股票期权制度的失灵及经理人激励机制的改进

虽然在理论上股票期权具有很强的激励作用，但是至今没有令人信服的实证结果说明股票期权制度对企业绩效的促进效果。相反，很多企业对股票期权的热衷度在逐渐下降。事实证明了股票期权制度的失灵。本文在对股票期权制度失灵的原因分析基础上提出经理人激励机制的改进措施，并对我国经理人激励机制的完善提出了建议。     

探析激励型股票期权的会计处理

激励型股票期权,是由企业所有者向员工提供激励的一种报酬制度,意在促使员工对工作全心投入,激发员工未来的工作效能,是一种长期性的激励工具。通常做法是企业根据股票期权计划的规定,给予员工在某一规定的期限内,按约定的价格(一般不低于给予期权时的股票市价)购买本企业一定数量股票的权利。股票期权产生于20世纪七八十年代的美国,到90年代,激励型股票期权已经在美国与西方其他国家得到快速发展。现在,激励型股票期权的实施已成为我国建立现代企业制度过程中的热点问题。一、激励型股票期权的履约方式及会计处理激励型股票期权的履约方式…     

限制性股票、激励性股票对薪酬制度选择的影响分析

限制性股票期权与激励性股票期权在授权价格和行权价格、受赠股份的数量、收益大小、风险大小、员工投资程度以及税收待遇等上存在差别。不同的企业在薪酬制度中都会选择适合本企业的股票期权。选择适合企业目标的薪酬制度不仅有利于激励员工,更能帮助企业留住人才。因此,选择适合的股权激励方案就成为企业薪酬制定的重中之重。但是不同层次的员工,需求也不相同。这就要求企业应该对不同层次的员工,提出不同的股权激励方案。     

浅议经理股票期权激励制度

在美国和欧洲各国企业中经理股票期权激励制度被广泛采用,我国企业也纷纷试行.但在股票期权的实践中出现了一些问题,美国财务造假丑闻使其受到许多批评.从经理股票期权激励的实践和效应分析,经理股票期权激励制度完全可以加以完善并发挥其应有的作用.     

论企业高管股权激励有效性

企业高管股票期权激励制度已成为人们关注的焦点。依据股权激励的内在机理,结合我国股票期权激励的制度基础,在重新审视相关制约因素的基础上,从提升股票期权激励的有效性角度,提出了完善绩效评价体系、切实解决“内部人控制”与审慎处理期权费用化、尽快调整股权激励的税收政策等相关措施与政策建议。     

创业企业股票期权激励研究

本文根据股票期权的理论、方法,结合我国创业企业的背景和特点,探讨股票期权激励在我国创业企业中的实际应用。文章具体研究了创业公司股权激励的可行性、股权激励的作用,从股票期权的制度原则、激励对象、行权方式、授予时机选择、退出机制等条款的制订方面来设计股票期权激励方案。文章最后分析了股权激励为创业公司带来的风险,提出了适合我国创业企业的股票期权激励方案和注意点。     

上市公司股票期权激励计划中的业绩评价问题

随着我国资本市场的发展,股票期权激励计划已经越来越为上市公司所重视,成为当前关注的焦点。上市公司高管人员股票期权激励方案的实施效果,取决于多种因素,其中,业绩评价指标设计的科学性是一个十分重要的因素。本文在分析我国上市公司股票期权激励计划的制度基础和股票期权制度实质的基础上,探讨了我国上市公司股票期权激励计划中的业绩评价指标设计问题。     

关于股票期权会计若干问题的探讨

随着我国企业改革的深化与市场经济的确立与完善，在企业中探索一种科学有效的激励机制已成为一个亟等解决的课题，股标期权制度作为近年来在西方国家中行之有效的一种企业激励机制，在我国也吸引了越来越多的注意力。本文在对股标期权概念及其激励作用进行分析的基础上，对股票期权的确认时机、股票期权的计量和设计股标期权应注意的问题进行了探讨。     

股票期权制度在经理层激励中的运用

股票期权制度起源于美国，上世纪80年代后普遍被运用于对企业经理层的激励。本文分析了股票期权制度的理论基础，提出了这种制度不可避免的内在缺陷，指出在我国要想避免缺陷，充分发挥这种制度的激励作用必须具备两个外部条件，并提出完善这两个外部条件的相关措施。     

我国引入股票期权的法律分析

股票期权在现代企业制度中具有积极作用。我国引入这一制度,希望建立对经营者的长期激励。介绍股票期权的概念、特点和实施意义,对股票期权在我国实施遇到的法律障碍,提出了完善对策。     

A Model of Equity Based Compensation with Tax

In this paper, we develop a two‐stage continuous time model of employee stock option (ESO) valuation under different tax regimes. We show that tax rules can have significant effects on ESO exercise behavior. In addition, we find that incentive stock options (ISO) are the optimal form of compensation for all levels of employees in the UK. In the US, restricted stock plans are preferred, and tax breaks offered by incentive schemes are only beneficial to employees with high liquid wealth (or small option holdings relative to wealth) or low risk aversion. We also analyze 83b elections for restricted stock plans in the US and find that making an election is a sub‐optimal decision for both the employee and the firm.     

Companies' Modest Claims About the Value of CEO Stock Option Awards

This paper analyzes company disclosures of CEO stock option values in compliance with the SEC's regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Companies appear to exploit the flexibility of the regulations to reduce the apparent value of managerial compensation. Companies shorten the expected lives of stock options and unilaterally apply discounts to the Black-Scholes formula. Theoretical support for these adjustments is often thin, and companies universally ignore reasons that the Black-Scholes formula might underestimate the value of executive stock options. The findings not only cast light upon how corporations value executive stock options, but also provide a means of forecasting compliance with controversial new FASB requirements for firms to disclose the compensation expense represented by executive stock options.     

Stock Option Schedules and Managerial Opportunism

This study investigates some of the most important avenues that mangers use to manipulate the value of stock option grants. It also compares the use of these avenues in firms that issue scheduled options and in firms that issue irregular options. We document that before the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX), cumulative abnormal returns were significantly negative in the 30‐day window before an option grant, but cumulative abnormal returns turned significantly positive after the option grant. This pattern is more pronounced for irregular options, and the evidence supports the hypothesis that opportunistic manipulation of strike prices by CEOs maximized the value of the option grants. We find the disclosure requirement of option grants included in SOX successfully curtails opportunistic behavior in firms that issue scheduled options, but has a lesser effect stopping opportunistic behavior in firms that issue irregular options. Firms granting irregular options take larger negative discretionary accruals in advance of the grant than firms that grant scheduled options, and the degree of downward earnings management increases with the size of the subsequent grant. We further show that firms are more likely to issue irregular options when they offer larger option grants, have a less independent board, receive less analyst coverage, have a new CEO, exhibit poor prior performance, have higher stock return volatility and are smaller in size.     

The Effect of Exercise Date Uncertainty on Employee Stock Option Value

The IASC recently recommended that employee compensation in the form of stock options be measured at the 'fair value' based on an option pricing model and the value should be recognized in financial statements. This follows adoption of SFAS No. 123 in the United States, which requires firms to estimate the value of employee stock options using either a Black‐Scholes or binomial model. Most US firms used the B‐S model for their 1996 financial statements. This study assumes that option life follows a Gamma distribution, allowing the variance of option life to be separate from its expected life. The results indicate the adjusted Black‐Scholes model could overvalue employee stock options on the grant date by as much as 72 percent for nondividend paying firms and by as much as 84 percent for dividend paying firms. The results further demonstrate the sensitivity of ESO values to the volatility of the expected option life, a parameter that the B‐S model or a Poisson process cannot accommodate. The variability of option life has an especially big impact on ESO value for firms whose ESOs have a relatively short life (5 years, for example) and high employee turnover. For such firms, the results indicate a binomial option pricing model is more appropriate for estimating ESO value than the B‐S type model.     

Option trading after the opening bell and intraday stock return predictability

Prior literature finds that information is reflected in option markets before stock markets, but no study has explored whether option volume soon after market open has predictive power for intraday stock returns. Using novel intraday signed option-to-stock volume data, we find that a composite option trading score (OTS) in the first 30 min of market open predicts stock returns during the rest of the trading day. Such return predictability is greater for smaller stocks, stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility, and stocks with higher bid–ask spreads relative to their options’ bid–ask spreads. Moreover, OTS is a significantly stronger predictor of intraday stock returns after overnight earnings announcements. The evidence suggests that option trading in the 30 min after the opening bell has predictive power for intraday stock returns.     

Option-Based Compensation,Corporate Investment Policy,and Stock Repurchases

Abstract:

Taking account of the business life cycle, this paper investigates the impact of the proceeds associated with stock option exercises on investment expenditures and stock repurchases. The results reveal that the proceeds associated with option exercises could add internal funds to firms and contribute to investment in research and development and capital expenditures, especially in the growth stage of a firm’s life cycle. This paper also shows the positive relationship between option proceeds and stock repurchases in the stagnant stage of that cycle. The empirical results further suggest that stock repurchases may substitute for dividends. In summary, the paper empirically demonstrates that stock options not only encourage employees to work harder, but also create more funds for the firm.     

我国股票期权税收政策存在的问题及对策

股票期权制度是目前盛行于西方的一种比较有效的公司分配激励机制。但目前在我国还处于起步阶段。为促进股票期权这一新生事物在我国的发展,推动国有企业改革的深入,我们应借鉴发达国家的成功经验,尽快规范和完善我国的股票期权政策。     

Do executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance?

Consistent with predictions of agency theory, we find direct evidence that executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance. This inference is drawn from evaluation of various motivations for the use of such grants in executive compensation: value enhancement, risk taking, tax benefit, signaling and cash conservation. We find consistent evidence for the value enhancement motivation to reduce agency costs. As well, they signal for positive price sensitive information. Our results reject the tax benefit and cash conservation motivations. This finding is robust after controlling for the endogenous character of executive stock option grants and other equity-based grants. JEL Classification G32 • J33 • M52     

股票期权激励与公司绩效关系的实证研究--基于我国制造业上市公司2006-2011年的经验数据

我国的股票期权激励制度在2006年开始正式实施,已有上百家上市公司实施了股票期权,但是对于股票期权在中国上市公司业绩提升中的实践效果缺乏相关实证研究。本文运用2006-2011年我国制造业上市公司的经验数据,建立了面板数据模型,对这一问题进行实证研究。研究发现上市公司股票期权激励效果明显,确实提高了企业绩效。     

Analyzing the Tax Benefits from Employee Stock Options

Employees tend to exercise stock options when corporate taxable income is high, shifting corporate tax deductions to years with higher tax rates. If firms paid employees the same dollar value in wages instead of stock options, the average annual tax bill for large U.S. companies would increase by $12.6 million, or 9.8%. These direct tax benefits of options increase in the convexity of the tax function. In addition, profitable firms can realize indirect tax benefits because stock options increase debt capacity. Although tax minimization is probably not the main motive for option grants, firms with larger potential tax benefits grant more options.