Bequests, Inter Vivos Transfers, and Wealth Distribution

This paper constructs a heterogeneous agent overlapping generations model with bequests and inter vivos transfers. In the model, households in the same family line behave strategically to determine their consumption, working hours, gifts, and savings. Calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, the paper measures time preference and parental altruism consistent with the economy's capital-output ratio and the size of intergenerational transfers. The model with intergenerational transfers better explains, although not fully, the wealth distribution of the United States. The paper also analyzes the effects of government policy changes on wealth accumulation, distribution, and social welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D64, D91, H31.     

Market Power and Emissions Trading: Theory and Laboratory Results

Policymakers are concerned with market power being exploited by dominant firms in emission permit markets. Two types of market power may emerge: simple and exclusionary manipulation. Simple manipulation should result in reduced pollution‐control cost relative to command‐and‐control regulation. Exclusionary manipulation may result in increased cost. The paper reports results of an economic experiment to determine whether (i) such opportunities are successfully exploited when a dominant firm has the opportunity to do so, and (ii) the resulting outcomes are serious enough to merit consideration by regulators. Market power outcomes emerge and market efficiency is far below predicted levels.     

排放交易体系与新西兰农业

本文在分析新西兰国情的基础上,阐明了新西兰为何有别于其他发达国家,将农业一并纳入排放交易体系的原因。扼要叙述排放交易立法将农业纳入减排体系的机制和过程。通过个案研究,定量分析农业成本的增长幅度。深入研究农业减排所面临的困难和风险、可能产生的经济社会效应、带来的发展机遇以及存在着的不确定性。     

Strategic Behavior,Private Information,and Decentralization in the European Union Emissions Trading System

In the European Union Emissions Trading System, the supply of carbon permits is determined in a decentralized manner by Member States. Alternatively, the supply could be determined by an EU central authority. We analyze whether decentralization leads to lower total abatement costs under various assumptions about the behavior of Member States and the privacy of information about their abatement costs. If Member States do not behave strategically, then decentralization is preferred, regardless of whether abatement costs are private information. If the Member States behave strategically, then decentralization may or may not be preferred, depending on the degree of uncertainty about abatement cost parameters, the variation in emission endowments, and the number of Member States.     

Wealth Distribution and Optimal Inheritance Taxation in Life-cycle Economies with Intergenerational Transfers

Intergenerational transfers are introduced into a general equilibrium life-cycle model in order to explain observed levels of wealth heterogeneity. In our overlapping generations model, heterogenous agents face uncertain lifetime and leave both accidental and voluntary bequests to their children. Furthermore, agents face stochastic employment opportunities. The model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the US economy. Our results indicate that bequests only account for a small proportion of observed wealth heterogeneity. The introduction of an inheritance tax increases both welfare, as measured by the average lifetime utility of a newborn, and equality of the wealth distribution.
JEL classification : D 31; D 91; H 21; C 68; E 21     

Emissions Trading Mode in America and China and Its Future

The emissions trading is a kind of sustainable development measures that is based on market mechanism, and its growing is closely connected with the market development level. The level of American emissions permits market is relatively high, and also predicts the prospect of professional bourse pattern. Most of emissions permits transactions in China are organized by government environment authority, which make it lack of market function. Emissions permits is a kind of property rights. It is important and profitable, while the emissions trading market obviously possesses the two-class of original allocation and second-time transfer. But there are some decisive differences between emissions permits and ordinary transaction object, so the specialized bourse for emissions trading should be built.     

Assessing the performance of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme

The UK’s Climate Change Programme introduced an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for greenhouse gases. Firms in over 40 industrial sectors which have negotiated “Climate Change Agreements” setting quantitative energy efficiency targets can use the ETS to trade over-and under-compliance with these targets. In parallel, a limited number of firms have become major participants in the ETS as a result of an auction of subsidies for additional abatement commitments. The paper describes the UK arrangements and assesses the economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness of the ETS, drawing on evidence of participants’ behaviour both in the incentive auction, and in subsequent trading.     

Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. We find that output, abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading. Allowing trade between permit-trading and credit-trading sectors may increase welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading may outperform permit trading. Environmental policy can lead to exit, but also to entry of firms. Entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under imperfect competition. We find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions. Under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions.     

Trading Sulphur Emissions in Europe: `Guided Bilateral Trade'

In this paper a system of `guided permit trading' is developed for SO₂emissions reduction which considers permit trading as a bilateral andsequential process. This implies that in order to meet the deposition targetsat the end of the trading process, not every single trade transaction hasto meet the deposition targets. To ensure that the target is ultimately met,the number of permits traded should be controlled by a trade coordinatinginstitution. A simulation of the system of guided bilateral trading ofSO₂ permits among European countries on the basis of the SecondSO₂ Protocol indicates that some non-profitable trade transactionstake place. This prevents the cost effective emission allocation from beingfully achieved. However, the calculations show that guided bilateral permittrading may generate substantial cost savings while contributing toenvironmental protection.     

Intertemporal Permit Trading for the Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions

This paper integrates two themes in the intertemporal permitliterature through the construction of an intertemporal bankingsystem for a pollutant that creates both stock and flow damages. A permit banking system for the special case of a pollutant thatonly causes stock damages is also developed. This latter,simpler case corresponds roughly to the greenhouse gas emissionreduction regime proposed by the U.S. Department of State as ameans of fulfilling the U.S. commitment to the FrameworkConvention on Climate Change. This paper shows that environmentalregulators can achieve the socially optimal level of emissionsand output through time by setting the correct total sum ofallowable emissions, and specifying the correct intertemporaltrading ratio for banking and borrowing. For the case ofgreenhouse gases, we show that the optimal growth rate of permitprices, and therefore the optimal intertemporal trading rate, hasthe closed-form solution equal to the ratio of current marginalstock damages to the discounted future value of marginal stockdamages less the decay rate of emissions in the atmosphere. Given a non-optimal negotiated emission path we then derive apermit banking system that has the potential to lower net socialcosts by adjusting the intertemporal trading ratio taking intoaccount the behavior of private agents. We use a simplenumerical simulation model to illustrate the potential gains fromvarious possible banking systems.     

The Welfare Effects of Allowance Banking in Emissions Trading Programs

Permitting allowance banking in emissions trading programs can reduce expected compliance costs by giving capped firms flexibility to adjust the time path of abatement and to hedge against future uncertainty. Recent literature suggests that this compliance cost dividend is significant (Fell and Morgenstern Environ Resour Econ 47:275–297, 2010). Allowance banking may yield an environmental dividend (a) if the growth rate of marginal damages from emissions is less than the discount rate and (b) if emissions are lower in the short run as firms bank permits for use in later periods. A discrete, stochastic dynamic programming model is considered to simulate the two dividends of allowance banking in the context of the most recent Federal United States greenhouse gas cap-and-trade legislation. Simulation results show that under a range of parameter values, the environmental dividend has the same order of magnitude as the compliance cost dividend. Under the central set of parameters, allowance banking increases expected present value of benefits by about $350$ million dollars per year of the program. The environmental dividend, however, is completely eliminated if capped firms can borrow permits from future periods without limit.     

排污权交易市场构建的技术要件分析研究

我国自20世纪90年代开始引进排污权交易制度以来,已经经过了20年的时间,目前还处在试点中,距系统化、规范化的排污权交易市场的建立还有很大差距。文章指出,加快我国排污权交易市场的建设步伐,必须从分析构建排污权交易市场的关键要件出发,逐个突破。文章分析了影响我国排污权交易市场建立的几个关键的技术要件,并就目前应如何去突破提出了自己的看法和建议,以期为推动我国系统化、规范化公平有效的排污权交易市场的建立提供理论和技术支持。     

碳排放权交易会计的国际进展及借鉴

随着《京都议定书》的签署,发展低碳经济、建设碳排放权交易市场在我国拉开序幕,碳排放权成为一种具有流通性的稀缺资源,开始试点交易。但是,我国至今还未颁布关于碳排放权交易的会计准则。通过对欧盟碳排放权与美国排污权相关会计处理方式分析研究,归纳比较碳排放权交易会计处理的几种观点,并为发展我国碳排放权交易会计提出建议。     

关于中国碳排放权交易机制的构想

在碳排放量跃居全球首位的严峻压力下,中国清洁发展机制项目的发展成绩卓著。然而,碳排放权售价过低造成的巨大损失迫切要求中国构建自身的碳排放权交易机制。文章首先阐述了中国碳排放权交易的现状,接着分析了中国碳排放权交易存在的问题,并在此基础上提出了中国碳排放权交易机制的构想。     

京津冀协同发展复合式区域性碳市场体系研究

京津冀及周边地区的碳排放使本区域大气污染更加严重,控制碳排放是防治大气污染的重要举措。在区域大气污染需要统一治理的前提下,基于本区域各行政区成员处于不同碳排放发展阶段的现实背景,通过科学定位市场功能,明确各阶段的主要任务,实行总量控制,健全市场结构,重视管制机制和完善配套措施等方法,建立复合式区域性碳市场体系。     

知识是财富生产的精神力量

知识在社会生产与生活中的作用,在人类社会发展的不同阶段是不同的。在近代科学产生和机器大工业出现以前,谈不上有真正的科学知识的合并于生产和科学力并在生产中发挥作用。18世纪以来的机器大工业生产方式的发展,标志着科学向生产要素、生产方法转化和被合并于生产过程的时期的到来。知识积累是一种生产力,达到一定临界点的知识积累,成为推动知识创新和科学进步的内在力量。积累——创新——再积累——再创新的累进式发展,是知识进步的规律也是知识产品扩大再生产的规律。信息革命和当代知识密集的高技术生产方式的到来,标志着人的智能开发和人类向发达的智能人的转换进入了一个新阶段。     

欧美碳排放交易市场发展对我国的启示与借鉴

随着世界气候问题的凸现,发展低碳经济已经成为世界各国的共识,而发展碳排放交易则是引领低碳经济发展的必由之路.目前,我国碳排放交易虽取得较大发展,但仍缺乏一个统一的市场交易体系.在全国建立起碳排放交易市场已是刻不容缓.本文基于碳排放交易的内涵,结合欧美碳排放交易市场的发展经验,分析得出其对我国建设碳交易市场的启示,探讨我国建立碳排放交易市场的有效路径:逐步建立起完善的碳排放交易市场体系,构建基于分权化管理模式的区域性碳交易市场布局,完善碳排放交易法规制度,健全碳排放交易监管机制.