The Prevalence of Nascent Entrepreneurs in the United States: Evidence from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics

The Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) is a national longitudinal sample of 64,622 U.S. households that were contacted to find individuals who were actively engaged in starting new businesses. The PSED includes information on: the proportion and characteristics of the adult population involved in attempts to start new businesses, the kinds of activities nascent entrepreneurs undertake during the business startup process, and the proportion and characteristics of the start-up efforts that become infant firms. Prevalence rates for nascent entrepreneurs are reported by gender and ethnicity (whites, blacks and Hispanics) on such demographic variables as: age, education, household income, and urban context.     

The entrepreneurial ladder, gender, and regional development

Gender differences at five levels of entrepreneurial engagement are explained using country effects while controlling for individual-level variables. We distinguish between individuals who have never considered starting up a business, those who are thinking about it, and nascent, young, and established entrepreneurs. We use a large international dataset that includes respondents from 32 European countries, three Asian countries, and the United States. Findings show that cross-country gender differences are largest in the first and final transitions of the entrepreneurial process. In particular, some European transition economies are characterized by relatively low propensities of women to convert start-up considerations into start-up activities and low survival rates of businesses started by women.     

The Effects of Pre-venture Plan Timing and Perceived Environmental Uncertainty on the Persistence of Emerging Firms

This paper explores the effects of when pre-venture planning occurs (early or late) in the sequence of activities accomplished during the process of new business emergence, and the moderating effects of environmental context (the degree of perceived financial, competitive and operational uncertainty), on the persistence of emerging business startup efforts. Using data from the U.S. Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), our analyses found a strong main effect for business planning: Nascent entrepreneurs who completed a business plan were 2.6 times more likely to persist in the process of business emergence than those who did not complete a plan. In addition, the likelihood of venture persistence increased when nascent entrepreneurs engaged in planning early in the sequence of start-up activities in perceived uncertain financial and competitive environments, while venture persistence increased when nascent entrepreneurs engaged in planning late in a sequence of activities in perceived certain financial and competitive environments.     

Novice,portfolio, and serial founders: are they different?

There is growing interest in entrepreneurs who have been involved in more than one venture, yet to date there has been relatively little theoretical development and systematic empirical examination of the topic. In particular, there has been little attention to the potential heterogeneity of habitual entrepreneurship. This study aims to contribute to this emerging area in two ways. First, it outlines a conceptual typology of habitual entrepreneurs who have founded, purchased, or inherited businesses. Second, the empirical part of the study focuses on owner-managers, providing an exploratory analysis of the characteristics and effects of independent business ownership by novice, portfolio, and serial founders. Novice founders are those that have no prior entrepreneurial experience as either a founder, an inheritor, or a purchaser of a business. Portfolio founders retain their original business and inherit, establish, and/or purchase another business. Serial founders are those who sell their original business but at a later date inherit, establish, and/or purchase another business.The study derives propositions suggesting differences among the three types of founders. At the individual founder level of analysis, similarities as well as differences in the personal background, work experiences, reasons leading to the start-up of businesses, and personal attitudes to entrepreneurship of these three types of entrepreneurs are explored. At the organizational level of analysis, finance, employment and performance differences among the businesses owned by the three types of entrepreneurs are presented.The issues are examined using a sample of entrepreneurs who were the principal owner-managers of independent businesses in Great Britain. The sample included 389 novice founders (62.6%), 75 portfolio founders (12.1%), and 157 serial founders (25.3%). No statistically significant differences were found among the three groups of entrepreneurs with regard to the main industrial activity, geographical location, and the age of their businesses. Univariate and multivariate tests were used to examine potential differences between the groups.The results of the study show significant differences between portfolio and serial founders with regard to their parental background, work experience, and their age when they started their first business. Differences were also found with respect to reasons leading to start-up, personal attitudes to entrepreneurship, and sources of funds used during the launch period of the surveyed business. These findings suggest that habitual entrepreneurs cannot be treated as a homogeneous group. The analysis, however, failed to find any significant differences between the performance of the surveyed firms owned by habitual founders and novice founders and between the two types of habitual founders.The findings of the study indicate for researchers that there is a need to carefully define the unit of analysis in any examination of entrepreneurs. In particular, there is a need to take note of the heterogeneity of types of entrepreneur and to consider the entrepreneur as the appropriate unit of analysis rather than simply the firm. Although this study focused on habitual founders of businesses, the theoretical section of the study also identified other types of habitual entrepreneurs, such as serial corporate entrepreneurs and serial management buy-out and buy-in cases. These other types of habitual entrepreneurs would appear to warrant further analysis.The findings of this study have a number of implications for practitioners, especially venture capitalists. The absence of significant performance differences between novice and habitual entrepreneurs, which is consistent with the results from other studies, emphasizes the need for venture capitalists screening potential investees not to rely solely on previous experience.The study also has implications for policy-makers, especially with respect to decisions concerning the allocation of resources to assist nascent entrepreneurs, novice entrepreneurs, and habitual entrepreneurs. The similarities in business performance among novice, serial, and portfolio entrepreneurs suggests that policy-makers need to be careful in targeting scarce resources. Most notably, targeting resources to encourage talented nascent entrepreneurs to become novice entrepreneurs may offer returns which are at least as good as targeting resources to more experienced entrepreneurs.     

Start-Up Capital: "Does Gender Matter?"

Female and male entrepreneurs differ in the way they finance their businesses. This difference can be attributed to the type of business and the type of management and experience of the entrepreneur (indirect effect). Female start-ups may also experience specific barriers when trying to acquire start-up capital. These may be based upon discriminatory effects (direct effect). Whether gender has an impact on size and composition of start-up capital and in what way, is the subject of the present paper. The indirect effect is represented by the way women differ from men in terms of type of business and management and experience. The direct effect cannot be attributed to these differences and is called the gender effect. We use of a panel of 2000 Dutch starting entrepreneurs, of whom approximately 500 are female to test for these direct and indirect effects. The panel refers to the year 1994. We find that female entrepreneurs have a smaller amount of start-up capital, but that they do not differ significantly with respect to the type of capital. On average the proportion of equity and debt capital (bank loans) in the businesses of female entrepreneurs is the same as in those of their male counterparts.     

Intrapreneurship or entrepreneurship?

I explore the factors that determine whether new business opportunities are exploited by starting a new venture for an employer (‘nascent intrapreneurship’) or independently (‘nascent entrepreneurship’). Analysis of a nationally representative sample of American adults gathered in 2005-06 uncovers systematic differences between the drivers of nascent entrepreneurship and nascent intrapreneurship. Nascent entrepreneurs tend to leverage their general human capital and social ties to organize ventures which sell directly to customers, whereas intrapreneurs disproportionately commercialize unique new opportunities which sell to other businesses. Implications of the findings are discussed.     

A theoretical overview and extension of research on sex,gender, and entrepreneurship

With the rising number of women-owned businesses has come a considerable amount of research, and even more speculation, on differences between male and female entrepreneurs and their businesses. To date, these findings and speculations have been largely atheoretical, and little progress has been made in understanding whether such differences are pervasive, let alone why they might exist. Thus public policy-makers have had little guidance on such difficult issues as whether or not unique training and support programs should be designed for women versus men. Moreover, lenders who finance new and growing firms have little to go on but their own “gut instinct” in assessing whether women's and men's businesses are likely to run in similar ways, or whether they might be run in different but equally effective ways.The lack of integrative frameworks for understanding the nature and implications of issues related to sex, gender, and entrepreneurship has been a major obstacle. Two perspectives that help to organize and interpret past research, and highlight avenues for future research, are liberal feminism and social feminism.Liberal feminist theory suggests that women are disadvantaged relative to men due to overt discrimination and/or to systemic factors that deprive them of vital resources like business education and experience. Previous studies that have investigated whether or not women are discriminated against by lenders and consultants, and whether or not women actually do have less relevant education and experience, are consistent with a liberal feminist perspective. Those empirical studies that have been conducted provide modest evidence that overt discrimination, or any systematic lack of access to resources that women may experience, impedes their ability to succeed in business.Social feminist theory suggests that, due to differences in early and ongoing socialization, women and men do differ inherently. However, it also suggests that this does not mean women are inferior to men, as women and men may develop different but equally effective traits. Previous entrepreneurship studies that have compared men and women on socialized traits and values are consistent with a social feminist perspective. These studies have documented few consistent gender differences, and have suggested that those differences that do exist may have little impact on business performance.While this interpretation of past findings is relevant to the question of if and how female and male entrepreneurs differ, there are still large gaps in our knowledge. In particular, only one study (Kalleberg and Leicht 1991) has systematically explored whether or not potential differences related to discrimination or socialization affect business performance; the study used limited measures of business performance, and assessed only a restricted range of male I female differences. This article reports on a study that explored other potential differences related to discrimination and to socialization (which are hypothesized based on liberal and social feminism) and looked at their relationship to a more comprehensive set of business performance measures.The study indicates that for a large, randomly selected sample of entrepreneurs in the manufacturing, retail, and service sectors, there were few differences in the education obtained by males and females, or in their business motivations. Women entrepreneurs were, however, found to have less experience in managing employees, in working in similar firms, or in helping to start-up new businesses. Women's firms also were found to be smaller than men's, to have lower growth in income over two years, and to have lower sales per employee. Regressions undertaken to examine predictors of a range of business performance indicators suggest that women's lesser experience in working in similar firms and in helping to start-up businesses may help to explain the smaller size, slower income growth, and lesser sales per employee of their firms.For policy-makers, this article suggests that systemic factors that afford women less access to experience must be addressed. Support for classroom training or related advisory activities may not be warranted; there is little evidence that women lack access to relevant classroom education. However, programs that help increase women's access to hands-on experience in starting firms or in working in the industry in which they hope to set up business does seem advisable. In-class education or counseling would not seem to compensate for lack of real-world experience, which suggests that any available funds should be directed more toward initiatives centered on apprenticeship programs than toward those centered on classroom teaching.Implications for lenders and investors are less clear cut, but suggest that whatever innate differences may exist between men and women are irrelevant to entrepreneurship. While women's businesses do not perform as well as men's on measures of size, they show fewer differences on other, arguably more critical business effectiveness measures-growth and productivity—and no differences on returns. Discrimination against women-owned businesses based on these findings would clearly be both unethical and unwarranted. The fact that women appear to obtain similar growth, productivity, and returns, in fact, suggests that they may be compensating for experience deficits in ways that current research does not illuminate. While more systematic inquiry is required to assist in understanding why men's and women's firms may differ in some predictable ways, this study would suggest that lenders and investors wishing to assist small businesses should focus on evaluating the amount and quality of the business and non-business experience of entrepreneurs, and consider sex an irrelevant variable.For entrepreneurs, this research reinforces the notion that acquiring relevant industry and entrepreneurial experience is of considerable importance if they seek to establish large firms and/or to achieve substantial firm productivity and returns. In particular, helping in the start-up of firms and spending extended periods of time in the industry of choice appear to yield subsequent rewards in the performance of any individual's firm. Future research is needed to investigate whether or not other types of business experience or non-business experience might bring additional benefits in terms of positive impact on future business performance, but the indication of the current work is that one's sex per se is neither a liability nor an asset.     

Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs’ involvement in internationalization and innovation: Three Canadian cases

In international entrepreneurship literature, entrepreneurs moving across borders have received less attention than other entrepreneurs. Also, only scant attention has been paid to immigrant entrepreneurs’ contributions to their organizations. This paper aims to contribute to the emerging international immigrant entrepreneurship literature by studying Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs’ roles in their firms’ international and innovative activities in Canada, China, and other countries. It is based on three cases of Chinese entrepreneurs who established businesses in Canada. We conclude that these immigrants’ experience of doing business in China and Canada, their network relationships and knowledge of these markets quickened their firms’ internationalization considerably. Moreover, these firms became active in product or service innovation as the case immigrants also involved other immigrants and locals. Consequently, immigrant entrepreneurs should actively use their connections both in their new country of residence and also in their previous home country, but to become even more successful, they should also reach beyond their ethnic ties.     

The role of social and human capital among nascent entrepreneurs

This study examines nascent entrepreneurship by comparing individuals engaged in nascent activities (n=380) with a control group (n=608), after screening a sample from the general population (n=30,427). The study then follows the developmental process of nascent entrepreneurs for 18 months. Bridging and bonding social capital, consisting of both strong and weak ties, was a robust predictor for nascent entrepreneurs, as well as for advancing through the start-up process. With regard to outcomes like first sale or showing a profit, only one aspect of social capital, viz. being a member of a business network, had a statistically significant positive effect. The study supports human capital in predicting entry into nascent entrepreneurship, but only weakly for carrying the start-up process towards successful completion.     

Women Entrepreneurs and Family Firm Heterogeneity: Evidence from an Emerging Economy

Family firms add to the economic and social well-being of countries. While research on heterogeneity of family firms is gaining momentum, it has mostly been gender-neutral. The study fills this gap by examining heterogeneity of family firms owned and managed by women, in the context of a developing country—Brazil. The study draws upon the resource-based view of the firm to investigate the relationships between firm performance, family involvement, and financial resources at the start-up phase. An inductive analysis reveals two patterns. First, family firms that are started with the family achieve better performance than firms that are launched without the family and later evolve into a family business. Second, family firms that are funded with women entrepreneur’s own savings achieve worse performance than family firms that are started with borrowed funds. The results are useful for strategic decision making in fostering family businesses headed by women and proactive public policies for future innovation to enhance the success of women entrepreneurs.     

Motivations and Obstacles for Small Business Entrepreneurship in Russia: Fifteen Years in Transition

A longitudinal survey of small business entrepreneurs was conducted in Russia in two stages: in 1994 and in 2008. This study examined entrepreneurial climate and developments in Russia's small businesses with a focus on motivations and obstacles in starting up and operating businesses. It also aimed at analyzing entrepreneurs’ needs for training, consulting, and other types of assistance in a comparative context. Russia's climate for small and medium enterprises (SME) and entrepreneurship has improved, although it is still a work in progress. The 2008 survey indicated younger age, greater share of female entrepreneurs, and remaining small size of the firms. Though the level of SME entrepreneurial activities in Russia is still lower than in major developed economies, the gap is diminishing. Thise study found no significant differences between 1994 and 2008 in terms of entrepreneurial motivations and obstacles; several shifts and trends in motivations and obstacles were identified in their relative importance in SME dynamics.     

An investigation of hindsight bias in nascent venture activity

We posit that individuals who are actively engaged in activities to develop their own venture will exhibit hindsight bias when recalling their startup experiences. We observe that those who fail to develop their startup activity into an operating business demonstrate substantial hindsight bias concerning the probability of venture formation. In particular, the recalled probability of success, reported after their decision to quit, is lower than the probability of success solicited during the nascent process. We argue that the systematic distortion of the past has important implications for individuals involved in the venturing process. Specifically, we suggest that these individuals are at risk of overestimating their chances of success when starting future nascent activity if they do not correct for their optimistic tendencies. The evidence from this study suggests it is important to recognize that what nascent entrepreneurs believe they experienced, and what they actually experienced, may not be equivalent.     

Illegal entrepreneurship experience: Does it make a difference for business performance and motivation?

Existing studies show a positive relationship between entrepreneurs' business performance and their conventional human capital as measured by previous business experience and formal education. In this paper, we explore whether illegal entrepreneurship experience (IEE), an unconventional form of human capital, is related to the performance and motivation of entrepreneurs operating legal businesses in a transition context. Using regression techniques on a sample of 399 private business owners in Lithuania, we find that, in general, IEE is significantly and positively associated with subjective measures of business motivation. Moreover, younger entrepreneurs benefit from their IEE in terms of business performance, indicating that they have been more successful than older entrepreneurs in transferring their IEE to a market oriented setting. In addition, IEE and business performance are positively related for entrepreneurs who started completely new legal businesses. Thus, our research partially supports the notion that prior experience in the black or gray market may signal and provide valuable human capital for legal enterprising.     

The ambitious entrepreneur: High growth strategies of women-owned enterprises

During the last two decades, researchers have sought to develop categories of entrepreneurs and their businesses along a variety of dimensions to better comprehend and analyze the entrepreneurial growth process. Some of this research has focused on differences related to industrial sectors, firm size, the geographical region in which a business is located, the use of high-technology or low-technology, and the life-cycle stage of the firm (i.e., start-up vs. more mature, formalized companies). Researchers have also considered ways in which entrepreneurs can be differentiated from small business managers. One of these classifications is based on the entrepreneur's desire to grow the business rapidly. This is the focus of our study.To date, the media have paid considerable attention to rapidly growing new ventures. However, still lacking are large-scale research studies guided by theory through which we can expand our knowledge of the underlying factors supporting ambitious expansion plans. Some research has identified factors that enhance or reduce the willingness of the entrepreneur to grow the business. Factors include the strategic origin of the business (i.e., the methods and paths through which the firm was founded); previous experience of the founder/owner; and the ability of the entrepreneur to set realistic, measurable goals and to manage conflict effectively.Our study attempted to identify the strategic paths chosen by entrepreneurs and the relation of those paths to the growth orientation of the firm. The entrepreneurs sampled in this study are women entrepreneurs across a wide range of industrial sectors. Recent reviews of entrepreneurship research have suggested the need for more studies comparing high-growth firms with slower-growth firms to better delineate their differences in strategic choices and behaviors.Our study sought to answer the following questions: What characterizes a “high growth-oriented entrepreneur?” Is this distinction associated with specific strategic intentions, prior experience, equity held in previous firms, the type of company structure in place, or success factors the entrepreneur perceives are important to the business? Do “high growth” entrepreneurs show greater entrepreneurial “intensity” (i.e., commitment to the firm's success)? Are they willing to “pay the price” for their own and their firm's success? (i.e., the “opportunity costs” associated with business success and growth). Other relationships under investigation included different patterns of financing the business' start-up and early growth. Do “high-growth” entrepreneurs use unique sources of funding compared with “lower-growth” entrepreneurs?Eight hundred thirty-two entrepreneurs responded to a survey in which they were asked to describe their growth intentions along nineteen strategic dimensions, as well as respond to the foregoing questions. Some of the strategic activity measures included adding a new product or service, expanding operations, selling to a new market, and applying for a loan to expand operations. Actual growth rates based on sales revenues were calculated, and average annualized growth rates of the industrial sectors represented in the sample were obtained. This study showed that high-growth-oriented entrepreneurs were clearly different from low-growth-oriented entrepreneurs along several dimensions. The former were much more likely to select strategies for their firms that permitted greater focus on market expansion and new technologies, to exhibit greater intensity towards business ownership (“my business is the most important activity in my life”), and to be willing to incur greater opportunity costs for the success of their firms (“I would rather own my own business than earn a higher salary while employed by someone else”).The high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs tended to have a more structured approach to organizing their businesses, which suggests a more disciplined perception of managing the firm. In summary, results showed the group of high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs, labeled “ambitious,” as having the following distinctions: strategic intentions that emphasize market growth and technological change, stronger commitment to the success of the business, greater willingness to sacrifice on behalf of the business, earlier planning for the growth of the business, utilization of a team-based form of organization design, concern for reputation and quality, adequate capitalization, strong leadership, and utilization of a wider range of financing sources for the expansion of the venture. The purpose in uncovering these differences is to enable entrepreneurs and researchers to identify more clearly the attributes of rapid-growth ventures and their founders and to move closer to a field-based model of the entrepreneurial growth process which will help delineate the alternative paths to venture growth and organizational change.     

Success and Risk Factors in the Pre-Startup Phase

Why does one person actually succeed in starting a business, while a second person gives up? In order to answer this question, a sample of 517 nascent entrepreneurs (people in the process of setting up a business) was followed over a 3-year period. After this period, it was established that 195 efforts were successful and that 115 start up efforts were abandoned. Our research focuses on estimating the relative importance of a variety of approaches and variables in explaining pre-start-up success. These influences are organized in terms of Gartner’s (1985) framework of new venture creation. This framework suggests that start-up efforts differ in terms of the characteristics of the individual(s) who start the venture, the organization that they create, the environment surrounding the new venture, and the process by which the new venture is started. Logistic regression analyses are run for the sample as a whole as well as for subgroups within the sample, namely for those with high ambition versus low ambition and for those with substantial versus limited experience. The results point to the importance of perceived risk of the market as a predictor of getting started versus abandoning the start up effort.     

Survival patterns among newcomers to franchising

This study examines survival patterns among franchisee and nonfranchise small firms and establishments that entered business during 1986 and 1987. Aspiring entrepreneurs purchasing franchises choose this path to small business entry, in part, because they expect to improve their chances of survival during the turbulent early years of operation. Evidence to date has been mixed: some studies conclude that franchising is a low-risk route to small business ownership, while others suggest that independent start-ups are more likely to remain in operation than franchises.This study utilizes two distinct methodological approaches to investigate franchisee survival patterns. The first approach demonstrates that franchise units have better survival prospects than independents, and the second approach demonstrates that young firms formed without the benefit of a franchisor parent are more likely to remain in operation than franchised start-ups. Reconciliation of these seemingly inconsistent findings is explored.Survival measurement is heavily influenced by the unit of analysis in franchising. Firm-specific data show different patterns than establishment-specific data when young franchise units are tracked through time. Analysis of establishments owned by corporations is undertaken for restaurants opened nationwide in 1986 and 1987. Using Census Bureau data describing corporate-owned restaurant establishments that reported payroll to the IRS in 1987, 52,088 young establishments were identified; 22.5% were franchises. Comparison of the franchisee and independent restaurant units indicated that independents were more likely to cease operations by 1988 than franchises.The fact that franchisee establishments had a better survival track record than independent restaurants does not, however, demonstrate that aspiring entrepreneurs improve their survival prospects by purchasing a franchise. In fact, 84% of the new franchise establishments under consideration were units of multi-establishment corporations, and few of these corporate parents were new businesses. Envision a corporation in operation for 15 years that owns 20 McDonalds restaurants; in 1987 they opened their twenty-first unit. The findings of this study indicate that this twenty-first unit has excellent survival prospects, more so than either an independent start-up or a franchisee opening a restaurant for the first time. New franchised restaurant units, overall, may be a safe investment, although simultaneously, the newcomer opening a franchise may face a high-risk situation.The analysis then shifts from establishments owned by franchisees to young firms (not establishments) started in 1986 and 1987 as proprietorships, partnerships, or S-corporations. Among these young firms, franchisees are found to have lower survival rates than independent start-ups, and these differences persist when various firm and owner traits are controlled for statistically. Retailing is found to be a particularly difficult field for young franchised firms: risk of firm closure is high and mean profits are negative. The most common route into retailing entailed purchasing an operating franchise unit from its previous owner, that is, an ongoing franchise. Over 53% of the young franchised retailing firms started in 1986 and 1987 were ongoing operations. By 1991, only 52.4% of these firms were still operating with the owner of record present in 1987.The findings of this study indicate, on balance, that purchase of a franchise is unlikely to reduce the risks facing a new business start-up. This does not imply that the multi-establishment franchisee adding another new franchise unit to its existing chain of operations faces a high-risk situation. Rather, the high risk facing the franchisee newcomer is partially rooted in the fact that so many of the newly-opened units in mature franchising niches are owned by multi-unit franchisees that have greater experience and resources than newcomers who are attempting to enter the industry.     

A tale of two exits: nascent entrepreneur learning activities and disengagement from start-up

This article explores entrepreneurial exit defined as disengagement from the start-up process. It addresses two questions: (1) is disengagement a negative outcome? and (2) are all cases of disengagement homogeneous? The literature identifies two types of disengagements based on the degree of learning by nascent entrepreneurs. Intelligent exit refers to proactive or strategic disengagement precipitated by entrepreneurs?? learning that concluded the business opportunity would not be successful. From this perspective, entrepreneurs could adopt discovering or enacting modes and their related causal or effectual approaches to learning. Reactive or uninformed exit results from lack of planning and an inability to solve problems. Results suggest two different disengagement clusters??the intelligent and reactive exit clusters??but the distinction between discovering and enacting approaches to learning is not supported. Cases of intelligent exit are found to be more similar to cases of operating businesses than they are to cases of reactive exit.     

The Barriers to Growth in Ghana

This paper presents the results of ordered logit regression models of the problems faced by 500 entrepreneurs from six regions of Ghana against the characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their businesses and whether these were systematically related to a list of 37 factors that they perceived as limiting their ability to achieve their objectives in the period 2002–2005. The results show that the education, but not the sex or age of the entrepreneurs were related to business barriers. Family Businesses, growing businesses, those providing training and those which did not spend money on R&D were more likely to encounter business barriers. The findings of the research also revealed that in general firms in conurbations were more likely to encounter barriers.      

Explaining the formation of international new ventures: The limits of theories from international business research

International new ventures (INVs) represent a growing and important type of start-up. An INV is defined as a business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries (Oviatt and McDougall 1994). Their increasing prevalence and important role in international competition indicates a need for greater understanding of these new ventures (Oviatt and McDougall 1994).Logitech, as described in a case study by Alahuhta (1990), is a vivid example of an INV. Its founders were from two different countries and had a global vision for the company from its inception. The venture, which produces peripheral devices for personal computers, established headquarters in both Switzerland and the U.S. Manufacturing and R&D were split between the U.S. and Switzerland, and then quickly spread to Taiwan and Ireland. The venture's first commercial contract was with a Japanese company.Using 24 case studies of INVs, we found that their formation process is not explained by existing theories from the field of international business. Specifically, neither monopolistic advantage theory, product cycle theory, stage theory of internationalization, oligopolistic reaction theory, nor internalization theory can explain the formation process of INVs. These theories fail because they assume that firms become international long after they have been formed, and they therefore highlight large, mature firms. They also focus too much on the firm level and largely ignore the individual and small group level of analysis (i.e., the entrepreneur and his or her network of business alliances).We propose that an explanation for the formation process of INVs must answer three questions: (1) who are the founders of INVs? (2) why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries? and (3) what form do their international business activities take?Who are the founders of INVs? We argue that founders of INVs are individuals who see opportunities from establishing ventures that operate across national borders. They are “alert” to the possibilities of combining resources from different national markets because of the competencies (networks, knowledge, and background) that they have developed from their earlier activities. Following the logic of the resource-based view of the firm, we argue that the possession of these competencies is not matched by other entrepreneurs. Only the entrepreneur possessing these competencies is able to combine a particular set of resources across national borders and form a given INV.Why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries? The founders of INVs recognize they must create international business competencies from the time of venture formation. Otherwise, the venture may become path-dependent on the development of domestic competencies and the entrepreneur will find it difficult to change strategic direction when international expansion eventually becomes necessary. As the founder of one INV explained, “The advantage of starting internationally is that you establish an international spirit from the very beginning” (Mamis 1989:38).What form do their international business activities take? Founders of INVs prefer to use hybrid structures (i.e., strategic alliances and networks) for their international activities as a way to overcome the usual poverty of resources at the time of start-up.This study has important implications for the practice of management. In financing decisions relating to INVs, venture capitalists and other venture financiers should look for entrepreneurs who have a global vision, international business competence, and an established international network. When entrepreneurs start INVs they should create hybrid structures to preserve scarce resources. Finally, given the path-dependence of competence development, founders of new ventures should consider whether establishing a domestic new venture with plans to later internationalize will be as successful a strategy as establishing a new venture that is international from inception.     

Exit, stage left why entrepreneurs end their entrepreneurial careers before retirement

This article examines the process of entrepreneurship from a different perspective. It considers evidence not only about practicing entrepreneurs but also about ex-entrepreneurs: individuals who have ended their entrepreneurial pursuits to work for someone else.Why entrepreneurs ended their entrepreneurial careers is understood by examining not only their expressed reasons for leaving, but also by observing how they exited, when they exited, and who exited compared to who remained.The study's findings are tentative. They are published now because they have important implications for potential entrepreneurs, for practicing entrepreneurs, and for those working with entrepreneurs either directly or indirectly (e.g., policymakers) who must make important decisions before more evidence is available .Overall, the findings indicate that a high-risk profile exists that distinguishes ex-entrepreneurs, particularly those with brief careers, from “more seasoned” entrepreneurs who have experienced longer lives as entrepreneurs.Perhaps the most important implication is that early-career start-ups may be better than previously thought. Preexisting profiles of the “ideal entrepreneurs” place them in their mid- to late thirties at the time of venture start up. But this start-up age (and older ages) were highly correlated in this study with very short, aborted careers compared to practicing entrepreneurs and ex-entrepreneurs who started earlier.A second implication is related to the first: those who started earlier were able to do a better job of anticipating their future entrepreneurial pursuits than were those who started later, mainly because they were sensitized to entrepreneurship as a career possibility at a much earlier age. Early planning for an entrepreneurial career is correlated with longer careers not just because they start earlier but because they last longer.A third implication is the need to scale down the scope (and risk) of the first venture. Such venture “downsizing” can lessen financial requirements while also giving new entrepreneurs the flexibility to start another, often better, venture after they get into business and learn about new opportunities, contacts, and skills that they could not foresee or develop before starting their first ventures.A fourth implication reinforces existing notions about the relative perils of the first few years of an entrepreneurial career. Survival rates increase considerably after the completion of the second year and the probability of a long career rises substantially after the sixth year of entrepreneurial life.A final implication is that the overall costs, risks, and dangers of entrepreneuring have been overstated. Career exit rates are much lower than venture exit rates. Relatively few ex-entrepreneurs apparently suffered truly catastrophic career exits, at least to the extent that they felt that their careers had been very unrewarding and that they had ruled out ever entrepreneuring again.