Modelling Social Infrastructure and Economic Growth

This paper develops a growth model with a public sector and a human capital sector to explore the impact of social infrastructure on investment in physical capital, the accumulation of skills, output, and consumption. We show that the implications of the model are consistent with the empirical observations of Hall and Jones (1999 ). Economies where government policies and institutions encourage production over diversion have a larger 'stock' of social infrastructure, conditional on population size and sophistication of diversion technologies, which raises output per worker by increasing the extent of participation in market, rather than diversive, activities. The magnitude of these effects depends on economic agents' inherent propensity for rent-seeking. In addition, economies with unstable governments may suffer from an under-provision of social infrastructure and, consequently, have reduced levels of capital and output per worker.     

The Political Economy of Xenophobia and Distribution: The Case of Denmark*

For the first time in some years, a conservative government came to power in Denmark in 2001, due primarily to the citizenry's disaffection with social‐democratic policies on immigration. We represent political competition in Denmark as taking place over two issues—the size of the public sector and immigration—and model political equilibrium using the party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) concept, which generates equilibria on multi‐dimensional policy spaces where parties form endogenously. By fitting the model to Danish data, we argue that citizen xenophobia may be expected to decrease the size of the Danish public sector by an amount between 12% and 36% of one standard deviation of the probability distribution of citizens' ideal points of the size of the public sector.     

Does Precommitment Raise Growth? The Dynamics of Growth and Fiscal Policy

We develop an endogenous growth model driven by externalities from both private and public capital. The government levies distortionary taxation to finance a publicly provided consumption good and public infrastructure. Firms face adjustment costs. We compare the optimal and time-consistent policies in a linear-quadratic approximation of the model. Although the time-consistent equilibrium is sub-optimal in terms of ex-ante intertemporal welfare, it yields higher long-run growth and welfare, through an accumulation of assets by the state and a cut in government consumption.     

Thailand's Policy Challenges

Thailand's real gross domestic product growth has fallen to a permanently lower trend, making it the worst performer in the Southeastern Asian region. The export sector, the country's long‐standing growth engine, has sputtered due to the declining competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. Chronic political instability during the last two decades has resulted in the adoption of short‐sighted policies, in particular, populist policies designed specifically to garner votes rather than improve the long‐term productivity of the business sector. The military coup was expected to restore political stability and end costly populist policies introduced by elected civil governments. Unfortunately, as the military government develops its long‐term political aspirations, it, too, seeks the assistance of populist policies to ensure its political success. Thailand has promulgated laws and regulations to ensure fiscal discipline, but it has yet to be seen whether the letter of the law can help prevent such populist policies in practice.     

Sustainability of Austrian public debt: a political economy perspective

Sustainability of Austrian public debt is investigated in the context of political objectives such as stabilizing the business cycle, increasing chances for being re-elected and implementing the ideologies of political parties. Several tests indicate that Austrian fiscal policies were sustainable in the period 1960–1974, while from 1975 on, public debt grew much more rapidly. The development of public debt in Austria seems to be driven not primarily by ideology, but by structural causes and a shift in the budgetary policy paradigm. We find some empirical evidence that governments in Austria dominated by one party run higher deficits than coalition governments. There are no indications of a political business cycle.     

Capital depreciation allowances,redistributive taxation,and economic growth

Are capital depreciation allowances when coupled with capital income taxes good instruments for redistribution in the long run? In a simple two-agent-economy I find that accelerated depreciation is good for growth, but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. However, in a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, where the government is the leader and the private sector the follower, the depreciation allowance is maximal in the long run, time-consistent optimum. This removes the accumulation distortion of capital income taxes. Furthermore, the latter, and so redistribution, is found to be generically nonzero in the time-consistent optimum, and depends on the social weight of transfers receivers, the pretax factor income distribution, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the time preference rate. Thus, accelerated depreciation allowances are an important indirect tool for redistribution. The tax scheme allows for a separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns for redistributive policies.     

Fiscal policy reforms in general equilibrium: The case of Greece

This paper quantifies the macroeconomic and welfare implications of (i) changes in the tax-spending mix and (ii) debt consolidation policies. The setup is a neoclassical growth model augmented with a relatively rich public sector. The model is calibrated to the Greek economy. The results suggest that, if the goal of fiscal policy is to stimulate the economy and increase welfare by changing the tax mix, then it should decrease the tax rate on labour income and increase the consumption tax rate. While higher public investment spending is good for the economy, it is lower public consumption spending that is found to be expansionary. The results also suggest that both tax- and expenditure-based debt consolidation policies lead to worse economic activity in the short run, but they have strong beneficial effects in the medium and long run when the consolidation period finishes.     

Financial development,institutional quality and maximizing-growth trade-off in government finance

This paper studies monetary and fiscal policies in an endogenous growth model with transaction costs. We show that the relation between long-run economic growth and both monetary and fiscal policies is subject to threshold effects, a result that gives account of a number of recent empirical findings. Furthermore, the model shows that, to finance public expenditures, growth-maximizing governments must choose relatively high seigniorage (respectively income taxation), if “institutional quality” and “financial development” indicators are low (respectively high). Thus, our model may explain why some governments resort to seigniorage and inflationary finance, and others rather resort to high tax rates, as a result of growth-maximizing strategies in different structural environments (notably concerning institutional and financial development contexts). In addition, the model allows examining how the optimal mix of government finance changes in response to different public debt contexts. A short empirical section confirms our theoretical results.     

Bureaucracy, Tax System, and Economic Performance

This paper investigates the consequences for government size, growth and welfare if a selfish bureaucracy provides a congested input. Alternative exogenous tax systems are introduced and numerical analyses are carried out. The welfare optimum is only met under very specific assumptions: proportional congestion, a tax system only consisting of distortionary taxes and a bureaucracy that maximizes the budget's growth rate. Otherwise the relative size of the public sector becomes suboptimally large thus inducing welfare losses. From a welfare economic point of view bureaucratic selfishness is worse than a suboptimal taxing regime that does not (completely) internalize the congestion externalities.     

Governance And The Implementation Of Technology Policy In Less Developed Countries

This study discusses key issues of technology policy in less developed countries from a governance perspective. In particular, it analyzes critical problems of policy implementation and looks for general principles which may be suitable as guideposts in making the state more effective regardless of the particularities of its technology policy. The main argument is that governments need to assume a market-enhancing role and must enhance the state's capabilities and capacities for implementing public policies. Crafting public institutions which ensure accountability, transparency, and predictability of policy making and involve the private sector in political decision-making processes is critical for successful policy implementation. Besides institutional arrangements which help governments to credibly precommit to policies, the quality and institutional design of the public administration and the public-private interface are crucial ingredients of an effective governance structure.     

Electoral competition with environmental policy as a second best transfer

This paper explains why some governments fail to adopt policies that are sufficiently strong, while others adopt policies that are too stringent. Constructing a political economy model in which voters face uncertainty due to the types of politicians and the risk of environmental damage, we show that there is an equilibrium in which a politician uses a weaker environmental policy rather than efficient direct transfers for redistribution. We also show that there is an equilibrium in which a stricter environmental policy can be implemented by a politician who has no incentive to make transfers. Then, we discuss which equilibrium should be more plausible. We conclude that the latter equilibrium in which a too stringent environmental policy emerges can dominate the former unless the citizen’s estimate of environmental risk is sufficiently low.     

Regulation and rent‐seeking: The role of the distribution of political and economic power

It is shown that the joint distribution of economic and political power plays a key role in determining regulatory and tax policies of national and subnational governments. If both economic and political power are evenly distributed across individuals, then regulatory and tax policies are efficient, but if they are unevenly distributed and positively correlated, then regulatory policy is used by subnational governments to redistribute income in favor of individuals with higher economic and political power at the expense of productivity and output. Consequently, the national government has to raise the tax rate to finance public expenditure. Moreover, if there exists a positive correlation between economic and political power, then the higher the fiscal gap, the larger the gap between equilibrium and efficient policies because subnational governments underestimate more the fall of public revenues caused by inefficient policies.     

Modern slavery,corruption, and hysteresis

We develop a model where firms profit from coercing workers into employment under conditions violating national law and international conventions and where corrupt public servants prosecuting violations of the rules are willing to turn cases down if bribed. Firms and public servants are heterogeneous. Firms benefit differently from the use of coerced labour whereas public servants have differing intrinsic motivations to behave honestly. Moreover, there is a socially determined warm-glow effect: honest public servants feel better if their colleagues are honest too. The determination of bribes is modelled via Nash bargaining between the firm and the corrupt civil servant. It is shown that multiple equilibria and hysteresis are possible. Depending on history, an economy may be trapped in a locally stable high-corruption, high-slavery equilibrium and major changes in government policies may be necessary to move the economy out of this equilibrium. Moreover, we show that trade bans that are effective in reducing slavery in the export industry tend to raise slavery in the remainder of the economy. It is possible that this leakage effect dominates the reduction of slavery in the export sector.     

Mandatory spending,political polarization,and macroeconomic volatility

This paper studies the impact of political polarization on macroeconomic volatility in a political economy model of optimal fiscal policy. I introduce the distinction between mandatory and discretionary public spending in a model where consumers disagree on the size of the public sector. In the presence of political turnover and political polarization, public policies that affect individual decision-making lead to macroeconomic volatility. I show that the legislative requirements behind the changes in mandatory public spending can reduce macroeconomic volatility caused by political polarization and political turnover. The numerical simulations of the model suggest that in the presence of a binding constraint on the changes in mandatory spending, an increase in the political polarization is associated with an increase in the share of mandatory spending and a decrease in the macroeconomic volatility, consistent with the U.S. data.     

Environmental Quality,Public Debt and Economic Development

This article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmental quality of environmental policies financed by public debt. A public sector of pollution abatement is financed by a tax or by public debt. We show that if the initial capital stock is high enough, the economy monotonically converges to a long-run steady state. On the contrary, when the initial capital stock is low, the economy is relegated to an environmental poverty trap. We also explore the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long-run stable steady state. In particular, we find that government should decrease debt and increase pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality at the stable long-run steady state. Finally, a welfare analysis shows that there exists a level of public debt that allows a long run steady state to be optimal.     

A model of Chinese central government

Why was the Chinese State able to promote economic growth during the reform era, yet has been unable to do so over the previous 30 years? In this article, we focus on a specific aspect of the question, which will contribute to the development of a more comprehensive explanation: the specific institutional arrangement that may induce the autocratic government to adopt growth‐enhancing policies. We consider a standard political‐agency model (Besley, 2006) where the incumbent leader may or may not be congruent, and where, to maintain power, both leader types need the support of the selectorate, an elite group having a say in selecting the leader, as well as associated access to special privileges. Primarily, we find that in autocracies, without electoral discipline to restrain the opportunistic behaviour of a leader, the size of the selectorate should be intermediate; if it is too small, the selectorate is captured by the leader and has no disciplinary role, but if too big, the leader's incentives are diluted.     

The influence of special district governments on public spending and debt

Growth in special district governments is examined as a reason behind public sector expansion in the United States. A theoretical model is developed of the optimal mix of government suppliers which predicts how special district governments affect the overall provision of government policies. The hypothesis that expansion of special district governments leads to expansion of the public sector is expirically examined over two time periods.     

On indeterminacy and growth under progressive taxation and productive government spending

We examine the theoretical interrelations between equilibrium (in)determinacy and economic growth in a one‐sector representative‐agent model of endogenous growth with progressive taxation of income and productive flow of public spending. We analytically show that, if the demand‐side effect of government purchases is weaker, the economy exhibits an indeterminate balanced‐growth equilibrium and belief‐driven growth fluctuations when the tax schedule is sufficiently progressive or regressive. If the supply‐side effect of public expenditures is weaker, indeterminacy and sunspots arise under progressive income taxation. In sharp contrast to traditional Keynesian‐type stabilization policies, our analysis finds that raising the tax progressivity may destabilize an endogenously growing economy with fluctuations driven by agents’ self‐fulfilling expectations.     

A political foundation of public investment and welfare spending

This paper develops a political economy model to examine the implications of political selection under an authoritarian regime. We formalize the fiscal policy choice of local governments, focusing on two political selection mechanisms and their implications for public investment and welfare spending. A growth-oriented promotion system induces local officials to increase public investment, which may increase output but crowd out welfare transfers. This mimics the recent investment-driven growth in China and relatively low effort to tackle high inequality. Under a broader incentive structure, we show that it is possible for an authoritarian regime to attain the social welfare of a democracy.     

Structural Change,Urban Congestion,and the End of Growth

This paper develops a two‐sector R&D‐based growth model with congestion effects from increasing urban population density. We show that endogenous technological progress causes structural change if there are positive productivity spillovers from the modern to the traditional sector and Engel's law holds. In turn, urban congestion effects cause a productivity slowdown in the modern sector. Eventually, economic growth may cease in the long‐run. We also show that land dilution by a larger workforce may give rise to negative scale effects on (GDP) per capita.