PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY,NONDEBT TAX SHIELDS,AND FINANCIAL LEVERAGE

In the literature a negative relationship between debt and nondebt tax shields is predicted only for firms that have the same production technology (i.e., firms with perfectly correlated pretax output). In this paper we examine the relationship between production technology and differences in firms' financial leverage ratios, and find that firms in the same industry with highly (lowly) correlated output make similar (dissimilar) leverage decisions. Thus, the correlation of output across states of nature helps explain leverage differences that are not explained by industry differences. Contrary to previous predictions, however, leverage differences for firms with highly correlated pretax output suggest a positive relationship between debt and nondebt tax shields.     

Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?

This paper provides clear evidence of substantial tax effects on the choice between issuing debt or equity; most studies fail to find significant effects. The relationship between tax shields and debt policy is clarified. Other papers miss the fact that most tax shields have a negligible effect on the marginal tax rate for most firms. New predictions are strongly supported by an empirical analysis; the method is to study incremental financing decisions using discrete choice analysis. Previous researchers examined debt/equity ratios, but tests based on incremental decisions should have greater power.     

Employee Stock Options, Corporate Taxes, and Debt Policy

We find that employee stock option deductions lead to large aggregate tax savings for Nasdaq 100 and S&P 100 firms and also affect corporate marginal tax rates. For Nasdaq firms, including the effect of options reduces the estimated median marginal tax rate from 31% to 5%. For S&P firms, in contrast, option deductions do not affect marginal tax rates to a large degree. Our evidence suggests that option deductions are important nondebt tax shields and that option deductions substitute for interest deductions in corporate capital structure decisions, explaining in part why some firms use so little debt.     

INFLATION,INVESTMENT, AND DEBT

In this paper the effect of inflation on firms' investment and debt-financing decisions is examined. Inflation affects optimal investment and financing directly through the probability of accounting loss and the real value of depreciation and interest tax shields. In addition, when corporate and differential personal taxes cause investment and financing decisions to interact, inflation has indirect effects on these decisions through their interactions. In general, the overall effects of inflation on optimal investment and debt are ambiguous in sign. For tax-exempt firms, however, optimal investment and debt are independent of inflation. For firms that are always in a tax-paying position, higher inflation reduces optimal investment without affecting optimal debt. Furthermore, inflation causes total firm value to decrease if the depreciation rate exceeds the firm's debt/asset ratio.     

Estimating the Tax Advantage of Corporate Debt

This paper presents estimates of the effective tax value of incremental interest deductions for corporations taking into account that they may not be able to utilize all their interest deductions fully because of either insufficient taxable income or the availability of nondebt tax shields. After describing particular features of the tax code which may drive a wedge between statutory and effective tax rates for debt finance, we present estimates using the Treasury Corporate Tax Model of effective tax rates for a variety of industry groupings. Our estimates suggest that the after-tax cost of debt varies widely across industries.     

Optimality of project financing: Theory and empirical implications in finance and accounting

During the 1980s a fairly active market developed in the private placement of limited recourse project financing. Although this form of financing is gaining in importance, we know very little about it. This article presents a theoretical analysis of project financing. In the model of the firm presented, outstanding risky debt gives rise to agency costs of underinvestment that are offset by the benefit of debt-related tax shields. The tradeoff specifies the optimal leverage for a firm. Within this framework, we consider the optimality of financing a new project with a nonrecourse project financing arrangement. We derive implications for 1) the characteristics of a new venture that will be project financed, 2) the wealth gains from project financing over that of financing with straight debt, and 3) the optimal allocation of debt across the different assets (the sponsor firm vs. the new venture). It is shown that a project financing arrangement, where the debt is optimally allocated to the sponsor firm and the new venture, increases value by reducing agency costs and increasing the value of tax shields (compared to the case of straight debt financing). The optimal allocation of debt in project financing involves assigning to the sponsor firm and the new venture debt levels equal to their individual optimal capital structures. Several testable empirical implications in finance and accounting are developed.     

Debt Financing and Tax Status: Tests of the Substitution Effect and the Tax Exhaustion Hypothesis Using Firms' Responses to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981

This study tests the joint prediction of the substitution effect and the tax exhaustion hypothesis that an increase in non-debt tax shields leads to a decrease in leverage. Controls are introduced for the debt securability effect, the pecking order theory of financing, and the probability of losing tax shields. Using the relationship between changes in investment tax shields and changes in debt tax shields of firms in response to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, strong empirical support is found for predictions based on the substitution effect and the tax exhaustion hypothesis.     

WHY COST-REIMBURSED NOT-FOR-PROFITS USE DEBT FINANCING DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF TAX INCENTIVES

This paper explains why cost-reimbursed not-for-profits (NFPs) have incentives to use debt financing when purchasing capital assets. When the purchase is internally financed (i.e., through retained earnings), NPV is negative and the NFP lacks incentives for efficient investment. But when financed through debt with reimbursed ('passed through') interest, earlier reimbursed depreciation recovery relative to delayed principal costs can lead to positive NPV and excessive reimbursement. This analysis may thus help explain an empirical regularity, namely that NFPs tend to be highly leveraged despite the absence of tax shields or the availability of internal funds. This regularity cannot be explained either by the 'trade-off' or by the 'pecking order' theories of capital structure.     

Corporate taxes,strategic default,and the cost of debt

The current US tax code’s loss carry provisions provide implicit tax subsidies to financially troubled firms. Since shareholders ultimately decide when to announce bankruptcy, such tax subsidies can incentivize them to strategically postpone default. Therefore, corporate taxation can influence corporate cost of debt. Using a large panel of corporate bonds, we find supporting evidence: credit spreads become smaller as tax loss carries grow larger. In contrast, tax shields such as depreciation, which limit loss carry gains, lead to wider spreads. Interestingly, when stockholders hold greater bargaining power – due to large managerial ownership – larger corporate tax shields lead to even narrower credit spreads.     

Corporate Financing Decisions and Non-Debt Tax Shields: Evidence from Italian Experiences in the 1990s

Between 1995 and 1999, Italy experienced three episodes of fiscal reform during which different categories of non-debt tax shields were introduced, including a classical investment tax credit, a system of dual income taxation, and an investment tax credit restricted to equity financed investments. Using the balance sheets of a large sample of Italian companies, we construct a data set which allows us to evaluate the impact of the different fiscal interventions. We apply MacKie-Mason's (1990) method to study incremental financing decisions using discrete choice analysis. The analysis shows that the measures introduced were successful in reducing the advantage of debt financing relative to equity financing. We relate the findings to the current literature on the determinants of capital structure. JEL Code: G32, H25     

Tax-Adjusted Discount Rates with Investor Taxes and Risky Debt

This paper derives a tax-adjusted discount rate formula with a constant proportion leverage policy, investor taxes, and risky debt. The result depends on an assumption about the treatment of tax losses in default. We identify the assumption that justifies the textbook approach of discounting interest tax shields at the cost of debt. We contrast this with an alternative assumption that leads to the Sick (1990) result that these should be discounted at the riskless rate. These two approaches represent polar cases. Each generates its results by using a different simplifying assumption, and we explain what determines the correct treatment in practice. We also discuss implementation of the valuation procedure using the capital asset pricing model.     

Does debt capacity matter in the choice of debt in reducing the underinvestment problem?

We test the impact of debt capacity on firms’ simultaneous decisions of leverage and debt maturity in reducing underinvestment problems. Examining 24 OECD countries for the period between 1990 and 2011, we find strong evidence, that, unlike previous studies, the role of leverage and debt maturity in reducing underinvestment problems is not homogeneous across firms with varied debt capacity. We find new evidence that, when firms face lower debt capacity constraints, they benefit from their ability to use a greater amount of debt if they shorten their debt maturity, or gain from using longer maturity of debt if they decrease their leverage to reduce underinvestment problems. Our results suggest that they also benefit from the ability of their firms to gain from interest tax shields by financing more with debt or long-term debt, and hence use debt maturity and leverage as strategies substitutes. However, when firms are constrained by concerns over debt capacity, they tend to opt for a lower level of debt that is mainly short-term to reduce the underinvestment problem. Our results suggest that firms with lower debt capacity cannot completely resolve their underinvestment problems by using short-term debt or low leverage, implying that the effects of the liquidity risk outweigh those of underinvestment problems, and hence impose a constraint on firms’ choice of debt.     

Interest Tax Shields: A Barrier Options Approach

There is a link between barrier options and tax shields of interest expense. We combine this link with a traditional valuation approach, to present practical valuation formulas for interest tax shields in three debt scenarios with risk of default: (1) constant debt, (2) delayed debt, and (3) debt refinancing. In all cases, default and refinancing are contingent on the random evolution of the income of the firm. For each scenario, we work out sensitivity analysis of the value of tax shields with respect to income, growth, systematic and business risk, risk-free interest rate, interest coverage ratio covenant, and the firm??s refinancing strategy.     

The value of tax shields IS equal to the present value of tax shields

Fernandez [2004b. The value of tax shields is not equal to the present value of tax shields. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 145–165] argues that the present value effect of the tax saving on debt cannot be calculated as simply the present value of the tax shields associated with interest. This contradicts standard results in the literature. It implies that, even though the capital market is complete, value-additivity is violated. As a consequence, adjusted present value formulae of a standard sort cannot be used. Also, Fernandez's argument implies that the value of the tax saving differs from conventional estimates by a considerable amount. We reconcile Fernandez's results with standard valuation formulae for the tax saving from debt. We show that, as one would expect, the value of the debt tax saving is the present value of the tax savings from interest. The apparent violation of value-additivity in the Fernandez paper comes from mixing the Miles and Ezzell and Miller and Modigliani leverage policies.     

EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF TAXES ON FINANCING CHOICE: CONSIDERATION OF MANDATORILY REDEEMABLE PREFERRED STOCK

In this study we examine the effect of firms' marginal tax rates on incremental and overall reliance on mandatorily redeemable preferred stock (MRPS). Similarities in the cash flows associated with debt and MRPS, as well as similarities in the claims of holders of debt and MRPS on the assets of issuing firms, suggest that MRPS may be viewed as a substitute for debt. However, important differences in the tax treatment of MRPS and debt suggest that firms that cannot make full use of interest tax shields may be able to finance more efficiently using MRPS instead of debt. The results indicate that, both incrementally and overall, firms with low marginal tax rates rely more heavily on MRPS than debt relative to firms with high tax rates. This finding is consistent with the proposition that firms that cannot make full use of interest tax shields finance incrementally using equity rather than debt.     

西部地区上市公司债务融资效应的实证研究——基于2007-2010年的经验数据

本文选取沪市西部地区53家上市公司作为研究样本,着重研究债务融资的税盾效应与财务杠杆效应。基于样本公司的债务融资现状,通过因子分析、主成分分析与多元回归分析揭示了债务融资效应与各影响因素之间的关联程度及显著水平。结论表明,当总资产息税前利润率大于债务利息率时,提高资产负债率,税盾效应、财务杠杆效应同时增大,进而增强债务融资效应;当总资产息税前利润率小于债务利息率时,提高资产负债率,税盾效应增大,财务杠杆表现为负效应,债务融资效应呈现不确定性。     

The Capital Structure Puzzle: The Evidence Revisited

Since the formulation of the M&M propositions almost 50 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely "irrelevant" in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but simply follow a financial "pecking order" in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required.
In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy (and other "contracting") costs, and information costs all appear to play an important role in corporate financing decisions. While much of the evidence is consistent with the argument that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that firms are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (the levels of debt and equity in relation to the target) and flows (or which security to issue at a particular time).     

Optimal leverage strategy: Capital structure in real estate investments

This article examines the optimal leverage strategy for real estate investors who are investing in income-producing properties. Within a discounted cash-flow context, the investment objective for the equity investor is to maximize the contribution to net present value of using mortgage financing. Utilizing more debt decreases the required equity investment and increases the size of the tax shelter. On the other hand, as the loan-to-value ratio increases, the interest rate charged by the lender increases, which indicates a higher cost of debt. This article goes beyond the simple conventional wisdom that debt financing should be used when financial leverage is positive by developing an equation that allows one to determine the optimal level of debt financing to use when positive leverage is possible. The optimal loan-to-value ratio is found to be a function of the investor's characteristics. Several hypotheses about the relationships between such an optimal loan-to-value ratio and the investor's characteristics are derived.     

How Much Do Private Equity Funds Benefit From Debt‐related Tax Shields?

In 2008 the German government enacted a measure designed to curb excessive leverage in LBOs by limiting tax‐deductible interest to 30% of EBITDA. And in the U.S., legislators are currently reviewing several regulatory measures, including limits on tax‐deductible interest, that are intended to reduce the leverage of portfolio companies in U.S. LBO funds. In their recent study of 56 German LBOs transacted after the tax law change in 2008, the authors analyze the importance of debt‐related tax savings and the economic consequences of their reduction for the PE business model. The study begins by confirming that LBO debt tax shields are a material component of LBO purchase prices, contributing as much as 20% of the average estimated total enterprise value. At the same time, however, the study finds that the effects on LBO fund returns of limits to the taxdeductibility of LBO interest payments are likely to be modest, in part because a large portion of the value from expected tax savings is effectively paid for upfront by the private equity firm in the form of higher LBO purchase prices. Moreover, the authors do not expect to see LBO funds change their business model in response to this change in taxdeductibility. Based on their findings, the authors expect neither a significant decline in LBO leverage nor a notable change in the pricing of PE deals. As finance scholars have suggested, there are significant benefits associated with the use of debt that have nothing to do with the tax shield provided by the deductibility of interest. The authors' results provide yet another piece of evidence suggesting that taxes have at most a second‐order effect on corporate financing decisions—and that the gains to private equity come mainly from improvements in operating performance.     

ALL-EQUITY FIRMS AND THE BALANCING THEORY OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Despite the benefits of leverage, many firms exist that at some point in their corporate history had no debt. This study provides evidence that the balancing theory of capital structure can predict the behavior of such firms. All-equity firms allow a more precise measurement of firm market value and risk, and provide a less ambiguous relationship between independent variables and dependent variables than the firms used in previous studies. Using a logit function to avoid spurious correlation between the dependent and independent variables, we find that for most years during 1964–88 all-equity firms listed in the Compustat industrial file exhibited a consistently significant negative relationship between the Myers growth option variable and the probability of borrowing. Positively significant but less consistent relationships exist between the risk measures and the nondebt tax shields, and the probability of borrowing. These results do not qualitatively change when the data are aggregated over twenty years or over five-year subperiods. The tests are also conducted by industry according to the one-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Significant relationships are found in the 2000 and 3000 SIC code manufacturing industries.