持续发展中代际财富转移简单模型

代际均衡发展是持续发展论的主要内容之一，其中代际财富转移和贴现率应用是其核心内容。本文探讨了一个代际财富转移的简单模型，并采用人们熟悉的柯布──道格拉斯函数形式表达。模型的敏感因素为利息率、工资和自然资源价格，并且是由代际间的跨代收入分配决定的。贴现率等于同期利息率，其水平是变动的。     

Bequests, Inter Vivos Transfers, and Wealth Distribution

This paper constructs a heterogeneous agent overlapping generations model with bequests and inter vivos transfers. In the model, households in the same family line behave strategically to determine their consumption, working hours, gifts, and savings. Calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, the paper measures time preference and parental altruism consistent with the economy's capital-output ratio and the size of intergenerational transfers. The model with intergenerational transfers better explains, although not fully, the wealth distribution of the United States. The paper also analyzes the effects of government policy changes on wealth accumulation, distribution, and social welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D64, D91, H31.     

Market Power and Emissions Trading: Theory and Laboratory Results

Policymakers are concerned with market power being exploited by dominant firms in emission permit markets. Two types of market power may emerge: simple and exclusionary manipulation. Simple manipulation should result in reduced pollution‐control cost relative to command‐and‐control regulation. Exclusionary manipulation may result in increased cost. The paper reports results of an economic experiment to determine whether (i) such opportunities are successfully exploited when a dominant firm has the opportunity to do so, and (ii) the resulting outcomes are serious enough to merit consideration by regulators. Market power outcomes emerge and market efficiency is far below predicted levels.     

Wealth Distribution and Optimal Inheritance Taxation in Life-cycle Economies with Intergenerational Transfers

Intergenerational transfers are introduced into a general equilibrium life-cycle model in order to explain observed levels of wealth heterogeneity. In our overlapping generations model, heterogenous agents face uncertain lifetime and leave both accidental and voluntary bequests to their children. Furthermore, agents face stochastic employment opportunities. The model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the US economy. Our results indicate that bequests only account for a small proportion of observed wealth heterogeneity. The introduction of an inheritance tax increases both welfare, as measured by the average lifetime utility of a newborn, and equality of the wealth distribution.
JEL classification : D 31; D 91; H 21; C 68; E 21     

Strategic Behavior,Private Information,and Decentralization in the European Union Emissions Trading System

In the European Union Emissions Trading System, the supply of carbon permits is determined in a decentralized manner by Member States. Alternatively, the supply could be determined by an EU central authority. We analyze whether decentralization leads to lower total abatement costs under various assumptions about the behavior of Member States and the privacy of information about their abatement costs. If Member States do not behave strategically, then decentralization is preferred, regardless of whether abatement costs are private information. If the Member States behave strategically, then decentralization may or may not be preferred, depending on the degree of uncertainty about abatement cost parameters, the variation in emission endowments, and the number of Member States.     

排放交易体系与新西兰农业

本文在分析新西兰国情的基础上,阐明了新西兰为何有别于其他发达国家,将农业一并纳入排放交易体系的原因。扼要叙述排放交易立法将农业纳入减排体系的机制和过程。通过个案研究,定量分析农业成本的增长幅度。深入研究农业减排所面临的困难和风险、可能产生的经济社会效应、带来的发展机遇以及存在着的不确定性。     

自愿减排对构建国内碳排放交易市场的作用和对策

自愿减排指自愿碳减排市场中,个人、企业、政府为了对自己排放的温室气体作出抵偿,力图实现"碳中和",而购买碳信用额的一种交易模式。目前,我国尚未形成真正意义上的碳排放交易市场,自愿减排是建立碳排放交易市场前的有力尝试,具有重要意义。从自愿碳减排的角度,分析了自愿碳减排在建立国内碳排放交易市场中的重要作用,结合自愿碳减排现状,分析其不足之处并提出了相应的对策。     

Assessing the performance of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme

The UK’s Climate Change Programme introduced an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for greenhouse gases. Firms in over 40 industrial sectors which have negotiated “Climate Change Agreements” setting quantitative energy efficiency targets can use the ETS to trade over-and under-compliance with these targets. In parallel, a limited number of firms have become major participants in the ETS as a result of an auction of subsidies for additional abatement commitments. The paper describes the UK arrangements and assesses the economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness of the ETS, drawing on evidence of participants’ behaviour both in the incentive auction, and in subsequent trading.     

Emissions Trading Mode in America and China and Its Future

The emissions trading is a kind of sustainable development measures that is based on market mechanism, and its growing is closely connected with the market development level. The level of American emissions permits market is relatively high, and also predicts the prospect of professional bourse pattern. Most of emissions permits transactions in China are organized by government environment authority, which make it lack of market function. Emissions permits is a kind of property rights. It is important and profitable, while the emissions trading market obviously possesses the two-class of original allocation and second-time transfer. But there are some decisive differences between emissions permits and ordinary transaction object, so the specialized bourse for emissions trading should be built.     

Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. We find that output, abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading. Allowing trade between permit-trading and credit-trading sectors may increase welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading may outperform permit trading. Environmental policy can lead to exit, but also to entry of firms. Entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under imperfect competition. We find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions. Under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions.     

德国国家碳排放权交易体系初探

为落实减排承诺,实现2050年碳中和目标,德国联邦政府立法明确从2021年起引入国家碳排放权交易体系,针对未纳入欧盟碳市场的交通和建筑领域实施二氧化碳排放定价。本文通过介绍政策背景、交易基础和各要素情况,对比欧盟碳排放交易制度,初步探析德国即将实施的国家碳交易体系。     

Market Power in Emissions Trading Markets Ruled by a Multiple Unit Double Auction: Further Experimental Evidence

We discuss selected methodological problems of previous Double Auction (DA) experiments and test the hypothesis that a Multiple Unit Double Auction (MUDA) is able to prevent market power in an emissions trading market. Additionally, we analyze how the information subjects receive about the market structure and different levels of subjects’ experience influence the behavior. Based on a larger number of independent observations than analyzed in previous studies, the experiment generates two main results. First, emissions trading markets ruled by a MUDA realize a high degree of efficiency even under market power conditions. However, a MUDA is, in general, not able to restrict market power. We observe persistent price discrimination in two market power environments, i.e., the distribution of profits is strongly shifted in favor of the strong market side without greatly harming efficiency. This result is independent of the information to subjects about the market structure. Second, when subjects are experienced, the efficiency is higher and the ability of the strong market side to exercise market power declines strongly. However, the variability of behavior is large and the strong market side is still able to realize supracompetitive profits in some groups.      

Trading Sulphur Emissions in Europe: `Guided Bilateral Trade'

In this paper a system of `guided permit trading' is developed for SO₂emissions reduction which considers permit trading as a bilateral andsequential process. This implies that in order to meet the deposition targetsat the end of the trading process, not every single trade transaction hasto meet the deposition targets. To ensure that the target is ultimately met,the number of permits traded should be controlled by a trade coordinatinginstitution. A simulation of the system of guided bilateral trading ofSO₂ permits among European countries on the basis of the SecondSO₂ Protocol indicates that some non-profitable trade transactionstake place. This prevents the cost effective emission allocation from beingfully achieved. However, the calculations show that guided bilateral permittrading may generate substantial cost savings while contributing toenvironmental protection.     

Saving,Wealth and the Transition from Transfers to Individual Responsibility: The Cases of Taiwan and the United States*

Under the life‐cycle saving model, population aging leads to an increased demand for life‐cycle wealth. Changes in transfer systems create or destroy one component of life‐cycle wealth—transfer wealth. The decline in the familial transfer system in Taiwan and reform of the US Social Security system are two examples of ways that transfer wealth is reduced. The combined effects of aging and changes in transfer systems are analyzed using simulation analysis. Rapid aging and radical decline in transfer systems lead to a large but transitory surge in aggregate saving. Capital per worker increases rapidly and remains at a high level.     

Intertemporal Permit Trading for the Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions

This paper integrates two themes in the intertemporal permitliterature through the construction of an intertemporal bankingsystem for a pollutant that creates both stock and flow damages. A permit banking system for the special case of a pollutant thatonly causes stock damages is also developed. This latter,simpler case corresponds roughly to the greenhouse gas emissionreduction regime proposed by the U.S. Department of State as ameans of fulfilling the U.S. commitment to the FrameworkConvention on Climate Change. This paper shows that environmentalregulators can achieve the socially optimal level of emissionsand output through time by setting the correct total sum ofallowable emissions, and specifying the correct intertemporaltrading ratio for banking and borrowing. For the case ofgreenhouse gases, we show that the optimal growth rate of permitprices, and therefore the optimal intertemporal trading rate, hasthe closed-form solution equal to the ratio of current marginalstock damages to the discounted future value of marginal stockdamages less the decay rate of emissions in the atmosphere. Given a non-optimal negotiated emission path we then derive apermit banking system that has the potential to lower net socialcosts by adjusting the intertemporal trading ratio taking intoaccount the behavior of private agents. We use a simplenumerical simulation model to illustrate the potential gains fromvarious possible banking systems.     

The Welfare Effects of Allowance Banking in Emissions Trading Programs

Permitting allowance banking in emissions trading programs can reduce expected compliance costs by giving capped firms flexibility to adjust the time path of abatement and to hedge against future uncertainty. Recent literature suggests that this compliance cost dividend is significant (Fell and Morgenstern Environ Resour Econ 47:275–297, 2010). Allowance banking may yield an environmental dividend (a) if the growth rate of marginal damages from emissions is less than the discount rate and (b) if emissions are lower in the short run as firms bank permits for use in later periods. A discrete, stochastic dynamic programming model is considered to simulate the two dividends of allowance banking in the context of the most recent Federal United States greenhouse gas cap-and-trade legislation. Simulation results show that under a range of parameter values, the environmental dividend has the same order of magnitude as the compliance cost dividend. Under the central set of parameters, allowance banking increases expected present value of benefits by about $350$ million dollars per year of the program. The environmental dividend, however, is completely eliminated if capped firms can borrow permits from future periods without limit.     

关于中国碳排放权交易机制的构想

在碳排放量跃居全球首位的严峻压力下,中国清洁发展机制项目的发展成绩卓著。然而,碳排放权售价过低造成的巨大损失迫切要求中国构建自身的碳排放权交易机制。文章首先阐述了中国碳排放权交易的现状,接着分析了中国碳排放权交易存在的问题,并在此基础上提出了中国碳排放权交易机制的构想。     

碳排放权交易会计的国际进展及借鉴

随着《京都议定书》的签署,发展低碳经济、建设碳排放权交易市场在我国拉开序幕,碳排放权成为一种具有流通性的稀缺资源,开始试点交易。但是,我国至今还未颁布关于碳排放权交易的会计准则。通过对欧盟碳排放权与美国排污权相关会计处理方式分析研究,归纳比较碳排放权交易会计处理的几种观点,并为发展我国碳排放权交易会计提出建议。