企业内外部薪酬差距与企业绩效关系研究

企业内外部薪酬差距会影响企业绩效。针对电子通信行业上市公司的面板数据,实证结果发现:高管团队薪酬差距与企业绩效呈显著负相关关系;高管团队—普通员工薪酬差距与企业绩效呈显著倒"U"形关系;高管团队—行业、地区薪酬差距与企业绩效呈显著正相关关系。研究对不同层级薪酬制定、层级间薪酬差距范围设定有参考价值。     

资本结构与高管薪酬的相关性研究

上市公司高管薪酬是否合理有效,成为学术界关注的焦点问题之一。研究表明,目前我国国有企业高管薪酬与公司业绩严重脱钩。在影响高管薪酬的众多因素中,资本结构对公司代理成本和激励机制的影响也不可忽视。因此,本文通过描述性统计、回归分析,实证检验了高管薪酬与公司资本结构水平之间的关系。研究结果表明高管薪酬与公司资本结构呈正相关关系,与流动负债比率呈"倒U型"关系。     

国内外上市公司高管薪酬现状对比

公司治理是企业寻求长远发展和快速成长的主要途径之一,而薪酬制度又是公司治理的一个重要方面。因此,如何有效利用薪酬激励机制充分发挥管理者的作用,受到理论界和实务界的广泛关注。近年来,国内外上市公司都不同程度地进行了激励制度的变革,主要体现在调整薪酬水平和薪酬结构。受公司内外部各种因素的影响,国内外上市公司薪酬水平和薪酬结构存在显著差异。本文以国外成熟的上市公司为案例,研究其2011年高管薪酬水平、薪酬结构,并与我国上市公司高管薪酬现状作对比,找出差距,以期为我国上市公司高管薪酬管理制度改革提供借鉴与启示。     

非家族高管更加“患不均”？——家族企业CEO身份对高管薪酬差距的影响研究

文章通过衡量家族企业中CEO与非家族高管之间的薪酬差距,试图探讨非家族高管的激励问题。依据社会比较理论和锦标赛理论的不同解释逻辑,并基于家族高管与非家族高管的不同特点,文章首先考察影响高管薪酬差距的前因变量,提出非家族CEO与薪酬差距之间关系的竞争性假设,并探讨薪酬差距对企业绩效的影响作用。利用2009〖KG-*4〗-〖KG-*6〗2016年中国家族上市公司数据,研究发现,当非家族成员担任CEO时,CEO与非家族高管之间的薪酬差距减小;另外,薪酬差距与企业绩效呈负相关关系,说明非家族高管中“不均”的薪酬安排会影响企业绩效。综合来看,相比锦标赛理论,社会比较理论对解释家族企业CEO身份对其与非家族高管之间薪酬差距的影响更具预测力与解释力。     

高管层内部薪酬差距研究综述——基于管理层权力理论视角

高层管理人员的薪酬契约被视为解决公司内部代理问题的重要机制。高管层内部薪酬差距属于高管薪酬结构研究中的重要问题。主要回顾了该研究领域的理论发展脉络和重要研究结论,并试图从管理层权力理论的角度来解释薪酬差距产生的原因及合理性。对已有薪酬差距的研究做出重要的理论扩展,具有重要的理论意义。     

金融企业高管薪酬制度的国际比较

高管薪酬制度作为金融企业治理结构的重要环节,对其不断调整和改进成为完善我国现代企业制度的必然趋势.欧美金融企业拥有较为成熟的高管薪酬制度,本文通过对美国和我国商业银行薪酬制度进行对比分析,发现我国现行金融企业高管薪酬制度存在的问题,并为我国建立金融企业发展的新型高管薪酬制度提供对策.     

薪酬差距与企业绩效分析——基于产权性质的视角

以沪深A股上市公司2009—2014年的样本数据进行实证研究发现,高管薪酬与企业绩效呈现正相关关系,高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效呈现正相关关系。更进一步研究发现,国有企业高管团队内部薪酬差距较之非国有企业激励效果更好,国有企业高管内部薪酬差距与绩效呈现出更强的正相关关系。     

论上市公司高管薪酬的法律规制

在中国资本市场战略转型的背景下,上市公司高管薪酬畸高与业绩脱离的现象不断遭到公众对其公平性的拷问。上市公司高管薪酬机制中出现了薪酬疯长、高管薪酬和对公司的贡献没有关联、市场机制不能调控、公司自我监管无效的现象,市场失灵与政府调控的力不从心,使司法规制高管薪酬之势难挡。本文将审视我国国情和司法现状,并结合国外实践经验,对上市公司高管薪酬的法律规制提出合理建议。     

高管薪酬差距、现金持有及其市场价值——基于不同产权性质比较

薪酬差距这一话题引起社会各界的广泛关注，国内外学者对此问题已经进行了大量的研究，并取得了丰硕的成果，但目前我国上市公司高管薪酬差距如何影响其现金持有水平及其价值，几乎尚未见探讨。基于此背景，以中国A股2005—2018年非金融类上市公司为研究对象，实证考察了不同产权性质公司高管薪酬差距对其现金持有水平及价值的影响。研究结果表明：国企高管薪酬差距增加了现金持有量，降低了现金持有价值；民企高管薪酬差距降低了现金持有量，但提高了现金持有价值；稳健性检验表明文中论断依然成立；进一步分析可知国企高管薪酬差距更加倾向于增加内部现金流用于现金持有的积累，且同时导致过度投资水平的增加，民企高管薪酬差距降低了内部现金流用于现金持有的积累，对过度投资水平影响不显著。从以上结果可以得出，国企高管薪酬差距对现金持有行为的影响支持了社会比较理论；民企高管薪酬差距对现金持有行为的影响支持了锦标赛理论。     

儒家文化与高管-员工薪酬差距

儒家文化在财富分配中强调"均平"思想,那么受儒家文化影响较强的企业在内部财富分配中是否会秉持这一思想,从而使得高管-员工薪酬差距较小呢?为此,选取2003—2014年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究儒家文化对企业高管-员工薪酬差距的影响,实证结果显示,受儒家文化影响越强的企业,其高管-员工薪酬差距越小。进一步分析发现,受儒家文化影响越强的企业,地区市场化水平与外资股东持股对高管-员工薪酬差距的正向影响越弱。     

财务困境中CEO权力、高管层薪酬差距与公司业绩

以2005—2009年深沪两市上市公司为样本,设定财务困境公司与财务健康公司两个对比组,分析CEO权力对高管层薪酬差距的影响,以及薪酬差距、CEO权力和两者的交互效应对公司业绩的影响。研究发现:CEO强权在财务困境公司中不会导致高管层薪酬差距显著扩大,而在财务健康公司则会;财务困境公司中较大的高管层薪酬差距和CEO强权均能促进公司业绩的提升,且比财务健康公司更显著;CEO权力与薪酬差距对公司业绩的影响在财务困境公司中呈互补关系,而在财务健康公司中呈替代关系。     

CEO compensation in venture-backed firms

We hypothesize that because fast-growing young companies must raise money in private capital markets that contain significant financing frictions, the CEOs of such firms will be compensated for successful fundraising. Using a sample of 1585 private venture-backed U.S. firms, we find that the cash pay of entrepreneur-CEOs is increasing in both the quantity and quality of financing secured and is more sensitive to successful fundraising the more challenging and difficult is the fundraising task. Successful fundraising also increases the gap between the pay of CEOs and other executives. Finally, we show that while VC financing dilutes the CEO's fractional equity ownership, it increases the dollar value of that ownership.     

The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive Turnover and Compensation

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards.     

Political Affiliation and Pay Slice: Do Blue CEOs Accept Less Green?

We examine the relationship among CEO political alignment, compensation, and pay disparity (relative to other high‐earning executives) and find that Democratic CEOs accept less pay and a significantly lower pay slice. That is, left‐leaning CEOs put their money where their mouth is regarding the Democratic ideology of economic and social equity. This smaller pay gap is not a function of variations in managerial ability; if anything, Democratic CEOs are more talented than Republican CEOs. Results suggest that Democratic CEOs may be more effective at running firms in which collaboration among top executives is more valuable than are the potential gains from tournament incentives.     

融资约束与资本结构的非对称调整——基于动态门限模型的经验证据

以1999—2009年中国上市公司面板数据为研究对象,围绕融资约束对资本结构调整行为的影响,以公司规模和现金持有水平作为衡量融资约束的指标,采用动态面板门限模型展开研究。结果表明,大规模和高现金持有的公司会表现出更快的调整速度,非融资约束公司比融资约束公司的调整速度要快30%以上。本文解决了以往研究中存在的分组模糊性及忽视个体异质性缺陷的问题,实证发现融资约束程度的降低能有效提高公司的资本结构调整速度。     

The impact of pay on CEO turnover: A test of two perspectives

We investigate the impact of pay on CEO turnover from two perspectives. One is managerial power perspective that focuses on power in the setting of CEO pay. The other is tournament theory that treats CEO pay as a top prize designed to motivate executives to work hard for the top position. Building on research that highlights the impact of power dynamics at the top of the firm on CEO turnover, we propose that managerial power perspective suggests a negative impact of CEO pay on CEO turnover, while tournament theory suggests a positive impact. Using data from a sample of 313 large U.S. companies from 1988 to 1997, we find that both the level of CEO pay and its ratio over the average pay of the firm's four other highest paid executives have a negative impact on CEO turnover.     

Top management team characteristics,R&;D investment and capital structure in the IT industry

This paper is based on agency theory, resource-based and upper-echelons perspectives to examine the relationship between R&D investment and capital structure and the moderating effects of top management team (TMT) characteristics on the financing decisions of R&D investment in small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Using data for SMEs in Taiwan’s IT industry, we find that (1) SMEs involved in R&D activities tend to have lower debt levels and (2) TMT characteristics exert considerable influence on the R&D investment-financial leverage relationship in SMEs. One important implication of the empirical evidence is that for SMEs trying to compete on the basis of innovation, the TMT characteristics significantly influence financing decisions. As innovative activities increase, the selection and development of top executives, who are responsible for choosing an optimal capital structure that could keep financial costs low while providing sufficient financial resources for maintaining a continuous, uninterrupted rate of R&D, is crucial for SMEs.     

Capital structure of Chinese listed SMEs: an agency theory perspective

Prior work examining the antecedents of capital structure for small and medium-sized enterprises in emerging markets is limited. This paper sheds light on how the corporate governance mechanisms adopted by firms on the newly established Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in China influence their use of debt. We find that the financial leverage of GEM firms is positively influenced by executives’ shareholding and their excess cash compensation. Ownership concentration appears to reduce leverage, whereas the percentage of tradable shares increases leverage. In contrast, institutional investors’ shareholding does not influence the level of debt. Traditional factors such as tax and operating cash flow are insignificant in explaining the debt levels among GEM firms.     

Underpaid and Corrupt Executives in China’s State Sector

This study examines the role of executive compensation in public governance. We collect data on corruption cases that involve top-level executives in Chinese listed state-controlled firms. We find a significant positive relationship between underpayment of executives and the likelihood of an investigation into corrupt behavior. We also show that corruption is positively associated with firm performance and that the relationship between underpayment of executives and corruption is influenced by firm performance, suggesting that top managers are more likely to engage in illicit behavior if they are compensated poorly while the firms under their control perform well. Finally, we find that pay-performance sensitivity decreases when top executives are involved in corruption investigations, indicating a lack of pecuniary incentives. Our empirical findings point toward an important relationship between executive compensation and corrupt behavior, thus providing valuable input to the understanding of executive pay and its effects in China’s state sector.