Do Retail Trades Move Markets?

We study the trading of individual investors using transactiondata and identifying buyer- or seller-initiated trades. We documentfour results: (1) Small trade order imbalance correlates wellwith order imbalance based on trades from retail brokers. (2)Individual investors herd. (3) When measured annually, smalltrade order imbalance forecasts future returns; stocks heavilybought underperform stocks heavily sold by 4.4 percentage pointsthe following year. (4) Over a weekly horizon, small trade orderimbalance reliably predicts returns, but in the opposite direction;stocks heavily bought one week earn strong returns the subsequentweek, while stocks heavily sold earn poor returns.     

The Total Cost of Transactions on the NYSE

This paper develops a measure of execution costs (market impact) of transactions on the NYSE. The measure is the volume-weighted average price over the trading day. It yields results that are less biased than measures that use single prices, such as closes. The paper then applies this measure to a data set containing more than 14,000 actual trades. We show that total transaction costs, commission plus market impact costs, average twenty-three basis points of principal value for our sample. Commission costs, averaging eighteen basis points, are considerably higher than execution costs, which average five basis points. They vary slightly across brokers and significantly across money managers. Though brokers do not incur consistently high or low transaction costs, money managers experience persistently high or lost costs. Finally, the paper explores the possible tradeoff between commission expenditures and market impact costs. Paying higher commissions does not yield commensurately lower execution costs, even after adjusting for trade difficulty. We cannot determine whether other valuable brokerage services are being purchased with higher commission payments or whether some money managers really are inefficient consumers of brokerage trading services.     

Brokered versus dealer markets: Impact of proprietary trading with transaction fees

In this study, we consider a one-period financial market with a dealer/broker and an infinite number of investors. While the dealer who trades on his own account (with proprietary trading) simultaneously sets both the transaction fee and the asset price, the broker who brings investors' orders to the market (with no proprietary trading) sets only the transaction fee, given that the price is determined according to the market-clearing condition among investors. We analyze the impact of proprietary trading on the asset price, transaction fee, trading volume, and the welfare of investors. We find that the bid and ask prices set by the dealer who can engage in proprietary trading are more favorable to average investors. As a result, both the trading volume and the transaction fee increase, and social welfare improves.     

HOURLY RETURNS,VOLUME, TRADE SIZE,AND NUMBER OF TRADES

Previous research identifies a causal relationship between returns and trading volume. But volume has two components: number of trades and number of shares per trade. In this paper the relationship between each of these volume components and returns is examined and the number of trades is found to be the dominant component. Results show that return activity in a period is associated with the level of trading frequency in a subsequent period and also with the number of shares in a subsequent period. This is consistent with small traders reacting to returns while professional traders largely ignore previous returns in their trading.     

Marketwide Private Information in Stocks: Forecasting Currency Returns

We present a model of equity trading with informed and uninformed investors where informed investors trade on firm‐specific and marketwide private information. The model is used to identify the component of order flow due to marketwide private information. Estimated trades driven by marketwide private information display little or no correlation with the first principal component in order flow. Indeed, we find that co‐movement in order flow captures variation mostly in liquidity trades. Marketwide private information obtained from equity market data forecasts industry stock returns, and also currency returns.     

Do institutional investors play hide-and-sell in the IPO aftermarket?

We document a robust buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker in the IPO aftermarket: institutions that sell IPO shares through non‑lead brokers tend to have bought them through the lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket. This trading behavior is consistent with institutional investors hiding their sell trades and presumably breaking their laddering agreements with the lead underwriters. The asymmetry is the strongest in cold IPOs and is limited exclusively to the first month after the issue, when the incentives not to be detected are the strongest. We show that the intention to flip IPO allocations is not an important motive for hiding sell trades from the lead underwriters. We find that hiding sell trades is an effective strategy to circumvent underwriters' monitoring mechanisms: the more institutions hide their sell trades, the less they are penalized in subsequent IPO allocations.     

The trades of NYSE floor brokers

This paper studies the contribution of NYSE floor brokers to the Exchange's agency auction market. Floor brokers represent 44%, specialists 11%, and system orders 45% of the value of all executed orders in our sample. We analyze how the cross-sectional distribution of floor broker trading depends on liquidity, block volume, on- and off-exchange competition, volatility, and order flow internalization. Floor brokers participate in large trades, primarily in liquid stocks, and they trade more when volatility is high. They provide two-sided liquidity to the market and often provide liquidity that would otherwise have been supplied by NYSE specialists.     

ACTIVITY STRATEGIES,AGENCY PROBLEMS,AND BANK RISK

We investigate whether diversification affects bank risk taking in the U.S. banking industry, and whether this relation is partially explained by agency theory. Our results show that U.S. banks with a relatively high share of noninterest income become riskier when moving toward non-interest-income-generating activities, especially activities from investment banking, proprietary trading, and so on. Diversification not only affects conditional average risk, but also the dispersion of risk. Moreover, diversified banks that received assistance from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) become riskier than diversified nonrecipients after TARP capital injections. Our main findings are robust to a battery of robustness tests. The results are partially explained under agency frameworks related to poor corporate governance.     

All else equal?: a multidimensional analysis of retail,market order execution quality

The extant execution quality literature generally suggests that brokers routing orders away from the NYSE might not fulfill their fiduciary best execution responsibility. This conclusion is drawn by comparing execution prices across trading venues and presumes that other execution-quality characteristics are equivalent. Using order audit-trail data, we find evidence that retail market orders obtain better trade prices on the NYSE but faster executions, more depth improvement, and order-flow payment at Trimark Securities, a Nasdaq dealer. Thus, non-price dimensions of execution quality are not equivalent across trading venues. Furthermore, considering order flow payments, brokers obtain better net prices with Trimark. If brokers pass enough of these payments through to investors in the form of lower commissions and/or better services, then investors also obtain better net prices with Trimark. Our results suggest that it may be misleading to evaluate execution quality or to base policy decisions on comparisons focusing on only execution prices.     

Global private information in international equity markets

This paper studies international equity markets when some investors have private information that is valuable for trading in many countries simultaneously. We use a dynamic model of equity trading to show that global private information helps explain US investors’ trading behavior and performance. In particular, the model predicts global return chasing (positive co-movement of US investors’ net purchases with returns in many countries) which we show to be present in the data. Return chasing in our model can be due to superior performance of US investors, not inferior knowledge or naive trend-following. We also show that trades due to private information are strongly correlated across countries. A common (global) factor accounts for about half their variation.     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND REPORTED TRADING VOLUME: NASDAQ VERSUS THE NYSE

Trading volume for common stocks is of interest to financial economists, investors, and securities lawyers. NASDAQ is a dealer market where trades with dealers are included in reported trading volume. This procedure does not accurately measure the trading volume by public buyers and sellers. Trading volume reported on the NYSE, which is primarily an auction market, provides a much closer measure of trades by public investors. We examine a sample of firms whose stock traded on the NASDAQ/NMS and subsequently on the NYSE. When trading switches to the NYSE, the firms' trading volume drops to about 50 percent of the volume previously reported on NASDAQ. A control group of firms that switched from the AMEX to the NYSE shows a small, but statistically insignificant, increase in trading volume.     

The Interim Trading Skills of Institutional Investors

Using a large proprietary database of institutional trades, this paper examines the interim (intraquarter) trading skills of institutional investors. We find strong evidence that institutional investors earn significant abnormal returns on their trades within the trading quarter and that interim trading performance is persistent. After transactions costs, our estimates suggest that interim trading skills contribute between 20 and 26 basis points per year to the average fund's abnormal performance. Our findings also indicate that any trading skills documented by previous studies that use quarterly data are biased downwards because of their inability to account for interim trades.     

Interaction of investor trades and market volatility: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange

This paper examines the relation between market volatility and investor trades by identifying who supplies and demands market liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Because the different trading patterns of various investor types such as individual investors, institutional investors, and foreign investors affect market liquidity differently, we find that market volatility fluctuates significantly depending on which investor types participate in trade. We show that market volatility increases by more than 50% from the average level when there are greater buy trades by momentum investors that demand liquidity and there are less sell trades by contrarian (or profit-taking) investors that supply liquidity. On the other hand, volatility dampens by more than 57% when there are greater sell trades by profit-taking investors, mostly by domestic investors, while there are less momentum buy trades.     

Do Domestic Investors Have an Edge? The Trading Experience of Foreign Investors in Korea

We investigate whether domestic investors have an edge overforeign investors in trading domestic stocks. Using Korean data,we show that foreign money managers pay more than domestic moneymanagers when they buy and receive less when they sell for mediumand large trades. The sample average daily trade-weighted disadvantageof foreign money managers is 21 basis points for purchases and16 basis points for sales. There is also some evidence thatdomestic individual investors have an edge over foreign investors.The explanation for these results is that prices move more againstforeign investors than against domestic investors before trades.     

Whose money is smart? Individual and institutional investors’ trades based on analyst recommendations

This study explores how institutional and individual investors respond to analyst recommendations. Using a unique account-level trading dataset taken from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, we obtain direct evidence to show that (1) active institutional investors are significantly net buyers (net sellers) on “strong buy” and “buy” (“hold” and “sell”) recommendations; (2) active institutional investors condition their trades based on the buy-side pressure of analysts; (3) institutional investors earn abnormal returns by incorporating analysts’ buy-side pressure into their trading reactions to analyst recommendations; and (4) individual investors, in contrast, exhibit abnormal trade reactions opposite to those of active institutional investors. Our results are robust to alternative measures and different specifications. This study provides evidence that active institutional investors are more sophisticated processors of information and provides support for regulators’ concerns about the sub-optimal investment decisions made by individual investors who are unaware of the potential conflicts of interest analysts may face.     

Transaction costs in an illiquid order‐driven market

Transaction costs in many international equity markets are much larger than those in the USA. This raises questions such as what trade size these reported trading costs relate to and whether investors can reduce trading costs by timing their trades. We show, using data from the order‐driven New Zealand market, that transaction costs are frequently lower for larger trades, particularly in small stocks, and investors are able to reduce costs by timing their transactions. While investors who require immediate execution incur transaction costs that are much higher than reported average costs, patient investors can trade at much better rates.     

Informed trading and order type

Each trader must choose between a limit order, a market order, or using a floor broker. We hypothesize that informed investors will: (1) concentrate their trading in floor broker orders and (2) sometimes trade patiently. Consistent with our hypotheses, empirical results suggest that most informed trading occurs through orders executed by floor brokers and that informed floor brokers are sometimes patient. Regardless of their patience, however, quote revisions following trade executions are consistent with the hypothesis that markets recognize that floor traders are more likely to be informed than other traders. As a result, informed trading moves equilibrium security values.     

The impact of foreign equity flows on market volatility during politically tranquil and turbulent times: The Egyptian experience

Since the popular uprising of January 2011, a series of momentous events has rocked Egypt’s political order, jeopardising the country’s economic and financial stability. This study examines the role of foreign capital flows in the volatility of the Egyptian equity market, and whether this role has changed due to the recent domestic political unrest. These issues are empirically addressed in the context of GMM estimation. The results suggest that, unlike those of foreign individual investors, trades of foreign institutional investors contribute to market fluctuations, whether prior to or following the January 2011 uprising. Sell trades by foreign individual and institutional investors exert a significant influence on volatility. Further, when volume is split into its anticipated and unanticipated components, the results show that surprises in trading activity by either group tend to exacerbate volatility in periods of calm and turmoil. These findings are broadly insensitive to volatility measures and robust, even after controlling for a variety of relevant determinants of market volatility. The evidence documented in this study provides important implications for policy markers.     

Institutional Investor Trading in a Short Investment Horizon: Evidence from the Korean Stock Market

We examine the weekly trading activities of institutional investors in the Korean stock market. First, we find that average net trades by institutional investors this week are negatively related to one-week lagged returns, suggesting that they could be contrarian traders. Second, our finding shows that institutional investors’ net trades this week are positively related to the net trades next week, consistent with persistent trading and/or herding behavior. Third, we find that institutional net trades are positively related to the post one-week returns. Finally, our findings are most pronounced in the group of short-term institutional investors.     

IPO price performance and block-trading activities: Evidence from Hong Kong

This research studies whether the trading behavior of IPO block holders is informative to small investors. The results show that IPOs have more block trades initiated by sellers on the first trading day than seasoned stocks do, and the level of block-trading activities is negatively associated with IPOs' long-term performance. This research also examines the impacts of the change in rules for IPO share allocations – which aimed at realizing a more even allocation between large and small investors – on IPO block-trading activities. The findings support the hypothesis that IPO block holders may have superior information on newly-listed companies.