Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets: Empirical Evidence from China

This study provides empirical evidence of managerial agency costs in socialistic internal capital markets. Listed Chinese companies are required to disclose the amount of resources that are reallocated to other firms of the parent company, which provides us with a direct measure of the socialistic subsidization of weak member firms by strong member firms within a business group. We hypothesize that in strong member firms, managerial compensation is less sensitive to firm performance because cross‐subsidization makes it difficult for group CEOs to hold the managers in strong firms accountable for their own firms' performance, and also increases the noise in performance measures. We also hypothesize that socialistic cross‐subsidization results in an increase in managerial agency costs of strong member firms due to the low pay‐performance sensitivity and low incentive to work hard. We document empirical results that are consistent with these two predictions.     

Equilibrium Principal‐Agent Contracts: Competition and R&D Incentives

We analyze competition between firms engaged in R&D activities and market competition to study the choice of the incentive contracts for managers with hidden productivity. Oligopolistic screening requires extra effort/investment from the most productive managers: under additional assumptions on the hazard rate of the distribution of types we obtain no distortion in the middle rather than at the top. The equilibrium contracts are characterized by effort differentials between (any) two types always increasing with the number of firms, suggesting a positive relation between competition and high‐powered incentives. An inverted U curve between competition and absolute investments can emerge for the most productive managers.     

Distorted Performance Measures and Dynamic Incentives

Incentive contracts must typically be based on performance measures that do not exactly match the agents' true contribution to the principals' objectives. Such misalignment may pose difficulties for effective incentive design. We analyze the extent to which implicit dynamic incentives, such as career concerns and ratchet effects, alleviate or aggfravate these problems. Our analysis demonstrates that the interplay between distorted performance measures and implicit incentives implies that career and ratchet effects have real effects in that stronger ratchet effects or greater distortion may increase optimal monetary incentives, and that distortion affects the optimality of different promotion rules.     

Relational Contracting in Partnerships

When performance is not verifiable, firms in a long-term relationship may rely on incentive contracts that are self-enforced or "relational." This paper studies the optimal design and performance of relational contracts in partnerships such as joint ventures or buyer-seller alliances. Optimal contracts look the same in each period as long as the relationship continues, but may require termination of the relationship after bad outcomes. Payments between the partners depend on their relative performance. In the special case of bilateral trade with specific investments, optimal relational contracting results in a price that varies with cost and demand conditions but is more stable than under spot market bargaining. Parallels are drawn with "Japanese style" subcontracting.     

The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents

While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often not explicitly incentivized. This paper offers an explanation for this observation based on the assumption that agents are envious and suffer utility losses if others receive higher wages. We analyze the impact of envy on optimal incentive contracts in a general moral hazard model and isolate the countervailing effects of envy on the costs of providing incentives. We show that envy creates a tendency towards flat-wage contracts if agents are risk-averse and there is no limited liability. Empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons are more pronounced among employees within firms than among individuals that interact in markets. Flat-wage contracts are then more likely to be optimal in firms.     

Task-specific abilities in multi-task principal–agent relationships

This paper analyzes a multi-task agency framework where the agent exhibits task-specific abilities. It illustrates how incentive contracts account for the agent's task-specific abilities if contractible performance measures do not reflect the agent's multidimensional contribution to firm value. This paper further sheds light on potential ranking criteria for performance measures in multi-task principal–agent relationships. It demonstrates that performance measures in multi-task agencies cannot necessarily be compared by their respective signal-to-noise ratio as in single-task agency relationships. In fact, it is indispensable to take the induced effort distortion and the measure-cost efficiency into consideration—both determined by the agent's task-specific abilities.     

引入相对业绩的员工激励机制研究

从员工激励的一般模型入手,结合信息不对称理论,构建了基于相对业绩的员工激励模型,并分析了其对最优激励契约的影响。理论上,纳入员工相对业绩机制可以有效缓解信息不对称下的道德风险,降低企业的代理成本。     

Bank capital regulation,loan contracts,and corporate investment

This paper studies the link between bank capital regulation, bank loan contracts and the allocation of corporate resources across firms’ different business lines. Credit risk is lower when firms write contracts that oblige them to invest mainly into projects with highly tangible assets. We argue that firms have an incentive to choose a contract with overly safe and thus inefficient investments when intermediation costs are increasing in banks’ capital-to-asset ratio. Imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs.     

Performance Measurement and Incentive Compensation: An Empirical Analysis and Comparison of Chinese and Western Firms' Practices

This paper describes the findings of a study aimed at providing a replication and extension in China of studies focused on incentive compensation practices of automobile retailers in the USA and the Netherlands. Rich, detailed data-sets from all three countries are analysed together and in comparison. As theory is not well developed at the level of detail of the data collected, the purpose of this study was primarily exploratory, to provide empirics that can lead to the development of theory. The findings show that Chinese firms are much more likely to provide incentive compensation than are Dutch firms, and they are even somewhat more likely to provide them than are US firms. But Chinese bonus plans are more likely to be subjective, rather than formula-based. In the situations where incentive payments are based on pre-set formulas, the Chinese firms' systems are more like those used in the Netherlands than in the USA, with bonuses based on non-financial performance measures and with more complex performance–reward functions. Like managers in the US firms, but unlike managers in the Dutch firms, Chinese managers who receive some form of incentive compensation are more satisfied with their pay. The paper concludes with tentative explanations of the findings and suggestions for future research.     

引入相对业绩的员工激励机制研究

从员工激励的一般模型入手,结合信息不对称理论,构建了基于相对业绩的员工激励模型,并分析了其对最优激励契约的影响。理论上,纳入员工相对业绩机制可以有效缓解信息不对称下的道德风险,降低企业的代理成本。     

Antecedents and consequences of the introduction of flexible benefit plans in China

The present study had two aims. The first was to explore the extent of flexible benefit plans (flex plans) within China and to make predictions about future trends. The second aim was to examine the relationships between the use of flex plans and two measures of labour market performance: the ability to attract essential employees and the level of labour turnover. The results from a survey of 324 firms in China reflecting a response rate of 32.4% showed that although there are presently a limited number of firms that adopt flex plans, the number is likely to increase in the next few years. Second, the probability of the adoption of flex plans was not found to vary with the mode of ownership and firm location. Third, flex plans were found to be adopted by firms for several practical reasons including their perceived role in cost containment, improved recruitment and retention, enhancement of job satisfaction and labour productivity. The take-up of such plans, however, was found to be inhibited by perceived administrative burdens and costs, and the limited number of staff qualified in benefit provision. Finally, the adoption of flex plans was significantly related to labour turnover and improved recruitment capacity.     

Endogenous timing of managerial delegation contracts in a unionized duopoly

In a multiple‐stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and unionized labor market, this paper analyzes whether firms' owners decide managerial incentive contracts sequentially or simultaneously. When firms compete in quantities, firms' owners can choose incentive contracts simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the unions' relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation. Instead, when firms compete in prices, firms' owners set incentive contracts sequentially with substitute goods and simultaneously with complement goods.     

Does it pay to be green? A disaggregated analysis of U.S. firms with green patents

The objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between environmental performance and financial performance on a sample of 361 U.S. firms over the 2007–2016 period. We contribute to the literature by considering firms active in sustainable innovations by obtaining green patents. We also contribute to the literature by using disaggregated measures of environmental performance collected from the Bloomberg ESG database, including environmental disclosure score, greenhouse gas emissions, waste emissions and water use. Panel data regressions' results show that environmental transparency positively influences current accounting and stock market performance, but negatively influences the return on capital employed. Furthermore, lower pollution emissions tend to improve the current return on assets, while being harmful for the efficiency of long‐term capital employment at the same time. The empirical results also indicate that the Global Financial Crisis (2007–2010) increased the environmental transparency of firms with green patents but negatively impacted their price to earnings ratio. At the same time, lower waste disposal diminishes stock valuation while the opposite is true with water use. Taken together, our results suggest that environmental transparency and greenhouse gas emissions generally appear to be the most important environmental variables influencing financial performance, with increasing importance attributed to them by the market after the global crisis period.     

Broad‐based incentive plans,HR practices and company performance

The purpose of this paper is to further develop our knowledge of the complementarities between broad‐based incentives and human resource (HR) management practices, and their combined impact on company performance. We focus on three HR practices that are expected, separately and in combination, to enhance the effectiveness of broad‐based plans: information sharing, upward communication, and training in team skills. Using a sample of 305 Canadian firms, we find that companies with broad‐based incentive plans have lower levels of upward communication and higher levels of information sharing compared with companies that do not offer incentives to the majority of their workforce. Further, we find that companies with broad‐based incentive plans are more productive compared with companies with no such plans, and the presence of supporting HR practices increases their productivity advantage even further. In particular, upward communication combined with broad‐based incentives has a strong positive relationship with productivity.     

Evaluating Form and Functionality of Pay‐for‐Performance Plans: The Relative Incentive and Sorting Effects of Merit Pay,Bonuses, and Long‐Term Incentives

Using two‐year longitudinal data from a large sample of US employees from a service‐related organization, the present study investigates the relative effects of three forms of pay‐for‐performance (PFP) plans on employees’ job performance (incentive effects) and voluntary turnover (sorting effects). The study differentiates between three forms of pay: merit pay, individual‐based bonuses, and long‐term incentives. By definition, these PFP plans have different structural elements that distinguish them from each other (i.e., pay plan form) and different characteristics (functionality), such as the degree to which pay and performance are linked and the size of the rewards, which can vary both within and across plan types. Our results provide evidence that merit raises have larger incentive and sorting effects than bonuses and long‐term incentives in multi‐PFP plan environments where the three PFP plans are operating simultaneously. Only merit pay has both incentive and sorting effects among the three PFP plans. The implications for the PFP‐related theory, as well as for the design and implementation of PFP plans, are discussed. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Performance compensation contracts and CEOs’ incentive to shift risk to debtholders: An empirical analysis

The paper investigates the relationships among CEO incentive contracts, manager ownership, charter value, and bank risk taking. We analyze whether the presence and magnitude of incentive contracts induce CEOs of financially distressed firms and firms with high manager ownership to take unprofitable risks that shift wealth from debtholders to equity holders. Our sample focuses on banks that had both the incentive and opportunity to shift risks, and compares them with those that did not. We compare weak and strong banks in periods when the banks’ principal creditor, the FDIC, was a lenient and then a stringent monitor. The evidence is consistent with bonus compensation inducing CEOs of financially weak firms to shift risk to debtholders only if they do not have large insider ownership. The evidence is also consistent with these contracts rewarding CEOs for their effort to manage unforeseeable risk albeit not their ability. Low charter value banks with high managerial ownership took profitable risk during the lenient regulatory period.     

Linking strategy and human resource practices: How employee and customer contracts are created

Organizations implement their business strategies through the human resource (HR) practices they use. These practices are major determinants of employees' psychological contracts. How employees interpret the terms of their employment impacts motivation, innovation, and customer service. This article describes four common types of psychological contracts in US firms and the HR practices that create them. It develops a framework for understanding how each contract shapes employee performance, retention, cooperation with fellow employees and customer responsiveness. It presents recommendations for more effectively managing the link between business strategy and the psychological contract of employees. © 1994 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Can environmental governance lower toxic emissions? A panel study of U.S. high‐polluting industries

Firms have increasingly adopted environmental governance mechanisms in the form of environmental compensation and environmental board committees. The current study examines the argument that such environmental governance mechanisms contribute to lower toxic emissions in high‐polluting industries. The sample comprises firms that were part of the S&P 500 from the years 2006 to 2011 and were mandated to report toxic emissions to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under the Toxic Release Inventory program. A panel regression model with propensity score matching was employed to minimize endogeneity bias. The results indicate that environmental compensation is a compelling incentive to motivate managers to invest in long‐term and highly uncertain environmental projects. Likewise, the presence of an environmental board committee appears to be significant, suggesting that directors contribute to a firm's strategy with their expertise and political influence. This research also found evidence supporting the cumulative adoption of both environmental governance mechanisms in enhancing environmental performance and the firm's legitimacy.     

管理报酬机制的构建

两权分离制度形成了企业所有者和经营者的委托代理关系,由于双方利益的冲突,委托人必然采取措施促使两者利益的趋同,报酬机制就是其中的一种有效的激励措施。本文以S=S0 aS1 bS2 E作为报酬方案的简化模型,具体分析了模型相关的构成因素,并以美国大企业管理人员报酬构成为例加以说明。     

Patterns of employment relationships: the association between compensation policy and contractual arrangements

Firms respond differently to labour market regulations and develop an employment relationship accordingly. We use linked employer–employee data to examine the relationship between compensation policies and contractual arrangements in large-sized firms in Portugal. In this country, the wages are regulated through minimum wage and collective agreement, while employment is protected by stringent employment legislation. The empirical analysis starts with a fuzzy clustering to identify typical compensation policies. Three major segments emerge from this analysis: Competitive, Internal Labour Markets and Incentive. The first segment comprises low-wage firms, which are highly responsive to market conditions. The other two reveal properties of internal labour markets, although the incentive-based firms reinforce the use of discretionary power to differentiate the workforce. Subsequently, we estimate a regression model to examine how the compensation policy interacts with contractual arrangement. Empirical evidence confirms the segmentation predictions, i.e. low, flexible wages and flexible contracts prevail in the same firms. Furthermore, vulnerable categories like young workers and female workers are over-represented in Competitive firms, while high-wages are associated with incentive devices benefiting white-collar employees. Apparently, firms foster inequality among segments of workers and often penalise or favour the same category of workers.