风险投资退出股权关联价值拍卖模型及仿真研究——基于Deffuant模型的群体局部博弈及社会网络演化

首先模拟了风险投资退出市场中社会网络的形成机理和演化过程,刻画了外部投资者的私人信息在该社会网络中的传递和交互;然后考虑存在群体局部交互博弈时外部投资者对股权的评价及报价策略的动态演进;最后建立了包含社会网络演化及网络群体局部动态博弈的股权关联价值拍卖模型,并进行了仿真分析。     

风险投资退出股权关联价值拍卖模型及仿真研究——基于Deffuant模型的群体局部博弈及社会网络演化

首先模拟了风险投资退出市场中社会网络的形成机理和演化过程,刻画了外部投资者的私人信息在该社会网络中的传递和交互;然后考虑存在群体局部交互博弈时外部投资者对股权的评价及报价策略的动态演进;最后建立了包含社会网络演化及网络群体局部动态博弈的股权关联价值拍卖模型,并进行了仿真分析。     

基于迭代组合拍卖的排污权交易影响因素研究

构建了初始排污权迭代组合拍卖模型,并结合EWA模型探究了排污企业的个体属性和学习行为以及拍卖竞争程度对排污权分配结果的影响。仿真结果表明:当参与竞拍企业的数量较多时政府可获得较高收益,当参与竞拍企业的数量较少时企业可获得较高收益;排污企业在竞拍中随拍卖环境调整报价策略越积极,其收益越高;排污企业的报价策略选择越依赖其学习行为,其收益越高。     

风险投资退出股权拍卖机制研究

设计了满足信息有效和激励相容条件的风险投资退出股权拍卖机制,有效解决了风险投资退出时股权交易市场中不对称信息导致的市场萎缩和交易价格失真等问题。通过与其他交易方式的交易绩效进行比较分析,进一步证明了本文所设计的拍卖机制的有效性。     

密封拍卖机制下的道德风险问题研究

本文以拍卖理论共同价值模型为基本分析框架,通过引入卖方委托代理关系,讨论了密封拍卖机制下竞买人信息寻租以及代理人道德风险对拍卖期望收入的影响。本文的主要结论包括:就控制道德风险而言,第二价格密封拍卖优于第一价格密封拍卖;拍卖品共同价值的大小决定了线性报酬激励合同的效果;特定情况下,竞买人的信息寻租行为有助于提高集体福利。     

创新型企业融资中的信息不对称性

使用双边随机边界模型对中国创新型企业在融资过程中与投资者的信息不对称程度及其对资本成本的影响效应进行实证测度。结果表明:信息不对称对企业资本成本的形成具有重要影响,投资者因所掌握的信息有限而索取更高的风险溢价;大部分创新型企业实际承受的资本成本高于基准资本成本,投资者与企业之间的博弈净效应使得企业的实际资本成本平均提高了9.92%;企业规模扩大和股权集中度提高有助于降低信息不对称程度、降低信息不对称影响资本成本的净效应。     

双向拍卖中的“零信息”模型研究

首先介绍了双向拍卖与单向拍卖的本质区别，然后分析了双向拍卖市场中的买卖双方所面临的复杂报价决策过程，最后在分析“零信息”报价模型和“增强型零信息”报价模型的基础上，提出了一种通用的“零信息”报价模型－－k-ZI模型。     

拍卖机制中的效率--对IPO询价发行方式的一种研究

用拍卖解决资源分配问题应该实现配置效率，在Myerson的最优机制设计中，取得收益最大化的拍卖商并不总是有效率地分配资源，依据修正后的有效拍卖机制原则，我们发现，由于投资者之间可获得的最大持股数的不平衡，大（机构）投资者在IPO市场中处于优势地位，他们总有动力去隐藏需求，这会导致股权分配的无效率，而无效率地分配股权，不仅不利于资金的合理流动，影响证券市场长期稳定的发展，也会制约上市公司通过资本市场融资的能力。     

独立董事与上市公司自愿性信息披露——基于A股上市公司2006年年报的实证分析

随着上市公司股权分置改革的不断深入,公司自愿性信息披露日益受到理论界和实务界的关注。独立董事作为中小投资者利益的代表,应当在公司自愿性信息披露方面起到积极的促进作用。但是,实证分析的结果表明,目前我国的独立董事制度并没有对上市公司的自愿性信息披露起到有效的促进作用。产生这种结果的主要原因是我国独立董事制度的内、外部制约机制不健全,因此,完善独立董事制度的相关法律法规,提高独立董事的专业性,健全独立董事的外部制约机制将对独立董事的职能发挥和上市公司的绩效提高起到积极的促进作用。     

国有股权、内部人掠夺与外部人约束——一个理论模型

上市公司的组织结构实际上是一个社会对于投资者保护水平需求的反应函数,而国有股权作为一种非标准的经济组织形式在特定的制度环境和历史阶段具有约束上市公司内部人的掠夺程度以及提高外部投资者参与程度的双重功能.     

A theory of firm decline

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter's operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter continues to grow, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside equity). In turn, this leads to a decline in the constrained-efficient level of effort and therefore to a drop in the return to investment.     

Corporate tax avoidance and cost of equity capital: international evidence

ABSTRACT

This study examines the association between firm’s tax avoidance activities and cost of equity capital across 17 countries. Consistent with the prior study based on the U.S. evidence, within strong investor protection countries, the extent of firm’s tax avoidance is negatively associated with its cost of equity capital. This result indicates that strong investor protection induces investors to perceive firm’s tax avoidance activities as the results of efficient tax planning to reduce tax liabilities. To the contrary, we find that the extent of firm’s tax avoidance is positively associated with its cost of equity capital within weak investor protection countries. This result suggests that investors impose equity risk premium on firm’s tax avoidance activities in weak investor protection countries, where agency conflicts prevail more on firm’s tax avoidance activities. As the first international study on the association between firm’s tax avoidance activities and its cost of equity capital, this study contributes to the literature by suggesting that such an association may vary across countries depending on the strength of investor protection within each country of domicile.     

Optimal Financial Structure: An Incomplete Contracting Model

The financial structures of firms observed in practice typically consist of debt claims of different priority and maturity, and outside equity with unconditional control. A simple model is developed in which this type of complex financial structure arises endogenously as a mechanism to allocate control and cash flow rights among the firm's manager and its investors. While short-term debt commits the manager to liquidate the firm in low profit states, outside equity with unconditional control allows investors to seize control in states where the manager otherwise would pursue low profit projects with high private benefits of control. Finally, long-term (junior) debt creates a debt overhang that protects the manager from excessive shareholder involvement.
JEL classification : G 32     

The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities

We scrutinize the scope of auctions for firm acquisitions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities. We show that no mechanism exists that allows an investor to acquire a low-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency is required as to qualify for a sequential equilibrium.     

投资者保护与公司股权结构:一个家族企业继任模型

本文借鉴家族企业继任模型,研究了投资者保护对公司股权结构安排产生影响的作用机理,认为投资者保护程度是决定公司股权结构安排的重要因素,公司治理结构中最优股权结构模式的选择在一定程度上受投资者保护的法律体系健全与否的影响。     

Does Mutual Fund Flow Reflect Investor Sentiment?

This paper examines the relationship between net aggregate equity fund flow and investor sentiment using weekly flow data. Using sentiment indicators from the American Association of Individual Investors and Investors Intelligence, I find that net aggregate equity fund flow in the current week is higher when individual investors became more bullish in the previous and current weeks. Moreover, higher net aggregate equity fund flow in the current week induces newsletter writers to become more bullish in the subsequent week. The relationship between net aggregate equity fund flow and investor sentiment remains strong even after accounting for the effects of risk premium and inflation. Overall, the evidence suggests that the behavior of equity fund investors is influenced not only by economic fundamentals, but also by investor sentiment.     

Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Markets

The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) has chosen to adopt an auctioning procedure to initially allocate CO₂ emission permits. Free allocation of permits will become an exception for the third phase (2013–2020) and most firms will have to buy all their permits on the market or via auctions. The ability of bidders to collude is a key concern about the design of the auction format. To counter collusion, the auction can be open to bidders without compliance obligations (speculators). This paper aims at studying experimentally speculation as a collusion‐breaking device in two different auction mechanisms: the uniform‐price sealed‐bid auction and the ascending clock auction. Our results suggest that a uniform sealed‐bid auction open to speculators should be chosen from a revenue maximization point of view. In this mechanism, compliance agents adopt an aggressive strategy toward speculators. This strategy significantly increases the seller's revenue, compared to the more collusive clock auction. In the latter, on the contrary, bidders accommodate speculators, letting them buy permits in the auction and buying their necessary permits on the secondary market. However, as opening the auction to speculators deteriorates efficiency, the regulator faces a trade‐off between these two objectives.     

Preplanned exit strategies in venture capital

This paper empirically considers the role of preplanned exits (the investor's initial strategy to sell the investee firm via an acquisition or an initial public offering (IPO) at the time of initial contract with the entrepreneur), legal conditions and investor versus investee bargaining power in the allocation of cash flow and control rights in entrepreneurial finance. We introduce a sample of 223 entrepreneurial investee firms financed by 35 venture capital funds in 11 continental European countries, and these data indicate the following. First, preplanned acquisition exits are associated with stronger investor veto and control rights, a greater probability that convertible securities will be used, and a lower probability that common equity will be used; the converse is observed for preplanned IPOs. Second, investors take fewer control and veto rights and use common equity in countries of German legal origin, relative to Socialist, Scandinavian, and French legal origin. Third, more experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to get financed with common equity and less likely to be financed with convertible preferred equity, while more experienced investors are more likely to use convertible preferred equity and less likely to use common equity.