Empirical evidence on the effects of tax incentives

This paper considers two empirical questions about tax incentives: (i)?are incentives used as tools of tax competition and (ii)?how effective are incentives in attracting investment? To answer these, we prepared a new dataset of tax incentives in over 40 Latin American, Caribbean and African countries for the period 1985–2004. Using spatial econometrics techniques for panel data to answer the first question, we find evidence for strategic interaction in tax holidays, in addition to the well-known competition over the corporate income tax (CIT) rate. We find no robust evidence, however, for competition over investment allowances and tax credits. Using dynamic panel data econometrics to answer the second question, we find evidence that lower CIT rates and longer tax holidays are effective in attracting FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean but not in Africa. None of the tax incentives is effective in boosting gross private fixed capital formation.     

The effect of leverage on the tax-cut versus investment-subsidy argument

Two common methods of attracting corporate investment are investment incentives and tax incentives. It is important to use the two incentives in the correct proportions, otherwise the government will give up too much value in the process of attracting investment. This paper examines the effect of tax cut and investment subsidy on the government's net benefit from a project. Earlier studies concluded that it was optimal to use only investment subsidy and no tax cuts. We show that this is not true when debt financing is possible, and it is generally optimal (from the government's perspective) to use a combination of tax reduction and investment subsidy. The optimal tax rate and optimal investment subsidy are identified and analyzed in the paper. It is shown that using a sub-optimal combination of incentives can result in substantial reduction of benefits for the government.     

Determinants of Regional Investment Decisions in China: An Econometric Model of Tax Incentive Policy

This paper examines whether concessionary tax rates and tax incentives can attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into certain designated areas in China. Since China opened its doors to foreign investors in 1979, tax benefits have been used extensively to attract FDI into different areas. In 1991, a new tax law was introduced which superseded two previous income tax laws. This new law provides additional tax benefits which improve the investment environment for foreign investors. This study investigates the effect of China's tax rates and tax incentive policy on FDI and on the locational choices of foreign firms. Our empirical results indicate that tax rates and incentives are important determinants of regional investment decisions in China, after controlling for potential confounding variables covering infrastructure, unemployment rate, wage rate and agglomeration economics. Specifically, areas offering lower tax rates and increased tax incentives are found to attract greater amounts of FDI. The impetus of the tax effect on FDI is more apparent in the post-1991 period due to changes in the tax laws. Our results also suggest that infrastructure variables are important determinants of regional investment decisions.     

The effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting investment: panel data evidence from the CFA Franc zone

In this paper we investigate to what extent tax incentives are effective in attracting investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. We test the neo-classical investment theory prediction that tax incentives, by lowering the user cost of capital, raise investment. Next to tax incentives, we also estimate the impact on investment of other investment climate variables that are under direct control of the government, such as the transparency and complexity of the tax system, and the legal protection of foreign investors. In developing countries these variables might be as important as or even more important than the tax variables themselves.     

Commitment and the time structure of taxation of foreign direct investment

The paper examines the role of commitment to future tax policy as an explanation for tax incentives for foreign direct investment that take the form of rates that increase over time. Both commitment and non-commitment to future tax rates are analyzed using a two-period model with investment determined endogenously in the first period. Without commitment, it is shown that tax rates may increase or decrease with time depending on the relative values of the firms' outside option each period of investing elsewhere in the world and on the responsiveness of investment to a change in the tax rate. With commitment, the time structure of tax rates is shown to depend on the relative rates at which firms and governments discount the future.This is a revised version of a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation completed at Queen's University (1993). I am grateful to my supervisors Robin Boadway and Beverly Lapham for comments on an earlier version. I also thank Sam Bucovetsky and two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions.     

Taxation and skills investment in frictional labor markets

This paper examines the effects of wage taxation and corporate income taxation on training investment in frictional labor markets. Because of labor market frictions, the wage structure is compressed and workers do not capture the entire return from their skills. As a result, both firms and workers have incentives to support part of the costs of training investments. The analysis shows that when decisions to invest in training are made by firms and workers acting cooperatively, a wage tax increases the level of investment in skills whereas a corporate income tax decreases it. In this case, the introduction of a small wage tax unambiguously increases efficiency. The effects of both types of taxes on training are reversed when investment decisions are taken by firms alone. In any case, a corporate income tax is not neutral with respect to decisions to invest in skills even if the full cost of investment is deducted from taxable income in the period when it is incurred and the tax system provides full loss offset.     

Taxation and foreign direct investment (FDI): empirical evidence from a quasi-experiment in China

China’s new Corporate Income Tax Law was passed in March 2007 and took effect on January 1 2008. It terminates the dual corporate income tax regime by removing the preferential tax treatments offered to foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) and unifies the corporate income tax regime for FIEs and Chinese domestic enterprises (DEs). This paper uses a difference-in-differences approach to determine whether FIEs are responding to the law by reducing their investment in China. Employing the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database (2002～2008) to implement the analysis, we find that: (1) FIEs are responding to the law by reducing their investment in China; and (2) the magnitude of the response is larger for HongKong-Macau-Taiwan (HMT) investment enterprises than that for other FIEs, which supports the claim that some Chinese investors engaged in “roundtripping” FDI. Our confidence in the conclusions are further boosted by the results of a series of placebo tests and two robustness checks: (1) the results of the placebo tests support the claim that the estimated effect is due to the tax reform rather than to other confounding factors; (2) the results of the first robustness check are consistent with the perception that State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) might enjoy more favorable treatments from the Chinese government than Private-Owned Enterprises (POEs); and (3) the results of the second robustness check show that incorporating enterprise-specific time trends into the baseline specification of our econometric models does not change the conclusions.     

Causes,benefits, and risks of business tax incentives

This paper provides an updated overview of tax incentives for business investment. It argues that tax competition is likely to be a major force driving countries’ tax reforms, and discusses tax incentives as a possible response to this. This is complemented by more detailed arguments for and against tax incentives, and by an illustrative analysis of different incentives using effective tax rates. Findings from the empirical literature on tax incentives are also presented. Based on the overview of theoretical and empirical findings, the paper then suggests a matrix of criteria to determine the usefulness of different tax incentives depending on a country’s circumstances.     

Do tax incentives affect investment quality?

This paper examines the effect of tax incentives in the form of bonus depreciation on investment quality. Using the expiration of tax incentives via bonus depreciation in eastern Germany and a representative panel of West German establishments, we show that bonus depreciation significantly lowers investment quality. The average quality of investments, measured by the responsiveness of future revenue and other proxies for cash flow to current investment, reduces by 15.2–23.8% in the short run and 31.8–41.4% in the long run. Our research suggests that this adverse effect of tax subsidies is greater for jurisdictions with higher tax rates, in times of high unemployment, and for large or low-productivity establishments. Overall, while increasing investment quantity, as shown by prior literature, tax incentives such as bonus depreciation substantially reduce the quality of investments.     

ODI与我国企业所得税激励政策

税收激励是促进我国对外直接投资发展的重要税收政策手段。但是我国的现行对外直接投资企业所得税激励政策存在诸多问题,如政策导向性弱、避免国际重复征税的措施不健全等。在借鉴国外激励对外直接投资的税收政策基础上,我们提出明确ODI税收政策的区域和产业导向,进一步完善消除国际双重征税的措施等建议,以优化我国对外直接投资企业所得税激励政策。     

Taxes and production: The case of Pakistan

This paper investigates the effectiveness of investment incentives and corporate income taxes in influencing production and investment decisions in the Pakistani wearing apparel and leather products industries. Three tax instruments are considered: the corporate income tax (CIT), the investment tax credit (ITC), and the capital cost allowance (CCA).The results show that since there are significant capital adjustment costs, it is important to distinguish between the short, intermediate, and long-run effects associated with the tax instruments. Production decisions are relatively more responsive to changes in the ITC rate compared to changes in either CCA or CIT rates in each run. However, only in the long run for the apparel industry are the ITC and CCA rates cost effective in stimulating investment. The CIT is never cost effective. Thus targeted instruments outperform the general CIT instrument. In addition, although the incentive to invest is enhanced, there is little effect on output. Therefore, tax incentives essentially make production techniques more capital intensive.     

Tax treatment of dividends and capital gains and the dividend decision under dual income tax

The paper analyses efficiency aspects of a dual income tax system with a higher tax on capital gains than dividends. It argues that apart from the distortions to investments claimed in earlier literature, the system puts even more emphasis in creating incentives for entrepreneurs to participate in tax planning. The paper suggests that the owner of a closely held company can avoid all personal taxes on entrepreneurial income by two tax-planning strategies. The first is the avoidance of distributions, which would be taxed at the tax rate on labour income. These funds would instead be invested in the financial markets. The second strategy is a distribute and call-back policy, converting retained profits into new equity capital. Interestingly, the outcome is that investment in real capital is not distorted in the long-run equilibrium. Empirical evidence using microdata is also provided.      

新企业所得税制对我国引进外资的影响及效应研究

本文通过对外商投资规模、产业结构、区域结构等方面的数据分析,研究2008年实施的新企业所得税制,相对减少外商投资企业税收优惠背景下,新企业所得税制实施对引进外资的影响及其效应。其结论是新企业所得税法实施后,虽然外商投资于中国境内的企业数量、绝对规模并未减少,且有一定增长趋势,但引资规模的增长幅度下降;投资于第一产业的企业数量和金额在三大产业中所占比重一直极低,投资于第二产业比例逐渐降低,投资于第三产业比例相对提高,对引导外商进入高新技术行业和基础设施建设激励不够明显。进而提出适度延长中西部地区企业所得税税收优惠期并加大优惠力度,对高新技术企业等实施一定期限的所得税免税优惠,适度延长基础设施建设的减免税期限或改变优惠方式等完善企业所得税制度的建议。     

Made in the U.S.A.? A Study of Firm Responses to Domestic Production Incentives

How do U.S. companies respond to incentives intended to encourage domestic manufacturing? I study the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), which was enacted in the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004 and was the third largest U.S. corporate tax expenditure as of 2017. Using confidential data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, I find greater average domestic investment spending of $95.5–$143.6 million, but only within the sample of domestic‐only firms and not until 2010, when the greatest statutory DPAD benefits were available. Additional evidence suggests that U.S. multinational claimants invest abroad rather than in the United States and that the increased investment by DPAD firms is accompanied by a reduction in the domestic workforce, consistent with a substitution of capital for labor. I also show that the delayed investment response is due to firms engaging in other responses first, such as changing corporate reporting to shift income across time and borders. Quantifying the extent of these effects contributes to the literature that studies this tax deduction and informs policy makers as to the effectiveness of both manufacturing incentives and U.S. corporate income tax rate reductions in stimulating real domestic activity.     

The Asset Price Theory of Shareholder Revaluations: Tests with the Tax Reforms of the 1980s

A tax reform providing incentives for fixed investment may increase shareholder wealth because after-tax cash flows on planned investment increase. Alternatively, shareholder wealth may decline because existing assets receive disadvantageous tax treatment relative to new ones and equities are largely claims on existing assets. This study tests the alternative hypothesis by predicting in a simulation model the revaluation of existing assets resulting from the 1981 and 1986 tax acts and then by comparing the predictions to stock returns data. The results reject the hypothesis that cumulative excess returns accruing because of tax reform equal the revaluation on existing assets.     

Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness.     

Taking the Long Way Home: U.S. Tax Evasion and Offshore Investments in U.S. Equity and Debt Markets

We empirically investigate one form of illegal investor‐level tax evasion and its effect on foreign portfolio investment. In particular, we examine a form of round‐tripping tax evasion in which U.S. individuals hide funds in entities located in offshore tax havens and then invest those funds in U.S. securities markets. Employing Becker's ( 1968 ) economic theory of crime, we identify the tax evasion component by examining how foreign portfolio investment varies with changes in the incentives to evade and the risks of detection. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence of investor‐level tax evasion affecting cross‐border equity and debt investment.     

A general equilibrium model of housing consumption and investment

This article develops an applied general equilibrium model for analyzing the effects of tax policy on housing consumption and investment. The model incorporates housing tenure choice and consumption decisions in an explicit model of household portfolio choice that recognizes that the demand for owner-occupied housing depends on the after-tax returns from housing capital and other investments. Asset returns are stochastic so that asset holdings are determined by the desired risk-return relationships of households. Owner-occupied housing has a unique position because it has both a consumption role in providing housing services and an investment role. The model is then used to evaluate the effects of tax policy on the size and composition of the housing stock. Potential tax changes include a flat rate income tax and taxation of the imputed rent from owner-occupied housing.     

Mitigating political uncertainty

This study examines whether firms that establish political connections gain differential access to relevant information over legislative developments, thereby mitigating the negative consequences of uncertainty. I find that political connections (partially) offset the negative relation between investment and political uncertainty documented in prior research. My results do not appear to be driven by connected firms pursuing investments that are insensitive to uncertainty. I perform additional tests to address concerns over correlated omitted variables. First, I identify a setting around a tax policy development designed to provide new investment incentives to firms. In this setting, I predict and find that reduced information asymmetry for connected firms results in delaying investment in anticipation of future lucrative tax incentives. Second, I perform a falsification test and document that political connections do not mitigate the effects of general economic uncertainty. Finally, I continue to find support for my hypothesis within a propensity matched sample.     

The impact of tax incentives on foreign direct investment in China

Scholes and Wolfson 1989, Scholes and Wolfson 1992) argue that tax rules jointly influence investment decisions and organizational form. The present research uses Chinese data to test these assertions. Specifically, our study investigates whether (1) the creation of special tax incentive zones is an effective tax policy for China to induce new foreign direct investment (FDI) into specific regions, and (2) changes in the tax rules influence the particular form of foreign direct investment selected: equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Our results indicate that tax incentives are effective in attracting FDI to China, and moreover, influence the selection of a particular form of FDI. One limitation of our study is that we were unable to completely control for the correlated-omitted-variable problem.