浅析《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》与我国《合同法》中的预期违约

1980的《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》中吸收英美法系的预期违约制度并有所发展,随着社会经济的发展其发挥着重要作用.我国《合同法》也规定了预期违约制度,但是存在体系混乱、救济措施不完善等问题.通过对《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》及我国《合同法》中预期违约制度分析,以期完善我国《合同法》中预期违约制度.     

论存款被冒领纠纷案件的处理原则

储蓄存款被冒领是储蓄机构经营中的一个重大风险点,储蓄存款被冒领纠纷是储蓄机构与用户之间经常发生的一种储蓄合同纠纷,冒领储蓄存款的实质是储蓄机构没有正确有效地履行合同义务,没有构成有效的债务清偿,债权债务仍然未能归于消灭,因此,储蓄机构必须按严格责任原则向储户承担违约责任。但储蓄机构若能举证证明储户存在过错,则可以被免除或减轻其违约责任。     

预期违约的法律价值及其经济分析

从传统法律价值角度审视,毫无疑问,预期违约制度蕴含着公平、正义价值;而通过经济分析,则可发现,该制度还彰显着为现代社会所需要的效益价值。我国在预期违约制度的适用中应强调效益价值取向。     

Asymétrie d'information,Litiges et Bien‐être social dans le cadre d'un contrat de Partenariat Public/Privé: Le cas de la construction d'infrastructures d'intérêt public en Afrique

Résumé: Dans cet article, nous analysons la structure des contrats optimaux de partenariat Public/Privé concernant la construction d'infrastructures d'intérêt public. Nous considérons une forme générale de contrat incitatif comportant un paiement ex‐post qui dépend du coût du projet observé et d'un prix fixe. Lorsque l'opérateur du projet peut influencer le résultat ex‐post par une action non observable par le partenaire public, il existe un risque de litiges concernant le coût observé ex‐post. On montre que, le contrat optimal réalise un arbitrage entre deux effets: aléa moral et partage du risque. Les mécanismes réalisables en présence ou en absence de litiges sont caractérisés. En cas de litige, le contrat à prix fixe peut être inférieur à un contrat à remboursement de coût. Ce résultat entre en contradiction avec le résultat bien connu selon lequel, en incitant l'agent à exercer un effort de réduction du coût, un contrat à prix fixe domine le contrat à remboursement du coût. Abstract: In this article, we analyzes the optimal structure of public/private partnership agreements, in cases where these contracts concern the construction of economic infrastructure. We consider a form of incentive contract stipulating rules of payment based on the ex post value, which are calculated based on the observed costs of the project and a fixed price. In cases where a private contractor can influence the final cost of a project by an action unobservable by the principal, there is a risk that a dispute will arise concerning the project's observable cost. We show that, the optimal contract establish a balance between moral hazard and risk sharing. We derive the feasible mechanisms, either in the presence or absence of litigation. In litigation contest, a fixed‐price contract may be inferior to a cost‐plus contract. This result stands in contrast to the well‐established finding that, in providing incentive for the agent to engage in cost‐reducing effort, a fixed‐price contract dominates a cost‐plus contract.     

论加害给付的责任

加害给付是合同履行过程中不适当履行的一种特殊形态,既产生了违约责任又产生了侵权责任。本文从加害给付的理论基础着手,分析了加害给付中的违约责任和侵权责任,并且就加害给付的几种实际的情形探讨责任的承担问题。     

Outsourcing and Audit Risk for Internal Audit Services*

Some companies now outsource their internal audit function to public accountants. Internal auditors and accounting firms disagree about the merits of outsourcing. Each type of auditor claims to provide more cost‐effective services and appears to claim superior expertise. This paper uses agency theory to examine outsourcing and reconciles the outsourcing debate without resorting to differential auditor expertise. Under the assumptions that public accountants' “deep pockets” provide incentives to outsource and their higher opportunity cost provides a disincentive, we characterize the optimal employment contract with each auditor. We find that public accountants provide higher levels of testing, but possibly for a higher expected fee. This result supports both the internal auditor's claim as the lower cost provider, and the public accountant's claim of higher quality. We also find that incentives to outsource generally increase in various measures of risk, including the risk that a control weakness exists and the size of the loss that can result from an undetected control weakness.     

Auditor Reputation,Auditor Independence,and the Stock‐Market Impact of Andersen's Indictment on Its Client Firms*

In this paper, we study a broad sample of Arthur Andersen clients and investigate whether the decline in Andersen's reputation, due to its criminal indictment on March 14, 2002, adversely affected the stock market's perception of its audit quality. Because these reputa‐tional concerns are more of an issue if an auditor's independence is impaired, we investigate the relationship between the abnormal market returns for Andersen clients around the time of the indictment announcement and several fee‐based measures of auditor independence. Our results suggest that when news about Andersen's indictment was released, the market reacted negatively to Andersen clients. More importantly, we find that the indictment period abnormal return is significantly more negative when the market perceived the auditor's independence to be threatened. We also examine the abnormal returns when firms announced the dismissal of Andersen as an auditor. Consistent with the audit quality explanation, we document that when firms quickly dismissed Andersen, the announcement returns are significantly higher when firms switched to a Big 4 auditor than when they either switched to non‐Big 4 auditors or did not announce the identity of the replacement auditor. Our empirical results support the notion that auditor reputation and independence have a material impact on perceived audit quality and the credibility of audited financial statements, and that the market prices this.     

交易成本与关系型契约的思考

契约成本问题一直是现代经济理论关注的焦点。本文从新制度经济学的相关理论出发,通过对交易成本加以界定和划分,试图探讨关系型契约的边界、产权特征和交易成本之间的关系。     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND PRICE‐COST MARGIN IN INDIAN INDUSTRIES

Using panel data for 137 three‐digit industries for 1980/81 to 1997/98, the paper examines the effect of trade liberalization on price‐cost margins in Indian industries. An econometric model is estimated to explain variations in price‐cost margins, taking tariff and nontariff barriers among the explanatory variables. The results indicate that the lowering of tariffs and removal of quantitative restrictions on imports of manufactures in the 1990s had a significant pro‐competitive effect on Indian industries, particularly concentrated industries, tending to reduce the price‐cost margins. The paper notes that despite the pro‐competitive effects of trade liberalization reinforced by domestic industrial deregulation, the price‐cost margin increased in the post‐reform period in most industries and aggregate manufacturing, which is attributed to a marked fall in the growth rate of real wages and a significant reduction in labor's income share in value added in the post‐reform period, reflecting perhaps a weakening of industrial labor's bargaining power.     

关于我国劳动合同法的违约金补偿制度探析

由于我国劳动合同违约金制度不完善,还存在诸多问题,导致用人单位侵害劳动者合法权益的案件经常发生。为此,本文充分吸收国际有关劳动合同违约金的经验基础上,重点分析诸如劳动合同违约金的性质、金额、适用对象和适用范围等劳动合同违约金制度的基本问题,提出按照公平平等的原则,合理设计劳动合同违约金制度,限制或消除约定违约金的不合理情形,倾斜保护劳动者择业自主权,平衡用人单位和劳动者的基本利益,是我国劳动力市场资源优化配置的法律保障。     

The Shielding of CEO Compensation from the Effects of Strategic Expenditures*

This study investigates whether and why compensation committees shield CEO compensation from income‐decreasing effects of strategic expenditures. We document that firms do shield recurring strategic expenditures such as research and development and advertising expenditures. We also find that firms shield research and development expenditures more than advertising expenditures. Our results are consistent with prior findings that suggest that compensation committees shield CEOs from nonroutine transactions such as restructuring charges and extraordinary losses. Using a two‐task principal‐agent framework, we show that such shielding improves the efficiency of the contract by making the shielded income measure more congruent with the principal's objectives.     

论合同纠纷仲裁的法律适用

在仲裁中正确适用法律，是确保仲裁质量的关键。本文就合同纠纷仲裁中关于确认合同的效力和违约责任的认定问题的法律适用进行了初步探讨。     

Equity‐Based Compensation of Outside Directors and Corporate Disclosure Quality

We examine the relationship between a firm's disclosure quality and equity‐based compensation of independent members of the board of directors. The dimensions of disclosure quality we focus on are management's earnings guidance and information flowthrough financial analysts. Using both levels and changes specifications, we find the average ratio of equity‐based pay to total pay of independent board members to be positively related to a firm's disclosure quality. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of management's equity‐based compensation, other governance measures, and financial controls, and robust to instrumental variable tests of endogeneity. Furthermore, we find directors’ equity‐based compensation to be negatively associated with the firm's cost of equity capital. Our results are consistent with equity‐based compensation providing incentives to independent directors to push for better disclosure quality.     

完善我国建设工程施工合同违约救济的思考

建设工程施工合同纠纷在我国普遍存在,现阶段我国施工合同的管理水平有待提高;纠纷的解决机制不够完善,研究解决施工合同违约救济的相关问题迫在眉睫。文章在研究美国建设工程施工合同的立法以及违约救济体系的基础上,结合我国现状与存在的问题,提出了完善我国建设工程施工合同违约救济体系的一些建议,有助于保护合同双方的权利,明确义务,提高合同的履行效率。     

Equilibrium Earnings Management,Incentive Contracts,and Accounting Standards*

In this paper, we model earnings management as a consequence of the interaction among self‐interested economic agents ‐ namely, the managers, the shareholders, and the regulators. In our model, a manager controls a stochastic production technology and makes periodic accounting reports about his or her performance; an owner chooses a compensation contract to induce desirable managerial inputs and reporting choices by the manager; and a regulatory body selects and enforces accounting standards to achieve certain social objectives. We show that various economic trade‐offs give rise to endogenous earnings management. Specifically, the owner may reduce agency costs by designing a compensation contract that tolerates some earnings management because such a contract allocates the compensation risk more efficiently. The earnings‐management activity produces accounting reports that deviate from those prescribed by accounting standards. Given such reports, the valuation of the firm may be nonlinear and s‐shaped, thereby recognizing the manager's reporting incentives. We also explore policy implications, noting that (1) the regulator may find enforcing a zero‐tolerance policy ‐ no earnings management allowed ‐ economically undesirable; and (2) when selecting the optimal accounting standard, valuation concerns may conflict with stewardship concerns. We conclude that earnings management is better understood in a strategic context that involves various economic trade‐offs.     

信任约束下制造企业与第三方物流企业的合约设计

信任对合约设计具有重要的影响。目前对于此类问题的研究大多以定性分析为主,这主要是因为对信任成本难以量化。文章在量化信任成本的基础上设计出信任约束的几个条件,然后将其代入委托代理模型中得出信任约束下制造企业的多指标合约模型。通过模型结果的分析,得出结论。模型适用于制造企业进行详细、全面的多指标合约设计。     

基于契约执行机制视角下的民间金融监管

作为一种非正式制度安排，基于隐性担保、重复博弈、关联博弈的私人契约执行机制，民间金融具有自我执行的内在机制，这种机制的作用力很强但有一定的范围限制，因此，政府想通过正规金融来收编民间金融是不可取的，而是应构建一种以行业协会自律性监管为主，政府监管为辅的民间金融监管模式：     

Idiosyncratic Information,Moral Hazard,and the Cost of Capital

This paper examines the effects of idiosyncratic accounting information on a firm's cost of capital. By embedding a moral hazard problem into a multifirm asset‐pricing model, I show that moral hazard distorts the sharing of idiosyncratic risk but does not affect the sharing of systematic risk in the economy. A firm‐level improvement in idiosyncratic information reduces the firm's cost of capital even though it does not affect the implied cost of capital inferred from publicly traded shares. Moreover, an economy‐level improvement in idiosyncratic information reduces the risk premium for idiosyncratic risk but increases the risk premium for systematic risk, resulting in an ambiguous net effect on the firm's cost of capital. These results provide alternative explanations for the mixed empirical evidence on the relation between information quality and the cost of capital.     

Chinese Stylized Sterilization： The Cost-sharing Mechanism and Financial Repression

This paper attempts to explain why sterilized intervention was so successful and sustainable in China during the first decade of the 21st century.We argue that the Chinese Government established a sterilization cost-sharing mechanism among the People’s Bank of China, commercial banks and the household sector.On the one hand,Chinese commercial banks have to assume some of the sterilization costs by purchasing low yield central bank bills and maintaining high levels of required reserves.On the other hand,Chinese households assume some of the sterilization costs by bearing negative real deposit interest rates.The costsharing mechanism under financial repression prevents a huge quasi-fiscal loss by the People’s Bank of China as well as high inflation.However,Chinese households have become victims of this financial repression.Faced with the pressure of changing the growth model from investment-driven to domestic consumption-driven,the interest rate will have to be liberalized eventually,which will,in turn,make sterilized intervention unsustainable.     

委托-代理理论的分析应用——以漳州花卉企业雇佣关系为例

本文以代理-理论模型分析框架为基础,研究台资花卉企业与雇佣花农之间的风险分担和利益分成。通过比较信息对称与信息不对称情况下的最优契约,分析不同因素对花卉企业与雇佣花农以及代理成本的影响。考察了写入契约的新观测变量对最优契约设计的影响。利用拓展的模型证明了无法写入契约的代理人额外收入对雇佣花农和花卉企业各自收益的影响。最后引入声誉模型,讨论了利用隐性激励机制解决企业与花农之间道德风险的方法。