Reconsidering the empirical evidence on the Grossman-Helpman model of endogenous protection

Abstract.  The emergence of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of endogenous protection as the preëminent model in the political economy of trade literature has been significantly advanced by the finding that its predictions about the cross-industry pattern of protection are broadly consistent with the data. However, in their empirical implementation of the Grossman-Helpman model, researchers have assumed the presence of multiple policy instruments and extraneous political factors. We argue that incorporating these assumptions into the theory significantly changes its predictions about the cross-industry pattern of protection. JEL classification: F1     

The effects of tariffs on coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game

The prospects for cooperation on climate protection beyond 2012 are currently uncertain. Thus policy instruments which foster participation in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) are in demand. Among the instruments under discussion are trade sanctions. Multi-region optimal growth models are a state of the art tool for integrated assessment, but introducing trade sanctions distorts the competitive equilibrium, making it difficult to compute numerically. We introduce trade and trade sanctions into a model of coalition stability to assess the potential of trade sanctions to support an IEA. Trade is modeled by having all countries produce a generic output good, but adopting national product differentiation (Armington assumption). Coalitions are free to impose tariffs on imports from non-cooperating countries. We solve the model numerically using a refined version of Negishi's [Negishi, T., 1960. Welfare economics and existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Metroeconomica 12, 92–97] basic algorithm. We then apply the model to analyze the influence of tariffs on international cooperation. The model suggests that there is indeed a significant potential to raise participation through trade sanctions, even when goods from different countries are nearly perfect substitutes. Furthermore we investigate the effect of trade sanctions on global welfare, environmental effectiveness, and the credibility of the tariff mechanism.     

Environmental tariffs on polluting imports

This paper examines the implications for the use of trade measures as weapons to address global environmental concerns. There are already proposals in the U.S. senate to impose an environmental tariff against foreign nations whose cost advantages stem from less stringent environmental standards than the U.S. The paper argues that trade policy measures typically are not the first best instruments for achieving environmental objectives. Even theoretically they could be shown to be welfare improving only under a very narrow range of circumstances. Their use in place of more efficient policy instruments may not only end up distorting the patterns of world trade but also may worsen the overall patterns of environmental quality. Simulation exercises undertaken here suggest that it is highly unlikely that countries would alter their environmental behavior because of the imposition of the proposed U.S. tariff. Hence the proposed legislation has very uncertain environmental consequences. Even if the policy has been mainly designed to protect domestic industries, it would only provide a minor margin of protection because the costs of complying with the environmental standards represent a relatively small element in the total costs. The analysis suggests that trade policy introduced in this fashion will have no significant impact on the patterns of world trade and pollution.     

国外贸易保护措施对中国制造业出口的影响——来自企业层面的微观证据

当前,以贸易保护主义为主要特征的"逆全球化"思潮涌现,国外的贸易保护措施对中国制造业的出口增长构成严重的威胁.那么,这些贸易保护措施对中国制造业的出口到底产生了怎样的影响?其内在机制是什么?文章采用2009?2011年GTA数据库与中国海关统计数据库的合并数据,从企业这一微观层面定量识别国外贸易保护措施对中国制造业出口的实际影响.研究发现:(1)国外贸易保护措施的实施显著地降低了受影响企业的出口规模,贸易保护措施的数量每增加1次,受影响企业的出口将下降17%左右;贸易保护强度每增加1个单位,受影响企业的出口将下降52%左右.(2)从影响机制看,国外贸易保护措施对制造业出口的抑制效应是通过降低出口的数量和质量来实现的.(3)贸易融资对制造业出口的边际影响最大,而贸易救济措施是对制造业出口整体影响最大的贸易保护措施.(4)国外贸易保护措施对外资企业、同质产品以及中间品出口的抑制作用更明显.文章的研究结论既为理解贸易保护主义的危害提供了经验证据,也为中国在持续推动对外开放背景下如何应对贸易保护壁垒提供了决策依据.     

Trade,poverty, and social protection in developing countries

How do shifts in trade affect social protections for the poor? Although the fraction of the world's population considered the “extreme” poor has fallen by over one-half over the past quarter century, many of those lifted above the global poverty line remain vulnerable to shocks that could place them back into poverty. These are the groups that require social protection to stabilize their incomes. Among the shocks to which the absolute poor have been exposed are those created by trade liberalization, particularly of the agricultural sector. The resulting risks, uncertainties, and threats to social stability from this type of trade require that the poor be provided with some forms of adjustment assistance. We examine the effects of trade components on several dimensions of social protection in developing countries, including spending, coverage, and adequacy over the past two decades. We find that, contrary to previous studies, disaggregating trade may be a key to determining which international market variables drive expansion of social protection. Disaggregating trade balances in agricultural vs. manufactured goods reveals that net food and agricultural exporters provide better social protection than countries that report agricultural trade deficits. Meanwhile, countries with manufacturing trade surpluses tend to experience reduced social protection coverage. We reason that governments of net agricultural exporters face incentives to invest in social programs that extend eligibility to the rural poor. Manufacturing export-driven economies, on the other hand, are likely participants in global production chains that limit the capacity of the public sector to extend social protection.     

Towards a unified scheme for environmental and social protection: Learning from PES and CCT experiences in developing countries

Environmental protection and poverty alleviation in the developing world are usually heralded as joint objectives. However, these two goals are often associated with different sectoral policy instruments. While so−called payments for environmental services (PES) are increasingly being promoted for environmental protection, poverty alleviation is increasingly addressed by conditional cash transfers (CCT) program. These instruments although aimed to achieve distinct objectives have a number of similarities and challenges in their design and implementation phases. This paper elaborates on these similarities and develops a unifying generic framework that is used to discuss the extent to which both approaches could be unified.     

从人口、资源与环境的视点看中美食品贸易

食品贸易不仅仅是保障各国食品安全,利用不同国家比较优势获得经济利益的经济活动,也是与人类健康与安全、生态环境保护和生物资源可持续利用紧密相关的一个全球性社会问题。本文从人口、资源与环境的视点,利用国际贸易的比较优势理论分析了中美食品贸易的意义,得出以下主要结论：首先,应充分利用中国的人力资源成本优势和美国的机械费用优势,发展食品贸易,提高两国人民的福利;其次,为老龄人提供营养丰富的健康食品应成为中美食品贸易发展的机会之一;再次,应充分发挥两国的自然资源禀赋优势,发展食品贸易;最后,中国将成为美国食品贸易的巨大市场,但两国间对食品质量问题有较大的认识差距,因此应在食品贸易的过程中,不断培育绿色食品理念,加强政府间交流与沟通,构建食品安全控制机制。     

产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策——基于古诺双寡头垄断模型的分析

20世纪60年代以后,学者研究发现,传统的贸易理论无法解释大量工业化国家之间的贸易,从而使产业内贸易的研究成为国际贸易的核心问题之一。本文建立古诺双寡头垄断模型对同质产品产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策进行了博弈分析,通过研究发现：寡头垄断企业之间即使在比较优势和报酬递增都不存在的条件下也会互相向对方市场销售商品;追求社会福利最大化的政府很容易陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境,从而导致双方社会福利恶化。本文认为,政府之间应该加强交往,深化合作,通过谈判解决贸易争端,避免陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境。     

A swing state theory of trade protection in the Electoral College

This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re‐election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.     

Is International Trade Relevant to Social Trust Formation? Evidence from Cross-country Analysis

In this paper, we investigate whether international trade itself can contribute to the level of generalized trust. We extend the existing empirical research in several ways. First, we use a larger sample size, we test and reject the treatment of international trade as an exogenous variable, and we address trade endogeneity using instrumental variables estimators. Second, we use geographical variables and international trade prices to instrument for international trade. Third, we perform instrumental variables diagnostics tests to determine the suitability and relevance of our instruments; we also perform tests of the statistical significance of our parameter of interest that are robust to the presence of weak instruments. Our empirical analysis suggests that international trade does have a significant and relatively large positive effect on social trust and reconfirms the role played by other variables like income inequality in the formation of trust found in the literature.     

On the possibility of attaining environmental and trade objectives simultaneously

With the greening of political debate around the world, large nations — precluded from using trade instruments explicitly — have become aware of the fact that they can manipulate their domestic tax structure to attain environmental and trade objectives simultaneously. In this note we show how such nations can attain these two targets with one instrument. Specifically, we show how to construct dual purpose taxes. We then focus on the empirical determinants of these taxes.     

A Theory of Trade Secrets in Firms*

This article provides a simple theoretical model of trade secrets in hierarchical firms. A crucial assumption is that each manager has access to trade secrets pertaining to his own hierarchical level as well as to all lower levels. The article explores some implications of this assumption for optimal degree of trade secrets accumulation and protection as well as for the wage structure in firms. In addition, the model implies that managers may have an incentive to overpay their subordinates and protect their firms’ trade secrets too much.     

The impact of preferential trade agreements on the duration of antidumping protection

This paper examines the impact of preferential trade agreements on the duration of antidumping protection. We employ a two-step selection model where the first step accounts for the impact of membership in a preferential trade agreement on the original antidumping determination and the second step estimates the impact of membership in a preferential trade agreement on the duration of the measures. We find the duration of antidumping protection is about 17% shorter for preferential trade agreement members compared with targeted countries that are not preferential trade agreement members. The impact on duration depends largely on whether preferential trade agreements have rules related specifically to antidumping. Preferential trade agreements with rules are associated with a 28% reduction in the duration of protection, whereas the duration for preferential trade agreements without rules is not statistically different from the duration for non-preferential trade agreement countries. While the duration of antidumping measures against China is longer than for other countries, the impact of preferential trade agreement rules is robust to controlling for China.     

中国加入WTO环境保护的对策研究

中国目前正积极准备加入世界贸易组织（WTO）,WTO的宗旨是实现世界贸易自由化,而贸易自由化与环境保护之间存在着密切的关系。本文总结了GATT／WTO的多边贸易协议中与环境保护有关的规定与条款,对加入WTO我国环境保护与国际贸易的协调发展提出了对策建议。     

以循环农业模式破解"绿色贸易壁垒"的思考

With their advantages in the field of environmental protection, by means of combining trade in the WTO and environmental protection, many countries and territories have laid down the principle of “the green trade barrier ”, which constitutes a serious challenge against our produce export. It is hypothesized that the basic solution to the barrier is the replacement of the conventional agricultural mode with the recycling agriculture mode. whereby implementations and measures of the new mode are put forward.     

对华纺织品贸易保护措施的影响机制研究

针对新时期贸易保护更加侧重于从市场准入方面干预进出口数量的现状,本文以我国纺织品贸易为背景,分析了贸易保护措施的数量控制机制和市场准入机制,从而更加清晰地认识了贸易保护的本质,有助于我国企业采取相应的应对措施。     

Trade creating free trade areas and the undermining of multilateralism

This paper indicates that the consequences of regional trade agreements for the world trade system may be deceiving—an arrangement's apparent virtue may constitute the source of its drawback. In a model where governments have political, as well as economic, motivations, I show that a free trade area induces its members to reduce protection against the non-members, and to do so sufficiently deeply to generate overall trade creation. Trade creation amplifies the excluded countries’ access to the integrating markets, but also reduces their extra gains from multilateral liberalization. Thus, trade creation can reverse the support of the excluded countries to liberalization on a multilateral basis. This is more likely to happen when governments outside the free trade area are more responsive to special interests.     

Trade policy in the face of price and non-price strategies

When selling their products domestically or internationally, firms rely on more than just price as a strategic variable. They also rely on non-price instruments such as advertising and/or R&D investments. Any trade policy that affects or limits the use of one variable will likely have strategic consequences for the use of all the others. Using a Hotelling model with vertical differentiation we focus on how trade policy barriers alter price and non-price competition on the goods market. The main results are as follows: first, no matter whether the trade restriction (tariff) is placed on the non-price instrument or on the good itself, the foreign (domestic) firm prefers to increase (decrease) its use of its pricing tool and give up some of (increase) its use of the non-price instrument. Second, in the presence of a non-price instrument, tariffs do not always lead both firms to increase their price: it can lead the foreign firm to decrease its (final) price.     

With whom do you trade? Defensive innovation and the skill‐bias

Abstract We examine whether increased trade with countries with ineffective protection of intellectual property has contributed to the skill‐deepening of the 1980s. We construct an index of effective protection of intellectual property at the country level, combining data on protection of patents and rule of law. Next, we construct an industry‐specific version of this index, using as weights each country's trade share in the total trade of the industry. We find a decline in this trade‐weighted index, owing to a rise in trade with countries with low effective protection of intellectual property, which explains 29% of the rise in within‐industry skill‐intensity.     

On the robustness of the trade-inducing effects of trade agreements and currency unions

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) and currency unions (CUs) are potentially endogenous trade cost proxies in equations estimating their effects on bilateral trade. In case of both, this problem is magnified by the paucity of reliable instruments. Instead of resorting to the oft-employed alternative of panel data to address selection on just the time-invariant unobservables, this paper assesses the extent to which a positive association between CU or RTA membership and bilateral trade can be considered causal. In addition, it attends to recent concerns over the extensive margin of trade (at the country-level) and the issue of zero trade observations in log-linearized gravity models by relying more on a bivariate probit analysis. Despite not identifying point estimates, striking results are obtained. While most cross-sections exhibit a positive association between both RTAs and CUs and trade, the evidence in favor of a robust causal effect is strong mainly for CUs. However, the magnitude of the CU effect is still sensitive to the amount of selection on unobservables. Moreover, selection into RTAs (CUs) is mostly found to be positive (negative). Finally, the presence of spillovers across the policy regimes is also detected.