中国经济增长如何持续发挥规模效应?-经济开放与国内商品市场分割的实证研究

国内市场分割不利于发挥规模效应,不利于经济可持续增长。在本文中,我们首先利用商品零售价格指数数据构造出度量地区间市场分割程度的指标,发现中国国内商品市场总体上处于趋向整合的状态。随后,我们将这个指标作为被解释变量,利用1985—2001年的省级面板数据分析了经济开放、国有企业就业比重、政府消费的相对规模、地区间的技术差异和地理距离对于市场分割程度的影响,并且将研究的重点放在了经济开放上。研究发现,在经济开放水平较低时,经济开放加剧了国内市场的分割,但进一步的经济开放能够促进国内市场一体化。而国有企业就业比重和政府消费的相对规模是加剧市场分割的因素。基于模型的预测表明,未来在一些省份国内商品市场分割有加剧的可能性。     

中国经济增长如何持续发挥规模效应？——经济开放与国内商品市场分割的实证研究

国内市场分割不利于发挥规模效应，不利于经济可持续增长。在本文中，我们首先利用商品零售价格指数数据构造出度量地区间市场分割程度的指标，发现中国国内商品市场总体上处于趋向整合的状态。随后，我们将这个指标作为被解释变量，利用1985-2001年的省级面板数据分析了经济开放、国有企业就业比重、政府消费的相对规模、地区间的技术差异和地理距离对于市场分割程度的影响，并且将研究的重点放在了经济开放上。研究发现，在经济开放水平较低时，经济开放加剧了国内市场的分割，但进一步的经济开放能够促进国内市场一体化。而国有企业就业比重和政府消费的相对规模是加剧市场分割的因素。基于模型的预测表明，未来在一些省份国内商品市场分割有加剧的可能性。     

市场分割与资源错配*——基于生产率分布视角的理论与实证分析

资源错配已成为新常态下制约经济增长的重要因素。现有文献主要从要素市场扭曲视角分析了资源错配问题,而对市场分割与资源错配的研究相对缺乏。本文试图从这方面进行探讨。理论部分将市场分割引致的制度性交易成本加入企业利润函数,分别讨论企业在省内和省外市场的生产行为和定价策略,通过垄断竞争局部均衡模型分析市场分割对资源错配的影响机制。实证部分利用中国工业企业数据库的大样本微观数据对上述机制进行计量检验,以各省市之间的运输成本作为市场分割的工具变量避免估计结果的内生性问题。本文研究发现,国内市场分割指数减少一个百分点可以使资源错配程度降低394%。因此,减少市场分割所引致的制度性交易成本对于深化供给侧结构性改革、提升资源配置效率具有重要政策含义。     

社会责任履行、市场分割与企业财务绩效

现有研究对企业社会责任与财务绩效之间的关系有待商榷。文章选取2010—2021年A股上市公司数据，从资源要素流动视角考察了市场分割对上述关系的调节作用。研究发现：市场分割弱化了企业社会责任对财务绩效的促进作用，表现为地区市场分割水平越高，企业社会责任与财务绩效的正相关关系越弱，过高的市场分割甚至导致企业社会责任与财务绩效的负相关；较于东部地区，市场分割的负向调节作用在要素市场发育程度较低的中、西部地区更为明显。进一步研究还发现：在非国有企业、技术密集型行业，市场分割的负向调节作用更为突出。文章为厘清企业社会责任与财务绩效之间的关系提供了新的研究视角，也丰富了市场分割经济后果的相关研究。     

我国地区市场分割成因与福利分析

我国建立和完善市场经济体制的过程是非常复杂而艰巨的,改革开放后各地经济发展程度不一致,地区间竞争的加剧导致了激烈的地区利益的冲突,地区市场分割是最为明显的表现方式。市场分割在较短的时期内促进了地区经济的快速发展,但也是全国建立统一市场的主要障碍。国务院发展研究中心所做的调查问卷显示,2/3的企业认为市场分割对企业的生产经营有影响。市场分割严重阻碍了良好竞争秩序的形成。在这样的背景下,探讨和研究市场分割就显得非常必要和迫切。文章以经济学的视角,从市场分割对地区经济的影响、产生的原因和如何实现区域市场整合进行分析。     

国内产品市场从分割走向整合了吗——来自中国城市层面的经验证据

本文从城市层面对我国2009—2019年产品市场分割水平进行了测度。首先，在现有价格法的基础上，考虑到地区之间的经济联系，构建融合经济权重的市场分割测算方法；然后，基于2009—2019年238个城市16类商品零售价格指数对产品市场分割程度进行了测算，并分别从时间和空间维度上对国内产品市场分割的演进趋势进行了比较分析；并通过测算各省份内部的市场分割程度，比较了省内城市之间以及与省外地区分割程度的差异。结果发现：整体来看，国内产品市场分割水平呈下降趋势，产品市场趋于整合，全国市场统一性逐渐增强；分地区来看，中西部地区的市场分割程度较低，而东部地区市场分割程度相对较高。此外，省份内部城市之间与省外地区的市场分割程度差距逐渐缩小，发现省际的“边界效应”在减弱。本文的研究为国内统一大市场建设提供了重要的经验证据和政策启示。     

市场需求与我国工业企业规模经济的实证分析

市场需求是影响企业规模经济实现的一个重要因素。本文从我国国内需求的整体规模出发,分析了地方政府的市场分割行为和当前的二元经济结构带来的城乡市场断层对我国企业规模经济的影响。并就市场需求与规模经济之间的作用机理结合我国当前情况作了实证分析,指出只有打破市场封锁,缩小城乡差距,促进全国市场一体化,才能充分利用我国巨大的市场需求规模来促进企业规模的优化。     

中国地方市场分割成因刍议

形成地方市场分割的原因很复杂,行政性分权只是一个政策性原因,分权并不绝对导致地方市场分割。我国实施行政性分权的同时又配合了增量改革,加之计划经济体制遗留下的自成体系的生产力布局,共同构成了地方市场分割的历史原因。区域内不同经济利益主体对自身利益最大化的追求,是导致地方市场分割的现实原因,也是根本原因。     

财政分权与地区市场分割实证研究

财政分权对国内市场一体化进程的影响在实证上仍然是一个有待回答的问题。文章首先利用商品零售价格指数数据测度了378对省际间的市场分割度,随后,利用1986~2005年的省级面板数据检验了财政分权、经济分权、对外开放、FDI、相对财富、政府相对规模、预算外支出占预算内支出比重和地理距离对市场分割程度的影响,重点研究财政分权对市场分割的影响。研究发现,财政分权加剧了市场分割度,尤其是收入分权,而经济分权则降低了市场分割度,有益于市场一体化进程。此外,FDI、对外开放、政府相对规模、预算外支出占预算内支出比重是加剧市场分割的因素,而相对财富的提高则有利于促进国内市场一体化。     

金融危机背景下我国经济增长的区域差异及其协调发展

对于经济全球化背景下的大国而言,国际和国内市场均是促进经济增长的动力源泉。本文认为,我国地区发展差距过大的原因在于,市场分割所导致的狭小的内部市场规模不足以成为经济快速发展的引擎。即相对于中西部地区而言,东部地区可以借助广阔的外部市场规模,在报酬递增机制的作用下,吸引越来越多的企业和资源集聚,政策难以扭转这种局面。而金融危机改变了经济增长的约束条件,国外市场需求的衰落凸现国内市场的重要性,这为我国缩小地区收入差距带来了一个难得的历史机遇,适当的政策措施无疑将会发挥关键性的作用,而加强地区之间的合作、消除行政性阻隔是其中的应有之义。     

The Influence of a Neighbouring Market on Product Qualities and Prices

This paper analyses a model of vertical product differentiation in which there is a primary market with two firms and a secondary market with no firms. Consumers in the secondary market incur a cost when purchasing the product from the primary market. The firms sequentially choose product quality and then simultaneously choose prices. Firm 1 always chooses the maximum quality, while firm 2's quality and the prices depend on the cost. Also, the cost determines which firm(s), if either, serves the secondary market. It is shown that the firms and the consumers of each market prefer different levels of costs.     

Market Entry Regulation and International Competition*

We analyze a non‐cooperative two‐country game where each government decides whether to allow free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We show that a Pareto‐efficient allocation may result in equilibrium. In particular, if the cost difference between home and foreign production is “significant,” production will be located in the cost‐efficient country exclusively; and if this cost difference is even “substantial,” the induced allocation is also Pareto efficient. Only if the cost difference is “insignificant,” production may take place in both countries and the allocation is inefficient.     

Strategic Complementarity in Direct Investments

The paper investigates a three‐country duopoly model. Two developed countries have large markets and one developing country has a cost advantage. The author finds that strategic complementarity in location choice yields multiple equilibria. One is a cost‐oriented agglomeration of firms in the developing country and the other is a market‐oriented equilibrium where each firm locates in its developed home country. Also, private incentives for the cost‐oriented location are excessive (resp. insufficient) from the viewpoint of world welfare if firms choose their locations non‐cooperatively (resp. cooperatively).     

Firm Metrics with Continuous R&;D,Quality Improvement,and Cournot Quantities

The paper considers a dynamic two-firm model of intra-industry trade in which the firms compete for the same market on the basis of product reliability. By assumption, the home firm always has the reliability cost advantage but it may or may not have the manufacturing cost advantage. The results suggest that reliability improvement always helps customers in that they pay a lower full quality price. Comparing the home firm with the foreign firm, metrics such as price, sales, profit margins, and variable profits depend on the relative costs, with the low cost firm performing better. Finally, although this is not the common outcome, the paper suggests that it is possible for the reliability cost advantages gained by R&D expenditures to overcome manufacturing cost disadvantages.     

Home bias in multimarket Cournot games

We explore the role of trade costs for the home bias in trade. In a series of Cournot duopoly experiments with a home and an export market, we compare output choices when firms face different levels of trade costs. We find that there is two-way trade in identical products and that firms hold the majority market share in their home market. The resulting home bias turns out to be, however, stronger than that predicted by theory, and it even occurs without trade costs. Tacit collusion contributes to the home bias observed in our experiment but does not offer a full explanation for the phenomenon.     

Competition, entry and the social returns to infrastructure in transition economies

This paper presents a simple model for analysing the contribution of investments in physical and institutional infrastructure to the transition process. In addition to the direct cost savings, infrastructure investment generates important indirect effects, or transition impacts . The model shows that, by reducing transaction costs, infrastructure intensifies product market competition. This leads to more effective weeding out of the existing high-cost firms in the market. In this model, infrastructure also increases the incentives for low-cost firms to restructure which generates additional efficiency gains, but exacerbates the existing cost asymmetry in the economy. Finally, infrastructure investment enhances the incentives for relatively low-cost firms to enter the market, and thus improves the efficiency of the entry process. The importance of these transition impacts of infrastructure is dependent upon features of the economy, such as the degree of cost asymmetry among firms, the proportion of high-cost firms, the cost of restructuring and entry costs for new firms.
JEL classification: L1, O1, P2.     

Import Protection, Export Promotion, and Product Positioning

The argument that import protection may lead to export promotion is examined from the marketing standpoint. The model shows that protection allows home firms to cover a larger portion of the domestic market than they otherwise would and to target market segments that are closer to the mainstream. At the same time, foreign competitors are forced to retreat to more idiosyncratic market segments of narrower appeal. Thus, protection gives home firms a product positioning advantage over their foreign rivals; this advantage translates into higher market share and profits—not only in the protected home market, but also in export markets.     

Exit with incomplete information about cost

This paper presents a model of output decisions by competitive firms which have incomplete information about costs. Unlike other work on this topic, our model incorporates the possibility of exit from the market after a firm has observed its unit cost. At the equilibrium expected aggregate output and the likelihood of exit depend upon the opportunity cost of staying in the market, the number of informed firms, and the intensity of competition. Uninformed firms may be better off than informed firms if exit is feasible. As a result, even if all firms face the same cost of acquiring information, informed firms may coexist with uninformed firms.     

电信企业基于价格行为的纵向市场圈定与接入规制

电信企业能否达到纵向市场圈定目的,与实施市场圈定的企业和被圈定企业在下游市场的成本差异有关。本文通过构建一个两阶段博弈模型,分析了电信企业基于价格行为的纵向市场圈定与接入规制问题。研究发现,当主导企业的下游附属企业具有成本优势时,则其通过实施价格策略性行为能够达到纵向市场圈定目的;当其处于成本劣势时,则不能通过价格行为实现纵向市场圈定。因此,规制机构在制定接入规制政策时,应根据下游市场两个企业的成本差异选择合理的接入规制方法。当新进入企业成本较低时,可采取有效成分接入定价法和由市场决定接入价格的两种接入规制方法;当两者成本相同时,可采取激励性接入规制方法;当新进入企业成本较高时,可对两者实行不对称接入规制。     

Trade costs, wage rates, technologies, and reverse imports

Abstract .  This paper explores the effects of transport costs, tariffs, and foreign wage rates on the domestic economy in the presence of reverse imports, with special emphasis on inter-firm cost asymmetry in an international oligopoly model. To serve the domestic market, a foreign firm produces in the foreign country, while two domestic firms produce either at home or abroad. Surprisingly, an increase in the foreign wage rate may increase the profits of a firm producing in the foreign country. Even if all firms produce in the foreign country, an increase in the foreign wage rate may improve domestic welfare.