The spatial selection of heterogeneous firms

We show that heterogeneous firms choose different locations in response to market integration. Specifically, decreasing trade costs lead to the gradual agglomeration of efficient firms in the larger country where they have access to a bigger pool of consumers. In contrast, high-cost firms seek protection against competition from efficient firms by locating in the smaller country. However, when the spatial separation of markets ceases to be a sufficient protection against foreign competition, high-cost firms choose to set up in the larger market. Hence, the relationship between economic integration and international productivity gap first increases and then decreases with market integration.     

Transportation, freight rates, and economic geography

We investigate the role of competitive transport markets in shaping the location of economic activity and the pattern of trade. In our model, carriers supply transport services for shipping manufactured goods, and freight rates are set to clear transport markets. Each carrier must commit to the maximum capacity for a round-trip and thus faces a logistics problem as there are opportunity costs of returning empty. These costs increase the freight rates charged to firms located in regions that are net exporters of manufactured goods. Since demand for transport services depends on the spatial distribution of economic activity, the concentration of production in one region raises freight rates to serve foreign markets from there, thus working against specialization and the agglomeration of firms. Consequently, a more even spatial distribution of firms and production prevails at equilibrium when freight rates are endogenously determined than when they are assumed to be exogenous as in the literature.     

Structural estimation and solution of international trade models with heterogeneous firms

We present an empirical implementation of a general-equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous manufacturing firms. The theory underlying our model is consistent with Melitz (2003). A nonlinear structural estimation procedure identifies a set of core parameters and unobserved firm-level trade frictions that best fit the geographic pattern of trade. Our estimation model is consistent with the specified general equilibrium model, and we conduct general equilibrium counterfactual analyses to illustrate model responses. We first assess the economic effects of reductions in measured tariffs. Taking the simple-average welfare change across regions the Melitz structure indicates welfare gains from liberalization that are four times larger than in a standard trade policy simulation. Furthermore, when we compare the economic impact of tariff reductions with reductions in estimated fixed trade costs we find that policy measures affecting the fixed costs are of greater importance than tariff barriers.     

Corporate tax systems, multinational enterprises, and economic integration

Multinational firms are known to shift profits and countries are known to compete over shifty profits. Two major principles for corporate taxation are Separate Accounting (SA) and Formula Apportionment (FA). These two principles have very different qualities when it comes to preventing profit shifting and preserving national tax autonomy. Most OECD countries use SA. In this paper we show that a reduction in trade barriers lowers equilibrium corporate taxes under SA, but leads to higher taxes under FA. From a welfare point of view, the choice of tax principle is shown to depend on the degree of economic integration.     

International trade and macroeconomic dynamics with labor market frictions

This paper studies how labor market frictions affect the consequences of trade integration in a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous producer entry. Two main results emerge. First, trade integration is beneficial for welfare by inducing higher productivity, but unemployment can temporarily rise during the transitional adjustment. Labor market rigidities reduce gains from trade, even though they can mitigate short-run employment losses. Second, consistent with the data, the model predicts that stronger trade linkages lead to increased business cycle synchronization. The strength of this effect, however, depends on the labor market characteristics of the integrating partners.     

Intra-industry trade and heterogeneity in pollution emission

This paper develops a model of intermediate goods firms heterogeneity with respect to a pollution parameter to analyze the effects of intra-industry trade on final good output, pollution and welfare. By focusing on intra-industry trade we consider trade between similar countries. We analyze both trade between developed countries, and trade between developing countries. In our model, final good producers pay an environmental tax on the total pollution emitted in their country. Therefore, final good producers determine the overall level of pollution by demanding ‘cleaner’ or ‘dirtier’ intermediate goods. To focus on intra-industry trade we consider only intermediate goods firms trade. We analyze three scenarios: closed economy; open economy with no impediments to trade; and open economy with transportation cost. Our main findings are: i. a developing country closed to trade faces lower final good output and higher total pollution and is thus worse off than a developed country; ii. countries are better off under trade than under autarky, regardless of their development level; and iii. an open economy with low transportation costs are better off than an open economy with no impediments to trade.     

Aggregate scale economies, market integration, and optimal welfare state policy

Using a two-sector-two-country model with aggregate scale economies and unionisation, we show that optimal welfare state policy entails positive levels of unemployment benefits under free-trade and capital mobility. In this setting, economic integration does not reduce the revenue raising capacity of governments and thus does not lead to a race-to-the-bottom in social standards. Instead, trade and capital flows interact with welfare state policies in increasing welfare even when each government acts independently (non-cooperatively) in determining its optimal welfare payment. Cooperation is shown to improve upon non-cooperative outcomes by raising both the generosity of the welfare state and aggregate welfare.     

The spatial selection of heterogeneous firms

We show that heterogeneous firms choose different locations in response to market integration. Specifically, decreasing trade costs lead to the gradual agglomeration of efficient firms in the larger country where they have access to a bigger pool of consumers. In contrast, high-cost firms seek protection against competition from efficient firms by locating in the smaller country. However, when the spatial separation of markets ceases to be a sufficient protection against foreign competition, high-cost firms choose to set up in the larger market. Hence, the relationship between economic integration and international productivity gap first increases and then decreases with market integration.     

Market size and tax competition

With international externalities, different country sizes, imperfect competition, and trade costs, tax competition for mobile firms is efficiency-enhancing with respect to the free market outcome. Under both scenarios, the resulting inefficiencies in international specialization and trade flows vanish when trade costs are low enough. Otherwise, only international tax coordination can implement the efficient spatial distribution of firms.     

Trade and industrial location with heterogeneous labor

It is shown in the context of a new economic geography model that when labor is heterogeneous trade liberalization may lead to industrial agglomeration and inter-regional trade. Labor heterogeneity gives local monopsony power to firms but also introduces variations in the quality of the job match. Matches are likely to be better when there are more firms and workers in the local market, giving rise to an agglomeration force which can offset the forces against, trade costs and the erosion of monopsony power. A robust agglomeration equilibrium is derived analytically and its properties illustrated with numerical simulations.     

Trade patterns and export pricing under non-CES preferences

We develop a two-factor, two-sector trade model of monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution. Firms' profits and sizes may increase or decrease with market integration depending on the degree of asymmetry between countries. The country in which capital is relatively abundant is a net exporter of the manufactured good, although both firm sizes and profits are lower in this country than in the country where capital is relatively scarce. The pricing policy adopted by firms depends neither on capital endowment nor country asymmetry. It is determined by the nature of preferences: when demand elasticity increases (decreases) with consumption, firms practice dumping (reverse-dumping).     

General equilibrium trade modelling with Canada–US transportation costs

Transportation costs are an important topic in international trade, but seldom have researchers paid attention to general equilibrium trade modelling with transportation costs and explored their relevant effects. This paper uses numerical general equilibrium trade model structures to simulate the impacts of transportation costs on welfare and trade for a Canada–US country pair case. We compare two groups of model structures: Armington assumption models and homogeneous goods models. Within these two groups of models, we also compare balanced trade structures to trade imbalance structures and production function transportation costs to iceberg transportation costs. Armington goods models generate more absolute welfare gains from transportation cost elimination than homogeneous goods models. Welfare gains under balanced trade structures are larger in production function transportation cost scenarios than in iceberg transportation cost scenarios, but under trade imbalance structures, welfare gains are greater under iceberg transportation cost scenarios. Canada's welfare gains in the iceberg transportation cost scenario are significantly larger than gains in the production function transportation cost scenario. On trade effects, homogeneous goods models generate more export and import gains, balanced trade structures have more trade variations, and iceberg transportation costs generate more trade effects.     

Gravity, trade integration, and heterogeneity across industries

We derive a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade integration that is consistent with a broad range of leading gravity models. This measure accounts for cross-industry heterogeneity by incorporating substitution elasticities estimated at the industry level. We then use it to provide a theory-based ranking of trade integration across manufacturing industries in European Union countries. In addition, we explore the determinants of trade integration, finding that substantial Technical Barriers to Trade in certain industries as well as high transportation costs associated with heavy-weight goods are the most notable trade barriers.     

Capital controls and the location of industry

This paper studies capital controls on the outflow of capital in a two-region new economic geography model. Capital controls are set in a non-cooperative or cooperative manner by social planners. Capital controls are relatively higher in the North in the non-cooperative equilibrium. This leads to relatively more firms located in the region where more consumers reside under the non-cooperative equilibrium. The locational bias towards the North in the non-cooperative equilibrium becomes larger as trade barriers are reduced. That is, firms locate to the North at a relatively higher rate in the non-cooperative equilibrium as trade is liberalised. Contrary to previous findings, it follows that global welfare is relatively higher in the non-cooperative equilibrium, although the social planner sets capital controls by maximising joint regional welfare in the cooperative equilibrium.     

Optimal integration strategies for the multinational firm

We examine integration strategies of multinational firms that face a rich array of choices of international organization. Each firm must provide headquarter services from its home country, but can produce its intermediate inputs and conduct assembly operations in one or more of three locations. We study the equilibrium choices of firms that differ in productivity levels, focusing on the role that industry characteristics such as the fixed costs of foreign subsidiaries, the cost of transporting intermediate and final goods, and the regional composition of the consumer market play in determining the optimal integration strategies.     

International trade,risk taking and welfare

This paper shows that the gains from opening up to international trade are smaller when firms do not fully internalize downward risk. I develop a general equilibrium model with two key assumptions. First, when faced with adverse productivity shocks, employers can lay off workers without fully paying the social costs of their layoff decisions, a common feature of many institutions. Second, when opening to international trade, the elasticity of demand perceived by an industry increases. In this setup, I show that international trade induces firms to take more risk and (i) raises the equilibrium unemployment rate, (ii) increases the volatility of sectoral sales and (iii) increases welfare proportionately less than in the absence of the externality. Inducing firms to internalize the costs of layoff (Blanchard and Tirole, 2003) therefore appears even more important in a globalized world.     

Welfare implications of trade liberalization and fiscal reform: A quantitative experiment

This paper studies the welfare implications of revenue-neutral trade liberalization and fiscal reform programs for developing economies using a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy. We analyze how different combinations of tariffs – on imported consumption goods, intermediate inputs, and capital goods – and taxes – on consumption, labor income and capital income – affect the transitional and long-run welfare. We report three main findings. First, trade liberalization programs financed by consumption and labor income taxes tend to result in substantial welfare gains, but financing the lost tariff revenue through capital income taxes can have an adverse impact on welfare. Second, a significant fraction of welfare changes is due to transitional effects stemming from the allocation of resources in response to changes in tariffs and taxes. Third, trade liberalization and fiscal reform programs often translate into much larger welfare gains in countries that are more open to international financial markets.     

Trade and the (dis)incentive to reform labor markets: The case of reform in the European Union

We study the relation between international trade and the gains to reform labor markets by removing firing restrictions. We find that trade linkages imply substantially smaller benefits to reform than those calculated in the closed economy general equilibrium model of Hopenhayn and Rogerson [Hopenhayn, Hugo, Rogerson, Richard, 1993. Job Turnover and policy evaluations: a general equilibrium analysis. Journal of Political Economy 101 (5), 915–938 October]. When economies trade, labor market policies in one country spill over to other countries through their effect on the terms of trade. A key finding in the open economy is that the share of the welfare gains from domestic labor market reform exported substantially exceeds the share of goods exported. Thus, with international trade, a country retains little to no benefit from unilaterally reforming its labor market. A coordinated elimination of firing taxes yields considerable benefits. We also find that the U.K. benefits from labor market reform by its continental trading partners. These insights provide some explanation for recent efforts toward labor market reform in the European Union.     

Exclusive dealing and common agency in international markets

This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high, domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised be prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes.     

Induced clean technology adoption and international trade with heterogeneous firms

This paper introduces an environmental externality and factor-biased technology adoption into a trade model with heterogeneous firms. This study explores how firms’ decisions of technology adoption and of exports are affected by openness to trade and the stringency of environmental regulations. It shows that: (1) these decisions induced by tightened environmental policies depend upon whether the upgraded technology is labor-biased or emission-biased; (2) the environmental impact of trade cost reductions on the aggregate emissions and price of emissions permits varies with the factor-biased feature; and (3) regardless of the factor-biased feature, the trade cost reduction induces firms to export and to upgrade the factor-biased technology, while it forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Moreover, the model is further calibrated to simulate policy scenarios of bilateral and unilateral variations in trade variable costs and environmental policies. The bilateral reduction of emissions cap may contribute to welfare gains in both home and foreign countries. The unilateral action of tightening environmental policy in the home country may hurt the home country, but makes the foreign country better off.