Capital budgeting and delegation

As part of our ongoing research into capital budgeting processes as responses to decentralized information and incentive problems, we focus in this paper on when a level of a managerial hierarchy will delegate the allocation of capital across projects and time to the level below it. In our model, delegation is a way to save on costly investigation of proposed projects. Therefore, it is more extensive the larger are the costs of such investigations. This delegation takes advantage of the fact that the lower-level manager's preferences are assumed to be similar (though not identical) to those of the higher level.     

CAPM for estimating the cost of equity capital: Interpreting the empirical evidence

We argue that the empirical evidence against the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) based on stock returns does not invalidate its use for estimating the cost of capital for projects in making capital budgeting decisions. Because stocks are backed not only by projects in place, but also by the options to modify current projects and undertake new ones, the expected returns on stocks need not satisfy the CAPM even when expected returns of projects do. We provide empirical support for our arguments by developing a method for estimating firms' project CAPM betas and project returns. Our findings justify the continued use of the CAPM by firms in spite of the mounting evidence against it based on the cross section of stock returns.     

Internal versus External Financing: An Optimal Contracting Approach

We study optimal financial contracting for centralized and decentralized firms. Under centralized contracting, headquarters raises funds on behalf of multiple projects. Under decentralized contracting, each project raises funds separately on the external capital market. The benefit of centralization is that headquarters can use excess liquidity from high cash‐flow projects to buy continuation rights for low cash‐flow projects. The cost is that headquarters may pool cash flows from several projects and self‐finance follow‐up investments without having to return to the capital market. Absent any capital market discipline, it is more difficult to force headquarters to make repayments, which tightens financing constraints ex ante. Cross‐sectionally, our model implies that conglomerates should have a lower average productivity than stand‐alone firms.     

Political connections and preferential lending at local level: Some evidence from the Italian credit market

We investigate the effect of political connections in Italy, for each level of government, on the credit markets and we find robust evidence that politically connected firms benefit from lower interest rates when the political link is at a local level. Our results show that this preferential treatment is stronger when connected firms borrow from banks with politicians on their boards and when the degree of autonomy granted to local loan officers is higher. The latter result provides a novel addition to the literature on the effects of the delegation of lending decisions within the bank. We also show that the effect is stronger in geographical areas where the incidence of corruption is higher. Overall, our results show that on aggregate the impact of political connections on interest rates is limited but it may rise significantly in specific (local) situations due to a combination of factors such as the delegation of lending decisions, a weaker rule of law and some governance characteristics of banks.     

An intervention analysis for the relationship between capital expenditure decisions and the market value of firms

This article is meant to explore the relationship between corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of firms using the intervention technique. The article shows that deep cuts in capital expenditures may, for sink-hole type projects, provide a positive signal to the marketplace. For non-sink-hole type projects, our findings are not quite consistent with those reported in McConnell and Muscarella (1985).     

高铁时空压缩效应与公司权益资本成本——来自A股上市公司的经验证据

以往文献大多集中于交通基础设施对一国或地区宏观经济的影响,而较少关注其对资本市场的作用。本文基于信息不对称视角,考察了高铁开通改变地理距离的时空约束后如何影响公司权益资本成本。以2007—2018年A股上市公司为样本,本文研究发现,上市公司所在地开通高铁后,由于内外信息不对称程度的降低,公司权益资本成本显著下降。该现象受到一系列公司特征的影响,与多数投资者聚集地距离越远、业务复杂度越高的公司,权益资本成本受高铁开通影响而下降得更明显。进一步的研究表明,高铁开通后公司股票流动性的提升及信息披露质量的提高是影响权益资本成本的重要路径。     

IMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC CAPITAL IN AN INDUSTRIAL COMPANY: THE CASE OF MICHELIN

Economic capital (also referred to as "risk capital" or "risk-based capital") is the amount of capital, generally in the form of equity or equity equivalents, that is necessary to provide an adequate cushion against lower-than-expected operating results. Over the last two decades, the concept has taken root among banks, particularly in determining the amount of capital needed to protect against financial distress in the event of unexpectedly large credit losses.
Michelin is in the vanguard of industrial companies that are beginning to apply economic capital concepts. The company uses an option-pricing approach that effectively allows the market to identify the level of economic capital that is expected to maximize corporate value. Michelin has also begun the process of attributing economic capital to individual business units and activities. By so doing, the company is able to use a single, company-wide hurdle rate for all projects and business units. Thus, instead of raising the discount rate when evaluating riskier projects and businesses, management assigns them larger amounts of economic capital (and, hence, a higher charge for use of that capital).
The use of economic capital to evaluate ongoing activities and contemplated investments makes it more likely that decisions will translate into increased shareholder value. A case in point is outsourcing. As illustrated in an example analyzing the company's decision to sell but continue sourcing from a textile factory, outsourcing decisions typically reduce a firm's required amount of economic capital—and thus an analysis based on the use of economic capital provides a more realistic picture of the expected value added from such transactions.     

Dynamics of Banks' Capital Accumulation

We construct a dynamic neoclassical model of banking capital where the dynamics are governed by the process of financial capital accumulation and credit risk realizations in a structure where stylized banking characteristics are maintained. This is aimed at focusing on how the profit‐maximizing capital ratio of banks evolves and how it reacts to exogenous shocks particularly so during periods of prolonged downturn of the economy. We examine impulse responses of our model to credit risk shock, business cycle shock, and monetary policy shock. The convergence of financial capital to its optimal level is also explored.     

Capital Project Analysis When Cash Flows Evolve as a Continuous Time Branching Process

Optimal capital budgeting criteria now exist for a variety of applications when project cash flows (or present values) evolve in terms of the well-known geometric Brownian motion. However, relatively little is known about the capital budgeting procedures that ought to be implemented when cash flows are generated by stochastic processes other than the geometric Brownian motion. Given this, our purpose here is to develop optimal investment criteria for capital projects with cash flows that evolve in terms of a continuous time branching process. Branching processes are compatible with an empirical phenomenon known as 'volatility smile'. This occurs when there are systematic fluctuations in the implied volatility of a capital project's cash flows as the cash flow grows in magnitude. A number of studies have shown that this phenomenon characterizes the cash flow streams of the capital projects in which firms typically invest. We implement optimal capital budgeting procedures for both the continuous time branching process and the geometric Brownian motion using cost and revenue data for the Stuart oil shale project in central Queensland, Australia. This example shows that significant differences can arise between the optimal investment criteria for cash flows based on a branching process and those based on the geometric Brownian motion. This underscores the need for the geometric Brownian motion broadly to reflect the way a given capital project's cash flows actually evolve if serious errors in valuation and/or capital budgeting decisions are to be avoided.     

The evolution of the application of capital budgeting techniques in enterprises

This study examines the evolution of the application of capital budgeting techniques. Previous studies mostly used cross-sectional inquiries to understand the capital budgeting practices of firms. Only a few researchers have undertaken longitudinal studies to generalise the findings of the individual cross-sectional studies to the wider population and to identify the emerging trends in the use of capital budgeting techniques (CBTs). This longitudinal study surveys 83 studies of capital budgeting practices across firms in India, South Africa, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) for the period from 1966 to 2016. The findings show that six capital budgeting techniques, namely, the net present value (NPV), the internal rate of return (IRR), the payback period (PBP), the accounting rate of return (ARR), the return on investment (ROI) and the real option valuation (ROV), are the most popular methods for evaluating capital investments. Of these techniques, the ROV is the least used, and a general lack of familiarity with this technique and its complexity are the most commonly cited reasons for not using it. Another method that is used less than the first four techniques is the ROI. However, this technique is of growing significance and is mainly used in the UK, followed by the USA, South Africa, and India. Firms in the USA and UK have increased their use of the IRR as a primary method for evaluating capital projects and have retained the PBP as an ancillary technique to strengthen the available information when evaluating capital projects. Firms in India and South Africa are increasingly excluding both the PBP and ARR methods and are increasingly using the NPV when evaluating capital investments. Although this development is in line with the theory, it limits the scope of the available information when evaluating capital projects.     

Strategic capital investment decision-making: A role for emergent analysis tools?: A study of practice in large UK manufacturing companies

The complexity surrounding strategic capital investments present challenges to managers charged with evaluating these projects. In particular over-reliance on financial appraisal tools is thought to bias decision-makers against undertaking strategic projects that are crucial to the development of business capability and innovation. In response to this concern, several emergent analysis tools have been advanced as means to integrate strategic and financial analyses of capital investment projects. This paper examines the use of both conventional financial analysis tools and selected emergent analysis approaches in the capital investment decision-making of large UK manufacturing companies.The findings update previous studies on the use of financial analysis tools, but also examine how their use varies between strategic and non-strategic investment projects and the extent to which emergent analysis tools are impacting decision-making practice. Little evidence emerges of integration between strategic and financial analysis approaches. Financial analysis techniques still dominate the appraisal of all categories of capital investment projects, while risk analysis approaches remain simplistic, even for complex strategic projects. Despite their noted potential for informing strategic investment decisions, the emergent analysis tools barely register in practice. The appraisal of capital projects seems to reflect a ‘simple is best’ philosophy and a commitment to the role of intuition and judgement in assessing how the strategic dimensions of capital investments connect with their financial outcomes.     

中国冲销式干预的利率效应检验——基于2007-2015年的数据研究

依据资产组合平衡理论,冲销式干预存在利率效应,且在资本项目开放条件下,这种利率效应负向影响冲销式干预的效果。实证表明：我国冲销式干预存在利率效应,尽管当前我国资本项目处于半开放的状态,然而,冲销式干预的利率效应已经开始影响干预效果,但这种干预最终仍是有效的。     

Delegation and sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance within business groups: Evidence from China

In emerging markets, companies are often organized into corporate groups in which the controlling shareholders control the member firms through stock pyramids and cross-shareholdings. We examine how the incentive for these controlling shareholders to maximize the value of groups results in less delegation of decision rights to the CEO of the member firm and, in turn, how such delegation affects the rate of CEO turnover in response to the financial performance measures reported by member firms. Our results suggest that delegation, measured as the extent to which controlling owners control the board of directors, is negatively associated with the interdependence of member firms. We also find that delegation weakens the sensitivity of the CEO-turnover rate to financial performance measures. These findings extend the literature by providing evidence on how delegation and management-incentive arrangements are jointly determined at the firm level.     

CREATING VALUE IN THE OIL INDUSTRY

In contrast with current thinking that conglomerates are inefficient, this article begins by presenting arguments in favor of the size and structure of the large integrated oil companies, also known as "the supermajors." Among the advantages are tax efficiency, information flow, political and technological know-how, broad supplier and customer relationships, scale economies, cross-business economies of scope, brand power, and the ability to coordinate strategic initiatives across businesses. These advantages all translate into a lower cost of capital.
One problem, however, is that this lower cost of capital does not seem to be reflected in the target returns on capital currently set by the supermajors. Observing that the financial goal of a corporation is to maximize not its return on capital but rather the net present value of expected future cash flows and earnings, the authors argue that the majors need to make two major changes to current practice. First, their investment hurdle rates should be reduced from their current level of 14–15% to the weighted average cost of capital, which is estimated to run about 8–9%. Second, the actual returns on capital reported in published accounts are largely meaningless; and when evaluating new investments and existing operations alike, the companies must find an annual performance measure that better reflects the economic realities of the business. This paper recommends use of a performance measurement framework based on economic profit that should serve two critical purposes: it will encourage managers to undertake all value-increasing projects (not just those that will maintain or increase reported return on capital), and it will help the companies communicate their strategy and results to the investment community.     

Reducing managers’ incentives to cannibalize: Managerial stock options when shareholders are diversified

We analyze the relative advantage of option grants compared to stock compensation when shareholders are diversified. Our analysis recognizes a conflict that is largely neglected in the corporate finance literature. Shareholders want to maximize their portfolio value while capital budgeting rules direct managers to choose projects that maximize firm (equity) value. Options can reduce this conflict by motivating managers to avoid projects that enhance the value of one firm at the expense of another firm. Also, in our framework, relative performance evaluation destroys value for shareholders as it encourages firms to engage in cannibalistic activity. Consistent with the predictions of our model we find that firms with lower insider ownership, higher institutional ownership, and lower leverage tend to provide more option grants as compensation to their executives.     

Auditors’ Liability,Investments, and Capital Markets: A Potential Unintended Consequence of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act

To restore investors’ confidence in the reliability of corporate financial disclosures, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 mandated stricter regulations and arguably increased auditors’ liability. In this paper, we analyze the effects of increased auditor liability on the audit failure rate, the cost of capital, and the level of new investment. We focus on a setting in which, with imperfect auditing, a firm has better information than investors about its prospects and seeks to raise capital for new investments in a lemons market. The equilibrium analysis derives corporate reporting and investing choices by the firm, attestation opinions by the auditor, and valuation by rational investors. Three empirically testable predictions emerge: although increasing auditor liability decreases the audit failure rate and the cost of capital for new projects, it also decreases the level of new profitable investments.     

Overconfidence and Resistance to Abandoning Unprofitable Capital Budgeting Projects: The Effects of Autonomy,Internal Audit,and Accountability

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of managers' autonomy in choosing a capital budgeting project has on their confidence in managing the project. Furthermore, this study examines the role that internal audit reports and accountability play in mitigating the impact of autonomy on managers' resistance to abandoning unprofitable capital budgeting projects. Building on motivated reasoning theory, we hypothesize and find that managers who are given autonomy to choose their own projects are more confident that their projects will be successful than managers who are assigned the projects by their superiors. This study also shows that internal audit reports and accountability are effective mechanisms for reducing the influence of prior decisions on managers' resistance to abandoning unprofitable projects.     

On the Positive Role of Financial Intermediation in Allocation of Venture Capital in a Market with Imperfect Information

This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation that highlights the contribution of intermediaries as informed agents in a market with imperfect information. We consider a venture capital market where the entrepreneurs select the qualities of projects and their perquisite consumptions, about which the investors are imperfectly informed. It is shown that when all investors have positive search costs, the entrepreneurs are induced to offer the unacceptable inferior projects (“lemons” only), and the investors will not enter the venture capital market, but put their funds in other low return investments–an undesirable allocation of resources. Beginning with an initial undesirable situation, the financial intermediaries may evolve as informed agents that induce a Pareto-preferred allocation, leading the investors to a higher welfare state. We focus our analysis on the existence of intermediation equilibra when the market for intermediation services is competitive. The distribution of returns on projects, the fees charged by intermediaries, and the fraction of institutional holdings are all endogenous in equilibrium. It is shown that (i) there cannot be a competitive intermediation equilibrium with very high institutional holdings, and (ii) in other cases multiple equilibra may exist, but the one with the highest institutional holdings dominates the others in a Pareto sense.     

A Model of Competition in Banking: Bank Capital vs Expertise

This paper presents a model of competition in the banking industry based upon the interplay of two factors: the level of capitalization of banks and their ability to monitor different types of projects (i.e., their expertise). In a setting of moral hazard with limited liability, banks must receive some rents to induce them to monitor projects diligently. The rents are decreasing in the banks' expertise and in the amount of capital that banks are able to commit to a project. This leads to a trade-off between capital and expertise. The analysis shows how shocks to bank capital and interest rates, and technological shocks can affect competition and monitoring efficiency in the banking sector. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, G32.