Public Policy for Growth and Poverty Reduction

In this paper, I would like to outline an approach to publicpolicy that focused on fighting poverty and is based on an understandingof growth and development. Such a public policy requires answeringtwo key questions. First, what are key determinants of a developmentthat benefits poor people – or what has been labelled"pro-poor growth"? And second, we need to answer the policyquestion: how can public action influence the key determinantswe identify? In putting the questions this way, we are settingourselves the task of building a dynamic public economics –a public economics of development. Given that development isthe objective, this task will require a better understandingof how to measure it. And we must also achieve a better graspof changes of behaviour in the process of development, sincechanging perspectives and behaviour are usually an integralpart of the development story. In laying our task of advancinga dynamic public economics, however, let me emphasise that shouldbe building – on – not overturning – pasttheory. In much of the work I will describe, the empirics seemto be ahead of theory. Thus one of my purposes is to highlightsome elements of an agenda for theoretical research. (JEL E6)     

Naturalised epistemology and economics

The relevance to economics of naturalised epistemology (alsoknown as the naturalistic turn) from philosophy of science hasrecently been argued by economic methodologists, especiallyby D. Wade Hands (Reflection Without Rules: Economic Methodologyand Contemporary Science Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2001). This concept is held by Hands to constitute partof the ‘new economic methodology’ that consistsof the ‘interpenetration of economics and science theory’.Contrary to Hands's case, naturalised epistemology is shownhere not to represent a qualitatively new concept, to possesslittle coherent meaning, and to be incapable of charting aninnovative way forward for economics. Although there are moreissues concerning naturalism bearing on economics than are notedby Hands, three specific limitations of naturalised epistemologyare discussed. These and other limitations are related to theeconomics examples Hands proposes suggesting the usefulnessof naturalised epistemology for economics.     

The Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics

There have been strong ties between the Cambridge Journal ofEconomics (CJE) and the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics,from the very beginning. In this paper, the author investigatesthe environment that saw the birth of the CJE at Cambridge (UK),in 1977, and the relationship that linked it to the direct pupilsof Keynes. A critical question is explicitly examined: why didn'tthe ‘Keynesian revolution’ succeed in becoming apermanent winning paradigm? Some behavioural mistakes of themembers of the Keynesian School may explain this lack of success,but only to a certain extent. In any case, there were and therestill are remedies too. But what we are inheriting is a uniqueset of analytical building blocks (the paper lists eight ofthem) that makes this School of economics a viable (and in somedirections definitely superior) alternative to mainstream economics.Admittedly, there is some important work still to be done. Thepaper highlights the need for a two-stage approach, addressingpure theory and extensive institutional analysis. It is arguedthat a combination of the two would strengthen the coherenceof the theoretical foundations, and at the same time would providea fruitful extension of economic analysis to empirical, institutionaland economic dynamics investigations.     

On some criticisms of critical realism in economics

Methodological comments on critical realism in economics haveproliferated over the past decade—typically focusing onTony Lawson's Economics and Reality and Reorienting Economics,which constitute the core of this project. In the present paperwe select a series of important, mostly very recent argumentsagainst critical realism in economics and assess their meritsand demerits.     

Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics

Economics rightfully represents the major basis for competitionpolicy. Next to generating knowledge about competition and itswelfare effects, the currently popular ‘more-economicapproach’ is charged with a number of additional hopesand expectations. While this article highlights the benefitsof economics-based competition policy, it takes a cautious stancetowards excessive expectations, in particular regarding theidea that a monocultural, ‘unified’ competitiontheory as an exact, objective and unerring scientific approachto antitrust could make normative assessment and generalisationssuperfluous. Diversity in competition economics is advocatedin two ways. First, competition economics is empirically characterisedby a considerable pluralism of theories and policy paradigms.Second, it is demonstrated that this diversity of theories istheoretically beneficial for future scientific progress. Asno ultimate competition theory can ever be expected., the ‘more-economicapproach’ must be extended in order to embrace diversity.     

Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies

This article discusses the application of transaction cost economics(TCE) to the specification of antitrust legal rules and antitrustremedies and explains why the application of TCE analysis maylead to very different legal rules and remedies from approachesthat ignore TCE considerations. Antitrust legal rules must besensitive to the attributes of the institutions we rely uponto enforce antitrust policies, the information and analyticalcapabilities these institutions possess, the uncertainties theymust confront in the diagnosis and mitigation of anticompetitivebehavior and market structures, and the associated costs oftype I and type II errors implied by alternative legal rulesand remedies. Modern imperfect competition theory that failsto take TCE principles into account is likely to lead to poorlegal rules and remedies. These conclusions are supported bya discussion of the Kodak case and its progeny and of the proposeddivestiture remedies approved by the District Court's decisionin the Microsoft case.     

Economics as progress: the LSE approach to econometric modelling and critical realism as programmes for research

In the face of claims that economics is increasingly drivenmerely by fashion, this paper draws out certain similaritiesand differences between two self-consciously progressive anddevelopmental research programmes—namely the LSE approachto econometric modelling and critical realism in economics.The argument is that, while these two programmes of researchshare a common point of departure and possess many common elements,what at root distinguishes them is their adoption of opposingphilosophical orientations. The comparison enables both thenature of each programme, and the relevance of their commonconcerns, to be more easily appreciated and helps clarify thesort of evidence that would provide a basis for selecting oneproject over the other.     

Keynesian Economics, Monetary Policy and the Business Cycle - New and Old

After a brief review of the main differences between New andOld Keynesian economics from the sixties this paper focuseson a tension between traditional sluggish measures of potentialoutput commonly used by policymakers and the New Keynesian (NK)notion of this variable which conceptualizes it as the levelof output that would have been produced under perfect competitionhad all prices and wages been flexible. The paper shows that,under monopolistic competition, NK potential output is oftenmore volatile than the level of output produced under stickyprices and wages implying either of the following. Real lifepolicymakers mistakenly target smooth versions of output or(since actual economies are monopolistically rather than perfectlycompetitive) the flexible price and wage equilibrium does notnecessarily maximize welfare. The paper shows, that dependingon the shape of the utility function and of the distributionof productivity shocks either case is possible and proposesa criterion for discriminating between them. (JEL E3, E4, E5,E6)     

The financial system and the Pasinetti theorem

Palley (Inside debt, aggregate demand, and the Cambridge theoryof distribution, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 20, no.4, 465–74, 1996; Financial institutions and the Cambridgetheory of distribution, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol.26, no. 2, 275–7, 2002) considers the Pasinetti theoremin the context of the credit money system where banks generatedebts endogenously, and claims that the theorem ceases to holdin such a system, being valid only in the loanable funds system.This paper traces the root of Palley's claim to his assumptionregarding the ownership of banks, sets out an alternative (morerealistic) ownership arrangement, and thereby restores the Pasinettitheorem unscathed in the credit money system (at least in thekind Palley must have considered). The paper, however, uncoversthe case where the theorem indeed collapses and discusses thereason for it: the hoarding of a non-interest-bearing asset.     

On Sraffa's Standard commodity

The necessity of expressing the relative price of a commodityin terms of another commodity makes it impossible to distinguishthat part of any change that can be ascribed to the characteristicsof the commodity itself from the part of that change that isto be ascribed to the characteristics of the commodity of reference,i.e., the numéraire. Ricardo (1817) was the first topoint out this problem and the need to find an ‘invariablemeasure of value’, but he was not able to solve the problem.In 1960, Sraffa suggested using a bundle of commodities, thathe called ‘Standard commodity’, to accomplish thisfunction, claiming that it was a standard of value invariantwith respect to changes in the distribution of income. But inSraffa's book there is no explicit proof of this claim. Thisgave rise to many misunderstandings about the Standard commodityand its role as invariable measure of value. This paper proposesa proper definition of an ‘invariable measure of value’,and then proves that the Sraffa ‘Standard commodity’does fulfil the requirements of this definition.     

Darwinism in economics: from analogy to ontology

Several social scientists, including ‘evolutionary economists’, have expressed scepticism of ‘biological analogies’ and rejected the application of ‘Darwinism’ to socio-economic evolution. Among this group, some have argued that self-organisation is an alternative to biological analogies or Darwinism. Others have seen ‘artificial selection’ as an alternative to natural selection in the socio-economic sphere. Another objection is that Darwinism excludes human intentionality. It is shown that all these objections to ‘biological analogies’ and ‘Darwinism’ are ungrounded. Furthermore, Darwinism includes a broad theoretical framework for the analysis of the evolution of all open, complex systems, including socio-economic systems. Finally and crucially, Darwinism also involves a basic philosophical commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal explanations. For these reasons, Darwinism is fully relevant for economics and an adequate evolutionary economics must be Darwinian, at least in these fundamental senses. However, this does not undermine the need for auxiliary theories and explanations in the economic domain.     

Keynes's Z function, heterogeneous output and marginal productivity

Keynes was adamant that the assumption of homogeneous outputand capital in macroeconomic theory is inadmissable. His aggregatesupply or Z function is a generalisation of Marshall's ordinarysupply function to take account of heterogeneous output, andis an essential element of the principle of effective demand.The ‘linear Z curve’ controversy can be attributedto Keynes's desire to demonstrate how his general monetary theoryof value and output encompasses the special case of Classicaltheory, including the marginal productivity theorem. The infamoussecond footnote on pages 55–6 of The General Theory canthereby be fully resolved.     

Economics,Democracy, and the Distribution of Capital Ownership

This article holds that widespread, practical access to capital acquisition is essential for sustainable widespread economic prosperity and democracy. The founders of the U.S.A. agreed that sustainable democracy required widespread ownership of land to provide a viable earning capacity sufficient to support robust participation in democratic government. The importance of widespread land ownership to individual prosperity and sustainable democracy was supported not only by the prevailing philosophical views of property, it was also apparent to the common man and woman. Compared to Europe, America offered widespread access to land ownership, higher wages, better work conditions, cheaper staples and greater individual freedom, equal opportunity, prosperity, and political participation. This conviction that widespread access to ownership is a necessary condition for widespread prosperity and sustainable democracy continued throughout most of the nineteenth century, but today public discourse reveals virtually no trace of this once universally held opinion. This article suggests that the disappearance of this conviction can be traced to an erroneous view shaped by neoclassical economics and Keynesian economics. According to this view, (1) the disappearance of the American frontier and industrialization made the goal of widespread capital ownership either impractical or of little or no economic significance and (2) by way of technological advance, sufficient earning capacity and consumer demand to promote growth and sustain democracy can be achieved, without widespread ownership, primarily through jobs and welfare. Although differing in many respects, both mainstream schools, along with Adam Smith’s classical economics, share one common but unstated economic assumption: the broader distribution of capital acquisition (in itself) has no fundamental relationship to the fuller employment of people and capital, the broader distribution of greater individual earning capacity, and growth. Contemporary thinking, shaped by these economic schools, also tacitly assumes that widespread capital ownership is not essential for the sustainable individual earning capacity needed to support robust democracy. This erroneous “ownership-neutrality assumption” (1) contradicts both the views of America’s founders and the colonial experience, and (2) provides theoretical justification for structuring capital markets and capital acquisition transactions to unfairly and dysfunctionally favor existing owners at the expense of broader ownership distribution, more widely shared prosperity, greater efficiency, ecologically friendly growth, and a vital democracy. America’s conscientious founders would be shocked by the diminished importance of the distribution of ownership in the mainstream analysis of prices, efficiency, production, growth, and democracy. Rather than enhancing democracy, they would view the “ownership-neutrality assumption” of mainstream economics as contributing to its deterioration and corruption. They would openly search for economic analysis built on an alternate assumption more consistent with their understanding of the requisite conditions for sustainable democracy. This article advances an economic analysis that suspends the ownership-neutrality assumption, replaces it with a “broader-ownership-growth assumption,” and suggests a voluntary market strategy for substantially broadening capital ownership, enhancing individual earning capacity, and providing the widespread economic prosperity needed for robust democracy.     

Economic life, rights, and obligations: Perspectives from theological teleology

Even while acknowledging the autonomy of “laws” specific to economics, theology situates the view of economics as a “means-ends” science of human choices within an unavoidable overarching moral order. After all, economic life is merely part of a much larger personal quest for happiness. Thus, the efficient selection of means for particular ends necessarily takes place within the context of objective standards of economic rights and obligations as part of human nature. The teleological perspectives of theology add much to our understanding of economic life by providing the warrants for these rights and obligations.     

Labour market deregulation, 'flexibility' and innovation

Labour ‘flexibility’ is often portrayed as importantto competitive success. Using evidence from an original surveyof UK firms, this paper investigates the relationships betweenfirms' use of, on the one hand, various flexible work practices,human resource management techniques, and industrial relationssystems and, on the other hand, the innovative activities ofthose firms. Our results suggest that the sort of ‘lowroad’ labour flexibility practices encouraged by labourmarket deregulation—short-term and temporary contracts,a lack of employer commitment to job security, low levels oftraining, and so on—are negatively correlated with innovation.