Gender bias and women’s political performance

We model voters’ gender bias as a prejudice on women’s competence coming from a distorted prior. We analyse the effect of this bias in a two-period two-party election model in which voters care about both policy preference and competence. We find that, if voters (wrongly) believe that women are drawn from a distribution of competences with higher weights on lower values, female politicians are less likely to win office but, when elected, they are on average more competent than male elected officials. As a consequence, female incumbents seek re-election more often.     

EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION MANDATES AND THE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES OF LIKELY UNAUTHORIZED AND NATIVE WORKERS

As recent efforts to reform immigration policy at the federal level have failed, states have started to take immigration matters into their own hands and researchers have been paying closer attention to state dynamics surrounding immigration policy. Yet, to this date, there is not a clear understanding of the consequences of enforcing E‐Verify on likely unauthorized immigrants or on natives across the United States. This study aims to fill in that gap by analyzing the impact that the enactment of various types of E‐Verify mandates may have on the employment and wages of these groups. We find that the enactment of employment verification mandates reduces the employment likelihood of likely unauthorized workers. Additionally, it raises the hourly wages of likely unauthorized women. None of these impacts are observed among a similarly skilled sample of naturalized Hispanic immigrants. Finally, the enactment of E‐Verify mandates appears to raise the employment likelihood of alike non‐Hispanic natives, while raising the hourly wage of native‐born male employees, alluding to the potential substitutability of unauthorized immigrants and non‐Hispanic natives. (JEL J2, J3, J6)     

Do voters demand responsive governments? Evidence from Indian disaster relief

Using rainfall, public relief, and election data from India, we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses. The data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control. However, fewer voters punish the ruling party when its government responds vigorously to the crisis, indicating that voters reward the government for responding to disasters. We also find evidence suggesting that voters only respond to rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election. In accordance with these electoral incentives, governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years. These results describe how failures in electoral accountability can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes.     

Entrepreneurship in post‐conflict transition1

We examine new self‐employment entry and its viability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, using a rich household survey for the years 2001–2004. We find that wealthier households are more likely to engage in viable self‐employment and create employment suggesting an important role for financing constraints. Specifically, although having an existing bank relationship is not significantly related to the entry decision, it is positively related to the survival for new entrepreneurs and their employment creation. We also find a non‐linear relationship between remittances and entry in that individuals not receiving remittances are more likely to enter self‐employment; but, if they do receive them, the likelihood of starting a business increases in the fraction of wealth received from domestic remittances. Finally, people working in the informal sector are more likely to become viable entrepreneurs, particularly those provided with loans from micro‐credit organizations. These findings support the perception of the informal sector as an incubator for formal self‐employment in the early years of transition.     

It is not easy being a Green party: Green politics as a normal good

An extensive body of literature shows that voters often credit or blame ruling political parties for economic successes and failures, respectively. This paper presents a related, but new possibility: whether local economic conditions impact Green party electoral outcomes. According to the environmental Kuznets curve, high-income countries will see decreased environmental degradation as they become wealthier, but it is yet to be seen whether this relationship is carried over to environmentally friendly political parties. Using a panel data set that includes over 250 elections from 26 European countries, we find that elections held during times of economic growth increase the vote share that Green parties win. This effect is especially robust for national elections, as opposed to elections for the European Parliament. The magnitudes are large enough to potentially alter the number of seats Green parties have in national legislatures. This provides evidence that Green parties are most likely to gain seats when the economy is growing, and support for the existence of an environmental Kuznets curve.     

Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures*

This paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997. We find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support. This is borne out in two ways. (i) Counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments. (ii) When control of the state government changes, the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party. We find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts. Finally, we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections. This suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results, and the mechanism through which this works is “mobilization” rather than “conversion” of voters in a fixed electorate.     

Local representation and strategic voting: Evidence from electoral boundary reforms

We analyze whether voters value local political representation by exploiting municipal mergers, which increase the number of candidates available to voters and intensify political competition. In the Finnish open-list proportional representation system, voters rank the candidates within parties, and thus, concentrating votes to local candidates increases the extent of local representation. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that the vote distributions become more concentrated in municipalities less likely to gain local representation after the mergers. Moreover, the effect is much larger in municipalities where the benefits of local representation to voters are large. The latter result disentangles voters' responses from the responses of other political actors. The results are important also for designing local government mergers, which are an important policy tool in many countries. They highlight that concerns over deteriorating local democracy due to mergers have merit, because voters have preferences for local representation. At the same time, the vote concentration patterns we find alleviate these concerns.     

Legislators' behaviour and electoral rules: Evidence from an Italian reform

We explore how electoral rules and the degree of civicness of the voters interact in shaping elected officials' behaviour. We examine the expenditure proposals sponsored by Italian Senators from 1994 to 2013 and exploit the 2005 electoral reform that transformed a mainly majoritarian system into a mainly proportional one. First, we find that legislators elected in first-past-the-post districts are more likely to sponsor pork-barrel bills and to put effort into legislative activity than those elected with a closed-list proportional system. Second, more importantly, we show that the effects of the electoral rules are muted in areas with high civicness.     

Remittances and incumbency: Theory and evidence

By raising household income, remittances lower the marginal utility of targeted electoral transfers, thus weakening the efficacy of vote buying. Yet, remittances make individuals wealthier and believe the national economy is performing well, which is positively attributed to the incumbent. Building on these insights, I show that the confluence of these divergent channels generate a surprising result that at increasingly higher levels of dissatisfaction with the incumbent, a remittance recipient is more likely to vote for the incumbent than a non‐remittance recipient. These predictions and their underlying mechanisms are substantiated across 18 Latin American countries.     

A theory of permissible illegal immigration

In many countries laws are not enforced against visibly present illegal immigrants. The visibly present illegal immigrants also tend to be concentrated in particular sectors. We explain such permissible illegal immigration in an endogenous-policy model where selective sector-specific illegality transforms illegal immigrants from non-sectorally specialized to sector-specific factors of production. Under initial conditions where no immigrants are present, the median voter opposes immigration. When, however, a population of illegal immigrants has accumulated, ongoing illegal immigration becomes an endogenous equilibrium policy, at the same time that a majority of voters opposes legal immigration and opposes amnesty that would legalize the immigrants' presence. We also establish a basis for domestic voters preferring that illegal immigrants be employed in service rather than traded-goods sectors.     

Human capital and the re‐employment of retrenchment labor in urban China

The inefficiency of state‐owned enterprises, followed by the economic reform in urban China, resulted in large‐scale retrenchment during the late1990s. The laid‐off workers were middle‐aged, not well educated and had accumulated a lot of firm‐specific human capital that was unlikely to be of value in the product market. In this study, we investigate how differently human capital affects laid‐off workers’ occupation choices: self‐employment, re‐employment and remaining unemployed. Using 2002 Chinese Household Income Project and 2009 Urban Household Survey datasets, we find that although general human capital measured by education is positively related to the probability of finding a job, it is negatively associated with the probability of self‐employment. Displaced workers with more sector‐specific work experience are more likely to be self‐employed than to be employed by others. Government‐sponsored training significantly increases the likelihood of finding a job. Health is positively associated with re‐employment.     

The political economy of naturalization

This paper presents a political economy model in which self‐interested natives decide when citizenship and/or voting rights should be granted to foreign‐born workers. Native voters know that immigrants hold different ‘political’ preferences and would thus tend to postpone their enfranchisement as much as possible. They also consider, however, that a more restrictive naturalization policy may reduce the gains from immigration. We find that the optimal timing of naturalization depends on the quantity, quality (productivity), and preferences of potential immigrants, the political composition and the age structure of the native population, as well as the sensitivity of migration choices to the citizenship issue.     

ECONOMIC VOTING AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: HOW DO INDIVIDUAL,LOCAL, AND NATIONAL FACTORS AFFECT THE PARTISAN CHOICE?

What impact do income and other demographic factors have on a voter's partisan choice? Using post‐election surveys of 14,000 voters in 10 Australian elections between 1966 and 2001, I explore the impact that individual, local, and national factors have on voters' decisions. In these 10 elections, the poor, foreign‐born, younger voters, voters born since 1950, men, and those who are unmarried are more likely to be left‐wing. Over the past 35 years, the partisan gap between men and women has closed, but the partisan gap has widened on three dimensions: between young and old; between rich and poor; and between native‐born and foreign‐born. At a neighborhood level, I find that, controlling for a respondent's own characteristics, and instrumenting for neighborhood characteristics, voters who live in richer neighborhoods are more likely to be right‐wing, while those in more ethnically diverse or unequal neighborhoods are more likely to be left‐wing. Controlling for incumbency, macroeconomic factors do not seem to affect partisan preferences – Australian voters apparently regard both major parties as equally capable of governing in booms and busts.     

CORRUPTION AND ELECTIONS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FOR A CROSS-SECTION OF COUNTRIES

In this paper, we study whether voters are more likely to "vote out" a corrupt incumbent than to re-elect him. Specifically, we examine whether they retract their support from political candidates who they think are corrupt by looking at changes in an index of corruption perceptions between the current and the last elections. Our results suggest that corruption in public office is effectively punished by voters. Furthermore, our findings support the idea that both the political system and the democratic experience are important determinants of the voters' reaction and control of corruption; while voters in countries with parliamentary systems or with relatively low levels of democracy react negatively to an increase in corruption, no perceptible effect of this kind was found in countries with mature democracies, and the evidence is inconclusive in the case of countries with presidential systems.     

Electoral systems and immigration

Unexplored stylized facts on OECD countries suggest that plurality electoral systems are associated with higher openness to immigration. We propose an explanation based on a retrospective voting model where immigration hurts voters but benefits a rent-seeking policymaker who appropriates part of the income generated by immigrants. To be reappointed, the policymaker must distribute the compensation. With respect to proportional systems, plurality systems make it possible to compensate only a few decisive districts and leave after-compensation rents higher, therefore producing higher immigration. In our model, non-decisive districts receive no compensation at all under both electoral systems, providing a rationale for widespread anti-immigration attitudes. Notably, our results also help to explain why governments often seem more pro-immigration than do voters. Finally, our model predicts that opposition to immigration is more geographically dispersed in plurality systems. Basic evidence supports this prediction.     

Political credit cycles

This paper tests the existence of political credit cycles, the positive comovement between credit and elections. While several single‐country studies point to the existence of this relationship, the link between electoral cycles and credit expansion has seen little exploration at the multicountry level. Using a comprehensive dataset covering bank and non‐bank credit in 165 countries from 1960 to 2013, we show that both government and private credit significantly increase in election years. This finding suggests the possibility that politicians use not only fiscal and monetary policy to court voters, but also implement credit policies such as interest rate subsidies and tax breaks for debt to enhance credit growth. We also find that a higher degree of financial openness weakens the frequency and magnitude of political credit cycles; yet, the conditional effect of financial openness is stronger for developing countries than developed economies.     

Political accountability and public service delivery in decentralized Indonesia: Incumbency advantage and the performance of second term mayors

To what extent do voters hold local elected leaders accountable for public service delivery in fiscally and politically decentralized environments, as theory suggests should be the case? We examine political accountability and service delivery in subnational Indonesia, through the lens of mayoral incumbency advantage. We apply regression discontinuity methods to a unique data set on local elections to identify the causal impact of incumbency on election outcomes and relate those effects to changes in citizen access to local public services. We find that voters in Indonesia are, in general, very willing to return incumbents to office compared to their counterparts in other countries. We also determine that the incumbent advantage is conditional on advances in local service provision: as service access expands more quickly, voters are more likely to vote incumbents back into office. Finally, we find that electorally successful incumbents—second term mayors—spend substantially less on education and health and more on infrastructure, manage their budgets less prudently, and deliver public services neither more nor less effectively than their first term equivalents. We conjecture that term limits and the attendant lack of electoral incentives leads to the disappointing second-term mayor performance.     

Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information,abstention, and coordination in standing committees

We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria – swing voterʼs curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low-quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low-quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low-quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on “letting the experts” decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.     

Examining the effect of IMF conditionality on natural resource policy

Can International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending improve natural resource governance in borrowing countries? While most IMF agreements mandate policy reforms in exchange for financial support, compliance with these reforms is mixed at best. The natural resource sector should be no exception. After all, resource windfalls enable short-term increases in discretionary spending, and office-seeking politicians are often unwilling to forgo this discretion by reforming the oil, gas, or mining sector. I investigate how and when borrowers go against their political interests and establish natural resource funds—a tool often promoted by the IMF—in the wake of a loan agreement. Using text analysis, statistical models, and qualitative evidence from natural resource policy and IMF conditionality for 74 countries between 1980 and 2019, I show that borrowers under an IMF agreement are more likely to create or regulate a resource fund, particularly if the agreement includes binding conditions that highlight the salience of natural resource reforms. This study contributes to extant research by proposing a new method to extract information from IMF conditions, by introducing a novel dataset on country-level natural resource policy, and by identifying under what circumstances international reform efforts can help combat the resource curse.     

“Restrict foreigners,not robots”: Partisan responses to automation threat

Recent scholarship on technological change highlights its negative impacts on employment and wages. However, a decade of nationally representative surveys show that Americans hold favorable views toward technology despite concerns over labor displacement. How do people cope with employment threats from a trend they consider desirable? Using a survey experiment, this paper argues that people opt to buffer domestic workers from technological threats with substitute policies against outgroups that they believe could improve wages and employment prospects. Specifically, direct cues about technological displacement make Republicans more likely to demand tighter restrictions on immigration and Democrats more likely to support higher tariffs. In other words, citizens respond to automation anxiety by blaming and penalizing groups that they consider unwelcome or objectionable, depending on their partisanship. Respondents remained reluctant to express support for technological restrictions. Thus, automation anxiety may intensify resistance to globalization, but not necessarily technology.