Residential search and choice of displaced households

Centrographic analysis is used to compare the residential search and choice behavior of 41 households who experienced either short-term or long-term displacement costs after moving out of the inner city of Saskatoon, with the behavior of 90 households who moved as if voluntarily. While the displaced households tended to search for housing in the same neighbourhoods as the voluntary movers, they chose a “new” home much farther away from their “old” home. By means of a logistic regression, the reasons for this more distant move are inferred to reflect both the tightness of the housing market and the housing search barriers that displaced households, who were more likely to be young or old renters, would have encountered.     

Long Term Incentive Plans,Executive Pay and UK Company Performance*

ABSTRACT In agency theory, the remuneration packages of executive directors in large companies are seen as an attempt to give them a pattern of rewards that aligns their interests more closely with shareholders as a whole. The sensitivity of total executive rewards to share price performance has become the conventional yardstick for judgements concerning whether reward packages do indeed serve shareholders’ interests or executives themselves. Long‐term incentive plans (LTIPs) introduced in the UK from 1995 have imposed new, firm‐specific performance conditions on senior managers. While LTIPs are designed to increase performance‐pay sensitivity, however, they also give executives new opportunities to manipulate the terms of LTIPs in their own favour, at the expense of shareholders and stakeholders in general. This paper presents the first estimates of UK total executive rewards that include detailed LTIP valuations. It finds that, while increasing average total rewards, the presence of LTIPs is actually associated with reductions in the sensitivity of executives’ total rewards to shareholder return. This raises doubts concerning both the effectiveness of the LTIP instrument and the validity of an agency perspective in this context.     

A fair go? The gender pay gap among corporate executives in Australian firms

In virtually all economies, executive positions are highly male dominated. This study examines the pay gap between male executives and female executives in large Australian firms from 2011 to 2014 to evaluate whether female executives are paid equitably compared with male executives. The mean pay comparison shows that female executives earn 80.7% of the total pay earned by male executives. A large part of the gender pay gap is explained by differences in positions held; female executives are particularly underrepresented in highly paid executive positions. After controlling for executive position and other relevant individual and firm characteristics, there remains a 15.1% gender gap in total pay. Our findings suggest that to achieve the goal of gender equity, both the proportion of women at executive level and the executive-level gender pay gap need to be monitored.     

康师傅公司是否进入方便米饭市场

案例描述了康师傅公司董事长兼执行总裁魏应州对公司是否进入方便米饭市场的决策过程。来自公司两位高层对此也争论不休,营销副总裁藤先生建议公司新年度应大幅度增加有关方便米饭市场调查与研究预算,开展新产品上市前期相关准备工作;技术副总裁钱先生提出截然相反的意见,认为从技术和市场角度,方便米饭是一个不成熟、不确定的市场,公司应采取观望的态度。魏老板怕错失方便米饭市场的先机,先后两次亲自召开会议,但仍感进退两难,困扰他的最重要的三个问题是：（1）方便米饭市场有增长的机会吗？（2）前期市场调研需要花费不少的费用,值得投入吗？（3）康师傅何时进入该市场呢？总而言之,魏老板下一步该怎么做呢？     

Executive compensation and firm risk after successful mergers and acquisitions in Africa

This paper examines the impact of various executive compensation types on the postmerger risk taking by firm's executives. We find that executive pay influences firm risk differently depending on compensation type and risk measure. Specifically, we find that rewarding executives with cash compensation reduces the total postmerger risk of acquirers. However, managers are motivated to increase systematic risk when they are rewarded with stock‐based incentives. Besides, based on the argument that managerial compensation portfolio might impact systematic and unsystematic risks differently, our findings show no evidence of the impact of executive pay on unsystematic risk.     

The Survival of Unique Corporate Cultures

In this paper we identify two situations that can lead a firm to hire an executive who supports a corporate culture that differs from the firm's current culture. In the first case, there is a similarity between the firm's culture and that of the candidate, and in the second case, executives who support the firm's culture constitute a minority of the available candidates. In both cases the firm prefers to hire an available candidate, rather than risk a prolonged vacancy. We show how these scenarios can lead to the eradication of unique cultures and to the perpetuation of more common cultures. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Executive compensation and gender: S&;P 1500 listed firms

We examine if a gender gap persists in executive compensation and if the composition and the determinants of executive compensation for men versus women are the same for the S&P1500 listed firms during the period from 1992 to 2004. This analysis is also extended to high tech firms, where high scholarship is required both for male and female executives. The results reveal that the gender gap in executive compensation is reducing essentially after the year 2000. Also, the factors that explain the variation in executive compensation are not all the same for men and women. However, firms continue to pay women, who are considered more risk averse than men, a similar proportion of risky compensation components, such as stock options and restricted stocks, than they pay to men. In terms of technology firms, we find that the gender differences in total compensation are not statistically significant. Our study offers insight into recent data for executive compensation. The finding that the gender gap diminishes is a sign of a better functioning market for executives. Our findings could be potentially useful for compensation committees in order to develop compensation packages that take into consideration the degree of risk aversion in order to enhance performance. Compensation adjusted for risk aversion can produce a higher level of satisfaction for the employees and can lead to better performances. Future research should focus on international comparison of various dimensions of executive compensation.     

Executive Pay Matters: Looking Beyond the CEO to Explore Implications of Pay Disparity on Non‐CEO Executive Turnover and Firm Performance

Using a longitudinal data set covering a span of 10 years, we investigate the impact of vertical and horizontal pay disparity on non‐CEO executive turnover and subsequent firm performance. Hypothesizing differential responses to pay disparity depending on a non‐CEO executive's responsibilities, we first categorize non‐CEO executives based on their job demands and their role in the organization (e.g., oversight, divisional). We then explore how pay disparity influences the relationship between executive category and turnover, and how the level of pay disparity impacts the relationship between turnover and firm performance. We find that executive category significantly impacts the likelihood of turnover, and also influences firm performance. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay‐for‐Firm‐Performance

Whether voluntary or mandatory in nature, most recent corporate governance codes of best practice assume that board structural independence, and the application by boards of outcome‐based incentive plans, are important boundary conditions for the enforcement of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay‐for‐firm‐performance; that is, for optimal contracting between owners and executive agents. We test this logic on a large Australian sample using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach to dynamic panel data estimation. We find that Australian boards exhibiting best practice structural arrangements – those chaired by non‐executives and dominated by non‐executive directors at the full board and compensation committee levels – are no more adept at enforcing CEO pay‐for‐firm‐performance than are executive‐dominated boards. These findings suggest that policy makers' faith in incentive plans and the moderating influence of structural independence per se may be misplaced. Our findings also hold significant implications for corporate governance theory. Specifically, the findings lend further support to a contingency‐based understanding of board composition, reward choice and monitoring; an approach integrating the insights afforded by behavioural approaches to Agency Theory and by social‐cognitive and institutional understandings of director outlook, decision‐making and behaviour.     

Do Prior Experiences of Top Executives Enable or Hinder Product Market Entry?

How firms achieve entry into new‐to‐the‐firm product markets is an important but overlooked topic. Some aspiring entrants fail during product development, and they miss the opportunity to enter. In such contexts, firms often take action to de‐risk entry, for example, by drawing upon the experience of top executives with market‐specific expertise obtained in prior jobs. However, the empirical evidence from this study shows that beyond a narrow threshold, greater prior experience in the top executive team was associated with a greater likelihood of failed entry attempts among the firms that I tracked over two decades in the biotechnology industry. This result held across product markets with low and high degrees of dynamism. Based on the literature on dynamic managerial capabilities, where entry into new markets indicates managers’ ability to reconfigure organizational resources and adapt to a changing environment, this study’s main contribution is to illustrate how and why experience matters for entry.     

CEO compensation and the seasoned equity offering decision

Empirical research on seasoned equity offerings indicates that the decision to make an SEO typically engenders a decline in firm value, as investors interpret this decision as a signal of poor financial health or that the stock is overpriced. Here, we add to the literature by analyzing the short‐term market reaction to SEO announcements and the chief executive officer's link to firm performance (i.e. the proportion of CEO equity‐based compensation). Results support the hypothesis that investors are more likely to view the announcement of an SEO as a last resort source of capital when the proportion of CEO equity‐based compensation is high. In such cases of high equity‐based compensation, our findings indicate that the SEO announcement provides an incremental signal of financial distress above that provided by financial statements. We also find this relationship (last resort signal) to be stronger when large information asymmetries exist between management and investors. Thus, managers should consider the ramifications of executive compensation structure when considering whether to make an SEO. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Experimental evaluation of executive skills in an EU country

Corporate executives constitute the highest echelon of the managerial hierarchy, responsible for implementing the strategic plans and policies established by the board of directors on an operational basis. Often the inquiry about executive skills evolves around the search for managerial skills. Executive skills form a distinct category of skills; however, they are often conceived as a set of managerial skills. This article presents the results of an extended survey concerning executive skills based in empirical measurements among executives in Greece. International literature suggests a wide range of executive skills. Based on this, a list of 42 skills, divided into six categories, was created. This list was evaluated by 110 executives of the larger corporations in Greece. Using a structured assessment methodology, skills and categories were assessed and validated. Then, factor analysis was applied to these results and a set of 11 executive skills synthesized from this work. Findings are discussed and compared with those of other surveys, and topics for further research are set out.     

高管激励机制与企业绩效相关性研究——基于主板、创业板上市公司的对比分析

企业代理问题在市场化改革不断深入的今天已成为中国公司亟待解决的发展障碍。本文结合2474家主板上市公司和379家创业板上市公司治理结构以及高管激励机制对于企业绩效的实际影响,通过构建动态博弈模型和回归模型,发现以薪酬和股票期权形式的高管激励的正相关性随着高管股权稀释程度的上升而减小。本文还研究发现,与理论预测不同,独立董事占比与企业绩效有着负相关性,反映出我国的独立董事制度还不够完善。另外,笔者创新地对比了两板公司由于公司规模、GDP等因素对激励体系产生的不同反应,发现处于起步阶段的创业板公司绩效同高管激励机制和公司内控体系并没有主板公司那样明显的相关性。     

高管薪酬激励、内部控制有效性与公司业绩——来自沪深A股上市公司的经验证据

采用2010—2014年沪深A股非金融保险类上市公司的数据对上市公司高管薪酬激励、内部控制有效性与公司业绩的关系进行实证检验,研究结果显示：高管薪酬激励程度越高,内部控制有效性越好;内部控制有效性、高管薪酬激励与公司业绩都存在显著的正相关关系;内部控制有效性是高管激励程度对公司业绩影响的中介变量,三者之间存在显著的局部中介效应,以控股权不同进行分组检验也证明了这一效应的存在。因此,上市公司在制定高管薪酬激励计划时应当考虑内部控制对薪酬激励效果的影响,为达到激励高管进而提升公司业绩的目的,需要建立与高管薪酬激励相配套的机制,完善上市公司内部控制制度。     

Internal Market Failure: A Framework for Diagnosing Firm Inefficiency*

ABSTRACT The theory of market and government failure can be used to diagnose inefficiency within firms and to identify strategies to deal with these problems. Internal market failures (IMFs) – internal public good problems, internal negative and positive externalities, internal information asymmetries, internal monopolies, the presence of uncertainty – create inefficiencies within firms just as they do in normal markets. As well, self‐interested behaviour by executives and internal interest groups (rent‐seeking) are analogous to government, or governance, failures (IGFs). Associated with many of these internal market failure problems are generic solutions that can usefully inform executives in their efforts to improve efficiency within the firm. Internal governance failures, in contrast, normally require action by shareholders and boards of directors.     

高管社会资本:高管团队人口特征绩效研究新进展

长期以来,高管人员作为企业最重要的人力资源备受研究人员的关注,早期的研究认为,高管团队人口特征与企业绩效存在直接的相关性,而近年的研究则发现高管团队人口特征对企业绩效的影响可能并非是简单的直接相关,更有可能受到一些中间变量的调节与影响。高管社会资本通过组织内外的关系网络,建立起以社会资本为中间变量的高管团队人口特征绩效影响的新机制。高管社会资本概念及研究内容的提出,为我们最终解决高管人口特征绩效影响的"黑箱"问题提供了新的研究思路与分析框架。     

Executive career advancement in career moves across employers: the role of organization-level predictors

This paper examines the career moves of executives between different organizations and looks at the characteristics of executives employing organizations as a predictor of the outcome of the moves. The paper uses a retained executive search firm's proprietary data set that contains information on the career paths of executives in the financial services industry. The results show that the perceived operational excellence of executives employing organization has a significant signalling power for other employers and strongly impacts the success of executives' moves across different organizations. The data also reveal that executives may use their employment spell at large-sized organizations that are perceived as excellent as a conscious career-building mechanism and accept smaller promotions to join such organizations.     

Friend or foe? Employee ownership and CEO dismissal

This paper examines 2 research questions. First, does the level of employee stock ownership impact the likelihood of dismissing poorly performing chief executive officers (CEOs)? Second, does the level of employee stock ownership affect the likelihood of appointing an outsider or an insider after the dismissal of an incumbent CEO? We suggest that employee stock ownership reinforces the firm performance—CEO dismissal link because employee shareholders' welfare consisting of fixed claims (wages, bonuses, etc.), residual claims (dividends, increase in stock value, etc.), and human capital (generic and idiosyncratic) are highly linked to their firm performance. Moreover, under conditions of poor performance, employee shareholders are likely to favor an outsider CEO because he or she is more likely to initiate and implement drastic changes to the strategy of the firm, and therefore, he or she is more likely to improve firm performance. Drawing on a longitudinal sample of French firms, we find that employee stock ownership strengthens the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO dismissal likelihood. We find also that the higher employee ownership, the more likely that the underperforming CEO is replaced by an outsider. In contrast, employee ownership has no moderating impact on the likelihood of insider CEO appointment.     

转轨经济条件下战略行为选择及转换研究

非市场资源对企业的非市场策略、行为以及绩效都具有十分重要的作用。在转轨经济条件下,尽管国有企业高管人员到政府任职不是企业主动行为,不符合企业政治策略的范畴,却能帮助企业形成相对于其他竞争对手的独特优势地位。当原企业高管人员到政府任职后,特别是担任企业所处行业的主管部门负责人后,会将在企业中所形成的认知模式转换为行业的管制政策,导致其此前所任职的企业必然形成一定的先发优势。本文从非市场资源的角度,提出了转轨经济条件下国有企业战略行为选择与转换的原因,以及竞争优势来源的新解释。     

Power as a determinant of executive compensation

Most empirical investigations on the disassociation between executive compensation and firm performance have been done using agency theory. Agency theory alludes to a power imbalance favorable to the executives, allowing them to pursue their self-interests in the form of large pay packages. However, because of its roots in the economic discipline, agency theory has led researchers to test financial rather than behavioral hypotheses. Over 70 years of research has been conducted on the pay-form-performance relationship, but only a few significant relationships have been found. This paper attempts to incorporate behavioral conjectures of power into the agency theory framework to provide a comprehensive approach to testing executive pay. Agency theory is combined with the resource dependency theory and with specific measures of power developed by Finkelstein (1992) for a more complete executive pay model.