债转发展：一种债务处理方式的历史演进与中国方案

中国当前参与全球主权债务谈判和重组面临高度政治化的国际环境，且处理方式有限、磋商进程缓慢，亟需识别可为中国所用的债务处理方式。债转发展产生于20世纪80年代，其基础模式是债权人给予优惠性债务重组，债务人将所节省资金投入双方协商同意的发展领域，以期达到减轻债务压力和支持公共事务发展的双重效果。回顾40年来债转发展的历史演进和实践模式，分析债务人和债权人开展债转发展的多重动因，可理解中国开展债转发展的可能路径和潜在收益。债转发展对中国具有打破债务处理僵局、腾挪空间、鼓励试错、改善外部环境等重要意义。中国债转发展应首先探讨双边渠道处理无息贷款、优惠贷款和官方出口信贷，再逐步探索商业债务的转换。     

试析主权债务危机反思宏观经济学理论困境

自欧洲金融危机后,一些欧洲发达国家的主权债务出现了不同程度的危机,使欧洲经济陷入了低迷阶段。面对这些危机,欧洲宏观经济学中的增加政府收入、减少政府支出和以债养债等治理路径都有着现实中的困难。本文主要从主权债务危机的发展历史,宏观经济学的角度解读主权债务危机和主权债务危机反思宏观经济学理论困境三方面来分析。     

欧债危机是怎么回事

<正>在接受欧盟和国际货币基金组织第二轮救助之后,希腊的主权债务危机暂时得到了缓解,但西班牙甚至意大利的债务问题又有发酵苗头。欧债危机像一场漫无止境的肥皂剧,加入危机阵容的国家也越来越多。由张志前和喇绍华两位专家编著的《欧债危机》首次详细地介绍了这次欧洲主权债务危机,分析了欧债危机产生的背景和根源,是广大经济工作者和对经济感兴趣的     

论主权债务危机

主权债务危机在此轮世界经济衰退中频发而且主要集中在欧洲,这存在一定的必然性——那就是世界经济发展的不平衡。文章结合此次欧债危机详细分析了主权债务危机发生的原因、条件、路径和新特点,找出主权债务危机发生的根本原因和应对措施,然后进一步探讨了中国地方债务问题的治理。     

欧债危机:深层原因与十大矛盾分析

发达国家主权债务过大问题由来已久,欧元区国家由于没有统一的财政政策、生产力水平不一等原因,导致欧债危机不断升温,成了主权债务危机的代表。研究分析欧债危机产生的深层原因和解决危机中面临的若干矛盾困难,对解决我国地方债、确定我国公共服务水平有重要现实意义。     

欧债危机引致的欧元汇率风险

始于美国的次级债券危机,造成全球经济衰退,希腊等欧元区国家爆发主权债务危机。欧债危机核心是欧元区治理机制的缺陷和各国经济发展不平衡造成。文章着重探讨了欧债危机产生的各种原因以及对欧元汇率的影响。     

欧债危机下的中欧经贸关系

自2009年底希腊主权债务危机爆发以来,欧洲主权债务危机持续蔓延,至今尚未见底。欧债危机对欧洲财政以及经济发展模式的可持续性产生了巨大的冲击,对欧洲的当前及未来发展造成了重大影响。中国十分关注欧债危机的发展。欧债危机成为当前影响中欧关系的一个重要事件。     

中国应做好全球信贷紧缩的准备

在欧债危机的影响下,2008年次贷危机后的全球信贷紧缩可能卷土重来,世界范围内的降杠杆过程可能将持续不短的时间.首当其冲的是欧元区.欧元区银行业持有过量的"欧猪国家"主权债券,这将对银行资产质量造成严重的冲击——即使欧债危机得以在保持欧元区统一的条件下顺利解决,欧洲私人银行业也须承受来自主权债务重组的压力.     

欧债危机的形成机理、传导机制及防范策略研究

欧债危机对危机国和全球经济、金融、社会和政治领域造成了巨大冲击,迫使各国反思其形成机理与传导机制,以加强防范,避免危机在本国的形成、传导与蔓延。本文对冰岛、希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙、西班牙、意大利等国家的主权债务危机加以比较研究,提炼出其形成机理与传导机制,并得出针对主权债务危机的防范策略,为加强对债务危机的研究,降低其对我国负面影响提供理论支持与决策参考。     

浅议欧债问题

自欧债危机爆发以来,主权债务危机在欧元区国家内不断蔓延和升级,暴露了欧元区财政与货币不能协调一致的软肋,严重打击了欧洲经济。欧债危机继续发酵有其内在的逻辑。欧元区外围国家的债务负担沉重,经济增长停滞,而财政赤字严重超标,各国赤字早已突破了构筑欧盟基石的《马斯特里赫特条约》所要求的限制,但欧盟决策机构对此并未良策,从2009年开始的多次救助无果;面临债务问题,欧元区德法与债务国之间、欧洲央行与民间债权人之间,甚至于各国内部政府与民众之间矛盾重重,无法形成有效的救助方案与长期解决债务的机制,导致欧债阴影不散。     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism

The absence of a formal international regulatory mechanism tofacilitate sovereign debt restructuring has long been recognizedas a most serious gap in the architecture of global finance.Why has it proven so difficult to create such a sovereign debtrestructuring mechanism (SDRM) at the international level? Politicaleconomists have devoted relatively little scholarly attentionto this question. This paper attempts to begin to fill thisgap in the literature by examining four failed initiatives tocreate a SDRM over the past century. In place of a realist orstructural Marxist account, the paper puts forward a more contingentexplanation for these failures that highlights three distinctpolitical problems that must be overcome in the constructionof a SDRM: (1) collective action problems on both the side ofsovereign debtors and that of private foreign creditors; (2)basic distributional conflicts embodied in any debt restructuringeffort; and (3) the uncertain behavior of the private creditors'home states.     

Sovereign Risk,Public Investment and the Fiscal Policy Stance

Of the different types of government outlays, since the 2000s public investment has been the main variable of adjustment during recessions in advanced and emerging economies. These contractions (expansions) have been associated with relatively medium-high (low) sovereign spreads, especially in advanced economies. To rationalize these issues, we develop a model of fiscal policy and sovereign default, with corporate default risk. Policymakers must decide between the provision of an unproductive public good and public investment, weighting their respective net benefits in terms of short-term stabilization and debt sustainability. In our model, investment follows a countercyclical stance only in the case of low levels of debt and moderate negative shocks, and otherwise contracts during recessions. The policy stance, along with the mix between different outlays, is determined by how sovereign risk responds to adverse economic shocks.     

Sovereign debt, structural adjustment, and conditionality

The lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure. As a result, a sovereign may seek to improve its position in debt renegotiations and thus evade its debt obligations by reducing exports. Conditionality seeks to provide a solution to the incentive problem by addressing the commitment failure. Formalizing this argument, we show that conditionality helps the repayment of sovereign debt. In certain circumstances, it can eliminate debt overhang, especially when it is coupled with concessionary lending of sufficient magnitude. It is, however, unable to restore first best. When it is anticipated by lenders, conditionality may get international financial institutions and sovereign debtors into a trap where the debt overhang persist, debt rescheduling takes place periodically, and conditionality continues indefinitely.     

Sovereign risk and deposit dynamics: evidence from Europe

The unprecedented expansion of sovereign balance sheets since the beginning of the global crisis has given a new meaning to the term sovereign risk. Developments in Europe since early 2010 revealed new challenges for the functioning of private banks in an environment of heightened sovereign risk and may have contributed to deleveraging. The article uses an innovative way of measuring the perception of sovereign risk and its impact. Using an extension of a common market discipline framework, it shows that exposure to sovereign risk may have limited the ability of banks in Europe to collect deposits. Potential identification issues between deposits and bank efficiency are controlled by using data envelopment analysis (DEA). The results are robust to inclusion of conventional measures of bank performance and the sector-wide holdings of foreign sovereign debt.     

Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: The role of domestic shocks

One of the most striking consequences of the recent episode of sovereign debt market stress in the Eurozone has been the increase in the share of public debt held by the domestic sector in fragile economies. However, the causes and potential consequences of this increase were only given scarce attention in the literature on the Euro area sovereign debt crisis. In order to fill this gap, we first determine the shocks that impact the variation in the share of sovereign debt held at home in an SVAR model on a sample of Eurozone countries between 2002 and 2014, distinguishing between external and domestic shocks. Thanks to several alternative tests, we show that home bias in sovereign debt responds positively to country-specific fundamentals and expectation shocks but we find no evidence that the increase in home bias is destabilizing per se in the short-run. Second, a stylized theoretical model backed by the empirical results predicts that the consequences for sovereign debt crisis depend on the relative impact of domestic initial destabilizing shocks and increased home bias. The analysis suggests that an increase in home bias in times of sovereign debt stress, despite reflecting deteriorating fiscal conditions, may make default less likely.     

Sovereign bond markets with political risk and moral hazard

A model of interest rates on sovereign bonds with default risk is presented. The model accounts for interaction between interest rates and default risk. Multiple equilibria and stability issues are examined. The model explores the level of debt that markets will tolerate in a context where there is uncertainty about output growth, fiscal discipline, real exchange rates, and IMF intervention. The effect of likely IMF assistance on the debt ceiling is shown to be large.     

欧元区主权债务期限结构的实证分析

本文通过对欧元区成员国长期债务占总债务比重与各国整体宏观经济指标相关关系的实证分析表明,欧元区各国以GDP与税收比、债务与GDP之比所描述的当期融资能力与长期债务比例呈显著负相关,由于非对称冲击的作用,各国体现出不同的特征。本文同时构建了一个政府债务效用函数的二期模型,说明主权债务期限结构安排可以通过宏观调控进行跨期平滑,以防止主权债务危机的发生。     

中国主权资产负债表及其风险评估(下)

2000——2010年,中国的国民资产负债表呈快速扩张之势。对外资产、基础设施以及房地产资产迅速积累,构成资产扩张的主导因素。这记载了出口导向发展战略之下中国工业化与城镇化加速发展的历史进程。在负债方,各级政府以及国有企业的负债以高于私人部门的增长率扩张。这凸显了政府主导经济活动的体制特征。对主权资产负债表的风险评估表明:(1)总体上,中国主权净值为正,因而,在相当一段时间内,发生主权债务危机的概率极低;(2)近期的风险点主要体现在房地产信贷与地方债务上,而中国的长期风险则更多集中在对外资产负债表、企业债务与社保欠账上。这些风险大都是或有负债风险,且与过去的发展方式密切相关;(3)主权债务动态的模拟进一步揭示出维持经济增长率与利率之差对于化解债务风险的重要性。因此,转变经济发展方式,保持经济可持续增长,是应对主权债务风险的根本途径。     

The role of debt profile vulnerabilities in sovereign distress

Sovereign debt distress has raised difficult issues in terms of debt sustainability in the past, but it has been associated not only with medium-term debt dynamics, but also with various dimensions of the debt profile that have typically built vulnerabilities over time. Vulnerabilities associated with the public debt structure and liquidity may play an important role in derailing a stable debt trajectory and thus contribute to debt distress. Financial developments may also contribute to the building in sovereign debt vulnerabilities, as deterioration in financial stability indicators can affect the balance sheet of the national treasury. Based on the experience during 37 debt distress events in countries with market access between 1993 and 2010, this article identifies early warning indicators of sovereign debt distress and defines thresholds – for the whole sample and for different regions – at which these latter have been associated with distress in the past. This approach allows us to assess indicators on an individual basis, and to develop a composite indicator of debt vulnerabilities as well.