WTO与中国企业专利发展战略

WTO以贸易为中心,在全球范围内将货物贸易、服务贸易与知识产权紧密地联系在一起,从而实现了专利保护全球化,知识经济时代知识产权成为了企业生存发展的核心问题,企业的生产、经营、管理都必须以知识产权为中心进行战略定位。专利是市场经济下的一种合法垄断,专利就是市场,要积极发挥专利技术的市场效用。加入WTO以后,中国市场成为了全球市场,中国企业必须立足发展中国家的现实,积极进行战略布局,才能在与跨国公司的竞争中生存和发展。专利战略已成为中国企业实施可持续发展的战略选择,成为了中国企业开展市场竞争的战略重点,也是中国企业进行对外贸易的战略举措。     

行业自律视角下知识产权服务行业“一业多会”机制研究

现阶段,知识产权服务行业实行的“一业一会”机制在行业自律方面发挥着显著作用,但也存在因其垄断地位导致的竞争活力缺乏以及独立性不足等问题。而“一业多会”机制无论是从权力来源的合法性还是从市场经济发展的内在需求来论证都是具有可行性的。但就目前“一业多会”机制的试点工作而言,在行业自律层面,均难以形成一套统一且行之有效的职业道德规范,对行业自律产生了弱化作用。因而,建立一套统一且行之有效的执业纪律和职业道德规范是关键,同时应辅之以完善的知识产权服务行业协会“准入—退出”机制以及完善的监督体制,共同促进知识产权服务业的健康有序发展。     

Legal positivism and property rights: a critique of Hayek and Peczenik

Scholars such as Friedrich Hayek and Aleksander Peczenik have criticized legal positivism for undermining constitutionalism and the rule of law, an implication of which is weakened private property rights. This conclusion is far from evident. First, I contend that legal positivism is compatible with a strong support for property rights. Second, the causal relationship between legal positivism and the degree to which property rights are applied and protected is analyzed. The main arguments for a negative relationship—that legal positivism centralizes and politicizes legislation and that it makes the legal culture servile in relation to the political sphere—are considered unconvincing.

Enforcement of Property Rights and Underdevelopment

The authors formalize the role of legal infrastructure in economic development in a general‐equilibrium model with endogenously determined property rights enforcement. The mutual importance of property rights protection and market production is illustrated by the model's multiplicity of equilibria. In one equilibrium, property rights are enforced, and market activity unhampered. In the other, property rights are not enforced, discouraging economic activity, which leaves the economy without the resources and the incentives to enforce property rights. Even identically endowed economies may therefore find themselves in very different equilibria.     

网络虚拟物品之法律保护渊源探寻

由于现行法律制度并未对虚拟物品的法律属性做出界定,随着网络交易规模的不断扩大,大量盗窃、不公平交易纠纷、欺诈等围绕网络虚拟物品的权属争议纠纷案件在实践中频发。因此,法律保护虚拟物品的期望是维护虚拟世界和现实世界正常财产秩序的必然要求。本文从法哲学的财产劳动理论、法理学关于财产的界定两方面论证网络虚拟物品财产的属性本质,并通过利益确认的需要、法律价值目的之体现、应有权利之必然的角度分析论证对虚拟物品进行法律保护的必要性。     

A market without the 'right' property rights

While Vietnam's reforms provided some of the weakest legal private property rights amongst the transitions countries, cities like Ho Chi Minh City have booming domestic real estate markets. Interestingly, while most properties in 2001 did not have legal title, those on the market did advertise a variety of property rights claims. Employing a hedonic price model to analyse the pattern of prices at which sellers offer properties in Ho Chi Minh City, this study examines how this market values property rights. The findings show that multiple forms of property rights, enforced by highly decentralized state institutions, are operational in this market. Furthermore, legal title itself is not the most valuable form of property right. These findings suggest that the value of property rights emanates from where it is enforced within the particular institutional context of a market.     

知识产权活动的心理学基础探析

知识产权保护作为一种法律制度设计,不应违背人的心理规律。正是在现代知识产权法律制度的保护下,“天才”的需要得到了满足,才为创造性劳动提供了不绝的动力,这是一个不断递进的过程,权利人不断从中获取动力,个人与社会在相互满足的过程中获得良性的互动与统一。但是,囿于需要的社会性,知识产权保护的目的应是满足人的需要而不是为了满足人的贪欲,并且,对需求的满足应纳入法制的轨道。     

Competition among the elites,property rights protection and economic performance

In this paper, a model is built that investigates how competition among elites interacts with property rights protection for the middle class, and how they influence economic performance, when this interaction is taken into account. It is shown that when property rights of the middle class are less protected, there is more competition among the elites. Therefore, in some circumstances, economic performance improves despite insecure property rights. On the other hand, however, when there exists strong competition among the elites, property rights protection for the middle class decreases. Hence, under some conditions, economic performance worsens even though the competition is high. Furthermore, the paper provides an explanation for why regulation of entry is commonplace around the world.     

The Property System in Austrian Economics: Ronald Coase's Contribution

This paper argues that contrary to Roy Cordato's claim, Ronald Coase's work on the problem of social cost is an important contribution to Austrian economics. Coase identified a criterion that can be used to establish initial legal rights to control actions that have external effects. In other words, he discovered a criterion that, in some cases, can be directly applied to help establish a property system when there is none. The criterion also helps a government adapt, or maintain, a property system in light of continuing changes that are characteristic of the entrepreneur economy. Cordato's anti-state ethical economics, which he used to criticize Coase, is a deviation from the century-old tradition of Austrian economics. Menger, Mises and Hayek saw economics as a body of logical knowledge that is value free. In addition they recognized a role for government in defining legal rights and in maintaining the property system in light of changing conditions. Accordingly, it is wrong to invoke Austrian economics, properly understood, to criticize this aspect of Coase's work. In this paper, I argue that Cordato has followed a deviant and troubling path by trying to construct an Austrian economics based on ethics, that he has failed to understand that a changeable property system is a prerequisite for the market economy, and that he has correspondingly failed to recognize Coase's contribution to the problem of how to maintain the property system in light of continuing change.     

知识产权领域影响社会和谐的问题及成因分析

知识产权在其生成环节、传播环节、利用环节中都存在着影响社会和谐的一些突出问题。知识产权领域的权利冲突现象也日益显性化。产生不和谐的原因是多个方面的：既有制度方面的,如法律制度方面的不完善、不科学;又有主体方面的,如意识的超前和滞后双向不均衡发展;还有客体方面的,如知识产权自身的无形性特征引发的权利边界模糊、“一物多权”和“一权多用”。对这些原因的学理分析是我们解决相关问题的前提条件。     

Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution

This paper challenges the view that legal rights are not important in affecting whether people divorce, but it puts as much emphasis on property rights (given, for example, by the law on alimony) as on dissolution rights. The paper sets out two stylised models of marriage and examines the consequences of fuller compensation for economic sacrifices made during marriage. If the dominant economic issue in a marriage is who undertakes household tasks then a law giving fuller compensation makes divorce more likely. If the dominant issue is child custody, divorce is less likely.     

会计准则保护产权的"马太效应"研究--来自近代西方历史的回顾与企业所有权理论的分析

在保护小股东的产权方面,中国会计准则曾一度被寄予厚望,但是结果却并不尽如人意。这很大程度上缘于我们缺乏对会计准则保护小股东产权的作用机理,以及会计准则产权保护功能发挥所需要的条件的分析。文章通过对英国、荷兰和美国建立产权法律保护体系的历史回顾,以及从企业所有权理论的角度对会计准则保护产权的作用途径进行分析,提出了会计准则与产权保护之间的基本关系———会计准则是产权法律保护体系的重要组成部分,但同时对产权保护又具有“马太效应”。这一理论对于理解中国会计准则具有深刻的含义。     

产品责任损害赔偿问题思考

在因产品缺陷而引起的人身和财产损害案件频发的今天，必须强化产品责任损害赔偿法律制度，以充分体现对消费者合法权益予以切实保护的立法目的。我国产品责任法应当明确精神损害赔偿，建立惩罚性损害赔偿制度。     

试论民间借贷中借出方权益的自我保护

民间借贷是指公民与公民之间、公民与法人以及其他经济组织之间的借贷,是具有广泛群众性和深远传统性的信用补偿机制."民间借贷"不同于"非法集资",合法的民间借贷是受国家法律保护的,民间借贷在社会经济活动中不可或缺.但是,由于民间借贷具有自发性、随意性、风险性,一旦遇到情况变化,非常容易引发纠纷,造成诸多社会问题.因此,公民在出借资金时应注意保护自身的合法权益,以避免不必要的借贷纠纷发生,使民间借贷活动在社会经济发展中发挥其应有的积极作用.     

Competition and Public Policy in the Nursing Home Industry

A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole lifecycle of a property right: How it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and almost completely neglected the question of initiation and termination of property in normal production and consumption (not in some original state or in the transition from common to private property). The institutional mechanism for the normal initiation and termination of property is an invisible hand function of the market — the market mechanism of appropriation. Does this mechanism satisfy an appropriate normative principle? The standard normative juridical principle is to assign or impute legal responsibility according to de facto responsibility. It is given a historical tag of being "Lockean," but the basis is contemporary jurisprudence, not historical exegesis. Then, the fundamental theorem of the property mechanism is proven, which shows that if "Hume's conditions" (no transfers without consent and all contracts fulfilled) are satisfied, then the market automatically satisfies the Lockean responsibility principle — i.e., "Hume implies Locke." As a major application, the results in their contrapositive form, "Not Locke implies Not Hume," are applied to a market economy based on the employment contract. I show that the production based on the employment contract violates the Lockean principle (all who work in an employment enterprise are de facto responsible for the positive and negative results), and thus Hume's conditions must also be violated in the marketplace (de facto responsible human action cannot be transferred from one person to another — as is readily recognized when an employer and employee together commit a crime).¹     

The Ideology of Intellectual Property Rights in the International Economy

Since the arrival of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 a number of side agreements have also been negotiated that seek further rationalization of the emerging global economy. Prominent among these is the agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS. Enforcement of the TRIPS agreement would involve the multilateral trade sanctions mechanism of the WTO. This paper examines justificatory arguments for the defense of intellectual property rights in the international economy. These arguments are based on the "classic" philosophic writings of Locke, Hegel, and Bentham. It is found that these well-known philosophic defenses for exclusive property rights do not hold up well when applied to intellectual property.     

Stranded Costs,Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts

Economic Analysis can help resolve the stranded cost controversy that has arisen in debates over electricity market deregulation. "Stranded costs" are costs electric utilities will not recover as power markets move from protected monopolies to an open, competitive environment. We describe the stranded cost problem, its magnitude and the prominent arguments for and against recovery. An economic analysis of implicit contracts can clarify whether there should be a legal duty to compensate utility shareholders for unrecovered costs. However, efficient approaches to electricity deregulation should rely on more than analysis of contracts. The politics of deregulation, as reflected in optimal compensation for regulatory "takings" of property, also affects the desirability of stranded cost recovery.     

Financial Liberalization, Property Rights, and Growth in an Overlapping-Generations Model

Using an endogenous growth model in which countries differ with respect to property rights protection, the paper analyzes the growth and welfare effects of removing capital controls, and studies the political support for a reform which improves the quality of property rights. When these are poorly protected, liberalization of capital movements may foster growth in the short run but eliminates it in the long run. The removal of capital controls may benefit agents at the time of liberalization, hurting future generations. Ceteris paribus , political support for a reform of property rights is stronger in the closed than in the open economy.     

自然保护地自然资源资产产权制度现状辨析

“建立以国家公园为主体的自然保护地体系”是党的十九大所提出的国家公园体制建设的新方向。实现自然保护地的有效保护管理是其重要内容，关键在于通过改革形成科学、合理的自然资源资产产权制度，而厘清自然资源资产产权制度的现状则是进行改革的前提。首先，对现行法律进行系统梳理，明确法律所认定的自然保护地中的自然资源类型。其次，从自然资源的产权种类及所有权改变、用益物权流转三方面总结了自然保护地自然资源资产的产权制度现状。再者，从各类自然保护地申报设立的条件和环保督查中反映出来的问题两方面入手分析了自然保护地的自然资源保护管理现状，从国家公园体制试点采取的措施出发分析了目前的改革探索，并提炼出自然保护地自然资源资产产权制度存在的四大问题，即自然资源资产产权的界定和要求较局限、自然资源所有权行使人虚位、公权与私权的利益协调机制不健全、改革探索中物权途径面临制度障碍。最后，从自然资源资产产权制度设计的角度提出了改革的4个方向。     

THE TAXABLE SURPLUS IN WATER RESOURCES

Taxes or rental charges for water use are bearable and legal and would spur water economy, but the following fallacies impede acceptance of these ideas: (i) water rights are real property, (ii) a charge on water would be passed on to consumers, (iii) the cost of water is just its development cost, (iv) markets solve most problems if property rights are firm, (v) only consumptive use is a social cost, and (vi) common rights must spell tragedy. This paper dispels these fallacies while advocating taxation and/or rental charges for water use.