国外股票回购简介

从我国资本市场发展的现实情况和《公司法》等有关法规规定来看,我国证券市场的股份回购与国际惯例相比较,其回购动机、操作方式、法律环境会有较大差异。本文就国外股份回购作一介绍。     

护盘式股份回购的弊端及风险防控机制探究——兼评《公司法》第142条第六项

护盘是上市公司回购股份的重要理由之一,2018年10月我国《公司法》第142条专项修改明确护盘式回购的合法性,是资本市场基础制度改革的重要一步。同时尤需注意护盘式回购的固有弊端,主要集中于市场秩序与债权人及中小股东合法权益的保护。本文旨在深入分析护盘式回购存在问题,结合我国立法变迁及市场回应,通过比较借鉴域外护盘式回购及安定操作的法律规制技术,进一步探讨如何从现有法规制度层面最大化防控其风险并有效保证护盘功能的发挥,促进资本市场的发展进步。     

读者观点

股票回购:迎来契机犹存阻碍2005年10月27日,公司法修订草案顺利通过,并将于2006年1月1日正式实施。新修订的《公司法》中特别引人关注的是“允许公司收购本公司不超过已发行股份总额的5％股份,用于奖励本公司职工”。这一政策的出台意味着公司回购的股份可以作为实行员工持股计划的股份来源,与国外资本市场做法初步接轨。尽管《公司法》修订案对股票回购产生了积极影响,但仍存在对股票回购的制约因素。实施股份回购的前提条件苛刻,上市公司能力不足。一般而言,只有公司的股票价格被长期低估,并且公司有充足     

浅析反对股东股份回购请求权

《公司法》确立反对股东股份回购请求权是为了克服资本多数决的弊端,保护少数股东的利益。本文结合中、日两国新《公司法》的具体规定,对反对股东的股份回购请求权的基本理论问题进行了探讨,并在此基础上提出完善我国相关制度的建议。     

浅析境外公司股份回购财源限制的立法模式

股份回购兴起于上世纪70年代的美国,近年随着各国经济的发展,股份回购日益成为公司在公司经营中使用的资本工具,利用股份回购实现公司的经营战略和未来发展。世界上各国和地区根据本国的实际情形,对本国的股份回购制度采用了不同的立法模式,在股份回购中的资金来源的限制也存在着很大的不同。     

公司回购股份问题探析

股份的流通转让,是市场经济运行规则和股份有限公司这一特殊财产组织形式的必然要求。通过流通转让股份,可以实现筹集资本,积累财富,增强公司活力,合理配置资源等功能,推动股份制经济的发展。但是,如果管理不当,股份的流通转让也会产生一些负作用。因此,各国法律都对股份的转让进行确认和保护,同时又从转让的主体、时间、程序等方面对股份转让进行限制,以充分发挥股份转让的积极效应。股份的回购     

异议股东股份回购请求权浅析

异议股东股份回购请求权,是指公司作出合并、分立、重大资产出售、章程变更等重大结构性调整决议时,异议股东享有的要求公司以公平价格回购其股份的权利。我国《公司法》对该权利的规定存在着对各类型公司规范不统一、适用范围过窄、对债权人保护不力、行使程序规定粗糙等缺陷。我国立法应分别针对该类缺陷加以具体的完善。     

上市公司股份回购的溢出效应——基于公司债信用利差的经验证据

立足于我国股份回购制度重大修订以及债券市场债券违约潮的现实背景，以公司债信用利差为研究视角，考察上市公司股份回购在债券市场的溢出效应。结果表明，股份回购对公司债信用利差有正向影响，说明股份回购在债券市场存在溢出效应。进一步研究发现，股份回购是通过“风险防御”效应中的信息风险传导使得公司债信用利差增大。公司治理水平越低、融资约束程度越高，这种溢出效应越明显。拓展性检验结果表明，股份回购对公司债信用利差的正向影响在《公司法》修订后更为显著。研究结论不仅为上市公司股份回购的溢出效应研究提供了债券市场的经验证据，也为监管部门制定债权人利益保护政策提供了参考。     

《回购管理办法》的会计处理缺陷

为了完善资本市场游戏规则,规范上市公司回购社会公众股份的行为,2005年6月16日中国证监会制定发布了《上市公司回购社会公众股份管理办法(试行)》(以下简称《回购管理办法》),并于发布之日起实施。《回购管理办法》发布、实施后,业内反响很大,对规范上市公司减资行为,维护股东权益等方面有着积极的作用。但笔者研读之后,认为《回购管理办法》在保护债权人合法权益方面存在一定缺陷。《回购管理办法》实施后,没有与之相配套的、切实保障债权人合法权益的会计处理规定,这就意味着实施回购减资的上市公司,只能按照现行《企业会计制度》规定进…     

《公司法》修订与商业银行信贷债权的维护

新修订的《公司法》放宽了对公司设立与出资的管制,规范了公司的关联交易与对外担保行为,引入了法人人格否认制度,强化了对公司中小股东与债权人利益的保护。本文认为,在新《公司法》框架下,公司信用的基调已从静态的资本信用转向动态的资产信用。对此,作为公司债权人的商业银行,应当确立事前、事中和事后的不同措施,认真做好贷款管理和评价工作。商业银行必须关注客户公司内部治理和对外经营的动态变化,并分析这些变化对公司偿债资产的法律影响。在此基础上,商业银行应充分利用新《公司法》及其他相关法律赋予的权利,有效维护信贷债权。     

Access to internal capital,creditor rights and corporate borrowing: Does group affiliation matter?

We examine whether the effect of increased creditor rights on corporate borrowing depends on firm's access to internal capital. By exploiting a creditor protection reform in India, empirical outcomes strongly indicate that strengthening of creditor rights leads to increased corporate borrowing among firms that have constrained access to internal capital compared to business group affiliated firms, which have relatively easier access to internal capital. Further, the increased corporate borrowing by firms with constrained access to internal capital, in the post-reform period, is associated with a greater expansion of real investments, improved operational performance, and better market valuation. Taken together, these findings indicate that expanding creditor rights may aid in improving allocative efficiency.     

A Time-Series Analysis of Corporate Payout Policies

I conduct a time-series analysis of corporate payout policies that accounts for the dynamic nature of these decisions and for the interaction among investment decisions and payout policies. The estimation is done with a VAR model of investments, earnings, total payout, and the split of the total payout between dividends and share repurchases. I control for changes in the legal treatment of share repurchases in 1982 and for changes in the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains. I find that: (i) an increase in the taxation of capital gains relative to dividends shifts the split of total payout away from share repurchase and toward dividends; (ii) corporate investment decisions lead payout policies and not the other way around; (iii) increases in corporate total payout are associated with long-term subsequent increases in earnings; (iv) changes in the composition of corporate payout away from share repurchases and toward dividends are associated with subsequent increases in earnings.     

Firms as buyers of last resort

We develop a model to explore the asset pricing implications of firms being buyers of last resort for their own stocks. Those with more ability to repurchase shares when prices drop far below fundamental value (i.e., less financially constrained firms) should have lower short-horizon return variances (controlling for fundamental variance) than other firms. Using standard proxies for financing constraints such as past repurchases and firm age, we find strong support for this predicted relation. We also find that this relation is stronger in the U.S. after 1982 when regulatory reforms lowered the legal cost of conducting repurchases as well as in countries where share repurchases are legally easier to execute.     

Payout flexibility and capital expenditure

Over the past two decades or so, repurchases have become an appealing method for disbursing cash to shareholders compared to the traditional dividends. Managerial perception as well as empirical evidence suggests that repurchases are inherently more flexible than dividends, which may account for their increasing popularity. The rigidity of dividends and the apparent flexibility of share repurchases could impact firm investments. Firms may forego profitable investment opportunities to maintain their dividend levels, while repurchases could be easily scaled back to fund profitable investment projects without fear of an adverse market reaction. We test the flexibility hypothesis of repurchases by regressing capital expenditures on repurchases and dividends in addition to other control variables. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find an inverse relationship between capital expenditures and repurchases but an insignificant relationship with dividends. Further, we find that the flexibility associated with repurchases is especially evident for firms that are financially constrained, and during the recent financial crisis period when external capital constraints were severe. Finally, we find that flexibility of repurchases with respect to capital expenditures is stronger in the more recent time period during which regulatory changes made repurchases more attractive as a mechanism to disburse cash back to shareholders.     

An Unconventional Conglomerateur: Henry Singleton and Teledyne

Capital allocation involves decisions about raising and returning capital, and about acquiring and selling companies—all of which can have major effects on shareholder value. Rather than judging CEOs by growth in revenues or earnings, the author argues that they should be judged by increases in the per share value of the companies they manage and also in comparison with the returns generated by peer firms and the broader market. Successful CEOs have been able to overcome the “institutional imperative”—the tendency of managers to focus on the sheer size of their enterprises and to avoid doing things that might be seen as unconventional. In this chapter from his recent book, The Outsiders, which provides accounts of eight remarkably successful and long‐tenured CEOs, the author describes the successful management by Henry Singleton of the conglomerate Teledyne from 1963 to 1990, a period during which the company's shareholders enjoyed annualized returns of over 20%. During the 1960s, the company produced high returns mainly by making large acquisitions funded by new equity issues. During the 1970s and '80s, by contrast, Teledyne used massive share repurchases to return excess capital to shareholders. Thus, Singleton adjusted his capital allocation strategy in response to changes in product and financial markets—and to changes in the perceived difference between market and intrinsic values. When investors provided capital with relatively low required rates of return, as in the 1960s, Singleton was an aggressive buyer investor in a wide range of businesses. But when interest rates were high and equity valuations were low, as in the 1970s and early 1980s, Singleton used share repurchases to create value by reducing investment and limiting growth. The company's shareholders were well rewarded in both environments.     

Creditor Protection and Credit Response to Shocks

This article studies the relationship between creditor protectionand credit responses to macroeconomic shocks. Using a data seton legal determinants of finance in a panel of data on aggregatecredit growth for 79 countries during 1990–2004, it isshown that credit is more responsive to external shocks in countrieswith weak legal creditor protection and weak enforcement. Theresults are statistically and economically significant and robustto alternative measures of creditor protection, to the inclusionof variables that reflect different stages of economic development,to the restriction of the sample to only developing economies,to the controls for systemic crises, to alternative shock measures,and to vector autoregressive specifications.     

担保物权制度改革降低了企业债务融资成本吗?——来自中国《物权法》自然实验的经验证据

本文运用双重差分法考察以《物权法》出台为标志的担保物权制度改革是否降低了企业的债务成本。实证结果显示,《物权法》出台后,与固定资产占比较高的企业相比,固定资产占比较低企业的债务成本显著降低。进一步,与《物权法》出台通过扩大可抵押资产范围、加强债权人保护等渠道降低企业债务成本的经济直觉一致,三重差分检验结果表明,担保物权制度改革对企业债务成本的降低作用表现出丰富差异性:其一,与法律制度环境较好地区相比,《物权法》对企业债务成本的降低作用在法律制度环境较差地区相对更大;其二,与金融市场化程度较高地区相比,《物权法》对企业债务成本的降低作用在金融市场化程度较低地区相对更大;其三,与融资约束较弱企业相比,对于融资约束较强的企业而言,《物权法》对债务成本的降低作用相对更强。这些基于中国经济实践的经验证据识别并揭示出了担保物权制度改革促使企业债务成本下降的作用机理,从而对有效缓解企业融资难、融资贵等问题具有借鉴意义。     

Caught in the crossfire: How the threat of hedge fund activism affects creditors

Firms under the threat of hedge fund activism on average experience significant losses of outstanding bondholder wealth: their bond yields rise while prices fall and ratings deteriorate. Under-threat firms receive inferior terms when initiating new loans. These observations are more prominent in firms with weaker creditor rights protection and firms that experience more significant improvement in stock performance without accompanying real improvements. These findings are consistent with the manifestation of agency problems. Share repurchases funded by cash, investment cutbacks, and new debt issuances elevate share price, which increases the cost of intervention for activists but jeopardizes the interest of existing bondholders.     

The market valuation of share repurchases in Europe

We analyze a uniquely constructed data set of open market share repurchases across a sample of European firms. We find that the announcement date market reaction is lower than that in the US, mainly because of (i) the relatively large number of recurring announcements which generate significantly lower returns than the initial announcements of intention to repurchase shares; (ii) the rather low market reaction in France, due probably to specific governance and corporate cultural issues; and (iii) the regulatory reform that allowed UK firms to keep the repurchased shares as treasury stock, which decreased their market impact. Across our countries, taxation, shareholder protection, and the European Union’s Market Abuse Directive do not affect significantly the market valuation of repurchases. Our results imply that ultimately, domestic institutional specificities and reforms play significant roles in the market valuation and popularity of share repurchases.