Tipping the (Im)balance: Capital inflows,financial market structure,and banking crises

An emerging consensus among scholars and policy‐makers identifies foreign capital inflows as one of the primary determinants of banking crises in developed countries. We challenge this view by arguing that external imbalances are destabilizing only when banks face substantial competition from securities markets in the process of financial intermediation. We assemble a dataset of banking crises covering the advanced industrialized countries from 1976 to 2011 and find evidence of a conditional relationship between capital inflows, a well‐developed securities market, and the incidence of banking crises. We further explore the impact of capital inflows on banks’ actual risk taking as indicated by their capital adequacy levels and measures of insolvency risk. Our results demonstrate that prudential capital cushions tend to decline with the combination of capital inflows and prominent securities markets. We highlight the political decisions—often made during the early days of a country's financial development—that determine the relative prominence of banks vs. non‐bank financial institutions and conclude with policy recommendations.     

Do changes in the rules of the game affect FDI flows in Latin America? A look at the macroeconomic,institutional and regional integration determinants of FDI

This paper aims to identify the main determinants of FDI in Latin America during the period 1990–2010. Evidence points to positive influences on FDI inflows of trade openness, maintaining low short-term debt levels and presenting a balance of payment deficit, government stability and low expropriation risk. Countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, in which the investment framework has become relatively less stable over the last decade, are finding it more difficult to attract foreign investors. From a risk-management perspective, both public solutions (such as sovereign guarantees) and private institutions have important roles to play in reducing the uncertainty involved in foreign investment decisions. Another result is that the DR CAFTA agreement does not seem to have played a significant role in the recent increase in investment directed towards Central America.     

Foreign direct investment,political risk and the limited access order

The common explanations for political risk in foreign investment focus on the opportunism of host-country governments. However, when governments are too weak to regulate and effectively control them, domestic business elites may also cause political risk. In the literature on political risk, the host state is mostly modelled as a single, cohesive actor and elites outside of the government are not taken into account. By contrast, this paper conceptualises political risk as a lack of government assertiveness vis-à-vis domestic business elites, drawing on the limited access order (LAO) concept developed by Douglass North and his co-authors. It presents the case of Swedish Tele2’s investment in Russia. The mobile telecommunications provider was highly successful in Russia until it became a threat to the business interests of three Russian oligarchs. Regulatory agencies in Russia lacked the necessary authority to provide a level playing field in the telecommunications industry. They did not intervene when Tele2’s access to vital licenses was blocked by competitors, effectively squeezing the Swedes out of the Russian market. This paper concludes that in LAOs foreign investors are initially welcome, but political risk is high when the market competition with domestic elites becomes intense.     

State capacity and the quality of policies. Revisiting the relationship between openness and government size

Countries with different levels of state capacity have access to different sets of policies. In particular, countries with strong state capabilities are able to draw from a broader menu of policies than countries with lower capabilities. We apply and test this insight to the case of exposure to trade‐related risk. So far, most of the literature has considered that only one type of policy—the one that increases government size—can help to overcome the challenge imposed by openness. However, there are a number of policies that can mitigate trade‐induced risks, many of which do not have the necessary implication of increasing public spending. Yet, many such policies require governmental capabilities not available to any country. For that reason, while the choice of a particular policy within a menu depends on political conditions, the relationship between openness and the size of government might be mediated by the capabilities of states. This paper provides reduced form evidence confirming that the empirical relationship between openness and government size is conditional on state capabilities. Therefore, public policies cannot be assessed independently of the capacity of the State that would have to implement them.     

Politics,institutions, and outcomes: Electricity regulation in Argentina and Chile

Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government, is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible.

Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatoty policies are based upon two political factors: regulatory predictability and regime stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory process, in which prices and levels of service are set, is not arbitrary. If the condition of regulatory predictability holds, then investors can forecast their returns over time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. If there is regime stability, then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the government regulates the industry—the most extreme type of change being the denial of property rights, or expropriation. We argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are, in turn, important determinants of regulatory predictability: agenda control, reversionary regulatory policy, and veto gates. Moreover, regime stability is also, in part, a function of these three characteristics. We examine our theory of political risk and regulatoty commitment by comparing the cases of Argentine and Chilean electricity investment and regulation.     

Education for the masses? The interaction between wealth,educational and political inequalities

This paper presents a simple model of distribution dynamics, in which the distributions of wealth, education and political power are circularly endogenous. Different levels of education translate into different income and wealth levels. Political power may (or may not) vary with wealth, and in turn affects decisions on the level of public expenditure on education. Since the market for education credit is imperfect, some people might need to rely on public schooling, the quality of which depends on those expenditure levels. As a result, educational opportunities differ along the wealth distribution. The dynamic system displays multiple equilibria, some of which are characterized by a vicious circle of interaction between educational, wealth and political inequalities. These particular equilibria, which are more unequal, are also shown to be inefficient in terms of aggregate output levels. Switching equilibria may be achieved through redistribution of political power.
JEL classification: D31, D63.     

Income Distribution, Redistributive Politics, and Economic Growth

This article studies the political economy of inequality and growth by combining the political economy approach with an imperfect capital market assumption. In the present model, there emerges a class of individuals whose members do not invest privately beyond the state-financed schooling, due to their initial wealth constraint. We show that inequality affects private investment not only through the political effect, which relates inequality to private investment negatively, but also through what we call the threshold effect, which associates inequality to private investment positively. In general, private investment and inequality do not show a monotone negative relationship.     

WHAT ATTRACTS FOREIGN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS TO CHINA?

After adopting the open-door policy, China experienced a boom of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations. This article attempts to assess effects of location characteristics and government policies on FDI flows during the period 1987–98. A model of FDI determinants is specified and estimated with cross-section and panel data. The estimates indicate that China's huge market size, liberalized FDI regime, and improving infrastructure are attractive to multinationals. The regional distribution of FDI within China is influenced largely by FDI incentives and historical-cultural links with foreign investors, along with other location factors.     

Informational externalities,strategic delay,and optimal investment subsidies

Abstract This paper examines optimal government policy when private investment generates information, but investors cannot internalize the informational value their actions have to others. Equilibrium exhibits inefficient delay, as investors adopt a wait‐and‐see approach. The government can alter incentives via an investment subsidy, but complications arise, since future subsidies may induce investors to disregard current policy initiatives. The paper shows that the government achieves its desired outcome only when the the investment subsidy is financed by a non‐distortionary, lump‐sum tax. When taxation is distortionary, the government faces a time inconsistency problem that may prevent effective policy.     

中国投融资体制改革的回顾与前瞻

文章认为中国的投融资改革严重滞后，其原因不仅因为受到国资国企延误改革的拖累。而且还因为它既秉承了传统计划经济最核心的内容(即政府配置资源)，又在渐进改革过程中衍生出了许多与市场经济不相容的“特色”。投融资体制改革迫在眉睫。其根本措施是完善出资人制度，将投融资管理的重点从项目管理转向资本市场管理，从“投”转向“融”。文章指出，中国投融资改革的总体目标应该是：建立起针对出资人的资信评价体系，以资信等级为依据，实施对出贵人融资能力的宏观调控。放弃项目的行政审批，形成投资决策、资本决策、信贷决策三权鼎立，相互制约各负其责的投融资格局。严格金融监管、放松金融准入，严格市场清除、放松资本管制，培育财务投资者与战略投资者之间良性互动的资金供求机制。厘清企业制度，改善中小企业融资环境。     

Do regional trade agreements stimulate FDI? Evidence for the Agadir,MERCOSUR and AFTA regions

The integration of emerging markets into the global economy is heavily promoted by foreign direct investment (FDI ) inflows. Among the factors explaining the location of FDI , regional trade agreements (RTA s) can be relevant for emerging markets, as they can promote economic integration and increase the attractiveness of the region for foreign investors. This paper investigates the impact of South–South trade agreements on the FDI decision of multinationals, where the Agadir, mercado comun del sur (MERCOSUR), and ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) agreements are considered. Three panels of countries are defined, where the members joined a specific agreement or not. Non‐Gulf Arab states are compared to better performing regions in Latin America and Southern and Eastern Asia. The analysis provides evidence that openness to foreign trade and financial markets are among the main catalysts to attract FDI , provided that business‐friendly institutions exist in the host country. Other variables, like the size of the industrial sector, urbanization rates, and external debt appear to be important in some cases. The integration of China into the world economy is a specific trigger for FDI to Asian destinations. Since RTA s influence the market size by reducing barriers to trade, their impact operates via GDP growth and openness. Gains from the agreement are striking for Latin America and Asia, but not for Arab states. To attract more FDI , business‐friendly institutional reforms and mechanisms to support new firm foundation should be implemented in this region.     

Manias,Panics and Crashes in Emerging Markets: An Empirical Investigation of the Post-2008 Crisis Period

ABSTRACT

Because of their economic importance, international bond markets are thought to be the likely location for the operation of financial market pressures on emerging market (EM) government policy. An important but unresolved debate that runs through the literature is the relative importance of domestic factors specific to the country receiving the capital flows (pull factors), versus push factors exogenous to the receiving country, in driving portfolio flows to EMs. Through extensive interviews with financial market participants, and analysis of the financial press between January 2008 and 2013, this paper argues that not only were market participants fully aware of the importance of push factors over the cycle, but that their perceptions of the domestic fundamentals themselves were influenced by these push factors. The paper provides evidence on the micro-foundations of investment decision making that make investors susceptible to influence by the push factors, and adds to a growing body of evidence that financial market borrowing costs are even less in the control of emerging market governments than previously assumed, because even when investors pay attention to domestic fundamentals, their assessments can be divorced from reality. This means that government efforts to attract foreign capital through implementing investors' preferred policies may be ultimately futile.     

INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS-COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES

The impact of property rights on economic growth is examined using indicators provided by country risk evaluators to potential foreign investors. Indicators include evaluations of contract enforceability and risk of expropriation. Using these variables, property rights are found to have a greater impact on investment and growth than has previously been found for proxies such as the Gastil indices of liberties, and frequencies of revolutions, coups and political assassinations. Rates of convergence to U.S.-level incomes increase notably when these property rights variables are included in growth regressions. These results are robust to the inclusion of measures of factor accumulation and of economic policy.     

Endogenous Pollution Havens: Does FDI Influence Environmental Regulations?*

We suggest a novel perspective on the relationship between the stringency of environmental policies and foreign direct investment (FDI). We develop a political economy model with imperfect product market competition where local and foreign firms jointly lobby the local government for a favorable pollution tax. FDI is found to affect environmental policy, and the effect is conditional on the local government's degree of corruptibility. If the degree of corruptibility is sufficiently high (low), FDI leads to less (more) stringent environmental policy, and FDI thus contributes to (mitigates) the creation of a pollution haven. Our empirical results using panel data from 33 countries support the predictions of the model.     

THE POLITICS OF FDI EXPROPRIATION

I examine the role of political instability and fractionalization as potential explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e., the Lucas Paradox). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document that (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) countries subject to high investment risk (IR) receive low FDI inflows, and (iii) IR is higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies. These findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and FDI through the IR channel. I inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political economy model of redistribution, wherein policymakers can expropriate resources from foreign investors. The proceeds are used to finance group‐specific transfers to domestic workers but hinder economic growth by discouraging FDI. I show that the political equilibrium exhibits overexpropriation and underinvestment.     

Private finance for public goods: social impact bonds

Social impact bonds (SIBs) attract private investment to social programs by paying a market rate of return if predefined outcome targets are met. SIBs monetize benefits of social interventions and tie pay to performance, limiting governmental control once the contract is designed. Despite policy enthusiasm across the globe, SIBs have failed to attract private market investors without substantial additional guarantees. SIBs raise questions about government’s ability to ensure broader public values. Using literature on contracting, performance management, and public private partnerships, this exploratory analysis focuses on institutional design, transaction costs, and performance measurement, outlining the opportunities and concerns SIBs present.     

Ownership structure,monitoring, and market value of companies: evidence from an unusual privatization mode

This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.     

Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?

This paper studies the pattern of allocation of foreign aid from various donors to receiving countries. We find considerable evidence that the direction of foreign aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients. Colonial past and political alliances are major determinants of foreign aid. At the margin, however, countries that democratize receive more aid, ceteris paribus. While foreign aid flows respond to political variables, foreign direct investments are more sensitive to economic incentives, particularly good policies and protection of property rights in the receiving countries. We also uncover significant differences in the behavior of different donors.     

Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties: An international political perspective

This paper investigates the effect of the implementation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the bilateral stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that the understanding of how BITs affect FDI requires recognizing that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not Stateless and that their investment return may well depend on the quality of political relations between the home and host countries. Using bilateral FDI data and event data to measure political interactions between countries, we show that the effect of the entry into force of a BIT crucially depends on the quality of political relations between the signatory countries; it increases FDI more between countries with tense relationships than between friendly countries. We also find evidence that BITs and good domestic institutions are complementary. BITs should therefore be understood as a mechanism for host governments to credibly commit not to expropriate investors in the future.     

Openness, Investment Climate, and FDI in Developing Countries

The paper assesses the importance of openness, infrastructure availability, and sound economic and political conditions in increasing developing countries' attractiveness with respect to FDI. The results show that these factors are particularly important for South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The paper also shows a higher impact of these factors on FDI in the manufacturing sector than on total FDI. The message to developing countries' policymakers is twofold. First, efforts towards openness should be initiated or further increased in order to make their economies attractive to foreign investors. Second, improvements in other aspects of the investment climate are important complements to openness and result in additional and sensitive increases in FDI inflows.