Frequency of observation and the estimation of integrated volatility in deep and liquid financial markets

Using two newly available ultrahigh-frequency datasets, we investigate empirically how frequently one can sample certain foreign exchange and U.S. Treasury security returns without contaminating estimates of their integrated volatility with market microstructure noise. Using the standard realized volatility estimator, we find that one can sample dollar/euro returns as frequently as once every 15 to 20 s without contaminating estimates of integrated volatility; 10-year Treasury note returns may be sampled as frequently as once every 2 to 3 min on days without U.S. macroeconomic announcements, and as frequently as once every 40 s on announcement days. Using a simple realized kernel estimator, this sampling frequency can be increased to once every 2 to 5 s for dollar/euro returns and to about once every 30 to 40 s for T-note returns. These sampling frequencies, especially in the case of dollar/euro returns, are much higher than those that are generally recommended in the empirical literature on realized volatility in equity markets. The higher sampling frequencies for dollar/euro and T-note returns likely reflect the superior depth and liquidity of these markets.     

Gaining a competitive edge through acquisitions: Evidence from the telecommunications industry

I study the announcement effects of all acquisitions in the recent telecom wave on both the acquirers and their industry competitors. I find evidence of negative rival returns (? 0.55%, t-stat = 2.47) by focusing on non-horizontal acquisitions where rivals are less susceptible to experience positive returns due to increased market power or expectation that some will become future targets themselves. I find that this effect is worse for closer rivals defined as having similar size and being in the same primary service area as the acquirer. Competitor returns are positively correlated with those of the acquirers suggesting that the negative impact experienced by competitors is driven by acquisitions in which the acquirer itself is earning negative abnormal returns. Results are broadly consistent with the Competitive Advantage Hypothesis that posits acquisitions are a means of corporate restructuring in a changing environment, awarding the acquirer a competitive edge and thereby making these acquisitions costly for their non-merging competitors.     

How costly is the Sarbanes Oxley Act? Evidence on the effects of the Act on corporate profitability

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was intended to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. However, critics have argued that the costs of SOX far outweigh its intended benefits. Prior studies based on stock-price reactions to SOX-related events document mixed evidence on the expected impact of SOX. In contrast, we provide evidence on the net realized costs of SOX by examining its impact on operating profitability. We find that average cash flows decline by 1.3% of total assets after SOX. These costs are more significant for smaller firms, for more complex firms, and for firms with lower-growth opportunities. Annually, these costs range from $6 million for smaller firms to $39 million for larger firms. Further, we document that net SOX-related costs are not limited to one-time expenses associated with internal-control design and implementation. In aggregate, for the 1428 firms in our sample, these costs amount to about $19 billion per year. Profitability is lower for up to four years post-SOX. To our knowledge, ours are the first estimates of the realized net costs imposed by SOX.     

Corporate liquidity and the contingent nature of bank credit lines: Evidence on the costs and consequences of bank default

I study the impact of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy and resultant inability to honor its obligations as a lender under committed credit lines. Firms that lost access to a credit line committed by Lehman Brothers experienced abnormal stock returns of − 3%, on average, on the day of and day after Lehman's bankruptcy filing, amounting to roughly $5.7 billion in aggregate, risk-adjusted losses. These losses were significantly larger for firms that were more financially constrained, firms with less cash, firms for whom Lehman was a lead-bank, and firms that lost access to larger amounts of committed credit. During the four quarters immediately following Lehman's collapse, firms that lost access to a credit line cut their investment spending significantly while simultaneously hoarding more cash than comparable firms. Overall, these findings indicate that firms that lost access to a credit line incurred economically significant costs and real-side consequences as a result of Lehman's default on its loan commitments.     

Preferred stock: Some insights into capital structure

This study analyzes the reactions of equity holders and bondholders to the announcement of 427 preferred stock issues. We document an average equity announcement effect of − 0.65%. This reaction is positively influenced by a number of measures of firm creditworthiness and transparency and is higher for bank issuers. The equity market reaction is negatively influenced by convertibility (and the moneyness of the embedded option) and by the firm's accounting treatment of the issue (specifically if the issue is classified as equity). We find that average credit default swap spreads decrease by 50 basis points after the issue announcement. This decrease is also larger for more creditworthy and transparent firms. Convertibility and the moneyness of the embedded option further decrease the CDS spread. In aggregate, the decrease in equity value is much smaller than the increase in the value of the issuer's debt.     

How corporate governance affect firm value? Evidence on a self-dealing channel from a natural experiment in Korea

Prior work in emerging markets provides evidence that better corporate governance predicts higher market value, but very little evidence on the specific channels through which governance can increase value. We provide evidence, from a natural experiment in Korea, that reduced tunneling is an important channel. Korean legal reform in 1999 changed the board structure of “large” firms (assets > 2 trillion won) relative to smaller firms. In event studies of the reform events, we show that large firms whose controllers have incentive to tunnel earn strong positive returns, relative to mid-sized firms. In panel regressions over 1998–2004, we also show that better governance moderates the negative effect of related-party transactions on value and increases the sensitivity of firm profitability to industry profitability (consistent with less tunneling).     

Do auctions induce a winner's curse? New evidence from the corporate takeover market

We contrast the winner's curse hypothesis and the competitive market hypothesis as potential explanations for the observed returns to bidders in corporate takeovers. The winner's curse hypothesis posits suboptimal behavior in which winning bidders fail to adapt their strategies to the level of competition and the amount of uncertainty in the takeover environment and predicts that bidder returns are inversely related to the level of competition in a given deal and to the uncertainty in the value of the target. Our measure of takeover competition comes from a unique data set on the auction process that occurs prior to the announcement of a takeover. In our empirical estimation, we control for the endogeneity between bidder returns and the level of competition in takeover deals. Controlling for endogeneity, we find that the returns to bidders are not significantly related to takeover competition. We also find that uncertainty in the value of the target does not reduce bidder returns. Related analysis indicates that prestigious investment banks do not promote overbidding. Analysis of post-takeover operating performance also fails to find any negative effects of takeover competition. As a whole, the results indicate that the breakeven returns to bidders in corporate takeovers stem not from the winner's curse but from the competitive market for targets that occurs predominantly prior to the public announcement of bids.     

Google Internet search activity and volatility prediction in the market for foreign currency

I study whether evolution in the number of Google Internet searches for particular keywords can predict volatility in the market for foreign currency. I find that data on Google searches for the keywords economic crisis + financial crisis and recession has incremental predictive power beyond the GARCH(1,1). These results support the mixture of distributions hypothesis in that volatility is linked to the stochastic rate at which information flows into the marketplace. These results also demonstrate the potential for Google to become a storehouse of information for financial markets.     

Predictive regression with order-p autoregressive predictors

Studies of predictive regressions analyze the case where y_t is predicted by x_t ? 1 with x_t being first-order autoregressive, AR(1). Under some conditions, the OLS-estimated predictive coefficient is known to be biased. We analyze a predictive model where y_t is predicted by x_t ? 1, x_t ? 2,… x_t ? p with x_t being autoregressive of order p, AR(p) with p > 1. We develop a generalized augmented regression method that produces a reduced-bias point estimate of the predictive coefficients and derive an appropriate hypothesis testing procedure. We apply our method to the prediction of quarterly stock returns by dividend yield, which is apparently AR(2). Using our method results in the AR(2) predictor series having insignificant effect, although under OLS, or the commonly assumed AR(1) structure, the predictive model is significant. We also generalize our method to the case of multiple AR(p) predictors.     

Momentum is really short-term momentum

We demonstrate the estimation biases that arise when stock returns from 12 month prior and 2 month prior are included within intermediate and recent past momentum profits. These biases lead to an overestimation of intermediate past momentum but an underestimation of recent past momentum in the US market. There is no significant difference between the predictability of stock performance in the intermediate past and the recent past once we exclude these two months from the construction of momentum strategies in the US and each of the 26 major international markets.     

Dynamic news effects in high frequency Euro exchange rates

This paper investigates the dynamic, short-run response of Euro exchange rate returns to the information surprise of global macroeconomic announcements. In addition, it advocates a new approach to modelling intraday exchange rate volatility to allow accurate characterisation of reactions. US macroeconomic news generates far more dramatic responses in EUR–USD returns and returns volatility than news on the macroeconomic performance of other countries. However, some Eurozone and German indicators are also important and UK announcements are important for the EUR–GBP rate. The reaction of exchange rate returns to news is very quick and occurs within the first 5 min of the release with very little reaction in the 15 min before and after. These findings show that exchange rates are strongly linked to fundamentals in the 5-min intervals immediately following the data release. Reactions to news are found to vary in magnitude over the sample, with the largest responses to news occurring in response to turning points in the cumulative flow of news.     

The impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks stocks. Some evidence of shift contagion in Europe

This paper analyzes the influence of the recent European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns for 15 countries. Our data span the period December 14th 2007 - March 8th 2013 that encompasses several episodes of economic and financial turmoil since the collapse of the subprime credit market. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we use an explicit multifactor model of equity returns extended with a sovereign risk factor. Second, we adopt a Smooth Transition Regression (STR) framework that allows for an endogenous definition of crisis periods and captures the changes in parameters associated with shift contagion. We find that the negative impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns has been mostly confined to European banks, whereas U.S. banks appear to be unharmed by its direct impact and may even have benefited from it. Besides, we find some evidence of shift contagion across Europe.     

Investor sentiment and stock returns: Wenchuan Earthquake

This paper exploits a natural experiment (the Wenchuan Earthquake in China) to study the effects of investor sentiment on stock returns. We find that during the 12 months following the earthquake, stock returns are significantly lower for firms headquartered nearer the epicenter than for firms further away. Further analyses indicate that this pattern of stock returns does not exist before or long after the earthquake, and cannot be explained by actual economic losses or a change in systematic risk. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the interaction of local bias and investor sentiment affecting stock returns.     

Can dual-currency sovereign CDS predict exchange rate returns?

This paper examines both the time-series and cross-sectional variation in the difference between US dollar and Euro denominated sovereign CDS spreads for a group of Eurozone countries. We find that the spread difference between dual-currency sovereign CDS significantly affects the bilateral exchange rate returns. In addition, the difference could predict the cumulative exchange rate returns up to 10 days. The results strongly suggest that the difference contains important information for the exchange rate dynamics at various phases of the crisis.     

Intraday stock price effects of ad hoc disclosures: the German case

This paper examines intraday stock price and trading volume effects caused by ad hoc disclosures in Germany. The evidence suggests that the stock prices react within 30 min after the ad hoc disclosures. The adjustment of the trading volume needs even more time. We find no evidence for abnormal high price nor trading volume reactions in the five transactions before ad hoc disclosures. The bigger the company, which announces an ad hoc disclosure, the less severe the abnormal price effect, following the announcement, is. The higher the trading volume at the last trading day before the announcement, the higher the price and trading volume effects, after the ad hoc disclosures, are.     

Do DOW returns really influence the intraday Spanish stock market behavior?

Although the behavior of the Spanish stock market has been studied from many different points of view, none of the previous research has ever analyzed the influence of previous daytime, overnight and daily returns from the DOW and IBEX upon 5-min intraday returns of the IBEX throughout the complete trading session. Clear evidence is provided relative to the influence of the DOW. The main finding that it underreacts to the DOW returns in the first hours of trading but overreacts during the last 2 h (after the opening of the US markets) would help to develop a profitable trading strategy.     

Individual and institutional herding and the impact on stock returns: Evidence from Taiwan stock market

Using high frequency intraday data, this paper investigates the herding behavior of institutional and individual investors in the Taiwan stock market. The study finds evidence of herding by both investors but a stronger herding tendency among institutional than among individual investors. Institutional investors herd more on firms with small capitalizations and lower turnovers and they follow positive feedback strategies. The portfolios that institutional investors herd buy outperform those they sell by an average of 1.009% during the 20 days after intense trading episodes. By contrast, individual investors herd more on firms with small sizes and higher turnovers, and they crowd to buy (sell) stocks with negative (positive) past returns. The portfolios that individual investors herd buy underperform those they sell by an average of − 0.829% during the following 20 days. Moreover, these return differences of both investors are more pronounced under a market with higher pressure and among small stocks. These findings suggest that the herding of institutional investors speeds up the price-adjustment process and is more likely to be driven by correlated private information, while individual herding is most likely to be driven by behavior and emotions.     

The nexus between financial integration and real economy: Solow-growth model concept

This paper aims to investigate the nexus between financial integration and the real economy in ASEAN + 3 economies based on the concept of Solow-Growth Model. The equity indices as a proxy for financial markets are collected from each ASEAN + 3 members and are segmented between two periods; before and after the financial cooperation agreement period. The finding presents several outcomes; 1) no cointegration nexus is found in the system during the pre-agreement periods; 2) the markets are found cointegrated during the post-agreement period, 3) financial integration is found to influence the real sectors of ASEAN + 3 economies. Finally, this study offers policy implications to improve financial integration for stabilizing the real economy.     

Command-and-control: Alternative futures of geoengineering in an age of global weirding

In July 2012, Russ George, the founder of Planktos Inc., organized efforts to dump 100 tons of iron sulfate off the coast of Canada to engineer a plankton bloom that would, ostensibly, absorb carbon dioxide and store it in the depths of the Pacific Ocean. As George's geoengineering experiment is one of the largest and first of its kind, many were quick to denounce his rogue action while others were delighted to see that he succeeded as a large algae bloom was reported to have emerged. Using the George event as a point of entry for exploring alternative futures of geoengineering in an age of global weirding, this project fuses the 2 × 2 scenario modeling technique with the “Mānoa School” four-futures method by situating command and control, along X (control) and Y (command) axes as two critical uncertainties and key drivers of change that will impact the design, development, and diffusion of climate mitigation engineering initiatives, which some see as holding the only solution to avert global catastrophe and others condemn as a postnormal remedy.