CEO duality,organizational slack,and firm performance in China

CEO duality, organizational slack, and ownership types have been found to affect firm performance in China. However, existing work has largely focused on their direct relationships with firm performance. Advancing this research, we develop an integrative framework to address an important and previously underexplored question: How do CEO duality and organizational slack affect the performance of firms with different ownership types? Specifically, we compare the moderating effects of CEO duality on the relationship between organizational slack and firm performance in China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-owned enterprises (POEs). Findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between organizational slack and firm performance, and that CEO duality negatively moderates this relationship in SOEs, but positively in POEs.     

Behind organizational slack and firm performance in China: The moderating roles of ownership and competitive intensity

Extensive studies of the organizational slack–performance relationship offer mixed findings in developed economies while little research attends to transition economies. Replicating and extending earlier work by Tan and Peng (2003), this study examines the relationship between organizational slack and firm performance in China and focuses on the moderating effects of firm ownership and competitive intensity. Empirical findings based on longitudinal data from 60,945 firms during 1998–2002 suggest that the impact of organizational slack on performance is stronger for private enterprises than for SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises. Furthermore, industry competitive intensity positively moderates the effect of organizational slack on performance. In a three-way interaction effect, the moderating effect of competitive intensity on the organizational slack–performance relationship is weaker in SOEs than in private enterprises and foreign invested enterprises.     

Political connections in the land market: Evidence from China's state‐owned enterprises

This study examines whether political connections lead state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to behave differently from privately owned enterprises (POEs) in acquiring land parcels at auctions and explores the underlying mechanisms that drive the price premiums paid by SOEs. We find that SOEs pay 11.9% more than POEs for observably comparable land parcels at auctions, and the price premiums SOEs pay are mainly driven by wholly state‐owned enterprises (WSOEs). In particular, we provide evidence that SOEs have advance access to information about the development of land parcels in 134 state‐level special economic zones, and land parcels purchased by SOEs lead to positive stock market performance. We also show that an anti‐corruption campaign that weakens political connections and reduces the information advantage leads to a decrease in the price premiums paid by SOEs.     

Today's state‐owned enterprises of China: are they dying dinosaurs or dynamic dynamos?

This paper raises the question and provides empirical evidence regarding the status of the evolution of the state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China today. In this study, we compare the SOEs to domestic private‐owned enterprises (POEs) and foreign‐controlled businesses (FCBs) in the context of their organizational cultures. While a new ownership form, many of the POEs evolved from former collectives that reflect the traditional values of Chinese business. Conversely, the FCBs are much more indicative of the large global MNCs. Therefore, we look at the SOEs in the context of these two reference points. We conclude that the SOEs of today have substantially transformed to approximate a configuration desired by the Chinese government when it began the SOE transformation a couple of decades ago to make them globally competitive. The SOEs of today appear to be appropriately described as China's economic dynamic dynamo for the future. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influence of clan culture on business performance in Asian private-owned enterprises: The case of China

The unique cultural phenomenon of Asia and the growth of Asian enterprises have attracted considerable academic attention in this domain. Clan culture is a typical part of Asian culture and represents a new field in the cultural study of management. Based on the statistical data from China's Annual Census on Industrial Enterprises 2007, this article discusses the influence of clan culture on the financial and social performance of private-owned enterprises (POEs). The results of this study show that the strength of clan culture inhibits the financial performance of POEs and improves social performance—i.e., the welfare of their internal employees; in addition, the degree of regional marketization and social trust can moderate this relationship. In summary, we illuminate the institutional logic that clan protection affects POE performance.     

中央企业国际竞争力的实证研究——基于“十二五”时期国企改革的效果评价

“十二五”是我国经济社会发展的关键时期。随着我国对外开放程度进一步提高,国有企业“走出去”进程加快,国有企业以及作为“精锐部队”的中央企业与国际社会的互动增加,对全球市场的影响力已不可同日而语。深化国企改革,既是中国国有企业自身的战略需要,更是国家发展大战略的客观要求。本文基于中央企业在2011～2015年间的财务数据,构建了中央企业国际竞争力的四维评价体系,并用主成分分析法对我国33家中央企业进行实证分析,在此基础上探析“十二五”期间国企改革的进展和成效。     

国有企业工作经历、企业家才能与企业成长

人力资本的高效配置和企业家才能的充分发挥关系到经济的可持续发展,制度建设如果能促进资源合理流向具有企业家才能的企业家,就能创造更多就业和社会财富。基于全国1997—2016年的私营企业调查数据,本文考察企业家的国有企业工作经历对企业成长的影响。研究结果显示,企业家的国有企业工作经历使得企业在市场扩张和盈利能力等方面表现更好,带来了更高水平的企业成长。机制讨论表明,企业家行为带有明显的烙印效应,国有企业工作经历为企业家带来了更多的社会资本和更高的公司治理水平,从而促进了企业成长。为了缓解由于选择性偏误等带来的内生性,本文采用倾向得分匹配、处理效应模型、代理变量、双差分模型等方法进行处理,结论仍然稳健。中国经济要向资源配置效率改善型模式转变,企业家才能的发挥至关重要,国有企业改革不仅应注重产权等方面的改革,同时也要充分重视国有企业改革带来的人力资本溢出效应。在不断深化国有企业改革的大背景下,本文从企业家才能培育和人力资本配置效应的角度考察国有企业改革问题,倡导国有企业改革进程中进一步营造企业家才能发挥的空间和制度安排,提高人力资本配置效应,从而促进中国经济健康可持续发展。     

Managerial ownership and the role of privatization in transition economies: The case of China

Within transition economies, a popular tactic for revitalizing large and inefficient stateowned enterprises (SOEs) is to privatize them. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence related to this issue is equivocal. This study, therefore, explores more deeply what the relationship may be between privatization efforts of SOEs and their financial performance in transition economies. Specifically, we seek to better understand whether privatization reforms per se, or other corporate governance mechanisms that complement or substitute for this effort, are most effective. Using a panel sample of Chinese state-owned public firms over an eight year period from 1999 to 2006, we find that managerial ownership has a more significant impact on firm performance than privatization does. This finding suggests that internal incentives to managers may be more effective than external market mechanisms in economies transitioning from centralized planning to market control. Our results are robust using a wide variety of performance measures and different model specifications.     

An empirical study of SOEs' market orientation in transitional China

Using institutional theory, this paper investigates the antecedents and outcomes of market orientation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in transitional China. A survey of 274 SOEs demonstrates a strong positive relationship between market orientation and various measures of organizational performance. Additionally, market competitive pressure, formalized corporate governance, and less government control are found to promote market orientation of SOEs in the transitional period. These results support the views that market orientation leads to better performance and that institutional factors should be considered in studies of strategy in Chinese firms. This paper was supported by NSFC (70472039, 70272023).     

国有企业出资人制度的原由和框架

国有企业难以全面振兴的深层次原因是：国民收入分配格局变化后，财政从生产建设财政转变为借债吃型财政后，它们失去了资本金注资来源，而银行注资形成的高负债发展模式，又会形成金融风险；工资成本上升趋势和资本利润率下降规律内样在国有企业发生作用，冗员过多的工资上升侵蚀利润，使国有企业难以为继；将企业作为一级党政社团组织办和企业办社会，使企业的体制成本很高，并内化了许多社会成本；所有者多头代理，导致管事的不管人，管人的不管事，所有者的权力、责任和应当承担的风险不对称。从放权让利改革开始的所有机和经营权的分离，虽然扩大了企业的自主权，但是没有形成真正管用的所有者，且形成了更多的不负责任的所有者代表。后来企业资产多元化的改革，希望通过外力建立所有者，国有资产管理搭便车，然而由于种种原因，效果并不理想。从战略上讲，国有经济要集中，要社会化，要在许多领域退出。但是，国有经济所占资源目前仍占全社会经营性资源的70%以上。并且，国有经济并不可能在短期内得以转轨。因此，需要在过渡时期建立一种有效的出资人一经营者制衡制度，使国有企业在国民经济中发挥应有的作用。     

Contingent value of director identification: The role of government directors in monitoring and resource provision in an emerging economy

Research summary: Although previous studies have explored the value of government directors, less attention has been directed at the antecedents of government directors' engagement in value‐adding activities, such as managerial monitoring and resource provision. Drawing on social identity theory, we offer a novel model that specifies how a government director's dual identifications with the focal firm, and with the government individually and interactively affect his or her governance behavior. An investigation of government directors in China shows that their identification with the focal firm enhances monitoring and resource provision, while their identification with the government affects monitoring and resource provision differently. depending on the dominance of state ownership. The synergistic/substitutable effects between the two types of identification are contingent on state ownership and governance roles. Managerial summary: This study examines how a government director's dual identities—as a government official and as a board member of a focal firm affect his or her engagement in managerial monitoring and resource provision. Using data of Chinese listed firms, we find that government directors who strongly identify with the focal firm or with the government are highly motivated to fulfill their fiduciary obligations. However, the positive effects of their identification with the government differ between state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and non‐SOEs. The combination of the two identifications offers a further boost to monitoring in non‐SOEs, and to resource provision in both SOEs and non‐SOEs, but it acts as a disincentive to monitoring in SOEs. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

跨国公司并购与大型国有企业改革

以大型国有企业为并购对象是近期跨国公司在华并购活动的一个新动向，因此，对于跨国公司并购与大型国有企业改革问题的研究就具有特殊的现实意义。本文在对跨国公司并购和大型国有企业改革目标进行深入分析的基础上，就目标之间的一致性和差异性展开讨论，深层次揭示跨国公司并购对大型国有企业改革所产生的具体影响，并从政府管制和企业管理两个层面提出相应的对策。     

What is the benefit of TMT��s governmental experience to private-owned enterprises? Evidence from China

In China, the phenomenon of government officials entering business (xiahai)??government officials leave government organizations to enter into private-owned enterprises (POEs)??gives rise to an intriguing question: Why do POEs invite the participation of former government officials? Based on a sample of 100 Chinese POEs, our findings indicate that both the mean number of years of top management team??s (TMT) governmental experience and the number of top managers with governmental experience in a TMT are positively related to a POE??s political networking, which in turn contributes to POE performance. By doing so, this study adds governmental experience to the literature on TMT experience, and identifies the mechanism of governmental experience effect. Overall, we provide an underlying mechanism of the phenomenon of government officials entering business.     

Subnational institutional contingencies and executive pay dispersion

This paper investigates the impact of subnational institutional contingencies on executive pay dispersion structure and the relationship between pay dispersion and firm performance. Using executive compensation data on Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2011, we find that executive pay dispersion is significantly lower in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while is significantly higher in cross-listed firms and to a smaller degree in firms located in developed regions. There is also evidence that executive pay dispersion is smaller during the voluntary compensation disclosure period. After controlling for endogeneity of pay determination, we find that executive pay dispersion is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, the positive link between executive pay dispersion and firm performance is stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs, and stronger in firms located in more developed regions than those not. Our findings are also robust to alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance.     

State Ownership, Privatization and Performance in Singapore: An Exploratory Study from a Strategic Management Perspective

This paper considers the ownership debate with regard to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) performance, that is, whether superior performance of SOEs can be achieved under state ownership. While the traditional belief has been, supported by empirical work, that private ownership is generally associated with superior performance, the experience of Singapore is a clear example to the contrary. We outline global privatization trends and discuss the impact of privatization programs. We then discuss Singapore Telecom as a case where state ownership combined with several contextual and firm-related factors, especially firm strategy, has led to sustained world-class performance. We develop a theoretical framework for this analysis based on the strategic management field. We lastly outline some theoretical and practical implications of the analysis.     

Theories of the (state-owned) firm

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) contribute approximately 10% of the world’s GDP. SOEs at one time were predicted to disappear from the economic landscape of the world, but today SOEs are growing more prevalent in the world economy. The current theories of the firm that form the pillars of the management discipline largely ignore the theoretical differences that SOEs introduce into the conceptualization of the firm. Therefore, we extend four core theories of the firm by incorporating SOEs as a mainstream (not special or marginal) organizational form into these theories. We focus specifically on property rights theory, transaction cost theory, agency theory, and resource-based theory, culminating in a research agenda with 12 testable propositions.     

Labor Flexibility,Ownership and Firm Performance in China

Developed and developing countries alike areprivatizing or corporatizing state owned enterprises(SOEs), often citing the flexibility to hire and shedlabor as an advantage. However, there is littleempirical evidence on the extent to which thisimproves firm performance. This paper investigates thelinkage between labor flexibility, ownership and firmperformance using China as a case study. We find thatSOEs are much less able to adjust quickly to demandshocks than are other ownership forms and that thedegree of worker input into hiring and firingdecisions slows the ability of firms to adapt,negatively affecting firm performance.     

Organizational structure,context, customer orientation,and performance: lessons from Chinese state‐owned enterprises

This study develops a model grounded in the contingency theory (i.e., context–structure–performance) applicable to Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). Using data from a sample of 205 industrial SOEs, the study shows that SOE growth performance relative to the industry is positively predicted by formal control, inversely predicted by decentralization, and positively predicted by the interaction of the two. Customer product knowledge utilization, unrelated to growth performance relative to the industry, is positively predicted by formal control and the interaction of formal control with decentralization. Foreign induced industry competitiveness, technological turbulence, size, and production technology routineness are treated as context variables and modeled accordingly. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Informativeness of performance measures and Chinese executive compensation

We provide evidence on the use of accounting versus stock market performance measures as determinants of Chinese top managers’ compensation over 2001–2007. We theorize and find that (1) accounting returns are weighted more heavily in general than stock returns in determining top executive compensation, (2) state-owned enterprises (SOEs) rely significantly less on stock market returns than do non-SOEs, (3) firms located in high marketization regions rely more heavily on stock market returns to reward managers, and (4) firms with better internal governance quality rely more on stock returns to reward executives. We discuss our findings with particular reference to the Chinese context of our research.     

How does slack affect product innovation in high-tech Chinese firms: The contingent value of entrepreneurial orientation

Innovation scholars are interested in how slack affects product innovation in high-tech Chinese firms. We highlight that slack–innovation linkages may differ depending on whether slack is absorbed or unabsorbed, and argue that entrepreneurial orientation (EO) moderates the slack–innovation connection. Our empirical study of 308 high-tech Chinese firms suggests that unabsorbed slack is more strongly positively related with product innovation than is absorbed slack in high-tech settings. Meanwhile, firms with high levels of EO enjoy better effects between unabsorbed slack and innovation, but worse effects between absorbed slack and innovation. We also provide theoretical and practical implications and directions for future research.