Welfare Effects of Timely Reporting

A principal-agent model is examined in which a manager acquires private cost information sequentially. All possible communication schemes are equivalent to one of two: (1) timely reporting, where the manager reports as soon as possible, and (2) delayed reporting, where the manager delays the report of the first of two signals. In the primary case identified, timely reporting is shown to be owner valuable. However, the manager is better off under delayed reporting. Finally, total expected surplus is shown greater under delayed reporting. The owner's benefit from timely reporting is less than the manager's loss.     

Abandonment Options and Information System Design

We study a principal-agent model of moral hazard in which the principal has an abandonment option. The option to abandon a project midstream limits a firm's downside risk. From a consumption (production) perspective, the option is clearly beneficial. However, from an incentive perspective, the option can be costly. Removing the lower tail of the project's underlying cash flow distribution also eliminates the information it contains about an agent's (unobservable) productive input. In addition, there is also the issue that the option holder cannot always (ex ante) commit to the precise circumstances under which the option will be exercised. These concerns introduce an interaction in the valuation of the abandonment option and information system. In particular, the manner in which information is coarsened and the direction of the flow of information are critical design parameters that affect option value.     

Equity value,implied cost of equity and shareholders’ real options

This study investigates the effects of shareholders’ real options on (i) firm financial performance and (ii) estimations of the implied cost of equity. After measuring the equity value of steady‐state operations using the residual income model, and the abandonment and expansion options using the Black‐Scholes option pricing model, I find that firms with a large expansion (abandonment) option value experience better (worse) financial performance than those with a small such value. I also find that ignoring these options results in a downward bias in implied cost of equity estimates by an average of 1.23 percentage points.     

Value creation with Dye’s disclosure option: optimal risk-shielding with an upper tailed disclosure strategy

Dye [J Account Res 23 (1985) 123] showed that the optimal disclosure policy, when a manager is randomly endowed with perfect private information, is upper tailed, i.e., the manager only discloses firm value above an appropriate cutoff level. We interpret this strategically as an optimal exercise by management of the embedded formal option to report value. Given any disclosure cutoff level, we value the corresponding option using contingent claims analysis. It is shown that the Dye disclosure cutoff value maximizes the formal option value. We find it to be the minimum possible conditional valuation (conditioned by non-disclosure) which is thus consistent with the intuition that investors should value conservatively. We show how the Dye cutoff can be interpreted as a strike price in a ‘protective put’ which offers a shield against risk of disclosure of low value. The strategic analysis is further extended by allowing the probability level that the manager is informed to be a choice variable. We show that the manager will never choose to be perfectly endowed with information, and is likely to be more endowed than unendowed. We also present a simple worked example which shows how the total value of the firm changes once the Dye option is formally incorporated.

Overconfidence,CEO Selection,and Corporate Governance

We develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager, who sometimes makes value‐destroying investments, has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to CEO under value‐maximizing corporate governance. Moreover, a risk‐averse CEO's overconfidence enhances firm value up to a point, but the effect is nonmonotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion. Overconfident CEOs also underinvest in information production. The board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident CEOs. Finally, Sarbanes‐Oxley is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors, but to reduce project investment.     

Presale Contract and its Embedded Default and Abandonment Options

The presale contract is a popular property selling method that allows a buyer to default on the remaining payment and/or a developer to abandon a project. Using a simple two-period game theoretical model, we derive a closed-form pricing equation for a presale contract that explicitly accounts for a developer??s abandonment option and a buyer??s default option. Although a developer has an abandonment option under either a spot sale or a presale method, the option is more valuable under a presale contract because of an additional cash inflow from the presale downpayment. A presale also provides a buyer a default option, which is valuable in a real estate market with uncertain demand and price risk. We analyze the implications of the abandonment option on a developer??s construction decision and choice of selling method, as well as the implications of the default option on a buyer??s purchase decision. Furthermore, our model framework has implications to the pricing of futures contracts that involve both stochastic revenues and costs.     

Reporting Discretion and Private Information Communication through Earnings

We model a two-period pure exchange economy where a risk averse manager, who has private information regarding future earnings, is required to issue an earnings report to investors at the end of each period. While the manager is prohibited from directly disclosing her private information, she is allowed to bias reported earnings in the first period, subject to GAAP rules that require that a specified proportion of the bias be reversed subsequently. We show there is a minimum threshold of reversal, such that, when the proportion of required reversal is above this threshold, the manager smooths income and communicates her private information through reported earnings. Consequently, the market attaches greater weight to reported earnings than under a regime that allows no discretion. When the required reversal is below the minimum threshold, the manager increases reported earnings without limit and the equilibrium degenerates. When the manager is not endowed with any private information, the market unravels the "true" earnings and price is unaffected by earnings management. Our results underscore the importance of both allowing and restricting reporting discretion through formal mechanisms.     

经理人股票期权会计确认的探讨

经理人股票期权的确认问题是亟待解决的会计理论和实践问题。经理人股票期权的经济实质是企业经理人参与企业剩余索取权的分享。经理人股票期权是一项无形资产,应在经理人提供劳动期间内,将其平均摊销。应改革现行的财务会计观念与模式,增设“待转股本准备”科目,以适应企业经理人参与现代企业剩余索取权分享的现实。     

Return predictability and shareholders’ real options

This study re-interprets the properties of the residual income model by highlighting the shareholders’ abandonment (liquidation or adaptation) option. We estimate the value of this real option as an explicit component of abnormal earnings in the residual income model and test the improvement in valuation after incorporating it into the model. Relative to the traditional specification of the residual income model, this real options model has a stronger predictive power for future abnormal stock returns. We also find that the superior return predictability of the real options model is pronounced in the set of firms with a high probability of exercising liquidation options (for example, those with low profitability, low growth opportunities, high underlying asset volatility, and low intangible assets), which is consistent with the importance of shareholders’ abandonment option in equity valuation. The results are robust to extensive sensitivity checks.     

Investment timing,agency, and information

This paper provides a model of investment timing by managers in a decentralized firm in the presence of agency conflicts and information asymmetries. When investment decisions are delegated to managers, contracts must be designed to provide incentives for managers to both extend effort and truthfully reveal private information. Using a real options approach, we show that an underlying option to invest can be decomposed into two components: a manager's option and an owner's option. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of the first-best no-agency solution. In particular, greater inertia occurs in investment, as the model predicts that the manager will have a more valuable option to wait than the owner.     

Disclosing a Random Walk

We examine a dynamic disclosure model in which the value of a firm follows a random walk. Every period, with some probability, the manager learns the firm's value and decides whether to disclose it. The manager maximizes the market perception of the firm's value, which is based on disclosed information. In equilibrium, the manager follows a threshold strategy with thresholds below current prices. He sometimes reveals pessimistic information that reduces the market perception of the firm's value. He does so to reduce future market uncertainty, which is valuable even under risk-neutrality.     

What Explains the Valuation Difference between Intangible‐intensive Profit and Loss Firms?

Prior research suggests that loss firms are valued based on their abandonment/adaptation option values, while profit firms are valued as going concerns. However, conservative accounting treatment of expensing of R&D leads many R&D‐intensive firms to report losses even though they are not in financial distress. In this paper we investigate the difference in valuation of profit and loss firms that invest in intangibles, either through internal development (R&D) or purchases. The accounting treatment for internally developed intangibles is conservative in that US GAAP requires immediate expensing. Yet, it allows recognition of purchased intangibles. We find that in valuation of firms with high recognized‐intangible assets, book value has more prominence in loss firms than profit firms, while that is not the case for firms with high R&D expenditures. This suggests that their abandonment/adaptation option explains the difference in valuation between profit and loss firms with high recognized‐intangibles, while conservative accounting explains the valuation difference between profit and loss firms with high R&D intensity. This result suggests that recognition of intangibles in financial statements might mitigate the conservative bias in accounting numbers.     

Real options under a double exponential jump-diffusion model with regime switching and partial information

We consider the irreversible investment in a project which generates a cash flow following a double exponential jump-diffusion process and its expected return is governed by a continuous-time two-state Markov chain. If the expected return is observable, we present explicit expressions for the pricing and timing of the option to invest. With partial information, i.e. if the expected return is unobservable, we provide an explicit project value and an integral-differential equation for the pricing and timing of the option. We provide a method to measure the information value, i.e. the difference between the option values under the two different cases. We present numerical solutions by finite difference methods. By numerical analysis, we find that: (i) the higher the jump intensity, the later the option to invest is exercised, but its effect on the option value is ambiguous; (ii) the option value increases with the belief in a boom economy; (iii) if investors are more uncertain about the economic environment, information is more valuable; (iv) the more likely the transition from boom to recession, the lower the value of the option; (v) the bigger the dispersion of the expected return, the higher the information value; (vi) a higher cash flow volatility induces a lower information value.     

Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?

This paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls. Under the manager's optimal policy, the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money. As the asset value goes to zero, volatility goes to infinity. However, the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking. Sometimes, the manager's optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account. Furthermore, giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility.     

The timeliness and consequences of disseminating public information by regulators

This paper documents different timeliness in disseminating sanction and enforcement information (SEI) by two types of regulatory agencies in China and the different consequences that flow from them. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) does not make timely public disclosures of SEI and, instead, leaves it up to the firms to make a public announcement under their general obligation to disclose price-sensitive information. The firms therefore have considerable discretion in deciding whether and when to disclose SEI. In contrast, the stock exchanges in Shenzhen and Shanghai make SEI public promptly through the media and the exchanges’ official websites. Using Chinese SEI data during the period 1999–2005, we find that the CSRC approach is associated with significantly lagged corporate disclosure (compared with the timely stock exchange approach) and a significantly negative (but delayed) stock price reaction. We also show that the sanctioned firm may take advantage of the less timely CSRC approach to delay its disclosure of SEI for opportunistic reasons such as completing material transactions. We conclude that the CSRC should make immediate public announcements of SEI as these contain price-sensitive information. Furthermore, the immediate dissemination of SEI will bring the CSRC into line with the disclosure practices of China’s stock exchanges and international market regulators.     

Stock Options and the Corporate Demand for Insurance

This article shows that a corporate manager compensated in stock options makes corporate decisions to maximize stock option value. Overinvestment is a consequence if risk increases with investment. Facing the choice of hedging corporate risk with forward contracts on a stock market index fund and insuring pure risks the manager will choose the latter. Hedging with forwards reduces weight in both tails of corporate payoff distribution and thus reduces option value. Insuring pure risks reduces the weight in the left tail where the options are out‐of‐the‐money and increases the weight in the right tail where the options are in‐the‐money; the effect is an increase in the option value. Insurance reduces the overinvestment problem but no level of insurance coverage can reduce investment to that which maximizes the shareholder value.     

Adverse selection, contract design, and investment distortion

We examine the design of compensation contracts and determination of investment policies when a manager has private information regarding the effect of investment on both the firm's cash flows and the private benefits she is able to extract from employment. We show that, in general, the optimal mechanism is characterized by a menu of salary and option contracts. When the manager's private information relates only to the firm's cash flows, the firm overinvests relative to the Pareto optimal level. On the other hand, if the private information relates only to private benefits, the firm will underinvest.     

Discretionary write-downs,write-offs,and other restructuring provisions: a signaling approach

This paper introduces a model seeking to explain the discretionary write-downs, write-offs, and other restructuring provisions reported by managers. The model comprises a firm, a manager, and a financial market. The firm is about to be restructured. The manager has some private information about the likelihood of success of his restructuring action. The manager may recognise all or part of the expenditure associated with his future restructuring action by reporting a discretionary restructuring provision. The manager chooses whether or not to report a provision, recognising the impact of the provision on his compensation. The paper shows how, under certain conditions, the manager may credibly communicate his private information to investors through his provision policy. Testable implications are consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Strong and Meyer (1987), Elliott and Shaw (1988), and Zucca and Campbell (1992).     

Move to success? Headquarters relocation,political favoritism,and corporate performance

This study documents an unexplored corporate rent-seeking phenomenon in non-representative regimes—relocating headquarters (HQ) to the political center. Focusing on China, we find that firms that relocate their HQs to Beijing (the political center) enjoy increased political favors, but those that move to Shanghai or Shenzhen (the country's two main economic centers) do not. Although both groups of movers experience improved profitability, their sustainable growth paths diverge after relocating. Firm productivity and innovation worsen after relocating to Beijing, but improve after moving to Shanghai or Shenzhen. Overall, these findings support the argument that political favoritism benefits firms' profitability but impairs their productivity and innovation.     

Changes in the value relevance of goodwill accounting following the adoption of IFRS 3

This study examines the value relevance effects of changes in goodwill accounting in a European setting. International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3 replaced accounting rules that emphasized goodwill amortization over short useful lives which kept goodwill balances low. Goodwill accounting under IFRS 3 largely relies on manager fair value estimates of acquired business units. Using Swedish data, we show that goodwill amortizations were not value-relevant prior to the adoption of IFRS 3. However, impairments reported in addition to amortization were significantly related to stock returns during that period. In contrast, under the impairment-only regime prescribed by IFRS 3, impairments are no longer statistically related to stock returns.