着很大的差别。影响加工贸易规模的因素分析表明,外商直接投资额、产业结构等变量与加工贸易规模呈现正相关关系。     

Some unfamiliar dynamics of a familiar macro model a note

The idea that for small disturbances the full employment equilibrium is stable while for large disturbances it is unstable was coined by Leijonhufvud in the notion of a corridor. We discuss the existence of a corridor in the standard Keynesian-monetarist textbook macro-model. It turns out that though the full employment steady state of this model may be locally stable — which is the case when the well-known Cagan condition holds — the model is never globally stable. This is due to the inherent non-linearity in the demand for money function, arising from non-negativity of the nominal rate of interest. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, the Cagan condition is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a corridor in the Keynesian-monetarist model.This note is adapted from a paper presented at the European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Bologna, August 1988. I would like to thank Søren Bo Nielsen and Peter Birch Sørensen (Copenhagen Business School), Thomas Lux (University of Bamberg), and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Remaining errors and shortcomings are mine.     

A Model of a Price-setting Duopoly with a Wage-rise Contract

This paper considers a wage-rise contract between a firm and its employees as the firm's strategy, and suggests a wage-rise-contract policy. The policy is a promise by the firm that it will announce a certain output level and a wage premium rate, and if it actually produces more than the announced output level, then it will pay each employee a wage premium uniformly. First, this paper examines the case in which one of two firms unilaterally offers the wage-rise-contract policy by using a two-stage price-setting duopoly model. It is then shown that there exists an equilibrium which coincides with the Stackelberg solution where the firm adopting the policy is the leader. Next, this paper examines the case in which both firms can offer the wage-rise-contract policy in the model. It is then shown that there exists an equilibrium which is more profitable for both firms than in the unilateral case.