企业财务风险管理新视角

本文从内部审计着手，研析了其发展的最新趋势——企业风险管理框架（ERM）的创立，并对其定义及深层内容进行了细致剖析。同时倚在我国的视角下，分析了当前我国企业风险管理的现状，尝试着提出企业建立风险管理框架的必要性和思路。     

对现代企业风险管理的探讨

2004年,COSO正式发布了企业风险管理框架(ERM),这是继1992年其发布内部控制整合框架后的又一突破.在目睹了众多触目惊心的公司丑闻和破产之后,企业风险管理的重要性和必要性正日益明显地呈现在世人面前.文章首先简单概述企业风险管理的发展概况;其次对COSO及其由内部控制整合框架到企业风险管理框架的发展尤其对后者进行了介绍,并分析了新框架的突破和进步,由此引出该框架对我国企业风险管理发展的启示;最后介绍了在企业风险管理过程中可能用到的一些应用技术,以期完善对该框架的介绍.     

企业项目投资风险研究

风险管理在企业项目投资管理中扮演着非常重要的角色,是企业项目投资管理的一个不可分割的部分,风险管理将整体风险概念原则以及全过程管理原则作为指导,其应用己经超出了集中在建设阶段的传统范围,企业项目投资获得成功的关键就是在其框架内进行的,分析项目投资管理、风险管理以及信息管理的关系,构建项目投资管理框架内的有效风险管理模型.     

ERM框架评析及其对我国民间审计的启示

COSO委员会于2004年发布的《企业风险管理——整合框架》（ERM框架）对企业的风险控制和风险管理产生了深远影响，学术界也有不少文章介绍了这一框架。并分析和探讨了该框架对我国企业内部控制和风险管理所带来的影响和启示。但是这些探讨极少涉及到ERM框架对我国民间审计的影响和启示，因此，文章对这一问题进行了分析。文章首先介绍了ERM框架的目的和概要．在此基础上对其进行评价。最后提出ERM框架对我国民间审计的几点启示。     

COSO报告及对我国企业内部控制的启示

美国COSO委员会出台的《企业风险管理——整体框架》被视为当前最先进的内部控制理论。本文对《企业风险管理——整体框架》及其前身《内部控制——整体框架》的核心内容进行了分析,从最新的风险管理框架出发,提出了对完善我国企业内部控制的几点启示,作为企业内部控制建设的参考。     

ERM-IF、现代风险导向审计对CPA审计风险管理的影响

随着社会各界对审计产品质量的依赖程度越来越高,注册会计师面临的审计风险已大大超越了最初的水平.如何识别、评估、规避审计风险,有效管理审计风险,成为注册会计师行业亟待研究的问题.2004年,美国COSO委员会发布了《企业风险管理整合框架》,提供了风险管理的一种范式.对注册会计师审计风险的管理具有积极的意义,文章就整体风险管理综合框架与现代风险导向审计模式的融合、注册会计师如何运用整体风险管理综合框架进行审计风险管理进行了深入的阐述.     

我国国有企业内部控制风险研究——美国《企业风险管理框架》的借鉴

美国《企业风险管理框架》的出台，对内部控制又提出了新的界定。本文在《企业风险管理框架》的基础上．针对我国国有企业内部控制的存在的问题进行分析，并给出相应的对策。     

内部控制新发展——ERM概念框架

鉴于内部控制在面对因企业内外部原因产生的风险而力不从心,COSO发布了《企业风险管理(ERM)——综合框架》。本文结合英国风险管理协会发布的风险管理准则,对ERM的概念、要素等进行了介绍和分析。     

在企业风险管理中构建管理控制嵌入式模块

一、企业风险管理内涵及要素(一)企业风险管理的内涵企业风险管理,是以企业为主体的风险管理。根据COSO2004年9月正式发布的《企业风险管理——整合框架》,企业风险管理定义如下:企业风险管理是一个过程,它由一个主体的董事会、管理当局和其他人员实施,应用于战略制订并     

浅议内部控制审计风险及其防范

内部控制的发展经历了内部牵制阶段、内部控制阶段、会计控制与管理控制阶段、结构阶段、整体框架阶段到现在的风险管理阶段。作为标准制定者的COSO委员会,从起初的八要素分析,发展到现在控制环境、风险评估、控制活动、信息与沟通以及监察的五要素框架,它在内控发展的进程中发挥了关键作用。我国财政部颁发的《内部控制基本规范》整合了八要素分析的内容,提出了内部环境、风险评估、控制活动、信息与沟通以及内部监督的五要素框架,它兼具了COSO报告八要素内容的实质和五要素框架的形式。与内部控制不断完善发展的同时,内部控制审计也经历了一次大的洗礼,文章就是建立在这个大的框架背景之上,着力解决内部控制审计过程中内控审计风险的识别与防范。     

竞赛机制设计研究回顾与展望

竞赛是社会、政治和经济中的典型现象,在激励和资源配置方面发挥了非常重要的作用,竞赛机 制设计已成为竞赛研究的理论热点问题。本文介绍了竞赛理论基础知识,主要从竞赛奖励、竞赛结构及 竞赛成功函数三个方面,综述了有关竞赛机制设计研究。在回顾以往研究的基础上,探讨了竞赛机制设 计研究未来的可能发展方向。     

The Earnings Quality Information Content of Dividend Policies and Audit Pricing

Recent studies indicate dividends are associated with higher‐quality earnings. Our study extends the literature by examining whether dividends' information is associated with auditors' assessment of their clients' earnings quality. Our results show that auditors charge lower fees to dividend‐paying clients than to nondividend‐paying clients and the average fee discount ranges from 6.0 to 10.6 percent. More importantly, we find dividends have an interactive effect with respect to earnings persistence and earnings manipulation: the negative association between audit fees and earnings persistence is more pronounced for dividend firms; and dividend payouts mitigate the positive relation between earnings manipulation risk and audit fees. Our results imply dividends reduce audit risk by enhancing clients' earnings quality information. We contribute to the literature by showing that auditors reflect the earnings quality information content of firms' dividend policies in their pricing decisions.     

“Low-Balling” and Efficiency in a Two-Period Specialization Model of Auditing Competition*

This paper develops a simple, two-period specialization model to analyze the effect of start-up costs on auditing competition. Audit firms in the model make strategic specialization and pricing decisions. Through specialization, an audit firm achieves a comparative cost advantage over its competitors for all clients whose characteristics are closer to its area of specialization. This comparative cost advantage is further fortified by the presence of start-up costs. As a result, each audit firm obtains some market power and is able to price-discriminate across clients by offering “specialization-and-relationship-specific” audit fee schedules. This paper demonstrates that the practice of “low-balling” is a natural consequence of competition among audit firms. However, low-balling occurs only in a certain market segment where audit firms compete fiercely. This paper also shows that a policy of banning low-balling acts as a substitute for the commitment of the audit firms to partially collude their pricing policies and results in increased profits for audit firms and increased fees. However, it also results in audit firms choosing specializations in a more efficient way, thereby reducing total auditing costs.     

The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management*

This study examines the relation between audit quality and earnings management. Consistent with prior research, we treat audit quality as a dichotomous variable and assume that Big Six auditors are of higher quality than non-Big Six auditors. Earnings management is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones 1991 model. Prior literature suggests that auditors are more likely to object to management's accounting choices that increase earnings (as opposed to decrease earnings) and that auditors are more likely to be sued when they are associated with financial statements that overstate earnings (as compared to understate earnings). Therefore, we hypothesize that clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that increase income relatively more than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. This hypothesis is supported by evidence from a sample of 10,379 Big Six and 2,179 non-Big Six firm years. Specifically, clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5-2.1 percent of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. Also, consistent with earnings management, we find that the mean and median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms with non-Big Six auditors. This result also indicates that lower audit quality is associated with more “accounting flexibility”.     

Public Company Audits and City‐Specific Labor Characteristics

Prior research emphasizes the centrality of audit offices in understanding auditing practices, and documents significant interoffice variation in audit outcomes based on industry expertise and office size. Our study examines how two city‐specific labor characteristics also affect audit offices and local audit markets: the city's average educational attainment, and the number of accountants in a city, which proxy for a city's human capital. Our argument draws on the urban economics literature and predicts that the level of human capital in a city is positively associated with an audit office's ability to conduct high‐quality audits. As expected, there is a positive association between audit quality (quality of audited earnings and accuracy of going‐concern reports) and average education level in the city in which the lead engagement office is located. This association is generally significant for both Big 4 and non‐Big 4 offices, but is relatively stronger for non‐Big 4 firms that are more tied to local labor markets. A company is also more likely to choose a non‐Big 4 auditor in cities with higher educational levels and relatively more accountants, and there is evidence of higher non‐Big 4 audit fees as a city's education level increases. Collectively, these results suggest that local labor characteristics affect audit offices, audit quality, and the ability of non‐Big 4 auditors to compete with Big 4 auditors in the audits of public companies.     

审计师行业专长、客户重要性与审计质量

本文以中国上市公司2006--2009年数据为样本,检验了审计师行业专长、客户重要性对审计质量的影响以及审计师行业专长对审计质量的影响是否受制于客户重要性。研究结果发现,总体而言,审计师行业专长能够抑制客户的盈余管理行为,提高审计质量,审计师对客户的经济依赖性并不会影响到独立审计判断。但行业专长审计师只针对大客户提供高质量审计服务,而对小客户这种效应则并未体现,这是具有行业专长审计师基于中国审计市场环境作出的最优选择。进一步研究发现,上述研究结论仅存在于“十大”样本组中。     

Does Audit Market Concentration Harm the Quality of Audited Earnings? Evidence from Audit Markets in 42 Countries*

Audit regulators around the world have expressed concern over market dominance by Big 4 accounting firms and the potential adverse effect it may have on the quality of audited financial statements. We use cross‐country variation in the audit market structure of 42 countries to examine two separate aspects of Big 4 dominance: (1) Big 4 market concentration as a group relative to non–Big 4 auditors; and (2) concentration within the Big 4 group in which one or more of the Big 4 firms is dominant relative to the other Big 4 firms. We find that in countries where the Big 4 (as a group) conduct more listed company audits, both Big 4 and non–Big 4 clients have higher quality audited earnings compared to clients in countries with smaller Big 4 market shares. In contrast, in countries where there is a greater concentration within the Big 4 group, we find that Big 4 clients have lower quality audited earnings compared to countries with more evenly distributed market shares among the Big 4. Thus concentration within the Big 4 group appears to be detrimental to audit quality in a country and of legitimate concern to regulators and policymakers. However, Big 4 dominance per se does not appear to harm audit quality and is in fact associated with higher earnings quality, after controlling for other country characteristics that potentially affect earnings quality.     

Auditor Choice and Its Implications for Group‐Affiliated Firms

We examine which of two opposing financial reporting incentives that group‐affiliated firms experience shapes their accounting transparency evident in auditor choice. In one direction, complex group structure and intragroup transactions enable controlling shareholders to pursue diversionary activities that they later hide by distorting reported earnings. In the other direction, as outside investors price‐protect against potential expropriation, controlling shareholders may be eager to improve financial reporting quality in order to alleviate agency costs. To empirically clarify whether group affiliation affects company insiders' incentives to address minority shareholders' concerns over agency costs, we examine auditor selection of group firms relative to stand‐alone firms. In comparison to nongroup firms, our evidence implies that group firms are more likely to appoint Top 10 audit firms in China, especially when their controlling shareholders have stronger incentives to improve external monitoring of the financial reporting process. After isolating group firms, we find that the presence of a Top 10 auditor translates into higher earnings and disclosure quality, higher valuation implications for related‐party transactions, and cheaper equity financing, implying that these firms benefit from engaging a high‐quality auditor. In additional analysis consistent with our predictions, we find that group firms that are Top 10 clients pay higher audit fees and their controlling shareholders are more constrained against meeting earnings benchmarks through intragroup transactions and siphoning corporate resources at the expense of minority investors. Collectively, our evidence supports the narrative that insiders in firms belonging to business groups weigh the costs and benefits stemming from auditor choice.     

The Consequences of Audit‐Related Earnings Revisions

In this study, we investigate the consequences that auditors and their clients face when earnings announced in an unaudited earnings release are subsequently revised, presumably as a result of year‐end audit procedures, so that earnings as reported in the 10‐K differ from earnings as previously announced. Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of an auditor “losing the client” is greater following such revisions, and whether the likelihood of dismissal is influenced by revisions that more negatively impact earnings, that cause the client to miss important earnings benchmarks, by greater local auditor competition, or by auditor characteristics. We also examine audit pricing subsequent to audit‐related earnings revisions for evidence of pricing concessions to retain the client. Finally, we examine whether client executives experience a greater likelihood of turnover following an audit‐related earnings revision. Consistent with expectations, we find that auditor dismissals are more likely following audit‐related earnings revisions. We also find that dismissals are more likely when revisions cause clients to miss important benchmarks and when there is greater local auditor competition. Among nondismissing clients, we find that future audit fees are lower when the effect of the revision on earnings is more negative, consistent with auditors offering price concessions to retain clients when revisions are more displeasing. We also find a greater likelihood of future chief financial officer (CFO) turnover as the effect of the revision worsens. Our findings offer important insights into the consequences that auditors face when balancing their responsibility for high audit quality and client satisfaction, as well as into the consequences that CFOs face when releasing inflated but not fully audited earnings.     

Do Accounting Firm Consulting Revenues Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from the Pre‐ and Post‐SOX Eras

In recent years, public accounting firms have experienced a steady increase in the proportion of their revenues generated from consulting services. Although growth in consulting revenue following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) has been generated primarily from services provided to nonaudit clients, regulators have expressed concerns about the potential implications of this increase for audit quality. In contrast, accounting firms assert that the expertise developed by their consulting professionals helps them to provide better quality audits. We examine the relation between the proportion of accounting firm consulting revenue to total revenue and audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. Because SOX drastically altered the source of consulting revenues for public accounting firms, we also separately examine these relations in the pre‐ and post‐SOX eras. We find evidence suggesting that before SOX, higher proportions of audit firm consulting revenues negatively impacted both audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. However, we do not find a statistically significant association between audit firm consulting revenues and either audit quality or investor perceptions of audit quality following SOX. Our analyses suggest that even if these relations exist following SOX, the potential economic magnitude of the effect is small.