IFRS Adoption and the Choice Between Public and Private Debt: Evidence from South Korea

This article examines the association between mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption and corporate choice between public debt and private debt. If IFRS adoption increases the quality of lenders’ information environment provided on financial statements, firms are more likely to access the public debt market. Using a sample of public and private debts financing firms from 2000 to 2014 in Korea, we find that firms that file financial reports under the IFRS are less likely to finance from public debt markets, implying that the mandatory IFRS adoption has exacerbated the information environment of the public debt market in Korea.     

Continuous disclosure compliance: does corporate governance matter?

Our study investigates the quality of firms’ continuous disclosure compliance during mandatory continuous disclosure reform, and whether the compliance quality is impacted by corporate governance, using the New Zealand market as the setting. We use a novel coding of different categories of disclosures (non‐routine, non‐procedural and internal), which represents the extent of proprietary insider information inherent in disclosures, to evaluate firms’ compliance quality. Our findings provide evidence that firms’ compliance quality improved after the reform, and this improvement is inconsistently impacted by corporate governance. Our findings provide important implications for regulators in their quest for a superior disclosure regime.     

IRS Attention

We study how public and private disclosure requirements interact to influence both tax regulator enforcement and firm disclosure. To capture IRS enforcement activities, we introduce a novel data set of IRS acquisition of firms’ public financial disclosures, which we label IRS attention. We examine the implementation of two new disclosure requirements that potentially alter IRS attention: FIN 48, which increased public tax disclosure requirements, and Schedule UTP, which increased private tax disclosure. We find that IRS attention increased following FIN 48 but subsequently decreased following Schedule UTP, consistent with public and private disclosure interacting to influence tax enforcement. We next examine how private tax disclosure requirements under Schedule UTP affected firms’ public disclosure responses. We find that, following Schedule UTP, firms significantly increased the quantity and altered the content of their tax‐related disclosures, consistent with lower tax‐related proprietary costs of disclosure. Our results suggest that changes in SEC disclosure requirements altered the IRS's behavior with regard to public information acquisition, and, relatedly, changes in IRS private disclosure requirements appear to change firms’ public disclosure behavior.     

Development costs capitalization and debt financing

This study investigates debt market effects of research and development (R&D) costs capitalization, using a global sample of public bonds and private syndicated loans issued by public non‐financial firms. Firstly, we show that firms capitalize larger amounts of R&D in a year when they exhibit a propensity for issuing bonds, rather than borrowing funds privately from the syndicated loan market, in the subsequent year. Secondly, we provide evidence that capitalized R&D investments reduce the cost of debt. We infer that debt market participants are able to identify firms’ motives for R&D capitalization, as we find a reduction in the cost of debt only for those firms that do not show indications of employing R&D capitalization for earnings management reasons. Indeed, only for this sub‐sample of firms, the amount of capitalized R&D contributes positively to future earnings. We confirm that R&D capitalization is positively associated with audit fees and thus can be deemed to be a signaling device. Lastly, we find that it is the amount of R&D a firm is expected to capitalize and not the discretionary counterparts, which facilitates a firm's access to public debt markets, reduces bond and syndicated loan prices, and contributes to future benefits.     

Conditional Mandates on Management Earnings Forecasts: The Impact on the Cost of Debt

Exploiting a unique conditional disclosure mandate on management earnings forecasts (MEFs) in China, we examine the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on the cost of debt. We find that firms providing voluntary MEFs have lower cost of debt than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters. The results of the channel analyses reveal that voluntary forecasters have greater commitment to voluntary MEFs in future periods than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters, and the precision, accuracy, and timeliness of MEFs are higher for voluntary forecasters than for mandatory forecasters. Additional analyses show that the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on cost of debt are stronger for voluntary forecasters operating in opaque information environments, issuing high-quality and confirming forecasts, controlled by private shareholders, and operating in highly competitive product markets. Overall, our results indicate that, compared with mandatory MEFs, voluntary MEFs are more informative for credit investors, particularly for firms facing greater information risk and operating uncertainty.     

The impact of narrative disclosure readability on bond ratings and the cost of debt

Prior research on the determinants of credit ratings has focused on rating agencies’ use of quantitative accounting information, but the there is scant evidence on the impact of textual attributes. This study examines the impact of financial disclosure narrative on bond market outcomes. We find that less readable financial disclosures are associated with less favorable ratings, greater bond rating agency disagreement, and a higher cost of debt. We improve causal identification by exploiting the 1998 Plain English Mandate, which required a subset of firms to exogenously improve the readability of their filings. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that the firms required to improve the readability of their filings experience more favorable ratings, lower bond rating disagreement, and lower cost of debt. Collectively, our evidence suggests that textual financial disclosure attributes appear to not only influence bond market intermediaries’ opinions but also firms’ cost of debt.     

Determinants and consequences of voluntary corporate social responsibility disclosure: Evidence from private firms

We examine whether and how private firms differ from public firms in determining corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure policies. We document that private firms are less likely to issue CSR reports compared with their public peers. Adopting a bivariate probit model that accommodates partial observability, we find that the effect is mainly driven by a supply-side force rather than a demand-side force. From a debtholder-oriented perspective, while public firms enjoy more favorable credit ratings and a lower cost of debt due to CSR disclosure, private firms do not reap similar benefits from CSR disclosure. Corporate governance and CSR assurance alleviate debtholders' concern on private firms’ engagements in CSR.     

Being private,Big 4 auditors,and debt raising

This study investigates the role of auditor choice (Big 4/Non-Big 4) in debt financing for private and public firms. We find private firms have less access to debt than public firms, and Big 4 auditors support debt raising in both private and public firms. Consistent with private firms facing greater information asymmetry, Big 4 auditors are more important for debt raising in private firms than in public firms. The benefit of appointing Big 4 auditors for private firms' debt raising is greater in the opaque information environment of the global financial crisis. It is also greater when firms are smaller, younger, or have poorer financial reporting quality. We also find evidence consistent with Big 4 auditors mitigating agency conflicts and enhancing debt raising when ownership concentration is higher in private firms.     

Political spending,related voluntary disclosure,and the cost of public debt

Following the Supreme Court decision in the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case of 2010, which removed restrictions in relation to firms’ political spending, and building on the growing debate over whether voluntary political spending disclosure (VPSD) provides valuable information, we examine the effect of political spending on the cost of public debt and the role of VPSD on this effect. Based on a measure of VPSD that became available in 2012 and a large dataset on US firms’ actual political spending, manually extracted from different filings, we provide novel evidence that, in the post-Supreme Court decision period, political spending increases the cost of public debt. This is consistent with the uncertainty associated with political spending. Moreover, we find that the level of voluntary disclosure weakens the positive association between political spending and the cost of public debt. These results hold across multiple specifications as well as when we use a sudden release of firms’ political spending as an exogenous shock to political spending.     

Voluntary disclosure practices by foreign firms cross-listed in the United States

This is one of the first large-scale studies to examine the voluntary disclosure practices of foreign firms cross-listed in the United States. We proxy for voluntary disclosure using three attributes of firms’ management earnings guidance: (1) the likelihood of issuance; (2) the frequency of earnings guidance; and (3) a guidance quality measure. After first establishing that market participants view these firms’ disclosures as credible and economically important (i.e., the disclosures are negatively related to analyst forecast errors and the implied cost of equity capital), we compare cross-listed firms’ disclosure practices with comparable US firms and explore variations in disclosure practices among cross-listed firms. We find that cross-listed firms issue less frequent and lower quality management earnings guidance than comparable US firms. We further show that the gap between US and cross-listed firms widened after passage of Regulation FD, a regulation which induced greater public disclosure of firm-specific information. Focusing on the sample of cross-listing firms, we show that firms from common-law countries disclose more than firms from code-law countries. Finally, our results indicate that cross-listed firms that do not list on an organized US exchange provide more frequent and higher quality disclosure than those that do list on organized exchanges.     

Mandatory Disclosure,Voluntary Disclosure,and Stock Market Liquidity: Evidence from the EU Bank Stress Tests

We use the EU stress tests and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis to study the consequences of supervisory disclosure of banks’ sovereign risk exposures. We test the idea that a mandatory one‐time disclosure induces an increase in voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk in the following periods and, through the shift in the voluntary disclosure equilibrium, increases the liquidity of banks’ shares. First, we find that the timing and content of different mandatory disclosure events helps explain the levels of stress‐test banks’ voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk. Second, although the bid‐ask spreads of stress test participants generally increased after the mandatory stress test in 2011, our results suggest that the decrease in market liquidity is entirely attributable to those stress‐test participants that did not commit to voluntarily maintaining the disclosures of sovereign risk exposure.     

Do Declines in Bank Health Affect Borrowers’ Voluntary Disclosures? Evidence from International Propagation of Banking Shocks

I examine whether declines in banks’ financial health affect their borrowers’ disclosures. Prior studies indicate that, in relationship lending, banks and borrowers rely on private communication, rather than public disclosures, to resolve information asymmetries. When banking relationships are threatened, borrowers must turn to new funding sources, inducing them to reconsider their disclosure policies. This paper predicts that borrowers, whose banking relationships are threatened by declining bank health, change their public disclosures of forward‐looking information. Using the emerging‐market financial crises in the late 1990s as shocks to the health of certain U.S. banks, I find that affected banks’ U.S. borrowers increase both the quantity and informativeness of their management forecasts following these shocks compared to borrowers of unaffected banks. The results are similar using conference calls or the length of the Management's Discussion and Analysis section as alternative proxies for voluntary disclosure. Overall, these results provide new insights into the impact of availability of relationship lending on firms’ disclosure choices.     

Family firm disclosure and accounting regulation reform in the Middle East: The case of Jordan

We examine the quality of accounting disclosures by family firms using mandatory and voluntary disclosures as proxies for the quality of disclosure. We find that family firms comply more fully with mandatory disclosure requirements than do non-family firms but they disclose significantly less voluntary information. We also document that the enhanced accounting regulation improves the strength of the association between family ownership and mandatory disclosure compliance. Another important finding is the greater disclosure, both mandatory and voluntary, for firms with high family ownership compared to firms with low family ownership.     

Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosures: Dynamic Interactions

Firms sometimes obtain soft private information about growth prospects along with hard information about current or past performance. In this environment, we find that optimizing disclosures over multiple periods yields nonlinear stock price reactions following both voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Further, we derive several predictions about distinct short‐run and long‐run effects of disclosures and nondisclosures on security prices. Under specified conditions, when the volatility of the firm's earnings increases, the average contemporaneous and prospective post‐mandatory‐disclosure market premia (for voluntary disclosures over nondisclosures) rise, while farther‐in‐future market discounts (for such voluntary disclosures) also become larger. Our analysis moreover predicts that both the disclosure probability and the information content of nondisclosures can increase in the persistence of earnings.     

The Value of Mandatory Certification: A Real Effects Perspective

We study the real effects of certification to demonstrate the value of mandatory certification over and above mandatory disclosure in enhancing investment efficiency. In our model, a firm's manager selects a project to maximize the firm's short-term stock price, which is a function of her certification and disclosure decisions about the outcome of the project. Although the manager might be either forthcoming or strategic with regard to the disclosure of her private information, she can strategically choose whether to incur a cost or not to certify her disclosure, unless mandated. The manager always selects the first-best project when both certification and disclosure are mandatory. However, when certification is voluntary, project selection is inefficient. In addition, mandating disclosure without mandating certification can lead to lower investment efficiency than mandating neither. In justifying why mandatory certification is beneficial for public firms, our results offer a note of caution regarding the contemplated regulatory moves for increased disclosures by public firms without corresponding certification requirements, for example, the recent SEC proposal requiring extensive climate-related disclosure.     

Financial Reporting and Supplemental Voluntary Disclosures

A standard result in the voluntary disclosure literature is that when the manager's private information is a signal correlated with the firm's liquidation value, mandatory disclosures substitute for voluntary disclosures. In this paper, we assume that the manager's private information complements the mandatory disclosure and show that the content and likelihood of a voluntary disclosure depend on whether the mandatory reports contain good or bad news. This different information asymmetry produces new, testable implications regarding the probability of and market reaction to voluntary disclosures. We also show that changes in mandatory disclosure regulations can have unintended consequences due to their effects on the manager's willingness to voluntarily provide supplemental disclosures.     

The Impact of Information Processing Costs on Firm Disclosure Choice: Evidence from the XBRL Mandate

This paper examines the effect of market participants’ information processing costs on firms’ disclosure choice. Using the recent eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) regulation, I find that firms increase their quantitative footnote disclosures upon implementation of XBRL detailed tagging requirements designed to reduce information users’ processing costs. These results hold in a difference‐in‐difference design using matched nonadopting firms as controls, as well as two additional identification strategies. Examination of the disclosure increase by footnote type suggests that both regulatory and nonregulatory market participants play a role in monitoring firm disclosures. Overall, these findings suggest that the processing costs of market participants can be significant enough to impact firms’ disclosure decisions.     

The Choice of Debt Source by UK Firms

We examine the choice of borrowing source among public debt, syndicated bank loans, bilateral bank loans and non‐bank private debt. Using a sample of 400 non‐financial firms over the period 2000–2012, we find strong support for the reputational theory of borrowing source. Larger firms are more likely to borrow in public debt markets. Bank dependent firms are less likely to borrow in public debt markets and choose between bank and non‐bank private debt based on maturity, collateral available to lenders and other firm characteristics. These results are consistent with the role of borrower reputation being the primary determinant of borrowing source for UK listed firms.     

Discretionary compliance with mandatory environmental disclosures: Evidence from SEC filings

We examine the determinants of adherence to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated disclosures of environmental sanctions. Our sample includes non-superfund U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sanctions between 1996 and 2005. Our results suggest that firms are more likely to provide sanction disclosures if they operate in environmentally sensitive industries, are subject to larger penalties and are voluntarily participating in a supplemental environmental project. Our results also suggest that firms are less likely to disclose sanctions involving judicial proceedings. Overall, we find that voluntary disclosure incentives impact compliance with mandatory reporting requirements. Although incentives exist for firms to comply with mandatory disclosures, our results suggest that increases in mandatory environmental accounting disclosures may not be effective under the current regulatory system despite the use of bright-line materiality thresholds. Our study contributes to the current and ongoing debate about the role and effectiveness of environmental risk disclosure mandates in providing information to the marketplace, as well as “mandated disclosure” rules in general. The value attributed to current and potential environmental disclosure regulations cannot be thoroughly understood without examining disclosure compliance with existing regulations. From an environmental and sustainability disclosure perspective, our findings are particularly germane since these disclosures focus on risks, liabilities, or other reputational shortcomings of the firm.     

Information Asymmetry and Voluntary SFAS 157 Fair Value Disclosures by Bank Holding Companies During the 2007 Financial Crisis

We hand‐collect SFAS 157 voluntary fair value disclosures of 18 bank holding companies. The SEC's Division of Corporate Finance likely targeted these entities in 2008 through their “Dear CFO” letters in which they requested specific, additional disclosure items. We collect disclosures that match the SEC recommendations and create eight common factor disclosure variables to examine the effect of such disclosures on information asymmetry. We find that disclosure variables about the use of broker quotes or prices from pricing services and the use of market indices and illiquidity adjustments are related to lower information asymmetry. However, disclosure variables about valuation techniques and asset‐backed securities are related to greater information asymmetry. We also document that disclosure complexity, and disclosure tone (uncertainty and litigious) is related to greater information asymmetry. These findings are consistent with criticism that corporate disclosures are voluminous; management may obfuscate unfavorable information which in turn increases market participants’ assessment of uncertainty associated with the fair value measures. We caveat that the setting of the financial crisis and a small sample size may limit the ability to generalize these inferences to other time periods or other financial firms.