Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

Optimal Currency Area: A twentieth Century Idea for the twenty-first Century?

We take stock of the history of the European Monetary Union and pegged exchange-rate regimes in recent decades. The post-Bretton Woods greater financial integration and under-regulated financial intermediation have increased the cost of sustaining a currency area and other forms of fixed exchange-rate regimes. Financial crises illustrated that fast-moving asymmetric financial shocks interacting with real distortions pose a grave threat to the stability of currency areas and fixed exchange-rate regimes. Members of a currency union with closer financial links may accumulate asymmetric balance-sheet exposure over time, becoming more susceptible to sudden-stop crises. In a phase of deepening financial ties, countries may end up with more correlated business cycles. Down the road, debtor countries that rely on financial inflows to fund structural imbalances may be exposed to devastating sudden-stop crises, subsequently reducing the correlation of business cycles between currency area’s members, possibly ceasing the gains from membership in a currency union. A currency union of developing countries anchored to a leading global currency stabilizes inflation at a cost of inhibiting the use of monetary policy to deal with real and financial shocks. Currency unions with low financial depth and low financial integration of its members may be more stable at a cost of inhibiting the growth of sectors depending on bank funding.     

Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?

Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Credible Inflation Targets or Monetized Debt? —The paper examines the interrelationship between fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country monetary union. The worst scenario occurs when an independent central bank sets the nominal interest rate and responds to rising government debt/GDP ratios by monetization. The result is high inflation, high debt/GDP ratios and a large public sector. Government debt and inflation are contained if the governments bear sole responsibility for solvency, but the public sector remains excessively large. The best scenario occurs if the central bank removes the incentive for the governments to engineer surprise inflation by credible inflation targeting.     

从债权国到债务国——美国国际债务模式转变的逻辑分析

国际债务危机最初都是起源于发展中国家,发展中国家是国际债务人。进入21世纪,国际债务模式呈现出新的变化,国际债务危机从"外围"向"中心"扩散;债务危机的形式由公司债务危机向主权债务危机转变,美国由原来世界最大债权国转变成为世界最大债务国,中国作为发展中国家已成为世界债权大国。美国国际债务模式转变的内在逻辑直接反映出发达国家利用债务对实施开放经济的发展中国家进行利益转移。中国作为债权国面临着诸多挑战,维护债权国利益是当务之急。     

Optimum Currency Areas Under Inflation Targeting

Several countries face the choice between targeting inflation independently and entering a monetary union that targets inflation. The present paper extends the theory of optimum currency areas to deal with this choice. In contrast to the conventional theory, countries might form more of an optimum currency area the more asymmetric supply shocks are.     

Optimal Debt? On the Insurance Value of International Debt Flows to Developing Countries

According to reputation models of sovereign debt, the incentives to repay are proportional to the income insurance benefits provided by the access to international markets. This paper, however, documents that private net lending to developing countries exhibits a procyclical or acyclical pattern, contradicting this premise. By contrast, official debt net flows exhibit a countercyclical patter. In addition, the paper shows that (both current and past) defaults are associated with lower net debt flows. The findings suggest that, while reputation models may explain the preferred creditor status enjoyed by official lenders, they cannot account for the presence of sovereign debt markets in developing countries.     

Liquidity Risk and Banks' Asset Composition: Implications for Monetary Policy

Monetary growth models in which the government is a net debtor demonstrate that inflation adversely affects capital formation through the crowding out effect. Interestingly, the results are at odds with empirical evidence. In particular, recent studies point to an asymmetric relationship between inflation and the real economy across countries. Specifically, inflation and output are negatively correlated in poor countries. In contrast, inflation is associated with higher levels of economic activity in advanced economies. I present a monetary growth model with public debt, where the exposure to risk is inversely related to the level of income. In this setting, I demonstrate that the effects of monetary policy depend on the level of capital of the economy. In poor countries, banks' portfolios consist primarily of government liabilities. Therefore, a higher rate of money creation inhibits capital formation in these economies. In contrast, banks devote more resources toward productive uses in advanced countries. Consequently, monetary policy generates a Tobin effect.     

主权货币国际化内在矛盾及其策略选择——兼论国际货币体系多元发展路线的历史逻辑

美元作为主权货币国际化,在适应并促进世界经济增长的同时,其内在矛盾成为世界经济失衡、汇率大幅波动以及流动性泛滥的重要因素。解决美国主权货币国际化助推的贸易赤字、财政赤字和巨额债务问题,需要美国政府财政政策、货币政策和产业政策的重大调整,还需要国际货币体系的重大改革,从美元主导的单一货币模式转变为多元模式。美元、欧元以及正在走向国际化的人民币共同构成代表和主导北美、欧洲、亚洲等三大经济圈、覆盖全球经济体的国际货币体系。研究主权货币国际化的内在矛盾以及国际货币体系多元发展路线的历史逻辑,对有效应对复杂多变的国际经济环境,加快人民币国际化进程具有理论和决策参考价值。     

Uncertainty and Fiscal Policy in an Asymmetric Monetary Union

We examine monetary and fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. It is first shown that monetary uncertainty discourages excessive taxation and may thus reduce average inflation and output distortions. However, as countries enter the monetary union, this tax-restraining effect of uncertainty is mitigated. The monetary union may hence lead to higher fiscal distortions in some member countries, depending on governments’ spending targets and on the change in the degree of uncertainty implied by common monetary policy.     

Monetary unions, external shocks and economic performance: A Latin American perspective

During the last few years there has been a renewed analysis in currency unions as a form of monetary arrangement. This new interest has been largely triggered by the Euro experience. Scholars and policy makers have asked about the optimal number of currencies in the world economy. They have analyzed whether different countries satisfy the traditional “optimal currency area” criteria. These include, among other: (a) the synchronization of the business cycle; (b) the degree of factor mobility; and (c) the extent of trade and financial integration. In this paper I analyze the desirability of a monetary union from a Latin American perspective. First, I review the existing literature on the subject. Second, I use a large data set to analyze the evidence on economic performance in currency union countries. I investigate these countries’ performance on four dimensions: (a) whether countries without a national currency have a lower occurrence of “sudden stop” episodes; (b) whether they have a lower occurrence of “current account reversal” episodes; (c) what is their ability to absorb international terms of trade shocks; and (d) what is their ability to absorb “sudden stops” and “current account reversals” shocks. I find that belonging to a currency union has not lower the probability of facing a sudden stop or a current account reversal. I also find that external shocks have been amplified in currency union countries. The degree of amplification is particularly large when compared to flexible exchange rate countries.     

Interest-Rate Spread and Public-Debt Dynamics in a Two-Country Monetary-Union Portfolio Model

Tracking, monitoring and steering the evolution of public debt over time will be a major policy challenge for almost all governments in the advanced countries in the years to come, in particular for those belonging to the European Monetary Union. In this paper I study public debt dynamics in a two-country monetary union where a representative, risk-averse wealth-owner optimizes his/her portfolio of sovereign bonds issued in the common currency. I obtain two main results with respect to the standard country-by-country approach. First, the interest-rate spread between the two countries is endogenized as the higher-debt country pays a risk premium which is proportional to the level of its own debt with respect to the debt of the other. Second, its debt dynamic path becomes nonlinear and dependent on the evolution of the other country’s debt. The most important policy implication is that “dynamic interdependence” is not fully considered in the implementation of EMU fiscal rules, but it may may jeopardize their goal of convergence and stability of debt stocks.     

Is the proposed East African Monetary Union an optimal currency area? a structural vector autoregression analysis

This paper empirically assesses the suitability of the East African (EA) countries for a regional monetary union by testing for symmetry of the underlying structural shocks. The results indicate that supply and demand shocks are generally asymmetric, which does not lend strong support for forming a currency union in the EA region at the moment. However, the speed and magnitude of adjustment to shocks is similar across the countries. Therefore, further integration of the economies might lead to more favorable conditions for a monetary union. Although evidence in favor of linking an EA currency to an external anchor is weak, such support seems to favor the Euro.     

美国量化宽松政策对亚太新兴市场国家的影响

量化宽松是美联储在通货紧缩下所采取的一种直接创造货币、扩大央行资产负债表规模的非传统货币政策。量化宽松将给我国等新兴市场国家造成较大的负面效果,建议采取临时性资本管制、针对性量化政策、建立区域货币离岸市场、加快经济结构转型等对策来应对。     

A suggested reformulation of the theory of optimal currency areas

In contrast to conventional analyses of monetary union between two particular countries or sets of countries, this paper treats the possible expansion of a given currency area as a continuous variable ranging from zero to one; zero if there is no expansion and one if all sources of imports and competition in trade are included in the union. The optimal order in which new members are admitted to the union then becomes a central aspect of the problem. Along with other advantages, this approach makes it easier to defend the argument that many nations are too small for form optimal currency areas. The demands upon the origin of the shocks, factor mobility, and political organization are smaller.     

欧洲央行的最后贷款人角色

欧债危机爆发后,欧洲央行一直在是否充当政府债券市场最后贷款人的问题上摇摆不定。笔者认为,货币联盟中的政府债券市场存在缺陷,很容易爆发流动性危机,只有中央银行做出最后贷款人的承诺才能解决这一问题。文章对以通胀风险、财政影响、道德风险、白芝浩理论、法律异议为理由反对欧洲央行为政府债券市场提供最后贷款支持的声音,进行了逐一驳斥,建议:为了维护金融稳定,欧洲央行必须公开声明将在政府债券市场上坚定不移地履行最后贷款人职责。     

Reactions to Shocks and Monetary Policy Regimes: Inflation Targeting Versus Flexible Currency Board in Sub‐Saharan Africa

The paper examines the monetary policy actions through which central banks in sub‐Saharan Africa have tried to eliminate the negative impacts of the shocks facing their economies. We compare two different monetary policy regimes: a currency board regime (in the CFA zone) and an inflation targeting policy regime (Ghana and South Africa) when central banks respond to demand, supply, and fiscal shocks. We extend the usual forecasting and policy analysis system models to replicate the economic features of these economies during the period 2002–12 and to evaluate the impact of several policies in response to these shocks. We find that both policies are inappropriate in helping the economies escape from the effects of negative demand shocks, both are essential when negative shocks to primary balance occur, while inflation targeting dominates the currency board regime as a strategy to cope with positive shocks to inflation.     

Welfare Implications of Currency Integration: Labor Mobility and Pricing-to-Market

In this paper, we examine the welfare cost of renouncing monetary policy autonomy in a model that includes labor mobility and pricing-to-market (PTM) behavior in firms. We find that renouncing monetary policy autonomy becomes a cost of currency integration when the consumption basket weights differ between candidate countries and when country-specific total factor productivity (TFP) shocks hit economies, even when the union fulfills the classic optimum currency area theory of labor mobility. We also found that a firm's PTM behavior has a significant effect on the welfare implications of currency integration combined with labor mobility. For instance, currency integration does not produce greater welfare losses in the PTM case (where the labor input weights differ across member countries and asymmetric labor disutility shocks occur), although greater welfare losses arise in the case of producer currency pricing.     

SHOULD THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES FORM A CURRENCY UNION?

This paper examines some of the factors related to the formation of a currency union in Southeast Asia. The main part of the paper presents the results of our examination of the correlation of shocks for the Southeast Asian countries using a structural vector autoregression. The shocks are identified using restrictions on the long‐run coefficient matrix as suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989). The correlations of shocks for the EU and NAFTA countries are used for comparison. The Southeast Asian countries are shown to have more strongly correlated shocks than the EU countries. Compared with the NAFTA countries, external shocks are more closely correlated for the ASEAN countries, but the supply and demand shocks are less correlated. Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, in particular, exhibit a high degree of correlation of shocks. Other criteria for monetary union, such as intra‐regional trade, openness of the economy, and similarity of monetary policy are also examined.     

The European monetary system: Crisis and future

This paper examines the immediate and the fundamental causes of the crsis that hit the European Monetary System in September 1992 and August 1993 and the obstacles that European countries face in trying to achieve their ultimate goal of full monetary union, including a single currency and a union-wide central bank by the end of this decade. The conclusion that follows from the paper is that achieving full monetary union in Europe by the end of this decade is certainly possible but not certain. A major recession or other shock affecting asymmetrically more than one large member nation could derail or at least delay the process of monetary union. Although major benefits are expected to flow from monetary union in Europe, even more important are the political benefits that such a union would provide to its members.     

Central Bank Autonomy,the Exchange Rate Constraint and Inflation: The Case of Italy, 1970–1992

This paper analyzes the determinants of inflation in Italy over the period 1970–1992. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of central bank independence in influencing monetary growth, and on the role of monetary growth and of the Exchange rate Mechanism (ERM) in affecting inflation. In the 1970s and early 1980s, when the Bank of Italy lacked independence and the ERM was still not credible, monetary growth was highly unstable and was the main determinant of Italian inflation, although oil price and tax shocks also played a role. After the March 1983 general exchange rate realignment and the French U-turn, the ERM became more credible and monetary growth stopped being a significant determinant of inflation; instead, the German inflation became the main variable influencing Italian inflation.