Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination,Macroeconomic Stability,and Sovereign Risk Premia

In standard macroeconomic models, equilibrium stability and uniqueness require monetary policy to actively target inflation and fiscal policy to ensure long‐run debt sustainability. We show analytically that these requirements change, and depend on the cyclicality of fiscal policy, when government debt is risky. In that case, budget deficits raise interest rates and crowd out consumption. Consequently, countercyclical fiscal policies reduce the parameter space supporting stable and unique equilibria and are feasible only if complemented with more aggressive debt consolidation and/or active monetary policy. Stability is more easily achieved, however, under procyclical fiscal policies.     

Time Inconsistency and Free‐Riding in a Monetary Union

In monetary unions, a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free‐rider problem in the setting of non‐monetary policies. The free‐rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non‐monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. Free‐riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non‐monetary policies. Without a time inconsistency problem, the union has no free‐rider problem; then constraints on non‐monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful. This theory is here detailed and applied to several non‐monetary policies: labor market policy, fiscal policy, and bank regulation.     

Monetary versus fiscal policy in India: an SVAR analysis

Conventionally, the policymakers relied on three policy alternatives to manage business cycles – debt-financed government spending, debt-financed tax rebate and interest rate. While the first two are fiscal policy instruments, the latter is a monetary policy instrument. This paper aims to capture interactions among Indian monetary and fiscal policy actions, and the impact of such policy actions on select macroeconomic variables for the period 1990Q1–2011Q4. The policy actions are identified using the sign restrictions approach combined with magnitude restrictions in a Structural Vector Autoregression framework, and interpreted using impulse responses and variance decomposition. The results show that Indian monetary policy responds to tax rebate shocks and spending shocks differently. In the case of a tax rebate shock, Indian monetary policy responds by reducing interest rates thereby accommodating fiscal expansion. On the opposite, monetary policy seems not to accommodate expenditure shocks. Interestingly, the monetary policy shock is accompanied by a fiscal expansion that threatens the credibility of the central bank actions, thus indicating fiscal policy dominance. A comparison of the efficacy of the policies suggests that the interest rate is more effective in stimulating output. Out of the two fiscal policy instruments analysed, the tax rebate seems to be the better option for stimulating output considering the output-debt trade-off.     

Identifying the Stance of Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Markov‐Switching Estimation Exploiting Monetary‐Fiscal Policy Interdependence

In this paper, I propose an econometric technique to estimate a Markov‐switching Taylor rule subject to the zero lower bound of interest rates. I show that linking the switching of the Taylor rule coefficients to the switching of the coefficients of an auxiliary uncensored Markov‐switching regression improves the identification of an otherwise unidentifiable prevalent monetary regime because of the presence of the zero lower bound. Using a Markov‐switching fiscal policy rule as the auxiliary regression, I apply the estimation technique to U.S. data. Results show evidence of monetary and fiscal policy comovements, with monetary policy reacting weakly to inflation when fiscal policy is focused on real activity as opposed to debt stabilization, and vice versa.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Switching

A growing body of evidence finds that policy reaction functions vary substantially over different periods in the United States. This paper explores how moving to an environment in which monetary and fiscal regimes evolve according to a Markov process can change the impacts of policy shocks. In one regime monetary policy follows the Taylor principle and taxes rise strongly with debt; in another regime the Taylor principle fails to hold and taxes are exogenous. An example shows that a unique bounded non-Ricardian equilibrium exists in this environment. A computational model illustrates that because agents' decision rules embed the probability that policies will change in the future, monetary and tax shocks always produce wealth effects. When it is possible that fiscal policy will be unresponsive to debt at times, active monetary policy (like a Taylor rule) in one regime is not sufficient to insulate the economy against tax shocks in that regime and it can have the unintended consequence of amplifying and propagating the aggregate demand effects of tax shocks. The paper also considers the implications of policy switching for two empirical issues.     

Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy

Does an inflation conservative central bank à la Rogoff (1985) remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy? To provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic, stochastic sticky-price economy with monopolistic distortions. Monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility. We find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending. The optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive, but lack of monetary commitment generates too much inflation. A conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable. When fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy each period, the monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation. Monetary conservatism then eliminates the steady state biases associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment and leads to stabilization policy that is close to optimal.     

Monetary Policy and Asset Prices: A Mechanism Design Approach

We investigate the effects of monetary policy on asset prices in economies where assets are traded periodically in bilateral meetings. The trading mechanism is designed to maximize social welfare taking as given the frictions in the environment and monetary policy. We show that asset price “bubbles” emerge in a constrained‐efficient monetary equilibrium only if liquidity is abundant and the first‐best allocation is implementable. In contrast, if liquidity is scarce, assets are priced at their fundamental value in any constrained‐efficient monetary equilibrium, in which case an increase in inflation has no effect on asset prices, but it reduces output and welfare.     

Monetary–Fiscal Policy Interactions under Implementable Monetary Policy Rules

This paper examines the implications of forward- and backward-looking monetary policy rules in an environment with monetary–fiscal interactions. We find that the unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is always non-Ricardian under simple implementable monetary policy rules.     

The Cyclical Relationships Between South Africa's Net Capital Inflows and Fiscal and Monetary Policies

This paper investigates the cyclical relationships between South Africa's post-liberalization net capital inflows and fiscal and monetary policies. Correlation analysis shows that the bulk of South Africa's capital inflows do not have a significant cyclical relationship with fiscal policy but have a procyclical and reactive cyclical relationship with monetary policy. Furthermore, causality analysis finds that fiscal policy reacts to monetary policy and capital flows, whereas capital flows react to monetary policy. Hence, these results suggest that South Africa's policymakers are in a better position to control the country's capital inflows using monetary policy than using fiscal policy.     

Interaction of Government Tiers and Central Banks in a Federation: An Empirical Test

Fiscal rules are necessary to protect monetary policy from the consequences of unsustainable or active fiscal policy for inflation. Monetary unions, such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), require even stronger fiscal rules to avoid free riding by regional fiscal authorities on the common monetary policy. By contrast, in a fiscal federation, the federal government internalises the effect of active regional policies on the overall price level. Federal fiscal policy contributes to price stability either by enforcing fiscal rules or by adjusting its own stance. Following Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), we test whether federal and regional governments in Germany behave in an active or passive way. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on other regions. The German federal government offsets the effect on the price level by running passive policies. The Bundesbank's prime objective of price stability is therefore endorsed by fiscal policy. The results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.     

货币、财政和宏观审慎政策的协调搭配研究

本文通过构建包含多部门和多元宏观政策的DSGE模型,对货币政策、财政政策和宏观审慎政策的最优反应规则及其协调组合问题进行了分析。分析结果显示:(1)从社会福利最大化的角度,货币政策可继续盯住通胀和产出的稳定,政府支出和税收政策可分别重点盯住产出稳定和债务稳定,而宏观审慎政策则可重点关注以信贷利差和信贷波动为代表的关键金融变量;(2)货币政策、财政政策和宏观审慎政策,通过合理的搭配和组合使用,能比任何单一政策工具都具有更好的经济金融稳定效应;反之,政策之间的不协调将显著削弱彼此的调控效应,加大经济和金融波动,从而导致显著的社会福利损失;(3)从多种政策协调搭配产生“合力”的内在机制来看,财政政策主要通过增加对产出、通胀、就业和债务等变量的稳定效应,对货币政策产生额外助力,而宏观审慎政策则主要通过稳定金融体系和降低金融风险对货币政策产生助力。上述结论表明,在多种经济金融政策并存的情况下,基于良好设定的政策规则,同时加强政策各部门之间的协调合作,是确保多元政策产生积极合力的重要基础。     

Optimal Monetary Policy in an Operational Medium‐Sized DSGE Model

We show how to construct optimal policy projections in Ramses, the Riksbank’s open‐economy medium‐sized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for forecasting and policy analysis. Bayesian estimation of the parameters of the model indicates that they are relatively invariant to alternative policy assumptions and supports our view that the model parameters may be regarded as unaffected by the monetary policy specification. We discuss how monetary policy, and in particular the choice of output gap measure, affects the transmission of shocks. Finally, we use the model to assess the recent Great Recession in the world economy and how its impact on the economic development in Sweden depends on the conduct of monetary policy. This provides an illustration on how Rames incoporates large international spillover effects.     

Monetary policy,bond returns and debt dynamics

Using the government׳s intertemporal budget constraint, we quantify the contribution of returns paid on the U.S. government׳s debt portfolio to the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio. We show that announcements of unconventional monetary policy measures by the Federal Reserve between 2008.IV and 2012, as a part of macroeconomic stabilization, were associated with a sizable increase in returns and debt-to-GDP ratios and contributed to fiscal imbalances. We use the Federal Reserve׳s portfolio composition as a proxy for unconventional monetary policy measures and show that it is significantly related to future bond returns and fiscal balances.     

物价与货币政策调控最优契合的实证研究

本文从货币渠道和信贷渠道对物价与货币政策的关系进行实证检验。结果表明,货币政策与物价水平之间存在稳定的均衡关系,但是货币政策存在滞后性,货币供应量M2的滞后期约为2个月,金融机构各项贷款规模的滞后期约为4个月,并基于此对货币政策调控提出相关建议。     

Monetary Policy and the Natural Rate of Interest

It is most important for monetary policy to track the natural rate of interest when interest rates take large and sustained swings away from their long‐run equilibrium values. Here, we study two models: a standard New Keynesian model and one in which government bonds provide liquidity. Policy rules that cannot track the natural rate perform poorly in both models, but are especially bad in the second because of sustained movements in the natural rate induced by fiscal shocks. First difference rules, on the other hand, do surprisingly well. When model uncertainty is taken into account, the dominance of the first difference rule is even more pronounced.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy Rules in a Monetary Union

This paper investigates the importance of fiscal policy in providing macroeconomic stabilization in a monetary union. We use a microfounded New Keynesian model of a monetary union, which incorporates persistence in inflation and non-Ricardian consumers, and derive optimal simple rules for fiscal authorities. We find that fiscal policy can play an important role in reacting to inflation, output, and the terms of trade, but that not much is lost if national fiscal policy is restricted to react, on the one hand, to national differences in inflation and, on the other hand, to either national differences in output or changes in the terms of trade. However, welfare is reduced if national fiscal policy responds only to output, ignoring inflation.     

货币政策、银行资本与风险承担

考虑存款准备金率作为我国货币政策的重要工具,本文在D-L-M模型中引入了法定存款准备金,分析了货币政策对银行风险承担的影响,发现货币政策对银行风险承担的影响取决于银行资本状况。接着利用我国14家上市银行的季度数据,采用门限面板回归模型实证分析了货币政策对银行风险承担的影响。实证结果表明紧缩的货币政策对银行风险承担     

U.S. Monetary Regimes and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

Monetary policy in the United States has been documented to have switched from reacting weakly to inflation fluctuations during the 1970s, to fighting inflation aggressively from the early 1980s onward. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the U.S. monetary policy regime switches on the Eurozone. I construct a New Keynesian two‐country model where foreign (U.S.) monetary policy switches regimes over time. I estimate the model for the U.S. and the Euro Area using quarterly data and find that the United States has switched between those two regimes, in line with existing evidence. I show that foreign regime switches affect home (Eurozone) inflation and output volatility and their responses to shocks, substantially, as long as the home central bank commits to a time‐invariant interest rate rule reacting to domestic conditions only. Optimal policy in the home country instead requires that the home central bank reacts strongly to domestic producer‐price inflation and to international variables, such as imported goods relative prices. In fact, I show that currency misalignments and relative prices play a crucial role in the transmission of foreign monetary policy regime switches internationally. Interestingly, I show that only marginal gains arise for the Euro Area when the European Central Bank (ECB) adjusts its policy according to the monetary regime in the United States. Thus, a simple time‐invariant monetary policy rule with a strong reaction to Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation and relative prices is enough to counteract the effects of monetary policy switches in the United States.     

Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy

We study empirically the macroeconomic effects of an explicit de jure quantitative goal for monetary policy. Quantitative goals take three forms: exchange rates, money growth rates, and inflation targets. We analyze the effects on inflation of both having a quantitative target and hitting a declared target. Our empirical work uses an annual data set covering 42 countries between 1960 and 2000, and takes account of other determinants of inflation (such as fiscal policy, the business cycle, and openness to international trade) and the endogeneity of the monetary policy regime. We find that both having and hitting quantitative targets for monetary policy is systematically and robustly associated with lower inflation. The exact form of the monetary target matters somewhat (especially for the sustainability of the monetary regime) but is less important than having some quantitative target. Successfully achieving a quantitative monetary goal is also associated with less volatile output.     

Household Debt Overhang and Transmission of Monetary Policy

We investigate how the level of household indebtedness affects the monetary transmission mechanism in the U.S. economy. Using state‐dependent local projection methods, we find that the effects of monetary policy are less powerful during periods of high household debt. In particular, the impact of monetary policy shocks is smaller on GDP, consumption, residential investment, house prices, and household debt during a high‐debt state. We then build a partial equilibrium model of borrower households with financial constraints to rationalize these facts. The model points to the weakening of the home equity loan channel as a possible reason for the decline in monetary policy effectiveness when initial debt levels are high.