Community–Industry Contracting over Natural Resource use in a Context of Weak Property Rights: The Case of Indonesia

Decentralization in Indonesia has resulted in an increased influence of local communities over the terms of logging agreements with timber companies. The outcomes of such community–company negotiations vary significantly across communities. What are the conditions that cause this variation, and how can the outcomes be more effectively and efficiently influenced by third-party actors such as the local government or NGOs? This paper addresses these questions by developing a game-theoretic model to illustrate the strategic interactions between communities and companies. The model allows for endogeneity of de facto property rights and bargaining positions. We show that third-party actions to improve the community’s bargaining position by raising its reservation utility may result in an increase in the area logged and thereby harm the environment. Our results indicate that the strategy of intervention matters. In particular, strategies that raise the sensitivity of interventions to local logging threats are likely to be more cost-effective in supporting communities and reducing forest degradation than more indiscriminatory strategies. The model will be relevant to other situations where communities negotiate contracts over natural resource use with outside actors in a context of weak property rights, a situation increasingly observed in other developing countries.     

Improving Human Wellbeing and Ecosystem Health on BC’s Coast: The Challenge Posed by Historic Resource Extraction

Synopsis Haida Gwaii and the Great Bear Rainforest (GBR) comprise the world’s largest intact coastal temperate rainforest. British Columbia has encouraged industrial logging of this region. As a result, ecological values have been eroded and natural capital has been drawn down. The logging industry has provided few local economic benefits. Colonization and industrial resource extraction have contributed to high levels of social distress in First Nations communities. Since 2001, logging companies, environmental organizations, and the provincial and First Nations governments have collaborated in developing an Ecosystem Based Management (EBM) approach. EBM is intended to maintain ecosystem integrity and improve human wellbeing. In 2006, the province began implementing EBM by setting aside one third of the GBR’s land base from logging and by proposing transitional EBM requirements. This paper draws on stumpage and forest cover data to analyze natural capital depletion. The analysis indicates that much of the GBR’s natural capital, as represented by timber, has been depleted. Industrial logging was already on the decline before the decision was taken to implement an EBM approach. Expectations for improved socio-economic outcomes under EBM may not be realistic given the constraints implied by past logging. If EBM performance is measured using conventional economic indicators without accounting for past depletion, it risks being found to have failed the goal of improving human wellbeing. This would create pressure to relax EBM provisions to allow more logging, an outcome that would fail both ecosystems and human communities in the long term. If much reduced extraction levels are to support local human wellbeing, a greater share of economic benefits must be retained locally.      

Complexities of Decentralization in a Globalizing World

In many developing countries, decentralization programmes for natural resource management aim to induce incentives for sustainable resource management at the local level. The effectiveness of such programmes has, however, suffered from weak property rights to the resource and by the presence of externalities. Growing economic integration among countries has exacerbated these problems by increasing the exposure of local user groups to commercial actors interested in resource extraction. In this paper, the interplay of decentralization and globalization in affecting environmental outcomes and community welfare is analysed through a game-theoretic model of community-firm interactions. The results highlight the complexities of policy design. First, by raising the extractive value of the resource, globalization may lead to communities negotiating resource extraction agreements with firms. Second, with a lack of effective state enforcement of community resource rights, communities may be unable to assume de facto ownership over the resource, while commercial actors succeed in exploiting resources without community consent. No single policy option provides a panacea to counteracting these negative effects. Instead, a mix of policies, combining incentive payments along with the provision of more secure property rights and poverty alleviation is shown to have the potential to improve both environmental outcomes and community welfare.     

Institutional dimensions of Payments for Ecosystem Services: An analysis of Mexico's carbon forestry programme

This article proposes a multi-dimensional framework for understanding the development and effectiveness of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes, framed around the notions of institutional design, performance and interplay. The framework is applied in the context of Mexico's Programme of Payments for Carbon, Biodiversity and Agro-forestry Services (PSA-CABSA), with an emphasis on its carbon component. The analysis shows that PSA-CABSA was promoted by civil society and its rules have been subject to continuous modifications over time. In the case of the carbon component, changes have been due to an original misunderstanding of how carbon projects should be designed, implemented, and carbon traded in actual markets. From a performance point of view, the paper shows that the programme has been well received by rural communities, and carbon payments have contributed to increase household income and to enhance forest management practices and organisational skills. The paper also highlights sources of institutional interplay with local institutions and international climate policy, and it reveals the importance of capacity and scale issues in securing an effective and fair implementation of PES. The conclusion provides some policy recommendations for the future development of PES initiatives in Mexico and elsewhere.     

REDD+ as Result‐based Aid: General Lessons and Bilateral Agreements of Norway

The initiative known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) officially became part of the international climate agenda in 2007. At that time, REDD+ was an idea regarding payment to countries (and possibly also projects) for reducing emission from forests, with funding primarily from carbon markets. The initiative has since become multi‐objective in nature; the policy focus has changed from a payments for environmental services (PES) approach to broader policies, and international funding primarily originates from development aid budgets. This “aidification” of REDD+ has made the program similar to previous efforts using conditional or results‐based aid (RBA). However, the experience of RBA in other sectors has scarcely been addressed in the REDD+ debate. The alleged advantages of RBA are poorly backed by empirical research. This paper reviews the primary challenges in designing and implementing a system of RBA, namely, donor spending pressure, performance criteria, reference levels, risk sharing, and funding credibility. It then reviews the four partially performance‐based, bilateral REDD+ agreements that Norway has entered with Tanzania, Brazil, Guyana, and Indonesia. These agreements and the aid experience provide valuable lessons for the design and implementation of future REDD+ mechanisms.     

The role of domestic timber markets in tropical deforestation and forest degradation in Ecuador: Implications for conservation planning and policy

Studies about the impact of the timber trade on tropical forests have often oversimplified process complexity and underestimated regional variability. This study shows that forest degradation and clearing in Northwest Ecuador between 1983 and 1992 was closely linked to commercial logging. A key finding is that domestic demand is critical for shaping timber extraction and, hence, forest degradation and deforestation in this region. Low timber prices for roundwood and sawnwood at the origin, which are bolstering unsustainable forest extraction, have not been affected by market liberalization. This suggests that conservation initiatives that target international trade linkages may only be partially successful, even when they do what they are intended to do. Results suggest that market-based incentives are more likely to produce the desired results if they target and support timber producers directly. These findings are also relevant for other regions where domestic markets are a significant drive for deforestation and where local markets are supplied through the activities of small-scale, labor-intensive primary producers. Also, by emphasizing areas where logging is a dominant force, meso-level studies, like this one, not only help to more accurately estimate the impact on local forests, but also identify major resource flows and the factors promoting or hindering sustainable use, and those affecting the effectiveness of policy options.     

Profitability and social impacts of reduced impact logging in the Tapajós National Forest, Brazil — A case study

Brazil contains the world's largest tropical rainforests, most located in the Amazon River Basin. Over the last three decades, rapid growth of this region's deforested area has had negative impacts. To minimize these impacts and maintain biodiversity, the Brazilian Government has established several national forests in the Basin. The ITTO Project, a reduced impact logging (RIL) operation, was recently carried out at one of these forests: the Tapajós National Forest, also known as Flona Tapajós. This paper evaluates the Project's profitability and its effect on local residents. The Project, which ran between 1999 and 2003, was coordinated by the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), with funding for planning and monitoring provided by the United Kingdom's Department of International Development (DFID) working through and approved by the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO). Treviso Agropecuária Ltda, a private logging company, carried out timber extraction on the Project site. Our evaluation found the ITTO Project to have been highly profitable for Treviso, even after their compliance with all Brazilian labor and environmental laws. This finding was based on field interviews and the examination of documents from IBAMA and Treviso. Treviso's mean internal rate of return from the Project was calculated to have been 35.79%, considerably higher than that generated by the region's farms and ranches. The ITTO Project positively impacted Project workers, providing employment and exposing them to rainforest management techniques that maximize timber production while minimizing forest destruction. The paper closes by suggesting that more of the direct and indirect benefits of new reduced impact logging projects on Brazilian national forest land need to be channeled to the local population to increase the probability of them act as capable forest custodians.     

The CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe: Payments for wildlife services

Payments for environmental services (PES) have been distinguished from the more common integrated conservation and development projects on the grounds that PES are direct, more cost-effective, less complex institutionally, and therefore more likely to produce the desired results. Both kinds of schemes aim to achieve similar conservation outcomes, however, and generally function in analogous social, political and economic environments. Given the relative novelty of PES, what lessons can be learnt and applied from earlier initiatives? In this paper, we describe the evolution over the first 12 years (1989-2001) of Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), a community-based natural resource management programme in which Rural District Councils, on behalf of communities on communal land, are granted the authority to market access to wildlife in their district to safari operators. These in turn sell hunting and photographic safaris to mostly foreign sport hunters and eco-tourists. The District Councils pay the communities a dividend according to an agreed formula. In practice, there have been some underpayments and frequent delays. During 1989-2001, CAMPFIRE generated over US$20 million of transfers to the participating communities, 89% of which came from sport hunting. The scale of benefits varied greatly across districts, wards and households. Twelve of the 37 districts with authority to market wildlife produced 97% of all CAMPFIRE revenues, reflecting the variability in wildlife resources and local institutional arrangements. The programme has been widely emulated in southern and eastern Africa. We suggest five main lessons for emerging PES schemes: community-level commercial transactions can seldom be pursued in isolation; non-differentiated payments weaken incentives; start-up costs can be high and may need to be underwritten; competitive bidding can allow service providers to hold on to rents; and schemes must be flexible and adaptive.     

Economic cost of deforestation in semi-deciduous forests — A case of two forest districts in Ghana

The ecological, economic and socio-cultural roles of forests are under threat in Ghana due to the high rate of deforestation. Efforts are being made to combat this problem through rehabilitation measures. However, the costs of deforestation and restoration benefits are not adequately estimated. This paper fills in the gap in knowledge by providing an empirical estimation of the cost of deforestation in monetary terms. Primary data collected regarding timber, non-timber forest products and soils in semi-deciduous forests were analyzed using opportunity cost and replacement cost techniques. The results emphasize differences in the value of these forest goods and services lost annually. The largest losses were in stumpage fees, edible fruits, and avoided carbon emissions values. The results show that US$133,650,000 gross revenue, equivalent to 2.6% of the 2008 agricultural sector Gross Domestic Product, is lost annually. It can be concluded that restoring the degraded forest lands would bring benefits particularly to the local communities through increased stumpage revenues and harvest of non-timber forest products, as well as additional funds from carbon credits. It is recommended that stakeholders of forest resources are made aware of these costs in order to raise awareness of what they are losing through deforestation.     

Optimal design of pro-conservation incentives

Payments for environmental services (PES) schemes have become an increasingly accepted and popular mode for governmental and non-governmental agencies to use in addressing local and regional declines in ecosystem services. In PES schemes, payments can either be tied to indicators of actions for service provision or to indicators of the generated service itself. Performance payments are synonymous for this second group, i.e. payments are completely contingent on the procurement of an environmental good or service. Such a focus raises several practical issues during implementation. We review and translate key aspects of the economic theory of incentives into the context of performance payment schemes with special attention paid to two practical issues: risks outside the individual's control and distortion in the measurement of environmental services. Four different incentive payment approaches are presented and the effects of risk and distortion on optimal incentives are discussed. The investigation of each payment approach is accompanied by a discussion of examples from the field.     

信息不对称、分成契约与超限额采伐--中国国有森林资源变化的理论分析和实证考察

本文回顾了改革开放以来国有林业企业管理体制的演变 ,通过多任务委托代理模型探讨了这一演变过程中利润分成和采伐限额两个不相容的政府政策激励对国有林业企业经营者激励的影响 ,特别是信息不对称条件下其对木材采伐的影响 ,从而解释了国有林业企业普遍存在的超限额采伐的经济原因。通过全国 2 8个省 5次全国森林资源普查的面板数据 ,通过使用国有林业企业的平均面积作为政府与国有林业企业委托—代理关系中信息不对称的代理变量 ,从实证上验证了信息不对称将会导致超限额采伐和国有林资源增长率下降的假说     

Selling two environmental services: In-kind payments for bird habitat and watershed protection in Los Negros, Bolivia

Marketing several environmental services from a single area can help access diverse sources of funding and make conservation a more competitive land use. In Bolivia's Los Negros valley (Department of Santa Cruz), bordering the Amboró National Park, 46 farmers are currently paid to protect 2774 ha of a watershed containing the threatened cloud-forest habitat of 11 species of migratory birds. In this payment for environmental services (PES) scheme, annual contracts prohibit tree cutting, hunting and forest clearing on enrolled lands. Farmer-landowners as service providers submit to independent yearly monitoring, and are sanctioned for non-compliance. Facilitated by a local NGO, Fundación Natura Bolivia, one service buyer is an international conservation donor (the US Fish and Wildlife Service) interested in biodiversity conservation. The second service users are downstream irrigators who likely benefit from stabilized dry-season water flows if upstream cloud forests are successfully protected. Individual irrigators have been reluctant to pay, but the Los Negros municipal government has on their behalf contributed ~ US$4500 to the scheme. The negotiated payment mode is annual quid pro quo in-kind compensations in return for forest protection. Predominantly, payments are made as “contingent project implementation”, transferring beehives supplemented by apicultural training. With regard to service provision, environment committees and education programs have increased awareness in downstream communities of the probable water-supply reduction effect of continued upstream deforestation. External donors have funded subsequent studies providing basic economic, hydrological and biodiversity data, and covered PES start-up (~ US$40,000) and running transaction costs (~ US$3000 per year over the last three years). The greatest challenges in the development of the PES mechanism have been the slow process of building trust between service buyers and providers, and in achieving clear service-provision additionality.     

Paying for the hydrological services of Mexico's forests: Analysis, negotiations and results

Mexico faces both high deforestation and severe water scarcity. The Payment for Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH) Program was designed to complement other policy responses to the crisis at the interface of these problems. Through the PSAH, the Mexican federal government pays participating forest owners for the benefits of watershed protection and aquifer recharge in areas where commercial forestry is not currently competitive. Funding comes from fees charged to water users, from which nearly US$18 million are earmarked for payments of environmental services. Applicants are selected according to several criteria that include indicators of the value of water scarcity in the region. This paper describes the process of policy design of the PSAH, the main actors involved in the program, its operating rules, and provides a preliminary evaluation. One of the main findings is that many of the program's payments have been in areas with low deforestation risk. Selection criteria need to be modified to better target the areas where benefits to water users are highest and behavior modification has the least cost, otherwise the program main gains will be distributive, but without bringing a Pareto improvement in overall welfare.     

Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

I study alternating-offer bargaining games with two-sided incomplete information about the players' discount rates. For both perfect Bayesian equilibrium and a rationalizability-style notion, I characterize the set of expected payoffs which may arise in the game. I also construct bounds on agreements that may be made. The set of expected payoffs is easy to compute and incorporate into applied models. My main result is a full characterization of the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs for games in which the distribution over the players' discount rates is of wide support, yet is in a weak sense close to a point mass distribution. I prove a lopsided convergence result: each player cannot gain from a slight chance that she is a strong type, but the player can suffer greatly if there is a slight chance that she is a weak type.     

Towards a unified scheme for environmental and social protection: Learning from PES and CCT experiences in developing countries

Environmental protection and poverty alleviation in the developing world are usually heralded as joint objectives. However, these two goals are often associated with different sectoral policy instruments. While so−called payments for environmental services (PES) are increasingly being promoted for environmental protection, poverty alleviation is increasingly addressed by conditional cash transfers (CCT) program. These instruments although aimed to achieve distinct objectives have a number of similarities and challenges in their design and implementation phases. This paper elaborates on these similarities and develops a unifying generic framework that is used to discuss the extent to which both approaches could be unified.     

The formation of networks with transfers among players

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network, when players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We vary three aspects of the game: (i) whether players can only make transfers to (and receive transfers from) players to whom they are directly linked, or whether they can also subsidize links that they are not directly involved in, (ii) whether or not transfers relating to a given link can be made contingent on the full resulting network or only on the link itself, and (iii) whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects either accounts for a specific type of externality, or deals with the combinatorial nature of network payoffs.     

The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments

In the infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments, we characterize the Pareto frontier of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for all possible combinations of discount factors. Play paths implementing Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs are uniquely determined in all but the first period. Full cooperation does not necessarily implement these payoffs even when it maximizes total stage game payoffs. Rather, when the difference in players' discount factors is sufficiently large, Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs are implemented by partial cooperation supported by repeated payments from the impatient to the patient player. When both players are sufficiently patient, such payoffs, while implemented via full cooperation, are supported by repeated payments from the impatient to the patient player. We characterize conditions under which public randomization has no impact on the Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs and conditions under which such payoffs are robust to renegotiation.     

Royalty reform and illegal reporting of harvest volumes under alternative penalty schemes

We study royalty reform in a timber concessions framework. Illegal logging in the form of underreporting of harvesting is modeled. Harvesters can be either risk neutral or risk averse. Detection of illegal logging by the government is imperfect and costly. We focus on the government’s policy problem, solving first for socially optimal royalty and auditing levels, and then examining a revenue-neutral reform toward this benchmark. We find that higher royalty progression will always decrease actual harvest volume regardless of risk preferences for the harvester, but the effect of a reform on reported harvest volume is sensitive to the penalty scheme imposed by the government. If the fine is levied on evaded royalty payments, then higher royalty progression may increase reported harvest volume. But when the fine is levied on undeclared harvest volume, the reverse happens. Higher royalty regression increases actual harvest volume under both penalty schemes, but it may decrease reported harvest volume. Higher regression will increase undeclared harvest volume when the fine is levied on evaded royalty payments.      

Payments for environmental services in Costa Rica

Costa Rica pioneered the use of the payments for environmental services (PES) approach in developing countries by establishing a formal, country-wide program of payments, the PSA program. The PSA program has worked hard to develop mechanisms to charge the users of environmental services for the services they receive. It has made substantial progress in charging water users, and more limited progress in charging biodiversity and carbon sequestration users. Because of the way it makes payments to service providers (using approaches largely inherited from earlier programs), however, the PSA program has considerable room for improvement in the efficiency with which it generates environmental services. With experience, many of these weaknesses are being gradually corrected as the PSA program evolves towards a much more targeted and differentiated program. An important lesson is the need to be flexible and to adapt to lessons learned and to changing circumstances.     

Designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues

Payments for environmental services (PES) have attracted increasing interest as a mechanism to translate external, non-market values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide environmental services (ES). In this introductory paper, we set the stage for the rest of this Special Issue of Ecological Economics by reviewing the main issues arising in PES design and implementation and discussing these in the light of environmental economics. We start with a discussion of PES definition and scope. We proceed to review some of the principal dimensions and design characteristics of PES programs and then analyze how PES compares to alternative policy instruments. Finally, we examine in detail two important aspects of PES programs: their effectiveness and their distributional implications.PES is not a silver bullet that can be used to address any environmental problem, but a tool tailored to address a specific set of problems: those in which ecosystems are mismanaged because many of their benefits are externalities from the perspective of ecosystem managers. PES is based on the beneficiary-pays rather than the polluter-pays principle, and as such is attractive in settings where ES providers are poor, marginalized landholders or powerful groups of actors. An important distinction within PES is between user-financed PES in which the buyers are the users of the ES, and government-financed PES in which the buyers are others (typically the government) acting on behalf of ES users. In practice, PES programs differ in the type and scale of ES demand, the payment source, the type of activity paid for, the performance measure used, as well as the payment mode and amount. The effectiveness and efficiency of PES depends crucially on program design.