A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States

We analyse a market where (i) trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining; (ii) agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good; and (iii) no new entrants are allowed once the market is open. We show that information revelation and efficiency never obtain in equilibrium, even as discounting is removed. This holds whether the asymmetry is two-sided or one-sided. In some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded. This contrasts with the earlier literature, which was based on the steady-state equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period.     

Firms,agency, and evolution

A recent (though controversial) trend in economics has been to appeal to evolutionary theory when addressing various open questions in the subject. I here further investigate one particular such appeal to evolutionary biology: the argument that, since markets select (in a standard biological sense) firms as coherent units, firms should be seen to be genuine economic agents. To assess this argument, I present a model of firm/office selection in a competitive market, and show that there are cases where markets can select for firms/offices as collective units – and thus, as agents of their own – but also that there are cases where they do not. In this way, I try to make the evolutionary argument for the agency-based view of the firm more precise.     

Can inefficient public production promote welfare?

Conclusion Politicians believe in an old fashioned conjecture. They all think welfare must always be increased if one only reduce inefficiency. But this intuition is wrong. If we look at piecemeal price changes, temporarily decreasing efficiency can be necessary for improving welfare.This conclusion shows that the usual argument of political administrations to advise the management of public enterprises to reduce the inefficiency of production can, under the above mentioned circumstances, lead to welfare losses. On this account the efficiency rule of thumb must be supported by welfare considerations, otherwise misleading results can occur.But we should not be too concerned. If the starting point of the piecemeal policy path is located not too far from the welfare optimum, the usual efficiency argument leads to satisfactory results.Last not least we mentioned the economic duality of decreasing efficiency and instability; here our results fit into the usual conception of the economists' world.This research was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303. I am grateful to Dieter Bös, Udo Ebert, and Hans-Dieter Stolper as well as the anonymous referees of this journal for extensive comments on previous drafts of this paper.     

Two-tier rationality and reflexivity: an examination of the foundations of economic reason

This paper develops a two-tier concept of rationality which broadens the orthodox notion of instrumental rationality in economics. In the first section, I conceive the idea of “background rationality” to consist in the ability to act normally, i.e., according to social conventions appropriate to the context. Background rationality is a necessary condition for the exercise of its instrumental counterpart. Implications and applications of this for economic phenomena are investigated in Section II. The third section draws parallels between the approach to rationality developed in this paper and Thorstein Veblen's notion “habits of thought”. I argue that a viable concept of rationality must itself be subject to explanatory scrutiny and justification and not merely posited as given.     

Technology and international competitiveness

This article analyses the structure of trade and trade performance of the largest six OECD economies in the 1980s. The article is concerned in particular with the role of technology and innovation and the relationship between specialization in sectors of high, medium or low technology intensity and trade performance. It assesses the argument that the maintenance of international competitiveness requires the advanced economies to become internationally competitive, and to specialize, in higher technology sectors, given that there is increasing competition, especially from newly industrializing countries in low technology products. Section I considers the theoretical basis of this hypothesis; Section II assesses whether it is compatible with data on manufacturing trade performance in the 1980s.     

Price normalization under imperfect competition

In general equilibrium models of imperfect competition the equilibria depend on how prices are normalized. This note shows that a price normalization preserves convexity properties if and only if prices are measured in terms of a fixed commodity bundle. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments, inspiring a simplification in the proof of the main result, and the argument in the Remark.     

Incentive compatible contractible information

Summary. The paper seeks to characterize what information is always available for contracting, independent of the form of the contract and the probabilities of different states of nature. The paper denotes such information as contractible. It is established that it is possible to speak uniquely of maximal contractible information. Several characterizations are exhibited. In particular, it is shown that if either (a) punishments are bounded everywhere, or (b) deviations from truth-telling are either always or never detected, then maximum contractible information coincides with where is the information partition of agent j. An argument is given for why (b) may be expected to hold. Received: August 7, 2000; revised version: December 21, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" I thank Michael Chwe, Douglas Diamond, Lars Stole, Robert Townsend, Nicholas Yannelis and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains

We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is strategy-proof. In case strategy-proofness is required to hold under all tie-breaking rules, strategy-proof domains coincide with top-trivial ones where the range of the plurality rule admits at most two alternatives. This impossibility virtually prevails when strategy-proofness is weakened so as to hold under at least one tie-breaking rule: unless there are less than five voters, the top-triviality of a domain is equivalent to the (weak) non-manipulability of the plurality rule. We also characterize the cases with two, three or four voters. I am grateful to Attila Tasnadi for his thorough reading of the paper and pointing to an error in an earlier version. I thank Levent Kutlu, Clemens Puppe, Arunava Sen, an anonymous referee and an anonymous AE for their comments. This research is part of the project “Social Perception—A Social Choice Perspective” supported by Istanbul Bilgi University Research Fund. I also acknowledge the support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBA-GEBIP).     

A note on modelling tournaments

Existing studies on tournaments utilize different specifications of the production function. Comparison of these results is difficult. This paper shows that the strategic behavior of agents in a tournament can be analyzed more generally using a specification of the production function along the lines of the standard agency model. I also show that in mixed contests, the more able contestant would in equilibrium have a higher probability of winning the contest despite attempts to use effort to compensate for ability by the less able contestant (Proposition 3).The author would like to thank Joseph Stiglitz for suggesting the idea for this paper, Jerry Green for reading an earlier version of the paper, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly

Summary. In an incomplete information, common values setting with risk-neutral agents, we consider mechanisms for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership where the mechanism designer has no information about the distribution of signals of the agents. We find that the divide and choose mechanism systematically favors the chooser and hence fails on the grounds of fairness. We also examine the fairness properties of the winning and losing bid auctions and show that they systematically favor winning (resp. losing) bidder in ex post allocation of surplus. Finally, we show that a binding arbitration mechanism implements fair allocations.Received: 17 May 2002, Revised: 5 June 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D39, D44I thank an anonymous referee for extremely helpful suggestions. I also gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation and the Hoover Institution.     

Exchange Rate Unification Under Non-Credibility: The Haïtian Economy

This paper builds on three strands of literature—Early Warning Systems (EWS), parallel exchange rates, and collapsing exchange rate regimes—by addressing the issue of credibility in the context of unification of the exchange rate in the Haïtian economy. It takes the view that when policymakers are perceived as non-credible, economic agents resort to observation of the economy's performance to assess the imminence of reforms. They then readjust their own behavior, particularly in the area of asset holdings. This paper models the adjustment process using the EWS ratios. Data supports the idea that credibility of the reform mounts over time reaching 85 percent on the eve of the reform.Winston-Salem State University—U.S.A. I would like to thank Mina Baliamoune and an anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are my responsibility.     

Non-stationary,stable Markov processes on a continuous state space

We extend our previous result on simple stable Markov (SSM) processes to the case where the state space is continuous. As anapplication we show the existence of a competitive general equilibrium of a cobweb model where price volatility is generated both by exogenous shocks and by stochastic, so called generating variables (that may be interpreted as sunspots) that govern the correlation of the rational beliefs of individual agents. I would like to thank Danish Social Science Foundation, The Carlsberg Foundation, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE) and Universita Cattolica for financial help. I would also like to thank Trinidad Casasus, Mordecai Kurz, an anonymous referee as well as participants at SITE, ESAM (2004) and ESEM (2004) for helpful discussions and comments. Peter Harremoes provided me with an illuminating counter example and Hiro Nakata provided many comments that helped improve the exposition of the paper. Part of this work is from a paper previously circulated under the title: “Sunspot rational belief structures: anonymity and endogenous uncertainty”.     

Sunspot-like equilibria in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions

In this paper I analyze the effect of market uncertainty in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions among agents. I demonstrate the existence of sunspot-like equilibria, in which arbitrarily small amounts of intrinsic uncertainty in agents’ offers generate large fluctuations in equilibrium bids and prices. I would like to express my gratitude to Stephen Spear for his guidance during the realization of this project. I thank an anonymous referee for providing insightful comments and suggestions. I have benefited from comments by Alexander Elbittar, Cesar Guerrero, and Vivek Ramachandran.     

Dynamic and stochastic structures in tourism demand modeling

In this paper we consider a model for international tourism demand. The point of departure of the analysis is a utility function that is both dynamic and stochastic. In the model the stochastic component is interpreted as random changes in preferences for goods and services, while the dynamic component can be seen as either habit formation or as interdependent preferences. The resulting demand functions are estimated as a multivariate state space model, where the stochastic components enter the model as stochastic seasonal and trend components. An application is constructed for different segments of the Swedish tourism market. The results indicate the importance of including both dynamic and stochastic components in the utility function, and the importance of using disaggregate data to enable investigation of each market segment.I am grateful to two anonymous referees for useful comments. Much of the research was done while I was a visiting scholar at University of California Berkeley. The hospitality of the RIPM division is gratefully acknowledged. The research was supported by grants from the Wallander Foundation.First version received: January 2003/Final version received: February 2004     

General equilibrium, markets, macroeconomics and money in a laboratory experimental environment

Summary. This paper studies a version of war of attrition where two agents with private information make irreversible investment decisions in continuous time. It analyzes a monotone equilibrium where the amount of delay in the timing of decisions is a monotone function of the strength of ones private signal: an agent with a clear signal makes a prompt decision, whereas an agent with a weak signal delays a decision to gather more information from the move of the other agent. Equilibrium delay is characterized under different assumptions about the number of investment options available.Received: 4 October 1996, Revised: 16 May 1997, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82, L13.Masaki Aoyagi: I am very grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments. I also thank seminar participants at the University of Tokyo and Kyoto University.     

The multiple perspective concept : With applications to technology assessment and other decision areas

In the area of sociotechnological systems the science/technology based paradigms of analysis haver serious limitations. Building on the work of Graham Allison, we explore the use of multiple perspectives to develop greater insights; specifically, an organizational/societal perspective and a personal/individual perspective augment the conventional “technical” perspective. Application of the three perspectives to several technology assessments and other complex decision areas indicates that the concept can effectively narrow the gap between model and reality for decision making.

Section I describes the background leading to the study and Section II focuses on the limitations of the traditional perspective. Section III develops the multiple perspectives and Section IV summarizes illustrations and applications to date. The concluding section (V) offers guidelines to assist assessors, forecasters, policy analysts, and other users.     

Conditions For Successful Technology Policy In Developing Countries—Learning Rents,State Structures,And Institutions

The paper develops an analysis of the economic, political, and institutional conditions for successful design and implementation of technology policy in developing countries. After a brief introduction (Section I), we discuss contending economic theories of technological change and technology policy (Section 2). It is concluded that, despite many pro-market arguments, market imperfections inherent in the process of technological change make the creation of learning and innovation rents by the state potentially very beneficial, especially in developing countries. The next section (Section 3) analyses the political and institutional factors that determine how effectively such rents can be created and managed. After an assessment of technology policy record in developing countries (Section 4) we discuss how the scope of such policy is affected by the recent changes in domestic and international policy contexts such as domestic deregulation and the emergence of a ‘liberal’ world order represented by the WTO (Section 5). The paper ends with a brief conclusion (Section 6).     

Dynamic adjustment of supply under Buyers' forced substitution

This paper presents a dynamic version of the static model analysed in Chapter 8 of Kornai (1980). A multi-commodity model is considered, where global excess supply prevails but excess demand persists for certain goods. It is assumed that the goods are storable, and the buyer purchases more than his demand fornon-shortage goods (he makes forced substitution) to satisfy his global demand.This paper investigates the seller's adjustment process and presents alternative assumptions for the supply, the demand, and the allocation rule under which the shortage disappears in a finite period of time.My indebtedness to J. Kornai is multi-sided: it was he, who formalized the theory: it was he, who created the underlying static model, finally the idea of the dynamic analysis is also due to him. I express my obligations to J. Kornai, B. Martos and an anonymous referee for their comments on an earlier version of my paper. Of course, I am alone responsible for any shortcomings of the model.     

Speculative trade, asset prices and investment levels

Summary. In this paper I consider a dynamically complete market model without intrinsic uncertainty. Agents' beliefs are different, but correct in the limit. Some agents are more patient than others. I show that infinitely often share prices are low and the economy stagnates. Also, infinitely often share prices are high and the economy grows. The changes from growth to stagnation and from stagnation to growth are not caused by exogenous shocks. They are caused by speculative trade among agents with different propensities to save and invest. Received: January 8, 2001; revised version: April 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation.