Search cost,trading strategies and optimal market structure

The theory of Walrasian equilibrium yields a set of prices at which the aggregate competitive demand for each commodity equals its aggregate competitive supply. However, even at equilibrium prices the theory of competitive equilibrium does not explicitly offer explanation regarding the manner in which trades are actually executed. This paper considers a model where trade takes place in a decentralized fashion and examines in a dynamic game-theoretic framework, the role of social institution of money and markets in facilitating exchange. The steady state Nash equilibrium derived in the paper demonstrates how, depending on the level of transaction costs associated with a market setup (synonymously, trading posts to exchange possible pairs of goods) appropriate monetary trade emerges, which like a hub and spoke network (Starr and Stinchcombe, 1999) makes some markets non-functioning and in equilibrium only the markets having trade through the medium of exchange continue to exist. However, despite the obvious advantages of a market setup in reducing search costs, pure random search for a complementary trading partner (as considered by Ostroy and Starr, 1974; Kiyotaki and Wright , 1989; and others) prevails in many economies, especially, in many developing economies. This paper models this feature of developing economies by introducing differences in transaction costs across agents and shows why sustainable equilibria might exist exhibiting random search for certain commodities even in the presence of established markets.     

中美建设工程交易费用影响因素比较——基于中美调研数据

从影响建设工程交易费用的决定性因素入手,构建了建设工程交易费用影响因素假设模型。利用来自中国和美国的调研数据,应用结构方程模型验证了研究假设。结果显示:中国业主行为的不确定性对交易费用有正向影响,且该影响在中国比在美国大;承包商行为的不确定性对建设工程交易费用具有正向影响,且该影响在美国比在中国大;交易环境和机制的不确定性对项目管理效率具有负向影响,且该影响在中国比在美国大;交易环境和机制的不确定性对建设工程交易费用具有负向影响,项目管理效率对建设工程交易费用具有正向影响。     

The economic consequences of substituting carbon payments for crop subsidies in U.S. agriculture

There is a growing body of literature on the costs of sequestering carbon. However, no studies have examined the interplay between farm commodity programs and carbon sequestration programs. This study investigates two dimensions of the interaction between farm commodity programs and afforestation programs, using a price-endogenous sector model of agriculture in the United States. First, this study compares the fiscal and welfare costs of achieving specific carbon targets through afforestation, with and without current farm programs. Second, it examines the welfare, fiscal, and carbon consequences of replacing existing farm subsidies, wholly or in part, with payments for carbon. Two approaches, Hicksian and Marshallian, are investigated. In the first, the sector model is used to quantify the carbon consequences and fiscal costs associated with various combinations of farm commodity and carbon sequestration programs that leave consumers and producers in the U.S. agricultural sector no worse off than under existing farm programs. The second approach focuses on the carbon and welfare consequences of various farm commodity and carbon sequestration programs that hold total program fiscal costs constant at current levels. Althouth the methodology and data are applied to the United States, the issues addressed are common in a number of developed nations, particularly within the European Union (EU). Adapting existing sector models in these nations to perform similar analyses would provide policy makers with more precise information about the nature of the trade-offs involved with second-best policies for replacing farm commodity subsidies with tree planting subsidies.The research reported in this paper was partially funded by the United States Environmental Protection Agency under contract number 68W90077. It does not reflect the official position of that agency. Mention of trade names does not constitute endorsement.     

Analysis of threshold cointegration with asymmetric adjustments in the Hong Kong grocery industry

High market concentration in the Hong Kong grocery industry has been prevalent over many years with the domination of a few large supermarket chains. However, no research has been conducted on the price dynamics between the supermarket and non-supermarket sectors to investigate whether the non-supermarket sector can impose competitive discipline on the dominating supermarket chains. We argue that standard cointegration tests cannot allow for transaction costs and distinguish whether the price co-movement is attributable to price competition or collusion. Our study therefore fills this research gap by adopting the threshold cointegration tests in a three-regime threshold vector error-correction model to account for the asymmetric price adjustment dynamics between supermarket and non-supermarket sectors of Hong Kong and evaluate the market power of the supermarket sectors in the presence of transaction costs. Our results favour the presence of cointegration between the supermarket and non-supermarket price indices with asymmetric adjustment dynamics. We interpret the results of statistically significant downward price adjustments in the outer-band regimes as the evidence of mutual price competition. Nevertheless, the supermarket sector has stronger market power than the non-supermarket sector, and therefore can sustain higher price level without inducing substantial competition pressures inside the neutral band.     

Strategic Research Partnerships: A Managerial Perspective

Private sector incentives to participate in research partnerships can be grouped roughly into two categories: cost-economizing incentives and strategic incentives. This paper summarizes the argument in two streams of thought that are often identified with these two sides: the transaction-cost/incomplete contracts approach and the strategic management approach. The paper recounts business motives to engage in research partnerships in each and points out that differentiating between more traditional economic perspectives (transaction costs, incomplete contracts) and strategic management/organizational theory perspectives (strategic networks, resource-dependent view, dynamic capabilities, knowledge-based view, organizational learning, options approach) may not be as sharp as one might suppose at first. The complementary nature of these perspectives should be encouraging for theoreticians looking for a more integrated model of collaboration.     

Transaction costs and planner intervention

In this paper, I examine a two-period general equilibrium model in which transaction costs are incurred whenever financial contracts are traded. These transaction costs are real and convex. The presence of these transaction costs results in a Pareto inefficient equilibrium allocation. Attempting to fix this problem, the planner will intervene by scaling the transaction costs either up or down. The intervention must satisfy fiscal balance meaning that the summed value of transaction costs will remain constant. I prove that over a generic subset of household utility functions and endowments and subject to an upper bound on the number of household types, there exists an open set of planner interventions that lead to a Pareto superior allocation.     

Strategic Research Partnerships: A Managerial Perspective

Private sector incentives to participate in research partnerships can be grouped roughly into two categories: cost-economizing incentives and strategic incentives. This paper summarizes the argument in two streams of thought that are often identified with these two sides: the transaction-cost/incomplete contracts approach and the strategic management approach. The paper recounts business motives to engage in research partnerships in each and points out that differentiating between more traditional economic perspectives (transaction costs, incomplete contracts) and strategic management/organizational theory perspectives (strategic networks, resource-dependent view, dynamic capabilities, knowledge-based view, organizational learning, options approach) may not be as sharp as one might suppose at first. The complementary nature of these perspectives should be encouraging for theoreticians looking for a more integrated model of collaboration.     

公共产品供给主体及边界确定的交易费用经济学分析——兼论我国公共产品供给过程中交易费用的计量

将新制度经济学中交易费用理论引入公共产品供给分析,给出了供给公共产品的主体确定的理论模型,并在威廉姆森范式扩展的基础上得出了各个主体的边界,认为最优公共产品供给方式的选择和主体边界的确定,取决于公共产品供给过程中发生的交易费用.测算了中国公私部门供给公共产品过程中存在的交易费用,发现就我国公共产品的供给而言,在一定的条件下将公共产品供给由政府部门交给私人部门与第三部门可以节约交易费用,提高公共产品供给的效率.     

CARBON REDUCTION COSTS IN NEW ENGLAND'S POWER SECTOR

This paper examines the cost of reducing carbon emissions in New England's power sector. The analysis relies on detailed sectoral studies of costs and resource potentials for demand-side efficiency, cogeneration, renewables, and conventional resource options. Sectoral studies' results were integrated using a production-cost model to estimate the total cost and rate impacts of carbon reduction strategies relative to a business-as-usual forecast. To capture potential uncertainties, the analysis takes into account variations in capital costs, fuel prices, resource utilization levels, and base case retirements of existing power plants. Results show that New England's power sector can freeze carbon emissions at current levels or reduce carbon emissions while simultaneously decreasing customers' total electricity bills.     

Small trades and volatility increases after stock splits

In this paper, we examine the trading activity and return volatility pattern before and after splits. Unlike previous studies, we employ high-frequency transaction data and more powerful asymptotical tests on the impact of split on volatility. Furthermore, we examine the relationship between volatility and volume using different volatility measures and controlling for the effects of autocorrelation and trading costs. We find that small trades increase significantly after stock splits and the increase in return volatility is strongly related to the increase in small trades after stock splits. The results support our contention that the post-split volatility increase is driven primarily by the trading activity of smaller noise investors. Test results are robust to different measures of trading activity and return volatility.     

Market Efficiency Reloaded: Why Insider Trades do not Reveal Exploitable Information

Abstract. Several studies have emphasized a slow price adjustment to reported insider trades for Germany. The results presented in this paper, though, show that this is mainly caused by a subset of high arbitrage risk stocks. In fact, the abnormal return difference between the quintiles of stocks with highest and lowest idiosyncratic risk is in the range of 2.99–4.90% over a 20‐day interval. These results are robust even in the context of a joint generalized least squares approach. By developing a simple zero‐investment arbitrage trading strategy mimicking insider trades, it turns out that such a trading strategy, in most cases, generates significant positive returns as long as transaction costs are neglected. However, the outperformance disappears in all risk quintiles, if bid/ask spreads are taken into account. We conclude that the market's under‐reaction to reported insider trades can mainly be explained by the cost of risky arbitrage and is therefore not exploitable.     

Are there too few trades during the NFL draft?

College football players are initially assigned to teams in the National Football League (NFL) through the league’s draft selection process. At each team’s turn to pick, the team has the option of exercising the pick itself or trading it to another team. If gains from trade are exhausted, draft picks should be exercised by the team with the highest expected value. That is, the expected player contribution garnered from a given pick should not be dependent on whether the pick was traded or retained. Regression results, however, indicate that controlling for a player’s draft position, when a team trades up to acquire a player, that player is more likely to have greater on-field success. This suggests that there are too few draft day trades. Plausible reasons are high transaction costs or the fear of media scrutiny that draft trades can engender.     

基于供应链视角的工程项目管理研究

首先对传统工程项目管理模式进行描述,发现了这种管理模式的两个固有缺陷:利益相关者之间的高度对立关系和高昂的交易成本。为解决这两个问题,供应链管理的思想需要被引入。结合供应链的理念,本文阐述了工程建设行业的特点,并提出了一种将其有效整合的管理模式,从整体上优化工程的建造环节,实现了利益相关者之间的多赢。     

Access to capital in rural Thailand: An estimated model of formal vs. informal credit

This paper analyzes the mechanism underlying access to credit, focusing on two important aspects of rural credit markets. First, moneylenders and other informal lenders coexist with formal lending institutions such as government or commercial banks, and, more recently, micro-lending institutions. Second, potential borrowers presumably face sizable transaction costs in obtaining external credit. We develop and estimate a model based on limited enforcement and transaction costs that provides a unified view of these facts. Based on data from Thailand, the results show that the limited ability of banks to enforce contracts, more than transaction costs, is crucial in understanding the observed diversity of lenders.     

Factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets: Who bears what and why?

Environmental policy instruments generate transaction costs to public and private parties. There is a growing literature reporting on the size of transaction costs produced by environmental policy instruments. This paper extends that literature through an analysis of the factors that influence transaction costs in environmental policy and how this influence occurs. The theory based factors that influence transaction costs are categorised as: 1) transaction characteristics; 2) transactor characteristics; 3) nature of the institutional environment; and 4) nature of the institutional arrangements. We examined how these factors influenced transaction costs through the analysis of two Australian-based development offset schemes with different policy designs. We found evidence of all four theory-based categories of influence in the policy case studies. The degree of influence and how each factor influenced transaction costs varies across the two policies and between parties. Policy design as a component of the institutional environment had a particularly large bearing on transaction costs of offset buyers and the policy administrator. An important contribution to transaction cost theory assumes the institutional environment as given.     

Growth and Agglomeration

This article presents a model in which growth and geographic agglomeration of economic activities are mutually self-reinforcing processes. Economic agglomeration in one region spurs growth because it reduces the cost of innovation in that region through a pecuniary externality due to transaction costs. Growth fosters agglomeration because, as the sector at the origin of innovation expands, new firms tend to locate close to this sector. Agglomeration implies that all innovation and most production activities take place in the core region. However, as new firms are continuously created in the core, some relocate their production to the periphery.     

The revenue potential of a financial transaction tax for US financial markets

This paper estimates the revenue potential of a financial transaction tax (FTT) for US financial markets. We focus on analyzing the revenue potential of the Inclusive Prosperity Act that was introduced in the US House of Representatives in 2012 and the US Senate in 2015. The tax rates stipulated in this Act include 0.5% (50 basis points (bps)) for all stock transactions, 0.1% (10 bps) for all bond transactions and 0.005% (0.5 bps) on the notional value of all derivative trades. We examine three sets of evidence to generate potential revenue estimates: 1) the levels of transaction costs in US financial markets over time and within the range of financial market segments; 2) the extent of trading elasticities under various trading conditions; and 3) the current level of trading activity in US financial markets. Based on this evidence, we conclude that a US FTT operating at the tax rates stated above would generate about $220 billion per year, equal to about 1.2% of the current US GDP.     

Consequences of Imitation by Poor Countries on International Wage Inequalities and Global Growth

The paper presents an endogenous growth model where the level of international transaction costs may be decisive for whether the relatively poor East specializes in agriculture production, imitates goods from the rich West, or makes its own innovations. The author shows that the East produces only agricultural goods if transaction costs are high, while innovation is profitable when transaction costs are low. In between there are a range of transaction costs where the East imitates, possibly resulting in a lower global growth rate and a larger international wage gap than if imitation were not possible.     

Neither market nor hierarchy—coordination costs in the allocation of track capacity in the Swedish railway network

Transaction costs have been an issue since the advent of the deregulation of the European railway markets in the 1990s. Transaction cost economics received renewed attention in research on the deregulated railway markets in the EU after the publications of two influential reports in the early 2010s. In this article, we develop a model that enables classification and measurement of transaction costs and other coordination costs in deregulated markets. This model is then used to analyze the costs of path allocation in the Swedish railway sector and to compare the results with findings in previous research. We also discuss the economic rationale of the distribution of coordination costs among the involved parties. Our key empirical findings are that the total coordination costs in the Swedish market-mimicking path allocation process are as low as or lower than the most cost-efficient market coordination processes studied in railway markets, and that the state administrations take on nearly all the coordination costs in order to minimize the effects of opportunism, rent-seeking and information impactedness. Another finding is that the size of the coordination costs found by different studies seems to be dependent on whether a bottom-up or a top-down approach is used.     

Land Reforms in the Presence of Monitoring Costs and International Trade

This paper elucidates the implications of transaction costs in agrarian labor hiring activities in a two-sector model of international trade and identifies a link between the size distribution of land and intersectoral allocation of productive inputs. Ceteris paribus , a more unequal distribution of land increases the amount of outmigration from agriculture, a shrinkage of the production possibility set, and a decrease (increase) in the volume of trade if and only if agriculture is the exportable (importable) sector. In addition, nonintervention in factor and commodity markets is constrained optimal only when land redistribution is not a feasible policy option.