Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade

We study international trade in innovative goods subject to uncertain consumer health effects. Such goods are often at the center of international trade disputes. We show that an interesting form of protectionism may arise because of scientific uncertainty. A free-riding effect is identified, implying more conservative behavior by countries. We also study the role of producers (lobbies) in providing valuable information, finding that the innovative lobby has an advantage in providing information as compared with the lobby producing the ‘traditional’ good. Moreover, lobbies disclose more information when the health effects are long lasting.     

Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies

I introduce a microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework. Politicians use contributions to finance their electoral expenditures. Voters are not fooled by electoral expenditures: they are influenced in a way that is consistent with the equilibrium behavior of lobbies and politicians. The model is used to: (i) determine the relation between campaign spending and the deviation from the median voter's preferred policy; (ii) show the informational value of lobbies' contributions; (iii) evaluate the welfare implications of restricting campaign spending; and (iv) interpret the empirical finding that campaign expenditures have a very low effect on election outcome. Although in equilibrium advertising provides voters with useful information, under reasonable parameter values, a ban on campaign contributions makes the median voter better off. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, D82, M37.     

PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION*

Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) building or stumbling blocks for multilateral trade liberalization? I address this question in an infinitely repeated tariff game between three countries engaged in intraindustry trade under oligopoly. The central result is that when countries are symmetric, a free trade agreement (FTA) undermines multilateral tariff cooperation by adversely affecting the cooperation incentive of the nonmember whereas a customs union (CU) does so via its effect on the cooperation incentives of members. However, when countries are asymmetric with respect to either market size or cost, there exist circumstances where PTAs facilitate multilateral tariff cooperation.     

Preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy

In this paper we analyze the effect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization, permitted by Article XXIV of the GATT, on country׳s incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on feasibility of global free trade. We present a model, in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups. We show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role in determining the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization. On one hand, the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations. On the other hand, when countries share similar political preferences, multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization.     

Political economy of income distribution dynamics

Income distribution varies considerably across countries; it tends to become more equal with development in some countries, but just the opposite occurs in other countries. This paper provides a theoretical investigation of the persistent differences in income distribution across countries over time. Motivated by the relationship between income distribution and public spending at different school levels for a broad range of countries over the past 30 years, the analysis centers on the role of public education where specific investments interact with political involvement by different socio-economic groups. Socio-economic groups may form lobbies to influence education policy making. The formation of lobbies is endogenous. Persistent inequality is caused by persistent lobbying efforts of the wealthy that lead to an allocation of public education spending more biased toward them.     

Aid,Terrorism, and Foreign Direct Investment: Empirical Insight Conditioned on Corruption Control

ABSTRACT

This paper checks the effect of foreign aid on terrorism–foreign direct investment (FDI) nexus, while considering the extent of domestic corruption control (CC). The empirical evidence is based on a sample of 78 developing countries. The following findings were established: the negative effect of terrorism on FDI is apparent only in countries with higher levels of CC; foreign aid dampens the negative effect of terrorism on FDI only in countries with high level of CC. Also, the result is mixed when foreign aid is subdivided into its bilateral and multilateral components. While our findings are in accordance with the stance that bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse effect of terrorism on FDI, we find that multilateral aid also decreases the adverse effect of other forms of terrorism that can neither be classified as domestic or transnational. Policy implications are discussed in the paper.     

Middle Class,Government Effectiveness and Poverty in the EU: A Dynamic Multilevel Analysis

Using the 2008-2011 EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions data, we implement a dynamic three-level model to analyze poverty persistence in 26 EU countries. We isolate true state dependence phenomena by disentangling the effects of observed and unobserved heterogeneity at country level and employ cofactors not previously considered by the literature. Estimates show that unobserved heterogeneity across individuals remains large, even after explicitly controlling for the observable components of individual characteristics. The initial value of poverty has large effects on current poverty status but this effect is not uniform across countries. The risk of poverty is negatively related to the size of the structural middle class and to the level of structural social expenditure but it increases when lagged total public expenditure increases (with respect to the structural value). There is strong evidence of true state dependence.     

Governance,resources and growth

Using a large sample of 50 oil exporting countries, we extend the prior literature by examining the role of quality of governance (QOG) on economic growth under the condition of heterogeneity and cross-sectional independence in errors. We document that QOG is by far the most consistent driver of economic growth both in the long- and short-run. Our result is robust to an alternative and an inverse measure of QOG. We also investigate a number of mediating factors contributing the QOG and economic growth linkage. We show that the long-run positive effect of QOG on economic growth is stronger in countries with higher information communication technology (ICT) diffusion; and such effect works only in countries with higher social capital, economic globalization, and financial development (FD). We also show that the ‘resource curse’ or ‘resource blessing’ debate in growth literature is sensitive to methodological choices.     

Multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences

This article examines multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences across countries. Under a planner who uses linear approximation for utility maximization, we show that (1) a country is an income receiver if it has a higher productivity than the average in producing public goods, enabling it to provide more public goods; (2) the amount of transfers can be pinned down for all countries with an adjustment cost; (3) each country obtains an identical utility increment; and (4) the country with the lowest adjustment cost is the best candidate for the planner country. All results are derived based on well-known information regarding the cost of producing the public goods and income levels.     

Firm growth in multinational corporate groups

This paper formulates an econometric model of firm growth that explicitly accounts for interdependence of firm growth rates within multinational corporate networks. We apply a recently introduced IV-estimation procedure for peer group effects to directly test for growth spillovers within multinational corporate networks. Using European firm level data, our estimation results indicate negative spillovers within horizontally organized multinational networks, with this effect being most pronounced for corporate groups producing in a larger number of different countries. In contrast, they are positive for vertically organized multinational corporate groups. In the former case, the spillovers lead to more within-network heterogeneity in the firm growth processes and slower average size adjustments. In the latter case, multinational corporate groups as a whole are more stable and, on average, members adjust their size faster. Finally, the robustness analysis demonstrates that the growth spillover effects in purely domestic corporate groups differ from their multinational counterparts and shows that our baseline results are not driven by spurious correlation of individual firm growth rates.     

Multilateral Comparisons of Productivity, Terms-of-Trade and Factor Accumulation

This paper proposes a new approach for multilateral comparisons using index numbers. The new approach combines two recently-proposed innovative techniques to examine differences among economies at various levels. The Minimum Spanning Tree algorithm, based on the idea of minimizing substitution bias of bilateral comparisons, provides a possible ordering for panel data. Making use of the suggested ordering, bilateral Törnqvist price and quantity indexes are calculated and multilateral indexes are obtained by chaining. An index-number based approach is then used to decompose the differences in GDP at the bilateral level. Different sources that contribute to the differences in GDP are considered: productivity differences, terms of trade differences, factor endowments differences and domestic output price differences. The newly formed indexes are base-invariant which provides strong support for using the technique for multilateral comparisons. An illustration of the technique using data from China and four OECD countries is included.     

Standards policy and international trade: Multilateralism versus regionalism

We develop a simple model of policy coordination on domestic standards and examine whether domestic standards policy can lead to regional and multilateral harmonization of standards under the principle of national treatment. This paper focuses on mandatory product and process standards affecting the characteristics of a final good that control negative consumption externalities (e.g., vehicle emissions control and safety standards, restrictions on the use of pesticides for agricultural goods, and safety standards for electrical products). Only the products that meet a country's national standards are allowed to circulate in that country's market. Raising standards reduces negative externalities caused by consumption of a traded good but increases firms’ costs. We use the core as the solution concept. A standards regime is considered to be in the core if it is not blocked by any coalition within countries. The main finding is that a multilateral agreement on standards that maximizes world welfare is only in the core if externalities are local or slightly transboundary. Otherwise, only a regional agreement on standards is in the core. As extensions, we consider many and asymmetric number of firms, asymmetry in market size, fixed costs for different standards, and a multilateral agreement on different standards.     

Multilateral trade and export-led growth in the world economy: some post-war evidence

In this paper, we address an empirical question: is there evidence to substantiate the assumption that the post-war liberalization of world trade has actually led to a significant increase in the world GDP? In our attempt to answer that question, time series data in the Penn World Table 6.1 are aggregated across countries to obtain a measure of world trade and output, and the total number of GATT/WTO member countries is employed as an explanatory variable to account for the impact of multilateral trade agreements, such as the Kennedy Round, Tokyo Round, and the Uruguay Round, on the trade-growth nexus. We then examine the relationship between world trade and the post-war GDP per worker across the world through the multivariate cointegration and error correction modeling and the Granger causality test. The results suggest that, at the global level, the post-war liberalization of multilateral trade has promoted both GDP and trade activities. There is also evidence that supports the export-led growth hypothesis in the world economy.     

The MFN clause,welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size

This paper analyzes MFN in a “competing exporters” model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that MFN yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off. Furthermore, in a repeated game of tariff cooperation, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under MFN punishments relative to discriminatory ones. This conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements. Overall, the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries, MFN and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature.     

Regionalism in standards: good or bad for trade?

Abstract.  Regional agreements on standards have been largely ignored by economists and blessed by multilateral trade rules. Using a constructed panel data that identifies the different types of agreements at the industry level, we find that such agreements increase the trade between participating countries but not necessarily with the rest of the world. Harmonization of standards may reduce the exports of excluded countries, especially in markets that have raised the stringency of standards. Mutual recognition agreements are more uniformly trade promoting unless they contain restrictive rules of origin, in which case intra-regional trade increases at the expense of imports from other countries.     

Analyzing the System of Preferential Tariffs for Least Developed Countries

This paper analyzes the rents available from non‐reciprocal preferential tariffs for least developed countries (LDCs) on all exports to the quad countries at the tariff line level. Most of the rents come from the European Union (EU) in clothing and textiles, while the USA and Canada offer few rents and charge significant tariffs to LDCs. We develop a dual economy labor market model that generates an income distribution and simulates the distributional effects of preferences. We find that the benefits of the preferences outweigh any adverse distributional effects. Relative inequality may increase with preferences in some cases, but absolute incomes increase in every case. We conclude that in the absence of multilateral liberalization, preferences are beneficial to some LDCs and expansion of preferences is desirable. In the event of multilateral liberalization, an import subsidy scheme that maintains the rents is the most desirable outcome.     

Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations

This paper provides a formal model of endogenous border formation and choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. We examine both the case of democratic governments and of dictatorships. The model is consistent with three observations. First, breakup of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflicts. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the breakup of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace dividend (the reduction in defense spending in a more peaceful world) is limited by the process of country breakup.     

Does it Matter Who You Sign With? Comparing the Impacts of North–South and South–South Trade Agreements on Bilateral Trade

Free trade agreements (FTAs) lead to a rise in bilateral trade regardless of whether the signatories are developed or developing countries. Furthermore, the percentage increase in bilateral trade is higher for South–South agreements than for North–South agreements. The results are robust across a number of gravity model specifications in which we control for the endogeneity of FTAs (with bilateral fixed effects) and also take account of multilateral resistance in both estimation (with country‐time fixed effects) and comparative statics (analytically). Our analytical model shows that multilateral resistance dampens the impact of FTAs on trade by less in South–South agreements than in North–South agreements, which accentuates the difference implied by our gravity model coefficients, and that this difference becomes larger as the number of signatories rises. For example, allowing for lags and multilateral resistance, a four‐country North–South agreement raises bilateral trade by 53% while the analogous South–South impact is 107%.     

Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets,simple mechanisms may help!

This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogeneous countries are key constraints on the design of those agreements. Mechanisms must prevent two sorts of free‐riding problems – free riding in effort provision and free riding in participation. As markets might fail to solve simultaneously those two problems, we construct instead a simple menu of options that trades off the provision of incentives for participating countries and the provision of incentives to participate. With such a mechanism, all countries voluntarily contribute to a fund, although at different intensities, but only the most efficient ones effectively reduce their pollution below its ‘business as usual’ level.     

Pecking order and core‐periphery in international trade

This paper analyzes the impact of market size and trade costs on bilateral trade flows. A multi‐country trade model with firm‐level heterogeneity in productivities and countries’ market potential provides a simple micro foundation for the link between these variables. In the model, market size and trade costs jointly determine a country‐specific pecking order of exporters serving their destination countries. In a counterfactual setting where bilateral trade costs are homogeneous across country pairs, market size predicts a common ranking of exporters among destination countries. This leads to a unique core‐periphery structure of the world trade network. With heterogeneous trade costs, we illustrate the impact of market size and trade costs on bilateral trade flows and its margins in a simple gravity‐like setting. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that both market size and trade costs (measured through the network position of countries) have a significant impact on bilateral exports: countries in the core bilaterally trade more with other countries in the core than with peripheral countries, conditional on typical observables.