Does better governance foster efficiency? An aggregate frontier analysis

We test the relationship between governance and macroeconomic technical efficiency on a sample of 62 countries, both developed and developing. We do so by applying Battese and Coelli (1995)s method at the aggregate level. We find that better governance, measured by six complementary indices each devoted to a different dimension of governance, is always associated with greater efficiency. However, when governance variables are tested against each other, we observe that government efficiency is the aspect of governance that most robustly affects aggregate efficiency.Received: September 2003, Accepted: August 2004, JEL Classification: C31, K40, O4We wish to thank Mohammed Chaffai and Jean-Yves Lesueur for their advice. We are also grateful to participants at the XVth Villa Mondragone International Economic Seminar on Markets, growth and global governance in Rome (June 2003), and seminar participants at the University Robert Schuman of Strasbourg, the University Louis Pasteur of Strasbourg, and the University Lumiére of Lyon, for their helpful comments. We are finally indebted to two anonymous referees whose constructive suggestions led us to substantially improve the paper. All remaining errors are ours.     

A responsive voting system

To say that a democratic system of government ought to be responsive to the opinions of the citizens sounds like a truism which could hardly be expected to generate much controversy. Yet, the notion of responsiveness turns out to be open to several nonequivalent interpretations: Condorcet-consistency, monotonicity, invulnerability to the no-show paradox, to name the most important ones. Several results have been achieved to establish incompatibilities between these properties. We shall review some of these and discuss some similar notions and their relationships with those just mentioned.Received: 5 August 2003, Accepted: 19 March 2004, JEL Classification: D70This work has been supported by the Academy of Finland and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation. The author is grateful to Donald G. Saari for perceptive comments on an earlier version. Also the comments of Elina Kestilä, Kai A. Konrad, Maria Suojanen, Matti Wiberg and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.     

Preemptive behavior in sequential-move tournaments with heterogeneous agents

Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents' strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, the first acting agent may choose a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium by choosing a sufficiently small spread between winner and loser prize. Received: January 2003, Accepted: November 2004 JEL Classification: J3, M12, M5 We would like to thank two anonymous referees and the editor Kai Konrad for helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), projects no. KR 2077/2-1 and SFB/TR 15 ("Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems"), is gratefully acknowledged.     

Selection institutions and war aims

We explore how the sizes of the winning coalition and selectorate influence the war aims of states. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territorial gain as a way to increase state resources. Nonterritorial war aims produce a commitment problem in that after the war the defeated state may not comply with the victor's demands. States with large winning coalitions are more willing to continue the war to remove the enemy leader as a solution to this commitment problem. We test our hypotheses against the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, and we find some support for our argument. Received: June 2004, Accepted: April 2005, Correspondence to: James D. Morrow     

Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent,two-good economies

In exchange economies where agents have private information about their preferences, strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions are in general not efficient. We provide a restricted domain, namely the set of preferences representable by Leontief utility functions, where there exist mechanisms which are strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational. In two-agent, two-good economies we are able to provide an even stronger result. We characterize the class of efficient and individually rational social choice functions, which are fully implementable in truthful strategies.Received: 28 April 2003, Accepted: 23 June 2003, JEL Classification: D51, D71The author thanks Matthew Jackson, Jordi Massó and James Schummer for fruitful discussions, William Thomson for many valuable comments on an earlier version. A particular thank to Salvador Barberá for his fundamental help.     

Optimal money growth in a limited participation model with heterogeneous agents

This paper studies optimal money growth in a cash-in-advance production economy with heterogeneity in patience levels and know-how. We show that the rate of deflation suggested by the Friedman rule is limited by the subjective discount rate of the most patient agent in the economy. The output distortion due to cash-in-advance constraints on firms can completely be eliminated by means of the Friedman rule if and only if firms are run by the most patient agents.Received: 16 August 2003, Accepted: 22 March 2005, JEL Classification: D52, D90, E21, E41, E52Parts of this paper were completed while the first and second authors were visiting the University of York and Princeton University respectively. We are thankful for the hospitality of these institutions. The second author also acknowledges the hospitality and support of Bilkent University that he is currently visiting, the support from the Turkish Academy of Sciences in the framework of the ‘Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program’ (TUBA-GEBIP/2004), the grant awarded by the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) under the NATO Science Fellowship Program as well as the support from the Center for Economic Design of Bogaziçi University. This paper was presented in the ERC/METU Second International Conference on Economics, Ankara, September 1998, and at seminars in Bilkent, Bogaziçi and Ohio State Universities. We thank, in particular, Emre Alper, Sumru Altug, Huw Dixon, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Ivan Pastine, Murat Sertel and Alan Sutherland for useful comments. We also thank two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect that of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey.     

On how size and composition of customer bases affect equilibrium in a duopoly with switching costs

Switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching cost is above some critical level. It is also well known that asymmetric size of customer bases makes monopoly pricing more difficult. Adding consumer heterogeneity to the model we demonstrate that also composition of each firms customer base affects pricing, and this composition may aggravate or ease the incentives to break out of the monopoly pricing equilibrium.Received: 16 August 2001, Accepted: 27 September 2004, JEL Classification: D43, L10, L13This research has been sponsored by Telenor, through the Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration. We thank participants at the 2002 EARIE conference in Madrid, Matthew Jackson and an anonymous referee for helpful and constructive comments to an earlier version. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Multiproject team assignments

We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project. Received: 30 April 1997 / Accepted: 22 December 1998     

Implementing action profiles with sequential mechanisms

In this paper we consider the problem of a principal with many agents who desires to implement a given action profile. Agents observe the actions taken by their colleagues, and this information can be exploited by the principal. Sufficient conditions for implementation under various informational structures are provided. Received: 6 April 1996 / Accepted: 19 April 1998     

Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large). Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004 JEL Classification: H11, H41 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged.     

An efficient binomial method for pricing¶American options

We present a new method for obtaining fast and accurate estimates of the price of an American put option by binomial trees. The method is based on the interpolation of suitable values obtained by modifying the contractual strike. A time-saving procedure allows us to derive all the interpolating data from a unique standard backward procedure. Received: 16 July 2001 / Accepted: 19 April 2002 {The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also thank Antonino Zanette for his help in the refinements of the numerical procedures.     

Implementation and orderings of public information

We explore the relationship between public information and implementable outcomes in an environment characterized by random endowments and private information. We show that if public signals carry no information about private types, then an exact relationship holds: a more informative public signal structure, in the sense of Blackwell, induces a smaller set of ex-ante implementable social choice functions. This holds for a large set of implementation standards, including Nash implementation, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. The result extends the notion, dating to Hirshleifer (1971), that public information can have negative value to an endowment economy under uncertainty.Received: 23 September 2003, Accepted: 30 July 2004, JEL Classification: D80Colin M. Campbell: I thank two referees and seminar participants at the 2002 meetings of the Society for Economic Design, at the 2003 Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society, and at Yale University for helpful input.     

County capital cities,county public finance and county economic geography

We are interested in the county governments role for the county seat economy. Our suggestion is this: Rather than discuss changes in county seat location at a given budget (representing a rare natural experiment), we should look at changes in county budget holding fixed county seat location (yielding a steady flow of observations). In the papers model changes in the county budget translate into changes in county seat employment. In the papers empirical test against a sample of German county seats we find it difficult to reject this.Received: February 2003, Accepted: Accepted May 2004JEL Classification: R53, H72, R23Kristof Dascher: I have benefitted from comments by three anonymous referees. I am also grateful for financial support from the CEPR research network on Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Organization, funded by the European Commission under contract number ERBFMRXCT980215.     

Military expenditure in post-conflict societies

Post-conflict situations face a high risk of reversion to conflict. We investigate the effect of military expenditure by the government during the first decade post-conflict on the risk of reversion. We contrast two theories as to the likely effects. In one, military spending deters conflict by reducing the prospects of rebel success. In the other it acts as a signal to the rebels of government intentions. In the signalling model, low military spending signals that the government intends to adhere to the terms of the peace settlement and so reduces the risk of renewed rebellion. We investigate the effects of post-conflict military spending on the risk of conflict, using our existing models of military expenditure and of conflict risk. We find that, consistent with the signalling model, high military spending post-conflict significantly increases the risk of renewed conflict. This effect of military spending is distinctive to post-conflict period, and becomes progressively more pronounced over the decade. Received: April 2004, Accepted: December 2004, JEL Classification: H56, F35, O10     

Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller

In a general auction framework with independent private values, we propose a game, with a simple economic interpretation, that allows to implement the revenue-maximizing auction outcome when the seller ignores the distributions of the different bidders’ valuations. In this detail-free implementation procedure, an ascending-price contest is organized and the winner volunteers a payment to the seller; this payment can then be challenged by another bidder who knows the distribution of the winner’s valuation.Received: 4 June 2003, Accepted: 4 April 2005, We have benefited from comments by seminar participants at the Econometric Society North American Winter Meeting and European Meeting, PURC University of Florida, University of Wisconsin, as well as by two referees and an Associate Editor. The authors also wish to acknowledge the hospitality of IDEI in Toulouse where they started this research. The second author acknowledges the financial support of CRSHC, CIRANO and the Bell University Labs.     

Adverse selection in group insurance: The virtues of failing to represent voters

Compared with non-union workers, union workers take more of their compensation in the form of insurance. This may be because unions choose democratically, and democratic choice mitigates adverse selection in group insurance. Relative to individually-purchased insurance, we show that group insurance chosen by an ideal profit-maximizing employer can be worse for every employee, while group insurance chosen democratically can be much better. The reason is that democracy can fail to represent the preferences of almost half the group.Received: January 2003, Accepted: September 2004, JEL Classification: J51, D82, G22     

The break-up of municipalities: Voting behavior in local referenda

This paper examines the economic and political conditions that influence peoples attitudes regarding a municipality break-up. The theoretical model predicts intra-municipal differences in tax bases, political preferences, and population size to affect the expected gain from secession. The predictions of the model are tested using data on local referenda about municipality partitioning in Sweden. The data support one of the three effects; voters in municipality parts that are wealthy compared to other parts of the same municipality are more positive to secession.Received: April 2003, Accepted: September 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: H11, H73Anna Brink: I thank Henry Ohlsson, Lars-Erik Borge, Matz Dahlberg, Katarina Nordblom, Magnus Wikström, seminar participants at Göteborg University and Uppsala University, and two anonymous referees for useful comments. This research was financially supported by the Swedish Research Council and Ejnar Lindhs kommunalvetenskapliga stiftelse.     

An elementary core equivalence theorem¶in a countable economy

We consider an infinite exchange economy with countably many traders, which can be regarded as a natural extension of finite exchange economies to an infinite one. In our countable economy the core defined in the traditional manner would be empty. To avoid this unwanted situation we have to strengthen the notion of “improves upon”. We will achieve this based on the idea that forming coalitions involve costs. Received: 23 August 2000 / Accepted: 12 April 2002 I am very grateful to István Dancs, Péter Medvegyev, Miklós Pintér, Csaba Sándor, András Simonovits, László Szili, Péter Tallos and the anonymous referees for comments and suggestions. Parts of this research were done during the author's Bolyai János Research Fellowship provided by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA). Of course, all errors remain the author's responsibility.     

Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis

This paper examines how the first-best models of compensation based on the agents' talents and responsibilities analyzed in some recent contributions can be extended to a second-best context. A few social criteria are proposed and compared to alternative approaches by Roemer and Van de gaer. Received: 5 March 1997 / Accepted: 19 August 1998     

Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity

I present a model of venture capital contracting in which contracts that involve a mixture of both debt and equity are efficient and dominate pure-equity and pure-debt financing. The optimal contract balances the venture capitalist's incentive to intervene in the project and the entrepreneur's desire for control. Received: 9 September 1997 / Accepted: 3 April 1998