Banking deregulation,consolidation, and corporate cash holdings: U.S. evidence

This paper tests the effects of banking deregulation on the cash policies of nonbanking firms in the United States. We document a significant and negative relation between intrastate banking deregulation and corporate cash holdings. We show that the negative relation is driven by financially constrained firms, especially by constrained firms with low hedging needs. Further, we construct indexes measuring the intensity of bank consolidation in local markets. We find that the intensity of in-market bank mergers is negatively related to corporate cash holdings. However, in-market bank mergers in highly concentrated markets tend to be positively related to corporate cash holdings.     

Management,productivity, and technology choices: evidence from U.S. mining schools

A key difference between managers and other production inputs is that managers choose the other inputs. Modelling management as a Hicks-neutral productivity shifter, which is a common practice, omits the productivity returns from these input decisions. I illustrate this through a historical episode in which technology choices were important and managers plausibly influenced those choices. I study the entry of the first mining college graduates into coal mine management positions in Pennsylvania. Whereas the Hicks-neutral productivity effect of these managers was negative and not significantly different from zero, their indirect productivity effect through electrical locomotive adoption was 3% on average.     

The U.S. Property and Liability Insurance Industry: Firm Growth,Size, and Age

The relationship between firm size, age, and growth is tested for the U.S. property and liability (P‐L) insurance industry, and the determinants of firm characteristics on firm growth are analyzed. Using Heckman's two‐stage methodology, this article examines the relationship between corporate growth and firm size. The relationship between firm growth and firm age is also investigated. Furthermore, to determine time‐varying effects, the analysis is conducted for the different subperiods. The results of this article strongly support Gibrat's Law in the U.S. P‐L insurance market for the testing periods. The results are consistent for longer time periods and for shorter subperiods. It also finds that young firms grow faster than old firms during the sample periods. Related to the determinants of firm characteristics on firm growth, insurers using less input cost tend to grow fast. Economies of scope are positively related to firm growth as well.     

CEO Pay and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions,Facts, and Challenges

This article brings a broad range of statistical studies and evidence to bear on three common perceptions about the CEO compensation and governance of U.S. public companies: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average CEO pay increased substantially during the 1990s, it has declined since then— by more than 30%—from peak levels that were reached around 2000. Moreover, when viewed relative to corporate net income or profits, CEO pay levels at S&P 500 companies are the lowest they've been in the last 20 years. And the ratio of large‐company CEO pay to firm market value is roughly similar to its level in the late 1970s, and lower than the levels that prevailed before the 1960s. What's more, in studies that begin with the late '70s, private company executives have seen their pay increase by at least as much as public companies. And when set against the compensation of other highly paid groups, today's levels of CEO pay, although somewhat above their long‐term historical average, are about the same as their average levels in the early 1990s. At the same time, the pay of U.S. CEOs appears to be reasonably highly correlated with corporate performance. As evidence, the author cites a 2010 study reporting that, over the period 1992 to 2005, companies with CEOs in the top quintile (top 20%) of realized pay in any given year had generated stock returns that were 60% higher than the average companies in their industries over the previous three years. Conversely, companies with CEOs in the bottom quintile of realized pay underperformed their industries by almost 20% in the previous three years. And along with lower pay, the CEOs of poorly performing companies in the 2000s faced a significant increase in the likelihood of dismissal by their own boards. When viewed together, these findings suggest that corporate boards have done a reasonably good job of overseeing CEO pay, and that factors such as technological advances and increased scale have played meaningful roles in driving the pay of both CEOs and others with top incomes—people who are assumed to have comparable skills, experience, and opportunities. If one wants to use increases in CEO pay as evidence of managerial power or “board capture,” one also has to explain why the other professional groups have experienced similar, or even higher, growth in pay. A more straightforward interpretation of the evidence reviewed in this article is that the market for talent has driven a meaningful portion of the increase in pay at the top. Consistent with this conclusion, top executive pay policies at roughly 97% of S&P 500 and Russell 3000 companies received majority shareholder support in the Dodd‐Frank mandated “Say‐on‐Pay” votes in 2011 and 2012, the first two years the measure was in force.     

Economic exposure and hysteresis: Evidence from German,Japanese, and U.S. stock returns

Real exchange rate changes reflect terms of trade changes and macroeconomic shocks in productivity, aggregate demand, and interest rates. We show that German, Japanese, and U.S. excess stock returns vary directly with changes in the real terms of trade as well as with exchange rate changes induced by the macroeconomic factors. These results suggest that economic exposure is a global phenomenon. Although German, Japanese, and U.S. firms appear to adjust costs and productivity in response to economic exposure, there are indications that firms in all three countries suffer from hysteresis, an effect persisting after the initial cause is removed.