Evaluation of Extraordinary and Exceptional Items Disclosed by Hong Kong Companies

This study evaluates extraordinary and exceptional items (EI) disclosed in financial statements by Hong Kong companies from 1989 to 1993, prior to revision of SSAP 2. The results indicate that disclosures of positive EI were associated with market expectations of profit before taxes. If market expectations were higher than profit before EI and taxes (PBEI), positive EI (gains) were likely to be disclosed to adjust PBEI upwards and thus reduce the gap between reported and expected profits.
The results relating to negative EI (losses) showed that if companies had low historical economic performance they were more likely to disclose negative EI. Because weak historical economic performance is likely to be associated with low market expectations, management used this opportunity to 'spring clean' in order to show better economic performance in future years.
These findings suggest that managers engage in earnings management through disclosure of extraordinary items when they have flexibility to do so. In order to improve quality of financial disclosure, better accounting standards need to be developed for disclosures of extraordinary items, especially by newly developed and developing countries where accounting standards are at the formative stage.     

JUST SAY NO TO WALL STREET: PUTTING A STOP TO THE EARNINGS GAME

CEOs are in a bind with Wall Street. Managers up and down the hierarchy work hard at putting together plans and budgets for the next year only to discover that the bottom line falls far short of Wall Street's expectations. CEOs and CFOs are therefore left in a difficult situation; they can stretch to try to meet Wall Street's projections or prepare to suffer the consequences if they fail.
All too often, top managers react by suggesting or even mandating that middle- and lower-level managers redo their forecasts and budgets to get them in line with external expectations. In some cases, managers simply acquiesce to increasingly unrealistic analyst forecasts and adopt them as the basis for setting organizational goals and developing internal budgets. But either approach sets up the firm and its managers for failure if external expectations are impossible to meet.
Using the recent experiences of Enron and Nortel, the authors illustrate the dangers of conforming to market pressures for unrealistic growth targets. They emphasize that an overvalued stock, by encouraging overpriced acquisitions and other value-destroying forms of overinvestment, can be as damaging to the long-run health of a company as an undervalued stock. Ending the "expectations game" requires that CEOs reclaim the initiative in setting expectations and forecasts so that stocks can trade at close to their intrinsic value. Managers must make their organizations more transparent to investors; they must promise only those results they have a legitimate prospect of delivering and be willing to inform the market when they believe their stock to be overvalued.     

How CEOs manage growth agendas

When does it make sense for companies to grow from within? When is it better to gain new capabilities or access to markets by merging with or acquiring other companies? When should you sacrifice the bottom line in order to nurture the top line? In a thought-provoking series of essays, five executives--Kenneth Freeman of Quest Diagnostics, George Nolen of Siemens USA, John Tyson of Tyson Foods, Kenneth Lewis of Bank of America, and Robert Creifeld of Nasdaq--describe how they have approached top-line growth in various leadership roles throughout their careers. They write candidly about their struggles and successes along the way, relaying growth strategies as diverse as the companies and industries they represent. The leaders' different tactics have almost everything to do with their companies' particular strengths, weaknesses, and needs. Freeman, for instance, emphasizes the importance of knowing when to put on the brakes. When he first became CEO of Quest, he froze acquisitions for a few years so the company could focus on internal processes and "earn the right to grow." But for Greifeld, it's all about innovation, which "shakes up competitive stasis and propels even mature businesses forward." The executives agree, though, that companies can grow (and can do so profitably) by distinguishing their offerings from those of other organizations. As Ranjay Gulati of Northwestern's Kellogg School of Management points out in his introduction to the essays, no matter what strategies are in play,"it's important to remember that growth comes in many forms and takes patience.... The key is to be ready to act on whatever types of opportunities arise."     

Getting the most out of all your customers

Companies spend billions of dollars on direct marketing, targeting individual customers with ever more accuracy. Yet despite the power of the myriad data-collecting and analytical tools at their disposal, they're still having trouble optimizing their direct-marketing investments. Many marketers try to minimize costs by pursuing only those customers who are cheap to find and cheap to keep. Others try to get the most customers they possibly can and keep all of them for as long as they can. But a customer need not be loyal to be highly profitable, and many loyal customers turn out to be highly unprofitable. Companies can get more out of direct marketing if they see it as a single system for generating profits than if they try to maximize performance measures at each stage of the process. This article describes a tool for doing just that. Called ARPRO (Allocating Resources for Profits), the tool is essentially a complex regression analysis that can estimate the impact of a company's direct-marketing investments on the profitability of its customer pool. With data that companies already gather, the tool can show managers how much to spend on acquisition versus retention and even what percentage of their funds they should allocate to the different direct-marketing channels. Using the model, companies can easily see that even small deviations from the optimal levels of customer profitability are expensive. Applying it to one catalog retailer showed, for instance, that a 10% reduction in marketing costs would lead to a 1.8 million dollar drop in long-term customer profits. Conversely, spending 69% less on marketing would actually increase average customer profitability at one B2B service provider by 42%. What's more, the tool can show that finding the optimal balance between investments in acquisition and retention can be more important than finding the optimum amount to invest overall.     

How to kill creativity

In today's knowledge economy, creativity is more important than ever. But many companies unwittingly employ managerial practices that kill it. How? By crushing their employees' intrinsic motivation--the strong internal desire to do something based on interests and passions. Managers don't kill creativity on purpose. Yet in the pursuit of productivity, efficiency, and control--all worthy business imperatives--they undermine creativity. It doesn't have to be that way, says Teresa Amabile. Business imperatives can comfortably coexist with creativity. But managers will have to change their thinking first. Specifically, managers will need to understand that creativity has three parts: expertise, the ability to think flexibly and imaginatively, and motivation. Managers can influence the first two, but doing so is costly and slow. It would be far more effective to increase employees' intrinsic motivation. To that end, managers have five levers to pull: the amount of challenge they give employees, the degree of freedom they grant around process, the way they design work groups, the level of encouragement they give, and the nature of organizational support. Take challenge as an example. Intrinsic motivation is high when employees feel challenged but not overwhelmed by their work. The task for managers, therefore, becomes matching people to the right assignments. Consider also freedom. Intrinsic motivation--and thus creativity--soars when managers let people decide how to achieve goals, not what goals to achieve. Managers can make a difference when it comes to employee creativity. The result can be truly innovative companies in which creativity doesn't just survive but actually thrives.     

Making business sense of the Internet

For managers in large, well-established businesses, the Internet is a tough nut to crack. It is very simple to set up a Web presence and very difficult to create a Web-based business model. Established businesses that over decades have carefully built brands and physical distribution relationships risk damaging all they have created when they pursue commerce through the Net. Still, managers can't avoid the impact of electronic commerce on their businesses. They need to understand the opportunities available to them and recognize how their companies may be vulnerable if rivals seize those opportunities first. Broadly speaking, the Internet presents four distinct types of opportunities. First, it links companies directly to customers, suppliers, and other interested parties. Second, it lets companies bypass other players in an industry's value chain. Third, it is a tool for developing and delivering new products and services to new customers. Fourth, it will enable certain companies to dominate the electronic channel of an entire industry or segment, control access to customers, and set business rules. As he elaborates on these four points, the author gives established companies a systematic way to sort through the risks and rewards of doing business in cyberspace.     

Spotting management fads

Business fads can change companies, for better or worse. They can introduce useful ideas but often fail to deliver on promises. So how can managers tell a fad from a tool that might endure? For one thing, beware of suspiciously simple techniques. If they seem too easy, they probably are.     

Organigraphs: drawing how companies really work

Walk into any organization and you will get a snapshot of the company in action--people and products moving every which way. But ask for a picture of the company and you will be given the org chart, with its orderly little boxes showing just the names and titles of managers. Now there's a more revealing way to depict the people and operations within an organization--an approach called the organigraph. The organigraph is not a chart. It's a map that offers an overview of the company's functions and the ways that people organize themselves at work. Perhaps most important, an organigraph can help managers see untapped competitive opportunities. Drawing on the organigraphs they created for about a dozen companies, authors Mintzberg and Van der Heyden illustrate just how valuable a tool the organigraph is. For instance, one they created for Electrocomponents, a British distributor of electrical and mechanical items, led managers to a better understanding of the company's real expertise--business-to-business relationships. As a result of that insight, the company wisely decided to expand in Asia and to increase its Internet business. As one manager says, "It allowed the company to see all sorts of new possibilities." With traditional hierarchies vanishing and newfangled--and often quite complex--organizational forms taking their place, people are struggling to understand how their companies work. What parts connect to one another? How should processes and people come together? Whose ideas have to flow where? With their flexibility and realism, organigraphs give managers a new way to answer those questions.     

Is a share buyback right for your company?

Contrary to popular wisdom, buybacks don't create value by raising earnings per share. But they do indeed create value, and in two very different ways. First, a buyback sends signals about the company's prospects to the market--hopefully, that prospects are so good that the best investment managers can make right now is in their own company. But investors won't see it that way if other, negative, signals are coming from the company, and it's rarely a good idea for companies in high-growth industries, where investors expect that money to be spent pursuing new opportunities. Second, when financed as a debt issue, a buyback is essentially an exchange of equity for debt, conferring the traditional benefits of leverage--a tax shield and a discipline for managers. For such a buyback to make sense, a company would need to have taxable profits in need of shielding, of course, and be able to predict its future cash flows fairly accurately. Justin Pettit has found that managers routinely underestimate how many shares they need to buy to send a credible signal to the markets, and he offers a way to calculate that number. He also goes through the iterative steps involved in working out how many shares must be purchased to reach a target level of debt. Then he takes a look at the advantages and disadvantages of the three most common ways that companies make the actual purchases--open-market purchases, fixed-price tender offers, and auction-based tender offers. When a company's performance is lagging, a share buyback can look attractive. Unfortunately, a buyback can backfire--unless executives understand why, when, and how to use this powerful and risky tool.     

Beyond products: services-based strategy

Services technologies are changing the way companies in every industry--manufacturers and service providers alike--compete. Vertical integration, physical facilities, even a seemingly superior product can no longer assure a competitive edge. Instead, sustainable advantage is more and more likely to come from developing superior capabilities in a few core service skills--and out-sourcing as much of the rest as possible. Within companies, technology is increasing the leverage of service activities: today, more value added comes from design innovations, product image, or other attributes that services create than from the production process. New technologies also let independent enterprises provide world-class services at lower costs than customers could achieve if they performed the activities themselves. These changes have far-reaching implications for how managers structure their organizations and define strategic focus. Companies like Apple, Honda, and Merck show that a less integrated but more focused organization is key to competitive success. They build their strategies around a few highly developed capabilities. And they outsource as many of the other activities in their value chain as possible. To help managers develop an activity-focused strategy, the authors offer a new way to approach competitive analyses, guidelines for determining which activities to outsource and which to retain, and an overview of the risks and rewards of strategic outsourcing. Throughout, they draw on the findings of their three-year study of the major impacts technology has had in the service sector.     

Knowing a winning business idea when you see one

Identifying which business ideas have real commercial potential is fraught with uncertainty, and even the most admired companies have stumbled. It's not as if they don't know what the challenges of innovation are. A new product has to offer customers exceptional utility at an attractive price, and the company must be able to deliver it at a tidy profit. But the uncertainties surrounding innovation are so great that even the most insightful managers have a hard time evaluating the commercial readiness of new business ideas. In this article, W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne introduce three tools that managers can use to help strip away some of that uncertainty. The first tool, "the buyer utility map," indicates how likely it is that customers will be attracted to a new business idea. The second, "the price corridor of the mass," identifies what price will unlock the greatest number of customers. And the third tool, "the business model guide," offers a framework for figuring out whether and how a company can profitably deliver the new idea at the targeted price. Applying the tools, though, is not the end of the story. Many innovations have to overcome adoption hurdles--strong resistance from stakeholders inside and outside the company. Often overlooked in the planning process, adoption hurdles can make or break the commercial viability of even the most powerful new ideas. The authors conclude by discussing how managers can head off negative reactions from stakeholders.     

EVA,not EBITDA: A New Financial Paradigm for Private Equity Firms

Private equity firms have boomed on the back of EBITDA. Most PE firms use it as their primary measure of value, and ask the managers of their portfolio companies to increase it. Many public companies have decided to emulate the PE firms by using EBITDA to review performance with investors, and even as a basis for determining incentive pay. But is the emphasis on EBITDA warranted? In this article, the co‐founder of Stern Stewart & Co. argues that EVA offers a better way. He discusses blind spots and distortions that make EBITDA highly unreliable and misleading as a measure of normalized, ongoing profitability. By comparing EBITDA with EVA, or Economic Value Added, a measure of economic profit net of a full cost‐of‐capital charge, Stewart demonstrates EVA's ability to provide managers and investors with much more clarity into the levers that are driving corporate performance and determining intrinsic market value. And in support of his demonstration, Stewart reports the finding of his analysis of Russell 3000 public companies that EVA explains almost 20% more than EBITDA of their changes in value, while at the same time providing far more insight into how to improve those values.     

Selection bias and the perils of benchmarking

To find the secrets of business success, what could be more natural than studying successful businesses? In fact, nothing could be more dangerous, warns this Stanford professor. Generalizing from the examples of successful companies is like generalizing about New England weather from data taken only in the summer. That's essentially what businesspeople do when they learn from good examples and what consultants, authors, and researchers do when they study only existing companies or--worse yet--only high-performing companies. They reach conclusions from unrepresentative data samples, falling into the classic statistical trap of selection bias. Drawing on a wealth of case studies, for instance, one researcher concluded that great leaders share two key traits: They persist, often despite initial failures, and they are able to persuade others to join them. But those traits are also the hallmarks of spectacularly unsuccessful entrepreneurs, who must persist in the face of failure to incur large losses and must be able to persuade others to pour their money down the drain. To discover what makes a business successful, then, managers should look at both successes and failures. Otherwise, they will overvalue risky business practices, seeing only those companies that won big and not the ones that lost dismally. They will not be able to tell if their current good fortune stems from smart business practices or if they are actually coasting on past accomplishments or good luck. Fortunately, economists have developed relatively simple tools that can correct for selection bias even when data about failed companies are hard to come by. Success may be inspirational, but managers are more likely to find the secrets of high performance if they give the stories of their competitors'failures as full a hearing as they do the stories of dazzling successes.     

What really works

When it comes to improving business performance, managers have no shortage of tools and techniques to choose from. But what really works? What's critical, and what's optional? Two business professors and a former McKinsey consultant set out to answer those questions. In a ground-breaking, five-year study that involved more than 50 academics and consultants, the authors analyzed 200 management techniques as they were employed by 160 companies over ten years. Their findings at a high level? Business basics really matter. In this article, the authors outline the management practices that are imperative for sustained superior financial performance--their "4+2 formula" for business success. They provide examples of companies that achieved varying degrees of success depending on whether they applied the formula, and they suggest ways that other companies can achieve excellence. The 160 companies in their study--called the Evergreen Project--were divided into 40 quads, each comprising four companies in a narrowly defined industry. Based on its performance between 1986 and 1996, each company in each quad was classified as either a winner (for instance, Dollar General), a loser (Kmart), a climber (Target), or a tumbler (the Limited). Without exception, the companies that outperformed their industry peers excelled in what the authors call the four primary management practices: strategy, execution, culture, and structure. And they supplemented their great skill in those areas with a mastery of any two of four secondary management practices: talent, leadership, innovation, and mergers and partnerships. A company that consistently follows this 4+2 formula has a better than 90% chance of sustaining superior performance, according to the authors.     

Realizing the Potential of Real Options: Does Theory Meet Practice?

The idea of viewing corporate investment opportunities as “real options” has been around for over 25 years. Real options concepts and techniques now routinely appear in academic research in finance and economics, and have begun to influence scholarly work in virtually every business discipline, including strategy, organizations, management science, operations management, information systems, accounting, and marketing. Real options concepts have also made considerable headway in practice. Corporate managers are more likely to recognize options in their strategic planning process, and have become more proactive in designing flexibility into projects and contracts, frequently using real options vocabulary in their discussions. Thanks in part to the spread of real options thinking, today's strategic planners are more likely than their predecessors to recognize the “option” value of actions like the following: ? dividing up large projects into a number of stages; ? investing in the acquisition or production of information; ? introducing “modularity” in manufacturing and design; ? developing competing prototypes for new products; and ? investing in overseas markets. But if real options has clearly succeeded as a way of thinking, the application of real options valuation methods has been limited to companies in relatively few industries and has thus failed to live up to expectations created in the mid‐ to late‐1990s. Increased corporate acceptance and implementations of real options valuation techniques will require several changes coming together. On the theory side, we need more realistic models that better reflect differences between financial and real options, simple heuristic methods that can be more easily implemented (but that have been carefully benchmarked against more precise models), and better guidance on implementation issues such as the estimation of discount rates for the “optionless” underlying projects. On the practitioner side, we need user‐friendly real options software, more senior‐level buy‐in, more deliberate diffusion of real options knowledge throughout organizations, better alignment of managerial incentives with long‐term shareholder value, and better‐designed contracts to correct the misalignment of incentives across the value chain. If these challenges can be met, there will continue to be a steady if gradual diffusion of real options analysis throughout organizations over the next few decades, with real options eventually becoming not only a standard part of corporate strategic planning, but also the primary valuation tool for assessing the expected shareholder effect of large capital investment projects.     

Three Versions of Perfect Pay for Performance (Or The Rebirth of Partnership Concepts in Executive Pay)

During the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, the compensation of non‐founder managers of U.S. public companies was guided by partnership concepts. Andrew Carnegie made his senior staff coowners by selling them stock at book value. And Alfred Sloan gave the senior staff of General Motors a fixed percentage of the company's “economic profit.” But in the years since World War II, such partnership concepts have largely disappeared from executive pay. The current view of executive pay is guided by the concepts of “competitive pay” and pay components. But unlike the partnership models of the past, today's “human resources model” of executive pay fails to provide useful guidance to companies on how to achieve a consistent relationship between pay and corporate performance, as reflected in returns to shareholders. As the author argues, the model's insistence on providing “competitive pay” packages that are (1) based on size (that is, on revenue not profitability) and (2) “recalibrated” every year regardless of past performance has the effect of undermining management's incentives by rewarding poor past value performance with increases (instead of reductions) in sharing percentage, and penalizing superior value performance with reductions (instead of increases) in sharing percentage. In recent years, however, three different model pay plans have been proposed that provide both competitive pay and fixed pay leverage in relation to shareholder value. The author is the source of one of the three “perfect” pay plans. The other two are (1) the Dynamic Incentive Account proposed by Alex Edmans of London Business School and Xavier Gabaix of NYU and (2) the investment manager fee structure developed and used by Don Raymond, the chief investment strategist of the Canada Pension Plan. The author shows that cumulative pay under all three plans can be expressed as a function of cumulative market compensation (that is, the pay earned by one's peers over the life of the plan, thus reflecting pay levels for average performance) and cumulative value added (as reflected, say, in the company's TSR relative to the average of its peers' over the life of the plan)—and in the case of plans with equity‐like leverage, cumulative pay is the simple sum of cumulative market compensation and a fixed share of the cumulative value added. The plans reconcile retention and performance objectives more effectively than current practice because they provide competitive pay only for average performance, while using the partnership concept of fixed sharing of the value added to provide strong incentives.     

In praise of middle managers

Middle managers have often been cast as dinosaurs. Has-beens. Mediocre managers and intermediaries who defend the status quo instead of supporting others' attempts to change organizations for the better. An INSEAD professor has examined this interesting breed of manager--in particular, middle managers' roles during periods of radical organizational change. His findings will surprise many. Middle managers, it turns out, make valuable contributions to the realization of radical change at companies--contributions that go largely unrecognized by most senior executives. Quy Nguyen Huy says these contributions occur in four major areas. First, middle managers often have good entrepreneurial ideas that they are able and willing to realize--if only they can get a hearing. Second, they're far better than most senior executives at leveraging the informal networks at companies that make substantive, lasting change. Because they've worked their way up the corporate ladder, middle managers' networks run deep. Third, they stay attuned to employees' emotional needs during organizational change, thereby maintaining the transformation's momentum. And finally, they manage the tension between continuity and change--they keep the organization from falling into extreme inertia or extreme chaos. The author examines each of these strengths, citing real-world examples culled from his research. Of course, not every middle manager in an organization is a paragon of entrepreneurial vigor and energy, Huy acknowledges. But cavalierly dismissing the roles that middle managers play--and carelessly reducing their ranks--will drastically diminish senior managers' chances of realizing radical change at their companies. Indeed, middle managers may be the most effective allies of corner office executives when it's time to make major changes in businesses.     

The right mind-set for managing information technology

Too many managers in the West are intimidated by the task of managing technology. They tiptoe around it, supposing that it needs special tools, special strategies, and a special mind-set. Well, it doesn't, the authors say. Technology should be managed-controlled, even--like any other competitive weapon in a manager's arsenal. The authors came to this conclusion in a surprising way. Having set out to compare Western and Japanese IT-management practices, they were startled to discover that Japanese companies rarely experience the IT problems so common in the United States and Europe. In fact, their senior executives didn't even recognize the problems that the authors described. When they dug deeper into 20 leading companies that the Japanese themselves consider exemplary IT users, they found that the Japanese see IT as just one competitive lever among many. Its purpose, very simply, is to help the organization achieve its operational goals. The authors recognize that their message is counterintuitive, to say the least. In visits to Japan, Western executives have found anything but a model to copy. But a closer look reveals that the prevailing wisdom is wrong. The authors found five principles of IT management in Japan that, they believe, are not only powerful but also universal. M. Bensaou and Michael Earl contrast these principles against the practices commonly found in Western companies. While acknowledging that Japan has its own weaknesses with technology, particularly in white-collar office settings, they nevertheless urge senior managers in the West to consider the solid foundation on which Japanese IT management rests.     

Uncovering your hidden occupancy costs

Senior managers at large companies may not believe that they can have much impact on the "bricks and mortar" of their cost structure. They may even think that occupancy costs are too insignificant to worry about, too technical to analyze, and too fixed to control. But as real estate consultant Mahlon Apgar argues, occupancy costs can hurt a company's earnings, share value, and overall performance. On the other hand, every dollar saved drops straight to the bottom line. Shearson Lehman Brothers, for example, has found that it can save as much as $20 million annually by reducing occupancy costs in its branch offices and headquarters. Managing occupancy costs isn't easy. But it is timely. As companies strive to improve productivity by consolidating functions and downsizing staff, they are saddled with excess office space. Expansions abroad present completely different market conditions that put a premium on reducing occupancy costs. At the same time, the changing nature of work is challenging deeply held beliefs about the workplace, and, consequently, traditional expectations of office space are giving way to innovations that are less costly and more productive. To manage occupancy costs, managers must be able to identify their components, measure their impact, understand what drives them, and develop options to change them. Four basic tools help diagnose problems: a cost history, a loss analysis, a component analysis, and a lease aging profile. Understanding cost drivers like leasing, location, and layout can give executives the insights they need to reduce occupancy costs while improving the effectiveness of facilities to support day-to-day operations.     

Interpretive management: what general managers can learn from design

The past two decades have seen a dramatic acceleration in the pace of marketplace change. Companies have abandoned the old hierarchical model, with its clean functional divisions and clear lines of authority, and adopted flatter, less bureaucratic structures. But if most organizations have begun to adapt to the uncertainty of rapid change, most managers have not. They remain locked into the mechanical mind-set of the industrial age--that is, they assume that any management challenge can be translated into a clearly defined problem for which an optimal solution can be found. That approach works in stable markets and even in markets that change in predictable ways. Today's markets, however, are increasingly unstable and unpredictable. Managers can never know precisely what they're trying to achieve or how best to achieve it. They can't even define the problem, much less engineer a solution. The challenges facing the general manager in these circumstances, the authors argue, resemble those typically confronted by design managers. In the unpredictable world of research and design, neither the flow of the development process nor its end point can be defined at the outset. Rather than the traditional analytical approach to management, the design world requires an interpretive one. And that approach is equally well suited to rapidly changing, unpredictable markets. The authors describe how companies such as Levi Strauss & Company and Chiron Corporation have stayed at the top of their industries by adopting just such an interpretive approach to management.