Brexit,the City and the Contingent Power of Finance

Brexit poses a profound challenge to the economic fortunes of the financial services sector in the United Kingdom (UK) because it threatens to sever access to the single market in the European Union (EU). Recognising this, the City of London’s largest financial firms and main representative bodies supported a Remain vote in the June 2016 referendum, and subsequently lobbied for a ‘soft’ Brexit policy to preserve the City’s lucrative passporting rights. Despite this, the government led by Theresa May pursued a ‘hard’ Brexit policy which threatened to leave the UK outside the single market. How can we explain the City’s apparent failure to influence the UK’s Brexit policy? We argue that whilst the UK financial sector wielded formidable latent structural power, its capacity to translate this into instrumental influence in the policy process was constrained by three factors: the political statecraft of Brexit, leading the government to downgrade the concerns of the financial industry; the reconfiguration of institutional structures, which undermined the City’s voice within government; and constraints on business organisation, caused by collective action problems and heterogeneous preferences. These three factors constitute important scope conditions which highlight the contingent power of finance in liberal market economies.     

Paying Our Way in the World? Visible and Invisible Dangers of Brexit

The UK economy has long been associated with a weak balance of payments, reflecting an underlying growth model reliant on private household consumption. A deficit in goods trade, chiefly with the EU, has been offset by surpluses in services trade and foreign investment earnings. The Single Market provided wider markets for the UK, but did not fundamentally alter Britain's structural weaknesses. The Brexit vote took place against the background of Britain running its largest peacetime current account deficit. Financing Britain's external position represents a key challenge post-Brexit. Post-Brexit models for Britain partially address this. Any emergent model will critically depend on the nature of the Brexit deal with the EU, not least in terms of the impact on financial services and on supply chains. This paper sets out the recent evolution of the UK's current account position, particularly in relation to the EU. It then highlights particular areas of potential disruption from Brexit and sketches out scenarios of possible evolution of the Britain's external position in response to this.     

Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’?* Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

A key battle has been fought within the UK cabinet on the direction of post-Brexit trade policy. The opposing sides have favoured either continued alignment or a ‘hard’ break with the European Union’s (EU’s) regulatory and customs regime, in the latter case to allow the UK to pursue an independent and ambitious trade policy agenda. Contrary to much commentary on ‘post-truth’ politics, both sides have relied on rival forms of expertise to support their claims. I argue for the need to not only re-emphasise the malleability and political nature of expert knowledge, but also appreciate its emotional bases. The Treasury has led the charge in favour of a softer Brexit by drawing on econometric (‘gravity’) models that emphasise the economic costs of looser association with the EU. In contrast to this attempt at technocratic legitimation, the specific legal expertise drawn upon by cabinet advocates of ‘hard’ Brexit has appealed to an emotive political economy of bringing the UK, and its (in this imaginary) overly regulated economy, closer to its ‘kith and kin’ in the Anglosphere, deepening the UK ‘national business model’. I conclude by calling for more explicitly emotive and values-based argumentation in the public debate on the UK’s future trade policy to improve the quality of democratic deliberation.     

Policy uncertainty and international financial markets: the case of Brexit

ABSTRACT

This study assesses the impact of the Brexit probability on both the UK and on international financial markets, for the first and the second statistical moments. As financial markets are by nature highly interlinked, one might expect that the uncertainty engendered by Brexit also has an impact on financial markets in several other countries. We first estimate the time-varying interactions between UK policy uncertainty, which to a large extent is attributed to uncertainty about Brexit and UK financial market volatilities. Second, we use two other measures of the perceived probability of Brexit before the referendum, namely daily data released by Betfair and results of polls published by Bloomberg. Based on these data sets, and using both panel and single-country SUR estimation methods, we analyse the Brexit effect on levels of stock returns, sovereign CDS, 10-year interest rates in 19 predominantly European countries, and those of the British pound and the euro. We show that Brexit-induced policy uncertainty will continue to cause instability in key financial markets and has the potential to damage the real economy in both the UK and other European countries. The main losers outside the UK are the ‘GIIPS’ economies: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.     

What's Left for ‘Social Europe’? Brexit and Transnational Labour Market Regulation in the UK-1 and the EU-27

The paper examines UK government positions on the regulation of transnational labour in the context of Brexit. Through an analysis of EU regulations on posted workers – the practice whereby a company based in one EU member state sends workers to carry out a service in another EU member state – the paper argues that the UK has consistently advocated further liberalisation of transnational labour markets in EU level decision-making, a position consistent with promoting increasingly ‘flexible’ labour markets at home. Brexit marks a turning point. Demands from British workers for stronger protection against liberalising pressure help explain the UK's recent shift towards relaxing its opposition to ‘market-correcting’ EU initiatives like the revised posted worker directive. Brexit provides a window of opportunity for the revitalisation of ‘Social Europe’ in the EU-27, without a longstanding veto player at the bargaining table, but one more likely focused more on upholding national labour protections than initiating new supranational policies.     

Skill Formation,Immigration and European Integration: The Politics of the UK Growth Model

ABSTRACT

While a reluctant European player now heading for the Exit, the UK was also an enthusiastic adopter of several key EU economic policies – namely, the skills and technology policies of Agenda 2020 and labour mobility. These initiatives worked with existing British policy, and structural biases, to exacerbate the already bifurcated structure of UK capitalism – between the high-paid technology and financial services sector on the one hand, and low-cost, low-wage sectors on the other hand. In particular, and central to the argument of this paper, immigration from Eastern and Central Europe after 2004 helped to sustain low-cost manufacturing and services industries by undermining firms’ incentives to invest in training. This combined with endemic failures in the UK’s skills system, which is heavily geared towards producing graduates with general skills but neglects the needs of mid and lower segments of the labour market. EU integration, therefore, exacerbated cleavages over skills between high- and low-productivity sectors and may have contributed to social divisions that led to Brexit.     

Financialization,Shareholder Orientation and the Cash Holdings of US Corporations

Growth in the cash holdings of US nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) has received considerable attention in recent years. These cash holdings constitute a primary component of the growth in firm-level financial asset holdings often highlighted in analyses of the ‘financialization’ of NFCs. In this article, I use a panel of US corporations to empirically analyze two links between corporate cash holdings and the literature on financialization. First, I find a small but positive relationship between cash holdings and shareholder value ideology among large corporations. I capture the growing entrenchment of shareholder ideology using average industry-level stock repurchases, to proxy for industry-level norms encouraging managers to target stock price-based indicators of firm performance. Second, I find a positive relationship between a firm's cash holdings and a measure of the differential it earns between interest income and expense. Given that cash is classified with short-term marketable (and, therefore, interest-bearing) securities on firm balance sheets, this result lends empirical support to the hypothesis that traditionally nonfinancial firms are increasingly engaged in borrowing and lending for profit.     

Optimal Currency Areas Scottish Economic Society/Royal Bank of Scotland Annual Lecture, 1999

Microeconomic efficiency and market transparency argue in favour of UK membership in EMU and for Scotland’s membership in the UK monetary union and also in EMU. UK seigniorage (government revenues from money issuance) would be boosted by EMU membership. Lender of last resort arrangements would not be substantially affected by UK membership in EMU. The UK is too small and too open to be an optimal currency area. The same point applies even more emphatically to Scotland. The ‘one‐size‐fits‐all’, ‘asymmetric shocks’ and ‘cyclical divergence’ objections to UK membership are based on the misapprehension that independent national monetary policy, and the associated nominal exchange rate flexibility, can be used effectively to offset or even neutralise asymmetric shocks. This ‘fine tuning delusion’ is compounded by a failure to understand that, under a high degree of international financial integration, market‐determined exchange rates are primarily a source of shocks and instability. Instead, opponents of UK membership in EMU view exchange rate flexibility as an effective buffer for adjusting to asymmetric shocks originating elsewhere. I know of no evidence that supports such an optimistic reading of what exchange rate flexibility can deliver under conditions of very high international financial capital mobility. The economic arguments for immediate UK membership in EMU, at an appropriate entry rate, are overwhelming. Monetary union raises important constitutional and political issues. It involves a further surrender of national sovereignty to a supranational institution, the ECB/ESCB. It is essential that this transfer of national sovereignty be perceived as legitimate by those affected by it. In addition, the citizens of the UK have become accustomed to a high standard of openness and accountability of their central bank since it gained operational independence in 1997. The ECB/ESCB must be held to the same high standard, and, while there are grounds for optimism, there still is some way to go there.     

Islamic Charitable Giving in the UK: A ‘Radical’ Economic Alternative?

ABSTRACT

Muslim financial actions have faced increased scrutiny as financial links to ‘terrorism’ have risen in political rhetoric with anything labelled as ‘Islamic’ being perceived to be in requirement of study in terms of its relation to ‘fundamental British values’ (Kundnani, A., 2014. The Muslims Are Coming! Islamaphobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror. London: Verso.). Exploring Muslim charitable giving in the UK, it will be posited that much of Islamic charitable practices sustains a relationship with neoliberalism without being entirely reduced to it. The post-9/11 environment ‘has led to renewed scholarly interest in the relationship between the economy and Islam and more specifically the incorporation of Islamic value in daily economic life’ (Rethel, L., 2019. Corporate Islam, Global Capitalism and the Performance of Economic Moralities. New Political Economy, 24 (3), 350–364, 2). Islamic charitable practices potentially offer a resistance to the inegalitarian effects of neoliberalism whilst simultaneously being both a part, and a consequence of, neoliberal dominance. Moreover, Islamic charity in the UK acts as an expression of the Muslim community against a backdrop of security and surveillance. Thus, while potentially offering a ‘radical’ alternative to neoliberalism it is a non-violent and non-conflictual alternative.     

Security and the Subsurface: Natural Gas and the Visualisation of Possibility Spaces

ABSTRACT

Beneath the surface of the United Kingdom lies a sprawling natural gas infrastructure. Based on recent (2014/15) ‘follow the thing’ fieldwork conducted in the UK onshore gas industry, this paper explores the ways that dangers related to the subterranean circulation of natural gas come to be visualised, and how these visualisations make possible different security interventions. These practices are shown to be limited by the ground, which despite its enrolment as a security device conceals from view the shifting landscapes of risk that surround these gaseous movements. Drawing on Manuel DeLanda's concept of the possibility space, I provide a conceptual framework for attending to security’s visualisation practices, describing how attempts are made to overcome the subsurface obfuscation of natural gas. I argue that, rather than being understood as a process of circulatory ‘filtration’ or ‘maintenance’, security must instead be regarded as a series of transformative practices of ecological (re)organisation that are predicated upon the visualisation of entities’ spaces of possibility. In the process, I provide an account of how the three-dimensional geographies and materialities of gas circulations and their milieus are intimately tied up in their governance and politics.     

Bank capital,the state contingency of banks’ assets and its role for the transmission of shocks

I show how the evolution of bank capital depends on the share of non-state-contingent assets in banks’ balance sheets and present the implications for macroeconomic dynamics. State-contingent securities impact on banks’ balance sheets through changes in their returns (and their prices), both of which depend on the current state of the economy. Non-state-contingent assets are signed before shocks are realized and their repayment is guaranteed. For this reason, they insulate banks’ balance sheets from recent economic activity in the absence of defaults. Non-state-contingent assets in banks’ balance sheets attenuate the amplification of shocks resulting from financial frictions. The same effect can be achieved if more weight is placed on the state-contingent assets in the equity related constraint against the costs of long-run output losses.     

Exporting Assets: EMU and the Financial Drivers of European Macroeconomic Imbalances

ABSTRACT

European Economic and Monetary Union has fostered an unstable complementarity in European financial markets between the growth models favoured by European savers (in the northern ‘core’ of Germany and other exporting states) and its borrowers (in the debt-fuelled and demand-driven eurozone periphery, including countries like Greece and Ireland). In the 2000s, the result of this development was a sharp decrease in real interest rates across the eurozone periphery, leading to rapid but inflationary growth. This eroded the competitiveness of exporters in the European periphery, making them more reliant on capital inflows to pay for growing current account deficits. Those deficits became problematic after the disruption of eurozone financial markets beginning in 2008. The policy response to the crises has focused on reducing the competitiveness gap between the core and periphery – while overlooking the financial forces that contributed to those competitiveness differentials in the first place. Indeed, it is the fragile and perverse complementarity in eurozone financial markets – more than any external shock or competitiveness differences – that lies at the root of Europe’s ongoing crisis.     

Balance Sheet Effects, Growth, and Crises

This paper addresses two questions: are currency crises predicted by increases in a central bank’s external and contingent liabilities relative to assets, and do these “balance sheet effects” generate persistent output losses following a crisis? I find empirical evidence that the answer to both questions is yes. I use data on stocks of gross external assets and liabilities for 167 countries over 1973–2003, in an unbalanced panel probit regression to obtain robust estimates of the probability and determinants of a post‐crisis recession. Several single and simultaneous equation specifications support the idea that the output cost of a currency crisis depends on its transmission mechanism. Specifically, a recession is likely to be severe if it is preceded by a crisis that works its way through the financial sector. In addition, the results show that measures of contingent liabilities, capital flight, and lack of financial depth are significant predictors of costly crises.     

Asset-based Reserve Requirements: Some Reservations

Abstract

Thomas Palley's (2004) paper ‘Asset-based reserve requirements: reasserting domestic monetary control in an era of financial innovation and instability’ has radical implications for monetary policy and the operations of central banks in the money markets. This comment argues that Palley's proposal may be impractical today because it overlooks banks' holding of excessive reserves (or claims on such reserves), and because reserves allocated for particular kinds of business cannot be isolated in bank balance sheets or markets. In particular, once differential reserves are imposed on particular kinds of business, banks may respond to changes in reserve requirements by varying their assets in less predictable ways than the scheme suggests. A central bank's willingness to use differential reserve requirements will be inhibited by the current policy doctrine that emphasises control of a stable money market rate of interest. In any case, it is doubtful if interest rates or reserve requirements could have the specific targeted effects that Palley's model suggests.     

The 2014–15 Financial Crisis in Russia and the Foundations of Weak Monetary Power Autonomy in the International Political Economy

ABSTRACT

This article contributes to international political economy debates about the monetary power autonomy (MPA) of emerging market and developing countries (EMDs). The 2014–15 Russian financial crisis is used as a case study to explore why an accumulation of large international reserves does not provide protection against currency crises and macroeconomic adjustments in EMDs. The analysis centres on the interplay between two dimensions of MPA: the Power to Delay and the Power to Deflect adjustment costs. Two structural factors condition Russia’s low MPA. First, the country’s subordinated integration in global financial markets increases its financial vulnerability. The composition of external assets and liabilities, combined with cross-border capital flows, restrict the use of international reserves to delay currency crises. Second, the choice of a particular macroeconomic policy regime embraced the financialisation of the – mainly state-owned – Russian banking sector, thus making it difficult to transform liquidity inflows into credits for enterprises. Russia’s main comparative advantage, hydrocarbon export revenues, is not exploited. The type of economy created due to the post-Communist transition means that provided ‘excessive’ liquidity remains in the financial system and is channelled into currency arbitrage. This factor increases exchange rate vulnerability and undermines Russia’s MPA.     

Restoring Macroeconomic Stability through Fiscal Adjustment: a Real–Financial CGE Analysis for India

Developing‐country attempts to regain macroeconomic stability through fiscal adjustment are often unsuccessful in reducing inflation and balance‐of‐payments (BoP) disequilibrium. This paper examines why this may be so in the light of India's experience with stabilization in response to the BoP crisis in 1991. It does so using a novel real–financial computable general‐equilibrium model. Focusing on credit rather than money, the model goes beyond earlier modeling approaches by (1) incorporating credit rationing, (2) recognizing the dual role of credit for working capital and investment, and (3) allowing for switches between credit‐constrained, capacity‐constrained, and demand‐constrained, regimes. The simulations indicate that the macroeconomic effects of monetized deficit reduction differ widely depending on the mode of financing and on initial conditions in real and financial markets. Whenever fiscal reform leads to a squeeze on available working capital credit, deficit reduction will lead to only a limited inflation decline and a modest BoP improvement.     

Exchange market pressure,stock prices,and commodity prices in West Africa

As Africa continues its decade of rapid economic growth, the continent also faces the risk of becoming more susceptible to financial ‘contagion.’ Capital flows and trade linkages might cause one country’s currency market to influence those of its neighbors. Likewise, shocks to global commodity or asset markets might induce a crisis in one or more countries in the region. This study generates monthly measures of exchange market pressure (EMP) for four individual West African countries, as well as for the WAEMU franc zone, from 2002 to 2012. Vector Autoregressive (VAR) methods are then used to test for linkages among them, as well as to analyze the effects of various external price shocks. A number of spillovers are uncovered. More importantly, local connections dominate global ones in the case of stock- and commodity-price declines. Ghana, for example, is shown to be a ‘commodity currency’ when West African commodity prices are included in the VAR, but not when a global index is used.     

Financialization in the American Pharmaceutical Industry: A Veblenian Approach

Thorstein Veblen’s theory of the business enterprise holds that business interests come to dominate industrial interests, with pecuniary returns being the dominant mindset under which economic activity is conducted. Under moneymanager capitalism, this is reflected in the increasing importance of profits from financial channels and the accumulation of intangible rent-generating assets to serve as the basis for capitalization — a process known as financialization. I examine this process of intangible asset accumulation within the context of the American pharmaceutical industry using Veblen’s theory of the business enterprise as a lens. I show that intangible assets have come to dominate productive capital on pharmaceutical enterprise balance sheets, suggesting that pharmaceutical profits are accumulated through rent-seeking channels rather than productive ones, in line with Veblen’s theory, and provide evidence of the financialization of this industry.     

Veto Players and Central Bank Gold Sales

This paper offers a critique of the increasingly prevalent argument that the late twentieth century saw a ‘financialisation’ of capitalism anchored in the USA, the UK, and other leading Western economies. The objective of the paper is not to claim that there has been no such structural mutation, but that the studies which allegedly demonstrate this mutation are compromised by the anaemic geographies that structure and animate them. Such studies, the paper argues, fetishise the national scale and, in doing so, offer a restricted and potentially misleading reading of trends such as, most notably, historic growth in the share of corporate profits accruing to ‘finance’ within individual countries. Examining empirical data for the UK, but explicitly incorporating the international perspective typically missing from existing studies of financialisation, the paper points to the vital role of international expansion by UK financial institutions in growing the financial sector's share of profits. Whether so-called ‘financialisation’ has also contributed to this growth remains, the paper submits, open to question.