The analysis of a price war strategy under market demand growth

We use the finite repeated Prisoners' Dilemma game model herein to discuss how firms choose their optimal strategy under a price war with market demand growth. This model has two players: one is an R-type player and the other is a TFT-type player. Each player has two strategies to choose from: a preemption strategy and a “wait” strategy. Our results indicate that: (i) if the probability that the opponent is an R-type (TFT-type) player is high, then the time when the opponent adopts a preemption strategy will be early (late); (ii) Market demand growth is an incentive for cooperation among firms; (iii) if the market demand growth rate is high, then the R-type player will not have an evolutionary advantage. We use the competition between cell phone manufacturing firms Nokia and Motorola in China as an example. When Nokia is an R-type player and adopts a preemption strategy, Motorola should preferably use a preemption strategy rather than a “wait” strategy. However, as a TFT-type player, this will benefit Motorola under the situation of market demand growth.     

A cost-effectiveness analysis of revaccination and catch-up strategies with the 23-valent pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine (PPV23) in older adults in Japan

Objective: In Japan, the National Immunization Program (NIP) includes PPV23 as the primary vaccination for adults and catch-up cohorts. The Japanese Association for Infectious Diseases recommends revaccination for older adults who received primary vaccination ≥5 years earlier. The cost-effectiveness of adding revaccination and/or continuing catch-up vaccination in the NIP was evaluated from the public payer perspective in Japan.

Methods: The Markov model included five health states: no pneumococcal disease, invasive pneumococcal diseases (IPD), non-bacteremic pneumococcal pneumonia (NBPP), post-meningitis sequelae, and death. Cohorts of adults aged 65–95 were followed until age 100 or death: 2014 cohort (aged 65–95, vaccinated: 2014); 2019 cohort (aged 65: 2019); and 2019 catch-up cohort (aged 70–100: 2019, unvaccinated: 2014). Strategies included: (1) vaccinate 2014 and 2019 cohorts; (2) vaccinate 2014 and 2019 cohorts and revaccinate both; (3) strategy 1 and vaccinate 2019 catch-up cohort; (4) strategy 2 and vaccinate 2019 catch-up cohort; and (5) strategy 4 and revaccinate 2019 catch-up cohort. Parameters were retrieved from global and Japanese sources, costs and QALYs discounted at 2%, and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) estimated.

Results: Strategy 1 had the highest number of IPD and NBPP cases, and strategy 5 the lowest. Strategies 3–5 dominated strategy 1 and strategy 2 was cost-effective compared to strategy 1 (ICER: ¥1,622,153 per QALY gained). At a willingness-to-pay threshold of ¥5 million per QALY gained, strategy 2 was cost-effective and strategies 3–5 were cost-saving compared to strategy 1.

Conclusions: Strategies including revaccination, catch-up, or both were cost-effective or cost-saving in comparison to no revaccination and no catch-up. Results can inform future vaccine policies and programs in Japan.     

基于我国现有能力的知识产权战略的分析

知识产权领域的重要性不同,知识产权创造能力不同,国家实施的知识产权战略也应该不同。按照知识产权领域重要性-能力分析矩阵,我国的知识产权领域可分为四个部分:强势重点领域、弱势重点领域、弱势一般领域和强势一般领域,根据我国现有的知识产权创造能力,应分别采取进攻战略、突围战略、防御战略和发展战略。     

战略成熟度因素探索:基于中国经验的实证分析

文章应用情景领导理论中根据下属成熟度进行有效领导的分析逻辑,定义了战略成熟度的概念。在战略成熟度的研究框架下,考察企业提高战略能力的两大类因素:战略洞察力和战略执行力,从而改善了战略分析模型在分析内容和分析工具方面的不足。文章还通过因子分析法在调研问卷中提取了战略洞察力因子、战略灵活力因子、战略变革力因子和战略适应力因子,并作四个因子对战略绩效的回归。实证结果表明,在中国企业战略成熟度因素中,战略洞察力要优于战略执行力。据此,文章还提出了一个关于战略成熟度的概念模型。     

印度经济安全战略及对中国的借鉴

本文认为,印度经济安全战略定位属于防御型,其形式为分散嵌入型。现阶段印度经济安全战略的重点包括:粮食安全、能源安全、金融安全、科技信息安全和外资安全。印度经济安全战略的运行过程主要包括战略的制定、执行和评估。本文最后提出对我国构建经济安全战略的借鉴。     

杭州转塘地区走出"经济洼地"的战略选择

由于转塘地区处于水源保护区等特殊的区位条件和与此相对应的产业政策,现已沦为杭州市近郊乡镇中的“经济洼地”。转塘地区要走出这一困境,必须坚持“发展是硬道理”,实施可持续发展战略,走生产发展、生活富裕、生态良好的文明发展道路。为此,可有：“生态补偿”、“循环经济”、“绿色经济”和“投资热土”四种战略选择。     

基于知识增值的企业专利管理战略效应分析

从知识增值的视角构建了企业专利管理增值模型,系统揭示了专利管理的内涵,从技术能力提升、市场价值实现两个方面,并结合华为集团案例探析了专利管理对企业运营管理的战略效应。     

A Characterization for Dominant Strategy Implementation

We introduce a perfect price discriminating mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A perfect price discriminating mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price schedule that does not depend on her report. In any perfect price discriminating mechanism, every player has a dominant strategy to truthfully report her private information.We establish a characterization for dominant strategy implementation: Any outcome that can be dominant strategy implemented can also be dominant strategy implemented using a perfect price discriminating mechanism. We apply this characterization to derive the optimal, budget-balanced, dominant strategy mechanisms for public good provision and bilateral bargaining.     

在位企业如何开拓新技术市场:商业模式与组织身份共演视角

新技术带来了新机遇,在位企业能否成功把握成为生存关键。采用单案例研究方法,以软件企业为案例研究对象,探索在位企业如何通过商业运营实现新技术市场开拓。研究发现:(1)商业模式与组织身份共演过程中,涌现了惯性思路-身份转移、整合思路-身份延伸、修补思路-身份增补3种演化形式;(2)战略导向变化是商业模式与组织身份演化的动因,出现了由内向外、混合导向和由外向内3种变化;(3)演化中组织身份匹配于商业模式,表现为嫁接匹配、重塑匹配和扩充匹配3种机制。扩展了在位企业应对技术变化的研究视角,丰富了组织身份的动态变化研究,深化了商业模式与技术发展间关系的研究,可为在位企业商业实践提供借鉴。     

Modeling of the clinical and economic impact of a risk-sharing agreement supporting a treat-to-target strategy in the management of patients with rheumatoid arthritis in France

Objectives: To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of a Treat-to-Target strategy with certolizumab pegol in patients with rheumatoid arthritis in the context of a pay-for-performance agreement in which medication costs are refunded in case of discontinuation during the first 3 months of treatment.

Methods: The Treat-to-Target strategy consisted of a systematic switch to second-line tumor necrosis factor (TNF)α inhibitor in case of an unmet ACR50 response at 3 months compared to current routine clinical practice. A reference cohort treated first-line with certolizumab pegol according to current practice without systematic switching was considered as the comparator. A decision-tree model was constructed to estimate clinical outcome (health assessment questionnaire-disability index or HAQ-DI score), time spent in ACR50 response (ACR 50), and direct costs of treatment over a 2-year period. HAQ scores were derived from American College of Rheumatology 50 (ACR50) responses. All TNFα inhibitors were assumed to have equivalent efficacy and tolerability. Costs were estimated at 2013 French retail prices (date of the pay-for-performance agreement).

Results: The mean duration of an ACR50 response was 1.23 years in the Treat-to-Target strategy certolizumab pegol cohort vs 0.98 years in the reference cohort, resulting in a mean gain in HAQ at 24 months of 0.117. The Treat-to-Target strategy with a mix of TNFα inhibitors as second-line therapy was more expensive than the reference strategy in absolute terms, but this difference was entirely offset by the pay-for-performance agreement. The Treat-to-Target strategy was, thus, cost-neutral over a 2-year period after the payback of CZP cost for patients not achieving the target at 3 months.

Conclusions: In the context of a pay-for-performance agreement, the management of patients with rheumatoid arthritis using a Treat-to-Target strategy with certolizumab pegol in first line is dominant compared to standard use of this drug in the French setting in 2013.     

Marketing and r&d strategies for biotechnology firms in the usa

This pape reports on a survey of 64 biotechnology firms in the USA about their R&D strategy, marketing focud and sources of technology. The survey explored the interrelationships among the strategic issues and how they were related with the means of appropriating R&D results. Three stralegic clusters for technology acquisitin emerged from the data: (i) internal developer, (ii) joint developer, and (iii) cooperative financed. Three marketing clusters were: (i) market penetartor, (ii) innovative marketer, and (iii) market developer. The R&D clusters were: (i) defensive strategy, (ii) aggressive strategy, and (iii) research-intensive strategy. External sources of technology appeared to be predominant among thje various firms and apparently marketing strategy and source of technology had no significant relationship. Most of the firms were involved with commercial innovation in their R&D strategy and few were research specialists. Innovative firms were inclined to depend on external sources sources of technology. Issues related to appropriability of R&D results for the different groups have been examined for their implications for public policy.     

Marketing and r&d strategies for biotechnology firms in the usa

This pape reports on a survey of 64 biotechnology firms in the USA about their R&D strategy, marketing focud and sources of technology. The survey explored the interrelationships among the strategic issues and how they were related with the means of appropriating R&D results. Three stralegic clusters for technology acquisitin emerged from the data: (i) internal developer, (ii) joint developer, and (iii) cooperative financed. Three marketing clusters were: (i) market penetartor, (ii) innovative marketer, and (iii) market developer. The R&D clusters were: (i) defensive strategy, (ii) aggressive strategy, and (iii) research-intensive strategy. External sources of technology appeared to be predominant among thje various firms and apparently marketing strategy and source of technology had no significant relationship. Most of the firms were involved with commercial innovation in their R&D strategy and few were research specialists. Innovative firms were inclined to depend on external sources sources of technology. Issues related to appropriability of R&D results for the different groups have been examined for their implications for public policy.     

循环经济视角下的企业营销创新

本文认为实施循环经济模式是人类社会发展的必然结果,我国实施该经济模式势在必行。循环经济模式对企业经营行为提出了新的要求,企业必须实施如下营销策略:新产品策略、绿色营销策略、生产可重复使用包装、以旧换新策略和跨国经营策略。     

Quality-oriented growth: a new trend for Chinese firms

ABSTRACT

Based on data from the China Employer-Employee Survey (CEES), this study analyses the actual effect of quality-driven growth on firms’ performances in the economic transition of recent years. The results show positive and significant effects between the firms’ performance and quality-oriented growth, which is defined as a strategy that supports the spirit of greater entrepreneurial innovation, the advancement of input quality, and corporate governance improvement. Using a quality-driven growth mode, firms can effectively relieve the adverse effect of downward macroeconomic growth pressure on performance. This study proposes that China’s macroeconomic policy should shift from demand-oriented management to supply-oriented management, with a particular focus on quality development strategy. Moreover, firms should establish a quality-driven development strategy, facilitating a spirit of entrepreneurial innovation, advancing input quality, and improving corporate governance. This strategy will increase the firm’s performance, and effectively relieve the macroeconomic downward pressure.

Abbreviations: CEES: China Employer-Employee Survey, TFP: Total factor productivity     

转型环境下创业战略与新创企业竞争优势关系研究

创新战略有利于企业构建新的价值链，模仿战略是对市场已有价值链的补充，现有研究主要关注创新战略，对模仿战略关注不足，实践中很多新创企业通过模仿战略实现创业成功。特别地，中国转型环境下制度不完善造成的不良竞争环境会制约创新战略，促进模仿战略。然而，实践中这两种战略对新创企业均存在积极影响，选择创新战略还是模仿战略事关新创企业创业成败。考察技术、市场环境和制度环境特征，剖析不同技术和市场环境下不良竞争对创新战略和模仿战略的调节作用。利用153份新创企业样本研究发现：创新战略和模仿战略均有利于竞争优势，但不同环境特征下作用效果存在差异。不良竞争对模仿战略的影响与技术、市场环境特征不相关；对创新战略的影响与技术、市场环境特征相关。创新战略和模仿战略并不存在孰优孰劣，是一定约束条件下新创企业战略决策的结果。     

Inflation-targeting rules: History-dependent or forward-looking?

This note discusses the inflation-targeting strategy if price setting gives rise to a hybrid Phillips curve. The strategy is inverted relative to private sector pricing behavior: if private sector price setting is backward-looking, policy should be forward-looking, and vice versa.     

Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates

This paper formulates and analyzes a general model of elections in which candidates receive private signals about voters' preferences prior to committing to political platforms. We fully characterize the unique pure-strategy equilibrium: After receiving her signal, each candidate locates at the median of the distribution of the median voter's location, conditional on the other candidate receiving the same signal. Sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium are provided. Though the electoral game exhibits discontinuous payoffs for the candidates, we prove that mixed strategy equilibria exist generally, that equilibrium expected payoffs are continuous in the parameters of the model, and that mixed strategy equilibria are upper hemicontinuous. This allows us to study the robustness of the median voter theorem to private information: Pure strategy equilibria may fail to exist in models “close” to the Downsian model, but mixed strategy equilibria must, and they will be “close” to the Downsian equilibrium.     

智能制造开放式创新平台战略异质性研究：基于扎根理论双案例视角

制造业需要抓住互联网机遇实施智能制造，实现转型升级。企业转型升级内涵是实现数字化、平台化、智能化，其中平台化是智能制造发展的新方向，而平台战略是对智能制造的统筹把握。然而，智能制造企业开放式创新平台模式研究匮乏，也不重视平台战略异质性。运用扎根理论，选取海尔、西门子两家典型智能制造企业进行双案例比较分析，总结两家企业平台化战略模型：西门子采取面向工厂管理与服务的开放式物联网云平台生态系统战略；海尔则推行直面用户的多平台大规模定制全流程创新生态圈战略。通过比较分析发现，两家企业在平台核心战略、平台流程战略、平台整合战略、平台保障战略、平台拓展战略等方面呈现异质性，并探讨形成这种异质性的经济、社会、文化和技术等方面原因。     

Anonymity in nonatomic games

This paper purpose is twofold. First, it offers a critical review of the proofs of existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria in nonatomic games. In particular, it focuses on the alternative ways of formalizing the critical assumption of anonymity. Second, the paper proves the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria by relaxing anonymity and allowing instead for “limited anonymity” (i.e. players’ decisions depend on the average strategy of a finite number of players’ subsets and not on the average strategy of the whole set of players). (JEL: C72, C79)     

On the Coalition-Proofness of the Pareto Frontier of the Set of Nash Equilibria

This article shows that the Pareto efficient frontier of the Nash equilibrium set of games with strategic substitutes is coalition-proof under the following conditions: (1) the game has three players, or, alternatively, a player's payoff depends on her own strategy and on the sum (but not on the composition) of other players' strategies; (2) an increase in a player's strategy either raises all other players' payoffs monotonically or reduces them monotonically; and (3) each player's payoff is strictly concave in her own strategy. Under these conditions, the Pareto dominance refinement is equivalent to the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refinement.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.