Hedging and the competitive firm under correlated price and background risk

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under correlated price and background risk when a futures market exists for hedging purposes. We show that imposing the background risk, be it additive or multiplicative, on the firm has no effect on the separation theorem. The full-hedging theorem, however, holds if the background risk is independent of the price risk. In the general case of the correlated price and background risk, we adopt the concept of expectation dependence to describe the bivariate dependence structure. When the background risk is additive, the firm finds it optimal to opt for an over-hedge or an under-hedge, depending on whether the price risk is positively or negatively expectation dependent on the background risk, respectively. When the background risk is multiplicative, both the concept of expectation dependence and the Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk aversion are called for to determine the firm’s optimal futures position.     

Loyalty Rewards Facilitate Tacit Collusion

Using a dynamic overlapping‐generations model, we show that loyalty rewards robustly facilitate tacit collusion. We compare the sustainability of tacit collusion when uniform prices are used, when loyal customers are rewarded without using commitment, and when loyalty rewards are implemented by committing to offering customers either lower fixed repeat‐purchase prices or fixed repeat‐purchase discounts. We find that, relative to uniform prices, rewarding loyalty without using commitment on the equilibrium path makes tacit collusion easier to sustain, because a deviating firm is unable to steal one period of industry profit before losing all future profits. When loyalty rewards are offered by firms committing to repeat‐purchase prices, collusion is even easier to sustain, because a deviating firm cannot renege on its discounted price for repeat‐purchase customers. When firms commit to repeat‐purchase discounts, they also commit to lowering the price for their repeat‐purchase customers if they undercut the regular price, rendering tacit collusion to be even more readily sustainable. Our results hold whether products are homogeneous or horizontally differentiated as in a Hotelling model.     

Peer‐to‐Peer File Sharing and the Market for Digital Information Goods

We study competitive interaction between two alternative models of digital content distribution over the Internet: peer‐to‐peer (p2p) file sharing and centralized client–server distribution. We present microfoundations for a stylized model of p2p file sharing where all peers are endowed with standard preferences and show that the endogenous structure of the network is conducive to sharing by a significant number of peers, even if sharing is costlier than freeriding. We build on this model of p2p to analyze the optimal strategy of a profit‐maximizing firm, such as Apple, that offers content available at positive prices. We characterize the size of the p2p network as a function of the firm's pricing strategy, and show that the firm may be better off setting high prices, allowing the network to survive, and that the p2p network may work more efficiently in the presence of the firm than in its absence.     

Unionisation structures, productivity and firm performance: New insights from a heterogeneous firm model

This paper introduces collective bargaining at the firm and at the sector level into the heterogeneous firm model of Melitz and Ottaviano (Melitz, M. J., Ottaviano, G. I. P., 2008. Market size, trade, and productivity. Review of Economic Studies 75 (1), 295-316). It then analyses how the two bargaining regimes change aggregate industry productivity and firm performance relative to a competitive labour market. While sector-level bargaining forces the least productive firms to exit and thus increases average productivity relative to the competitive benchmark, firm-level bargaining allows less productive firms to stay in the market and thus reduces average productivity. Sector-level bargaining also results in higher average output and profit levels than either firm-level bargaining or a competitive labour market. The paper also shows that the choice between sector- and firm-level bargaining can involve a trade-off between product variety and product prices: Not only the average price level but also product variety tends to be lower under sector-level bargaining than under firm-level bargaining.     

Imitation and price competition in a differentiated market

We study the stable market outcome that evolves in a spatially differentiated market when price-competing firms choose actions by imitation of the most profitable firm. We compare and contrast the stable outcomes under two imitation procedures: one, where each firm immediately imitates the most profitable firm, and the other when a firm imitates another firm only if it is more profitable while being “sufficiently similar” (in context of the market segment it operates in) or “sufficiently close”. In either case, the symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium is always a stable outcome. However, when imitation of the most profitable firm is immediate and market differentiation is ‘moderate’, states with prices lower than the Nash equilibrium are also stable. In contrast, when imitation of the most profitable firm is more gradual and market differentiation is below a threshold, states with prices above the Nash equilibrium are also stable. Thus, while competitive evolutionary pressure in this imitation based model does result in the Nash equilibrium always being stable, other outcomes may be stable as well. Interestingly, the states that are stable under gradual imitation give the firms a higher profit than the stable states under immediate imitation.     

Corporate hedging and input price risk

Input price variability is an important source of risk for corporations that process raw commodities. Models of optimal input hedging are developed in this paper based on the maximization of managerial expected utility. The relationship between hedging strategies and output decisions is examined to assess the impact of the ability to set output prices on futures market participation. As a firm's ability to set output prices diminishes in the short run, input futures positions increase although the optimal hedge ratio may either increase or decrease. For a perfectly competitive firm, however, shifts in output price caused by input price changes provide a natural cash market hedge of input price risk and reduce the firm's optimal input futures position.     

Pricing strategy in the product and service market

Existing studies have mainly focused on pricing in either primary markets or aftermarkets. However, in practice, prices in primary markets and aftermarkets are closely correlated. This study examines the joint pricing strategy in both primary markets and aftermarkets based on customer utility and establishes a pricing model for profit-maximization firms. Our results show that overpricing in the aftermarket is caused by customer myopia, while the motivation of the firm to avoid customer myopia depends on its pricing strategy. A quantity–price contract in the aftermarket is designed to raise the firm’s profit.     

Risk shocks and housing supply: A quantitative analysis

This paper analyzes the role of stochastic uncertainty in a multi-sector housing model with financial frictions. We include time varying uncertainty (i.e. risk shocks) in the technology shocks that affect housing production and provide estimates of the time-series properties of risk shocks by using firm level productivity data. The analysis demonstrates that risk shocks to the housing production sector are a quantitatively important impulse mechanism for understanding housing price movements. Specifically, the model can match the volatility of housing prices observed in the data. It is also demonstrated that adjustment costs are important in replicating the contemporaneous correlation of housing prices with GDP and residential investment. Critically, bankruptcy costs act as an endogenous markup factor in housing prices and are an important determinant of house price volatility. However, in comparison to housing demand shocks, risk shocks have low explanatory power for real quantities.     

Firm governance and duopoly: in weakness may lie strength

The paper proposes a model of firm governance when two firms compete in a duopoly. The paper assumes that a motivational asymmetry exists between owners and managers: owners wish to obtain maximum profits, managers wish to maximize sales. Managers perceive that salary, social status or future job prospects are more closely associated with firm size (i.e. sales) than with firm profits. The paper takes an agency view of the firm where owners only indirectly influence the behaviour of firms through the level of control they exert over managers. The paper demonstrates that a weakly governed firm, acting as a sales maximizer, can gain a competitive advantage over a strongly governed firm, acting as a profit maximizer. The paper examines the extent of this advantage under cost leadership and differentiation strategies. The paper also demonstrates that the objectives of profit maximization and maximization of competitive advantage are not necessarily congruent. The paper graphically represents the profit functions of the two firms illustrating the Nash equilibrium under Cournot and Stackelberg conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Quantity and price controls by the firm under demand uncertainty and welfare implications

A monopoly facing an uncertain demand can affect its profit distribution through the choice of ex ante controls. This paper compares two modes of behavior - price-setting and quantity-setting - in the context of a mean-variance model. The main results are: (a) With nonlinear cost, the monopoly will not be indifferent between the two modes. In the particular case of quadratic cost, conditions for the dominance of price-setting over quantity-setting behavior are derived. (b) Whereas it is well-known that the risk averse, quantity-setting monopoly will produce less under uncertainty than under certainty (or risk neutrality), the price-setting monopoly increases its expected output when faced by uncertain demand, possibly exceeding even the competitive output under uncertainty. (c) Using expected social surplus as a welfare criterion, price-setting emerges as the welfare-dominant behavior when there is a conflict between the privately and the socially preferred modes. (d) Finally, there exist conditions where price-setting monopolies welfare-dominate a competitive industry facing the same random demand.     

Attention to Fairness versus Profits: The Determinants of Satisficing Pricing

We investigate determinants of the competitive behaviour of satisficing, non‐profit‐maximizing pricing. Taking a behavioural approach, we argue that pricing decisions are motivated by fairness objectives as well as the desire to achieve economic objectives. We draw from the attention‐based view to build our theoretical model explaining the contextual conditions that are most likely to be associated with attention to fairness relative to attention to achieving maximum profits when setting prices. Our hypothesized predictors of satisficing pricing decisions encompass the institutional context in which the firm is embedded, the exchange context with customers and suppliers, and the context internal to the firm. Hypotheses are tested with survey data of over 3000 firms from 15 countries. We find that the decision to set prices at a satisficing level is remarkably common, and its prevalence is associated with contextual factors that are consistent with greater attention to fairness concerns.     

Pricing Experience Goods: The Effects of Customer Recognition and Commitment

In a two‐period model of nondurable experience goods, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD) and price commitment (PC) (relative to time‐consistent pricing) in a monopoly. We find that when the static, full‐information monopoly price is higher (lower) than the mean consumer valuation, PC yields higher (lower) profits and social welfare than BBPD. We also identify the market conditions under which BBPD does not increase firm profits and provide an explanation as to when the firm should discriminate against its first‐time and repeat customers, respectively.     

Production theory with profit-constrained revenue-maximization: The duality approach

This paper derives a general version of Baumol's production theory, where the main behavioral assumption is ‘revenue maximization subject to a profit constraint’ instead of ‘profit maximization’. This theory turns out to be analogous to the neoclassical (competitive) production and consumption theories. Employing the fruitful duality approach it is presented here in a unified and very economical form that provides a complete and general analysis of the comparative static behavior of Baumol's firm.     

Bargains Followed by Bargains: When Switching Costs Make Markets More Competitive

In markets where consumers have switching costs and firms cannot price‐discriminate, firms have two conflicting strategies. A firm can either offer a low price to attract new consumers and build future market share or a firm can offer a high price to exploit the partial lock‐in of their existing consumers. This paper develops a theory of competition when overlapping generations of consumers have switching costs and firms produce differentiated products. Competition takes place over an infinite horizon with any number of firms. This paper shows that the relationship between the level of switching costs, firms' discount rate, and the number of firms determines whether firms offer low or high prices. Similar to previous duopoly studies, switching costs are likely to facilitate lower (higher) equilibrium prices when switching costs are small (large) or when a firm's discount rate is large (small). Unlike previous studies, this paper demonstrates that the number of firms also determines whether switching costs are pro‐ or anticompetitive, and with a sufficiently large (small) number of firms switching costs are pro‐ (anti‐) competitive.     

Models of Competitive Price Promotions: Some Empirical Evidence from the Coffee and Saltine Crackers Markets

I present tests of a competitive rationale for price promotions. In a model with a population of informed and uninformed customers, price competition yields a static equilibrium in which each seller draws a price from a specified density function. Price data on coffee and saltine crackers products are used to test whether the sample of prices on each product could have possibly come from the theoretically specified density function. The results suggest that some markets are indeed consistent with the marginal distributions of prices predicted by the model. Furthermore, in the process of testing this rationale for price promotions, estimates are obtained for the marginal cost of each product, the number of competing goods, and the percentage of informed consumers. The resulting excess variability of these estimates across competing brands can also raise questions with respect to the empirical validity of the model.     

Production location and random input price

The purpose of this paper is to develop systematically the theory of plant location for a competitive firm facing random input price. It will be shown that the impact of input price uncertainty on the firm's optimum location depend crucially upon (i) the firm's attitude toward risk, (ii) the characteristics of the production function, (iii) the structure of transport costs on inputs and output, and (iv) the type of input usages. Moreover, and more importantly, some conclusions obtained by prior studies on location theory in a certainty world can also be shown to be special cases of our more general results, but some are not justifiable in a world with random input price.     

Dynamic competition with consumer inertia

We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where chosen prices potentially affect future market shares, but certainly do not affect current sales. This assumption of consumer inertia causes (noncooperative) coordination on high prices only to be possible as an equilibrium for low values of the discount factor. High discount factors increase opportunism and aggressiveness of competition to such an extent that high prices are no longer sustainable as an equilibrium outcome. Moreover, we find that both monopolization and enduring market share and price fluctuations (price wars) can be equilibrium path phenomena without requiring exogenous shocks in market or firm characteristics.     

The directional profit efficiency measure: on why profit inefficiency is either technical or allocative

The directional distance function encompasses Shephard’s input and output distance functions and also allows nonradial projections of the assessed firm onto the frontier of the technology in a preassigned direction. However, the criteria underlying the choice of its associated directional vector are numerous. When market prices are observed and firms have a profit maximizing behavior, it seems natural to choose as the directional vector that projecting inefficient firms towards profit maximizing benchmarks. Based on that choice of directional vector, we introduce the directional profit efficiency measure and show that, in this general setting, profit inefficiency can be categorized as either technical, for firms situated within the interior of the technology, or allocative, for firms lying on the frontier. We implement and illustrate the analytical model by way of Data Envelopment Analysis techniques, and introduce the necessary optimization programs for profit inefficiency measurement.     

Shadow profit maximization and a measure of overall inefficiency

Determining the profit maximizing input–output bundle of a firm requires data on prices. This paper shows how endogenously determined shadow prices can be used in place of actual prices to obtain the optimal input–output bundle where the firm’s shadow profit is maximized. This approach amounts to an application of the Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM) formulated by Varian [(1984) The Non-parametric approach to production analysis. Econometrica 52:3 (May) 579–597] based on shadow prices rather than actual prices. At these shadow prices, the shadow profit of a firm is zero. The maximum shadow profit that could have been attained at some other input–output bundle is shown to be a measure of the inefficiency of the firm. Because the benchmark input–output bundle is always an observed bundle from the data, it can be determined without having to solve any elaborate programming problem.

Asymmetric Price Adjustment and Consumer Search: An Examination of the Retail Gasoline Market

This article proposes a new explanation for why retail prices respond more quickly to cost increases than cost decreases. I develop a search model that assumes consumers’ expectations of prices are based on prices observed during previous purchases. This model predicts that consumers search less when prices are falling, which results in higher profit margins and a slower price response to cost changes. I then empirically examine patterns of retail gasoline price response and price dispersion to show that this model predicts observed price behavior better than previously suggested explanations.