The Impact of Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance on Real Options Exercise: Potential for Suboptimal Time Delays and Value Destruction

Real options (RO) valuation has been promoted as a way to evaluate investment opportunities and make investment decisions that takes into account the value of managerial flexibility in the face of uncertainty. Although RO enjoys a substantial body of literature considering its application and suitability in different situations, the impact of national culture on the application of RO has received little attention. Values embedded in national culture affect the behavior of managers. In particular, these values play a role in how managers frame information, communicate, and make decisions, directly and indirectly affecting behavior through cultural layers such as organizational culture. National culture, therefore, can systematically affect the application of RO, potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes. In this article, we hypothesize how 2 particularly relevant dimensions of culture, power distance and uncertainty avoidance, affect RO exercise, and estimate the magnitude suboptimality of these effects using a model we develop for the case of a put option. Our estimates suggest RO may not always be a superior valuation approach to net present value for national cultures with certain characteristics.     

Resisting economic integration when industry location is uncertain

This paper analyses the political determination of transportation costs in a new economic geography model. In a benchmark case with certainty about where agglomeration takes place, a majority of voters favour economic integration and the resulting equilibrium is an industrialised core and a de-industrialised periphery. Allowing for uncertainty, a high level of trade costs may win the election and maintain the initial distribution of industry. The reason is that a coalition of risk-averse immobile factors of production votes for the status quo due to uncertainty about which region will attract industry if economic integration is pursued. Finally, the standard view that agglomeration is unambiguously beneficial to residents in the industrial centre is challenged by introducing costs of undertaking economic integration.     

Irreversible investment and Knightian uncertainty

When firms make a decision about irreversible investment, they may not have complete confidence about their perceived probability measure describing future uncertainty. They may think other probability measures perturbed from the original one are also possible. Such uncertainty, characterized by not a single probability measure but a set of probability measures, is called “Knightian uncertainty.” The effect of Knightian uncertainty on the value of irreversible investment opportunity is shown to be drastically different from that of traditional uncertainty in the form of risk. Specifically, an increase in Knightian uncertainty decreases the value of investment opportunity while an increase in risk increases it.     

A difficulty with the “command” allocation mechanism

This paper studies the implementation of taut economic plans under uncertainty in a simple dynamic model of resource allocation. It argues that the “command” mechanism is unable to control the stochastic system, causing unexpected shocks to accumulate, disrupting the production process and leading to increasing divergence between plan and performance. The principal source of this problem is lack of feedback from the state of the system to the allocation decision. Two market-like mechanisms are also analized. Both stabilize the system and minimize the impact of uncertainty on its performance, showing that the difficulty is indeed with the “command” allocation mechanism.     

The choice between multiplicative and additive production uncertainty

When modeling output uncertainty, the multiplicative specification is consistently chosen over the additive form, despite the latter being arguably intuitively more obvious. The rationale for this seems to be that when production risk is the only source of uncertainty, additive uncertainty does not reduce output below the certainty level, while multiplicative uncertainty does. We show that, in the absence of hedging, this result is drastically modified when there is simultaneous price and output uncertainty. In this situation the theoretical implications of the two specifications are sufficiently similar to preclude any a priori choice between the two. Thus the choice between the additive and multiplicative formulations may be dictated by how each performs in empirical analyses.     

The effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons

We model a common pool resource game under environmental uncertainty, where individuals in a symmetric group face the dilemma of sharing a common resource. Each player chooses a consumption level and obtains a corresponding share of that resource, but if total consumption exceeds a sustainable level then the resource deteriorates and all players are worse-off. We consider the effect of uncertainty about the sustainable resource size on the outcome of this game. Assuming a general dynamic for resource deterioration, we study the effect of increased ambiguity (i.e., uncertain probabilities pertaining to the common resourceʼs sustainable size). We show that whereas increased risk may lead to more selfish behavior (i.e., to more consumption), increased ambiguity may have the opposite effect.     

Random capital service in labor-managed and profit-maximizing firms

The labor-managed firm and the profit-maximizing firm may experience random production due to a variety of fundamental sources of uncertainty. This paper demonstrates that the nature of the source of uncertainty leads to alternative specifications of the problem and to different conclusions. The specific source of uncertainty modeled in this presentation is random capital failure in the labor-managed firm and in the profit-maximizing firm. In each case, the choice of primary capital, reserve capital, and labor is considered.     

Optimal stationary consumption with stochastic production and resources

Uncertainty about technology and resources is represented in terms of uncertainty about an (exogenous) environment whose successive states form a stationary stochastic process, with probabilities that are unaffected by economic decisions. The successive states of the economy depend both on the environment and on the decisions taken with regard to production and consumption. It is shown that, under conditions that are natural extensions of “neoclassical” conditions in the case of certainty, (1) Capital saturation is possible, i.e., an optimal stationary stochastic program exists, and (2) An optimal program can be sustained by a price system that takes the form of a stationary stochastic process of price vectors. In other words, an optimal stationary program can be sustained by a stochastic “equilibrium,” in which at each date the optimal production decisions maximize expected intertemporal profit, and the optimal aggregate consumption vector has minimum cost among all aggregate consumption vectors yielding no less (social) utility.     

Time and uncertainty in resource dilemmas: equilibrium solutions and experimental results

Most common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas share two features: they evolve over time and they are managed under environmental uncertainties. We propose a stylized dynamic model that integrates these two dimensions. A distinguishing feature of our model is that the duration of the game is determined endogenously by the users’ collective decisions. In the proposed model, if the resource stock level below which the irreversible event occurs is known in advance, then the optimal resource use coincides with a unique symmetric equilibrium that guarantees survival of the resource. As the uncertainty about the threshold level increases, resource use increases if users adopt decision strategies that quickly deplete the resource stock, but decreases if they adopt path strategies guaranteeing that the unknown threshold level is never exceeded. We show that under relatively high uncertainty about resource size, CPR users frequently implement decision strategies that terminate the game immediately. When this uncertainty is reduced, they maintain a positive resource level for longer durations.     

ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

In this paper, we study the impact of central bank opacity on macroeconomic performances in a new Keynesian framework with model uncertainty using robust control techniques. We identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to the lack of information about the central bank's preference for robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent . We find closed‐form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing the impact of the lack of transparency about the central bank's preferences for robustness. We show that an increased transparency about the central bank's preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond less aggressively to cost‐push shocks, thus reducing the inflation and output gap variability. As a consequence, inflation and output gap are less volatile than under central bank opacity about its preference for robustness.     

The Effective Protection Rate Under Uncertainty: A Note*

This note presents a measure of the effective protection rate in a general equilibrium model under uncertainty where a stock market exists and international trade in securities takes place. Real equity prices replace the final commodity prices since, in the presence of uncertainty, resource allocation and therefore the output of each industry is governed by real equity prices. Using expected utility as a welfare criterion, it is shown that second-best optimum can be achieved by a tariff on the intermediate good at a rate given by setting the new measure to zero. This note provides the theoretical foundations to the measure estimated by Eldor (1984).     

Resource allocation in a general equilibrium model of production under uncertainty: The case of variable supply of labor

This paper examines the effects of a marginal change in uncertainty on resource allocation and factor rewards by relaxing the assumption of factor inelasticity. We demonstrate that integrating a variable labor supply into Batra's two-sector uncertainty model can mitigate or reverse many of the earlier results. Specifically, a marginal increase in uncertainty may trigger the resource to move from the certainty sector to the uncertainty sector in the presence of a backward-bending labor supply curve.     

H-S-R三维结构视角下众创空间智力资本协同创新对创客创新绩效的影响

众创空间作为承接大众创业、万众创新的新业态载体，其建设和发展成为国家及地方政府重要的发力点。智力资本作为知识经济的基础，其价值创造实现以知识转移和吸收为主要形式，以科技创新为目标，以知识共享和交互平台为依托。据此，基于智力资本“H-S-R”三维视角，采用单案例研究，以飞马旅空间5i center为例，从知识资源匹配、知识资源吸收、转移和交互、知识增值三阶段动态解读协同创新环境—智力资本—知识—创客绩效四重互动模式及其动态效应。最后，构建众创空间智力资本协同创新影响创客创新绩效的理论模型，以期优化众创空间的创新流程与功能，提升“双创”情境下众创空间创新创业服务能力。     

Redistribution from a constitutional perspective

In its traditional form, Paretian welfare economics has little to say about policies of redistribution. I argue that by adopting a constitutional perspective, elements of a theory of redistribution can be developed without recourse to interpersonal utility comparisons. Individuals who find themselves under an imperfect veil of uncertainty at a constitutional stage face a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of redistribution. The benefits consist of a reduction in the variance of a risk-averse agent's income distribution. The costs are represented by deadweight losses caused either by bureaucracy or by disincentive effects associated with the transfer scheme. My simple formal analysis shows that individuals may, even under an imperfect veil of uncertainty, be able to agree unanimously on a certain transfer policy if their personal characteristics are not too different from each other. This paper is a modified version of a chapter from my Master's thesis, submitted at the University of Bonn in 1992. Revisions were done during a stay at DELTA/Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris. A scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank Urs Schweizer, Hartmut Kliemt, Niclas Berggren, and an anonymous referee of this journal for valuable comments and suggestions, which have greatly improved the paper.     

Environmental variability and collective action: Experimental insights from an irrigation game

Studies of collective action in commons dilemmas in social–ecological systems typically focus on scenarios in which actors all share symmetric (or similar) positions in relation to the common-pool resource. Many common social–ecological systems do not meet these criteria, most notably, irrigation systems. Participants in irrigation systems must solve two related collective action problems: 1) the provisioning of physical infrastructure necessary to utilize the resource (water), and 2) the asymmetric common-pool resource dilemma where the relative positions of “head-enders” and “tail-enders” generate asymmetric access to the resource itself (water). In times of scarcity, head-enders have an incentive to not share water with tail-enders. Likewise, tail-enders have an incentive to not provide labor to maintain the system if they do not receive water. These interdependent incentives may induce a cooperative outcome under favorable conditions. However, how robust is this system of interdependent incentives in the presence of environmental variability that generates uncertainty about water availability either through variation in the water supply itself or through shocks to infrastructure? This paper reports on results from laboratory experiments designed to address this question.     

环境不确定情境下组织韧性影响路径、作用机制与应对策略研究

韧性作为探究组织—环境互动机理的方法，有助于企业在逆境中化危为机、借机成势。基于过程视角，打开环境不确定情境下组织韧性响应的“黑箱”,构建“暴露期(激活韧性)—发展期(调动韧性)—恢复期(发挥韧性)”研究框架。研究发现：环境作为企业的信息源和资源池，不确定性通过信息认知和资源依赖两条路径影响组织韧性；为应对环境不确定性，组织韧性通过探测机制和缓冲机制降低信息模糊，进而突破资源瓶颈。因此，应综合判断企业外部环境状况和组织自身禀赋，选择适应、更新和突破3种组织韧性应对策略。     

Papers to appear in forthcoming issues

Decisions concerning the production level of a substitue for a natural resource must often be taken well ahead of the time when the substitute is supplied. If the natural resource is owned by a monopolist, this may lead to an equilibrium in which the resource extracting firm takes the output path of the substitute as given. In this equilibrium the transition from resource extraction to substitute production takes place gradually. Furthermore, the price path of this equilibrium is lower than the price path one finds when the decision period of substitute production is ignored.     

The Impact of Resource Uncertainty and Intergroup Conflict on Harvesting in the Common-Pool Resource Experiment

How do resource uncertainty and intergroup conflict affect intragroup cooperation over resources in the common pool dilemmas? Does a danger of sudden resource depletion encourage random acts of violence? There are concerns that climate change will escalate conflicts over, and the scarcity of, renewable resources, which are already under threat or in a state of decline. However, we know surprisingly little about the impact of uncertainty on intergroup conflict over resources. In this paper, we present experimental evidence from a mixed design experiment with two-between-group factors: (1) the presence (or absence) of shocks that can destroy a part of resources; and (2) the availability of intergroup conflict. We find that random shocks encourage resource conservation within groups. The positive impact of resource uncertainty on resource conservation disappears in the presence of conflict. It seems that subjects protect themselves from resource exhaustion in the presence of shocks by engaging in conflict and taking resources from the out-group instead of reducing extraction. In general, conflict promotes intragroup cooperation, but this is conditional on the outcomes of past conflicts. In particular, groups harvest more after wins, and only reduce extraction after losing resources in conflict.     

Monitoring as a partially observable decision problem

Monitoring is an important and costly activity in resource management problems such as containing invasive species, protecting endangered species, preventing soil erosion, and regulating contracts for environmental services. Recent studies have viewed optimal monitoring as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), which provides a framework for sequential decision making under stochastic resource dynamics and uncertainty about the resource state. We present an overview of the POMDP framework and its applications to resource monitoring. We discuss the concept of the information content provided by monitoring systems and illustrate how information content affects optimal monitoring strategies. Finally, we demonstrate how the timing of monitoring in relation to resource treatment and transition can have substantial effects on optimal monitoring strategies.     

A martingale characterization of the price of a nonrenewable resource with decisions involving uncertainty

This paper presents a general model of nonrenewable resource consumption and exploration decisions involving uncertainty about the time of occurrence of an event such as exhaustion, stock discovery, or a substitute development. The resulting price process is characterized in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions under which the price is expected to rise at a rate equal to, greater than, or less than the discount rate. The general model is illustrated and the price process and the optimal decisions are characterized by examining the three types of uncertainty indicated above.