论抵押担保在不对称信息信贷市场中的作用

信贷市场中的信息不对称是银行惜贷的主要原因之一。本文运用信息经济学的有关原理,通过建模首先对信息不对称条件下的信贷市场逆向选择和道德风险的发生机理进行了分析,揭示了银行惜贷的原因。然后分别对银行将抵押担保品作为甄别信号和负激励措施以减少逆向选择和道德风险的运行机制进行了探讨,分析了抵押担保品在减少逆向选择和道德风险中的积极作用及局限性。最后得出结论:抵押担保在一定程度上是防止信贷市场逆向选择和道德风险的可行手段,但过高的抵押担保要求可能产生新的逆向选择。     

非对称信息下的信贷配给——中小企业融资的障碍之一

在信贷市场中,由于银行与中小企业之间存在严重的信息不对称,从而中小企业成为银行信贷配给的主要实施对象。逆向选择、道德风险的存在,都会使中小企业受到银行信贷配给的制约,成为其融资障碍。抵押担保、信贷承诺、信用评价与信息共享等方法在一定程度上能缓解信贷配给。     

担保机构、信贷市场结构与中小企业融资——基于信息不对称框架的理论分析

本文通过构建包含银行、企业及担保机构的逆向选择模型,研究了在信息不对称的信贷市场中担保机构对企业信贷行为的影响。分析表明:引入政策性担保机构可以有效增加进入信贷市场的企业规模,而引入商业性担保机构则无法起到积极作用。进一步地,在垄断的信贷市场中,引入政策性担保机构降低了银行利润,提高了企业利润,社会总福利不变;随着信贷市场的完善,在完全竞争的信贷市场中引入政策性担保机构可有效提高社会总福利。     

信息不对称的信贷市场效率分析

本文结合信息不对称使信贷市场产生的逆向选择效应,分析了信息不对称下信贷市场的效率状况,指出银行为弱化逆向选择效应而实行的信贷配给,使信贷市场产生不同于市场出清条件的均衡状态,即配给均衡,信贷配给均衡比信贷市场的瓦尔拉斯均衡能提高资源配置效率,改善社会福利,但仍未实现帕累托最优状态。因此,政府可制定适宜的信贷政策和干预措施,减小信贷市场的信息不对称程度,完善政府补贴和担保制度、降低金融风险,提高信贷市场的资源配置效率。     

中小企业信贷配给问题及信息共享机制

从中小企业获得贷款的情况和银行放款结构可以看出，中小企业面临的信贷约束既包括信贷配给，又受到信贷歧视的影响。其中中小企业贷款市场上信息不对称问题严重，使得中小企业面临信贷配给，而政府对大型国有企业的隐形担保则造成了信贷歧视。前者是信贷市场中客观规律和市场机制的不完善导致的，后者是体制的、历史的原因造成的结果，只能在体制转轨的过程中来解决。因此从长期来看，中小企业间接融资主要面对的问题是信贷配给。一方面，中小企业缺乏抵消逆向选择效应的抵押担保品，这既包括实物资产的抵押担保要求，又包括隐形附属担保—…     

对信息不对称市场上信贷配给现象的思考

在一个信息不对称的信贷市场上,银行和企业之间的信息是不对称的.由于信息不对称,将导致逆向选择和道德风险问题,进而出现信贷配给现象.与一般性均衡下的供求相等不同,信贷配给性均衡状态下的需求大于供给.本文分析了信息不对称-逆向选择和道德风险-信贷配给的传导机制,并证明了信贷市场上配给性均衡的长期存在性.     

基于非对称信息下银行信贷风险分析、贷款合约设计及担保模式的探析

信贷市场中,由于借贷双方的信息掌握程度不一致,从而导致了信贷市场的信息不对称.信息不对称情况下由于借款人和贷款人的经营目标不一致,作为受托人的借款人会产生逆向选择和道德风险效应,给作为委托人的银行带来潜在的损失.本文就如何设计贷款合约以及抵押担保物在防范逆向选择和道德风险时的机制做了一系列的探讨.     

对信息不对称市场上信贷配给现象的思考

在一个信息不对称的信贷市场上,银行和企业之间的信息是不对称的。由于信息不对称,将导致逆向选择和道德风险问题,进而出现信贷配给现象。与一般性均衡下的供求相等不同,信贷配给性均衡状态下的需求大于供给。本文分析了信息不对称-逆向选择和道德风险-信贷配给的传导机制,并证明了信贷市场上配给性均衡的长期存在性。     

信息不对称下科技型中小企业融资市场失衡问题研究——基于关系型融资视角

信息不对称下,科技型中小企业的融资失衡主要表现为：有效需求不能得到有效供给;在不同的发展阶段,其融资供求不平衡。银行为规避逆向选择和道德风险,常常将科技型中小企业配给出信贷市场。运用不完全信息关系型融资模型表明,关系型融资有利于降低信息不对称,放松利率和抵押品甄别机制对企业的信贷约束,扩大信贷量,实现银行的帕累托改进,达到双赢。     

我国农村信贷市场信息不对称问题及对策研究

在我国农村信贷市场上,信息不对称现象广泛存在,而信息不对称造成的逆向选择和道德风险则是不良贷款发生、农村金融抑制的重要原因.本文主要分析逆向选择和道德风险产生的原因,并提出了相关的对策,力求解决农村信贷市场上的信息不对称问题.     

推进互助性担保模式的构建问题研究——以河北省为例

担保模式的选择首先是一个实践问题而不是一个理论问题,因为现有担保模式在结构布局、经营效能、业务范围等方面存在诸多缺陷,中小企业贷款难问题仍在持续。中小企业信用担保要取得跨越性发展,关键在于借鉴其他省市成熟的担保模式,改革单一的专业担保结构,引入并大力推广互助性担保模式,重构中小企业信用担保体系。     

Lending policies of informal, formal and semiformal lenders

This paper compares lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal lenders with respect to household lending in Vietnam. The analysis suggests that the probability of using formal or semiformal credit increases if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or borrow for business‐related activities. The probability of using informal credit increases for female borrowers. It also appears that the probability of using formal credit increases in household welfare up to a certain threshold, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, the paper discerns the determinants of probability of default across lender types. Default risk of formal credit appears to be strongly affected by formal loan contract terms, e.g., loan interest rate and form of loan repayment, whereas default risk on informal loans is significantly related to the presence of propinquity and other internal characteristics of the borrowing household. Overall, the study raises several important implications for the screening, monitoring and enforcement instruments that may be employed by different types of lenders.     

Information asymmetry in small and medium enterprise credit guarantee schemes: evidence from Japan

In this article, we investigate whether there is adverse selection and/or moral hazard in credit guarantee schemes for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Japan. As credit guarantee corporations cannot distinguish low risk from risky borrowers, credit guarantee schemes typically attract a larger proportion of risky borrowers, which results in inefficient resource allocation. Using bank-level data, we analyse whether the default rate is positively associated with the ratio of guaranteed loans to total loans, and find that the data are consistent with an adverse selection and/or moral hazard hypothesis. Further analysis shows that the relationship is stronger for 100% coverage than for 80% coverage, indicating that the ‘20% self-payment’ requirement somewhat mitigates the problem, but not enough to eliminate it altogether.     

Exploring the mismatch between credit ratings and loss-given-default: A credit risk approach

It is commonly observed that high grade loans with better ratings are often associated with low recoveries if they default (i.e. with relatively high loss-given-default (LGD)). To address the mismatch problem, this paper proposes a credit risk approach by minimizing LGD for higher rated loans as a risk-rating matching standard in the sense that the decreasing LGD from creditors’ perspective is associated with higher credit rating for the borrower. This standard forces customers’ credit rating of each grade to be optimally determined in correspondence to its LGD, which means the LGD of high grade loans tends to be low. The approach is then tested using three credit datasets from China, i.e. credit data from 2044 farmers, 2157 small private businesses and 3111 SMEs. The empirical results show that the proposed approach indeed guides the way to solve the mismatch phenomenon between credit ratings and LGDs in the existing credit rating literature. By optimally determining credit ratings, the findings derived from this paper help provide a valuable reference for bankers, and bond investors to manage their credit risk.     

创新型中小企业与商业银行的演化博弈及信贷稳定策略研究

创新型中小企业融资难由来已久,特别是在以间接融资为主的金融环境下如何明晰银企关系,形成与之匹配的信贷策略,是化解企业融资约束的关键。本文首先建立银企演化博弈的理论框架,对创新型中小企业与商业银行的信贷行为演化过程及演化稳定性标准进行探讨,并从创新风险与监管奖惩两个维度构建银企演化博弈模型,分析两类群体在长期信贷博弈中的演化稳定策略。结果表明,银企双方均对高收益策略有模仿倾向,但创新型中小企业在与银行的长期合作中会对少数企业的违约行为具有抵御性;研发创业期企业所受融资约束最高,当且仅当创新成功率高于最小下限时,商业银行才考虑与企业发生信贷关系;政府、信用担保等外部力量与内生要素的相互制衡对实现银企信贷稳定状态具有重要作用。     

中国中小企业融资新渠道探究

政府出台的一系列支持、促进中小企业融资的政策和法规,为中小企业融资提供了更好的经济环境和制度保障。中小企业融资应从中小企业板市场、应收账款融资、资产支持商业票据及利用国际金融资源四方面开辟新途径。推进中小企业信用体系建设、信用担保体系建设和成立中小企业政策性银行是政府对中小企业融资有力的政策保障。     

卖方垄断市场中不同担保模式对企业融资的影响 --基于信息经济学的模型分析

在利率管制下的卖方垄断型信贷市场中,担保额是银行甄别企业风险的有效工具,但这依赖于企业的风险收益特征。第三方担保可以帮助禀赋不足的企业融资。由于不同担保机构对企业信息了解程度不同,文章通过模型证明,在对会内企业担保时,互助担保比政府担保具有优势。互助担保不会引起利益的重新分配。因为存在市场分割,政府担保是不可或缺的。政府担保会引起风险转嫁,导致收益在企业内部、银行与企业之间重新分配。     

Financing difficulties for SMEs and credit rationing – an expanded model of mortgage loans with asymmetric information

This article presents a new model of mortgage loans under reasonable assumptions. A several key variables that affects the success of a project, such as project risk, total investment, lending rate,mortgage, and self-financing are jointly considered in the model. The model takes the participation constraints and the incentive compatibility constraints into account for enterprises and banks on project investment actions respectively. Our model can explain the coexistence scenario of small medium enterprises’ (SMEs) financing difficulties and credit rationing in credit markets with asymmetric information. It reveals that higher enterprise self-financing for the project is a “credible factor” to the bank. Banks put forward strict requirements on mortgage for the SMEs with low proportion of project self-financing, which will lead to two scenarios:one is that some SMEs would not get loans due to insufficient mortgage assets; other is that some SMEs will voluntarily give up loans because of loan requirements, even if they have enough mortgage assets. Rationing is implemented both to large enterprises and SMEs, but the degree of rationing is gradually strengthened with the reduction of self-financing scale for the project.     

Analyzing the role of mutual guarantee societies on bank capital requirements for small and medium-sized enterprises

This paper analyzes the impact of the guarantee provided by mutual guarantee societies (MGSs) on the risk premium that banks should charge for small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) loans under the new Basel Capital Accords (Basel II and III). We also examine whether the foreseeable decrease in the theoretical credit risk premium would be compensated by the cost of the MGS guarantee. To do so, we develop a rating system for SMEs that uses a large sample of Spanish firms over the period from 2005 to 2009. We find that the final effect of the guarantee on the SME risk premium depends on the values taken by the credit variables of the MGS (essentially, the probability of default).     

The Macroeconomic Implications of Regulatory Capital Adequacy Requirements for Korean Banks

The capital adequacy requirement, combined with the flight to quality, contributed to a drastic credit slowdown and a sharp recession in Korea in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Since most banks were placed under the strengthened capital adequacy constraints, they reduced loans to firms with high credit risks. As a result, bank-dependent small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were badly hit, and eventually demand for bank loans fell. The reduction in loans was most visible among banks with poor capital adequacy, yet the overall change in bank portfolios had a disproportionately large negative influence on financial conditions for SMEs. In conclusion, the banks' response to capital adequacy requirements resulted in changes in the loan/bond ratio which, in turn, reduced loans to SMEs and caused a sharp cut in production. The resulting contraction in SME production created a polarized industrial structure and a chronic depression in the traditional sectors of the economy. The introduction of capital adequacy requirements (CARs) in the wake of financial crisis worsened conditions for SMEs and weakened the validity of the CARs that were mainly necessitated by successive failures among larger firms.