Voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic

This paper studies the determination through majority voting of a pension scheme when society consists of far-sighted and myopic individuals. All individuals have the same basic preferences but myopics tend to adopt a short-term view (instant gratification) when dealing with retirement saving and labor supply. Consequently, they will find themselves with low consumption after retirement and regret their insufficient savings decisions. Henceforth, when voting they tend to commit themselves into forced saving. We consider a pension scheme that is characterized by two parameters: the payroll tax rate (that determines the size or generosity of the system) and the “Bismarckian factor” that determines its redistributiveness. Individuals vote sequentially. We examine how the introduction of myopic agents affects the generosity and the redistributiveness of the pension system. Our main result is that a flat pension system is always chosen when all individuals are of one kind (all far-sighted or all myopic), while a less redistributive system may be chosen if society is composed of both myopic and far-sighted agents. Furthermore, while myopic individuals tend to prefer larger payroll taxes than their far-sighted counterparts, the generosity of the system does not always increase with the proportion of myopics.     

Consumption habits in an overlapping-generations model

This paper introduces consumption habits in the Blanchard (1985) overlapping-generations model. It shows that steady-state capital and consumption are higher if individuals have habits than otherwise. Moreover, “inward habits” lead to higher steady-state capital and consumption compared to “outward habits.”     

Crime and punishment in the “American Dream”

We observe that countries where belief in the “American dream”(i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know that beliefs are also correlated with several features of the economic system (taxation, social insurance, etc). Our objective is to study the joint determination of these three features (beliefs, punitiveness and economic system) in a way that replicates the observed empirical patterns. We present a model where beliefs determine the types of contracts that firms offer and whether workers exert effort. Some workers become criminals, depending on their luck in the labor market, the expected punishment, and an individual shock that we call “meanness”. It is this meanness level that a penal system based on “retribution” tries to detect when deciding the severity of the punishment. We find that when initial beliefs differ, two equilibria can emerge out of identical fundamentals. In the “American” (as opposed to the “French”) equilibrium, belief in the “American dream” is commonplace, workers exert effort, there are high powered contracts (and income is unequally distributed) and punishments are harsh. Economists who believe that deterrence (rather than retribution) shapes punishment can interpret the meanness parameter as pessimism about future economic opportunities and verify that two similar equilibria emerge.     

Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects

In this paper we examine a group formation problem, where heterogeneous individuals partitioned themselves into communities, each choosing its own public project from the given space of feasible projects. The model is that of “horizontal product differentiation” where individuals display distinct preferences over the policy space. We consider the notion of “efficient” configuration that minimizes the total project-related costs and aggregate personalized costs of all individuals, and “sustainable” configurations, those are immune against breakaways by subgroups of individuals. Our main result is that, with a unidimensional project space and single-peaked personalized costs, every efficient partition is sustainable.     

What explains consumption in the very short-run? Evidence from checking account data

This paper investigates consumption behavior within an intertemporal optimization model of the representative household. Our dataset consists of deposits and withdrawals from individual household checking accounts that received paychecks by direct deposit. We construct samples of panel data for households with weekly, biweekly, and semi-monthly pay-periods and form two different measures of consumption for each sample. GMM estimates of structural parameters provide mixed evidence for habit formation or durability and limited support for the permanent income hypothesis. The results instead point to “rule of thumb” consumption under liquidity constraints, where the household consumes its current disposable income each pay-period with possible debt servicing. These findings are uniform with regard to estimation of sub-samples split according to age or household income.     

Optimal fiscal policy in a model with inherited aspirations and habit formation

In this paper, we analyze optimal fiscal policies in an overlapping generations framework, where preferences exhibit aspirations in consumption and environmental quality as well as habit formation. We focus on the second best policies when the government needs to finance a given stream of public expenditures by using distortionary taxes. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the competitive equilibrium is characterized by levels of capital and environmental quality that are too small and a level of labor supply that is too large. Our numerical simulations show that an optimal fiscal policy can be used as an effective stabilization device and that when consumption taxes are fixed, the planner implements maintenance investment and capital income subsidies while financing public spending through labor and fixed consumption taxes.     

Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games

I study how having a choice about who to play affects the conventions that arise in a population playing a 2×2 common interest game. Match choice allows agents playing “fragile but efficient” strategies to isolate themselves, raising their returns but making it harder for outsiders to duplicate their success. When agents are myopic, the second effect dominates: long run play can shift toward either the risk-dominant equilibrium (with common interests in matching) or toward the inefficient equilibrium (with opposing interests in matching). In contrast, when agents are patient, supra-Nash payoffs can be sustained.     

Rejuveniles and growth

Rejuveniles are “people who cultivate tastes and mind-sets traditionally associated with those younger than themselves” [Noxon, C., 2006. Rejuvenile. Crown Publishers]. In this paper, we study a standard AK growth model of overlapping generations populated by rejuveniles. For our purposes, rejuveniles are old agents who derive utility from “keeping up” their consumption with that of the current young. We find that such cross-generational keeping up is capable of generating interesting equilibrium growth dynamics, including growth cycles. No such growth dynamics is possible either in the baseline model, one where no such generational consumption externality exists, or for almost any other form of keeping up. Steady-state growth in a world with rejuveniles may be higher than that obtained in the baseline model.     

Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely “selfish” preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in different firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are “close”. This result holds for a broad class and distribution of social preferences.     

From families to formal contracts: An approach to development

This paper develops a theory in which individuals can use one of two types of human/social capital to enforce contracts: “Local capital” relies on families and other personal networks; “market capital” relies on impersonal market institutions such as auditors and courts. Local capital is efficient when most trading is local, but only market capital can support trading between strangers that allows extensive division of labor and industrialization. We show that economies with a low cost of accumulating local capital (say, because people live close together) are richer than economies with a high cost of accumulation when long distance trade is difficult, but are slower to transition to impersonal market exchange (industrialize) when long distance trade becomes feasible. The model provides one way to understand why the wealthiest economies in 1600 AD, China, India, and the Islamic Middle East, industrialized more slowly than the West. We report an array of historical evidence documenting the pre-industrial importance of family and kinship networks in China, India, and the Islamic world compared to Europe, and the modernization problems linked to local capital.     

Does a ‘non-committed’ government always generate lower social welfare than its ‘committed’ counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters

We show that social welfare in the setup where the government lacks the full ability to commit to its trade policies may exceed the social welfare when the government possesses full commitment power if consumer surplus is part of the social welfare function. This is never the case in the standard, “third market” framework of strategic trade policy. We provide two examples in which consumer surplus matters: the “home market” and the “intra-industry trade” setup. The policy instruments under consideration are import tariffs and export subsidies and there are R&D spillovers from the domestic to the foreign firm.     

Can consumption habit spillovers be a source of equilibrium indeterminacy?

This paper investigates whether the external consumption habit can be a source of indeterminacy in a one-sector growth model when the labor supply is elastic. When there is a proper habit effect with a positive intertemporal elasticity of substitution, we find that the model exhibits indeterminacy if the coefficient of the habit formation is sufficiently large that allows for a substantial impact of current consumption on the habit. Indeterminacy arises even though the elasticity of the Frisch labor supply is positive and the elasticity of the labor demand in negative. In a calibrated version, we find that indeterminacy is empirically plausible when the habit effect is negative that features the “catching up with the Joneses” effect. Under given “catching up with the Joneses” effects, the external consumption habit can be a source of indeterminacy even if more than a half of the external consumption habit comes from past average consumption.     

Minimum wage,on-the-job search and employment: On the sectoral and aggregate equilibrium effect of the mandatory minimum wage

We study the impact of a minimum wage in a segmented labor market in which workers are at different stages of their careers. At the end of a learning-by-doing period, workers paid the minimum wage quit “bad jobs” for better-paying “good jobs”, following an on-the-job search process with endogenous search intensity. A rise in the minimum wage reduces “bad jobs” creation and prompts workers to keep their “bad jobs” by reducing on-the-job search intensity. The ambiguous impact on unqualified employment replicates and explains the findings of several empirical studies. However, a minimum wage rise reduces overall employment and output.     

Can Habit Formation Be Reconciled with Business Cycle Facts?

Many asset pricing puzzles can be explained when habit formation is added to standard preferences. We show that utility functions with a habit then gives rise to a puzzle of consumption volatility in place of the asset pricing puzzles when agents can choose consumption and labor optimally in response to more fundamental shocks. We show that the consumption reaction to technology shocks is too small by an order of magnitude when a utility includes a consumption habit. Moreover, once a habit in leisure is included, labor input is counterfactually smooth over the cycle. In the case of habits in both consumption and leisure, labor input is even countercyclical. Consumption continues to be too smooth. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E13, E21, E32.     

Patent law and complementary innovations

This paper explores which patent policy should be applied to complementary innovations that are aggregated into broader technologies. I compare a setting in which complementary innovations must be bundled prior to patenting, with a second setting in which they can be patented separately. The first setting can improve static efficiency by avoiding the costs resulting from the scattering of complementary patents. But it also limits the disclosure of small innovations, which may lead to inefficient R&D cost duplications. A model capturing these effects shows that patenting complementary innovations separately is not efficient when innovations can be developed rapidly. This result justifies the enforcement of a severe “inventive step” or “non-obviousness” requirement in sectors where complementary innovations are frequent.     

Impacts of hiring subsidies targeted at the long-term unemployed on the low-skilled labor market: The French experience

This paper proposes a theoretical matching framework to analyze firms' and workers' response to a targeted hiring subsidy program when taking into account interactions between segments of the low-skilled labor market. By developing a general equilibrium model, the paper provides a useful tool to evaluate the aggregate effects induced on the low-skilled labor market. Then, the model is computed above French data to estimate the employment and welfare effects of a measure introduced in France in 1995, the “Initiative-for-Employment Contract”. Finally, as the framework is well-suited to investigate design issues, I analyze the efficiency of the French program as well as targeting issues.     

Public goods, merit goods, and the relation between private and government consumption

In this paper, we investigate the relation between public and private consumption, by constructing a general government spending data set, by function, for 12 European countries. In particular, we split government consumption into two categories. The first category—“public goods”—includes defence, public order, and justice. The second category—“merit goods”—includes health, education, and other services that could have been provided privately. Equations from a relatively general permanent income model are estimated by GMM. The estimates are fairly robust in showing that public goods substitute while merit goods complement private consumption. However, the relation between merit goods and private goods turns out to be stronger than that between public goods and private goods. Thus, in the aggregate government and private consumption are complements.     

International migration and “educated unemployment”

This paper provides a novel explanation of “educated unemployment”, which is a salient feature of the labor markets in a number of developing countries. In a simple job-search framework we show that “educated unemployment” is caused by the prospect of international migration, that is, by the possibility of a “brain drain”. In addition, the analysis shows that a developing country may end up with more educated workers despite the brain drain and educated unemployment.     

Power fluctuations and political economy

We study (constrained) Pareto efficient allocations in a dynamic production economy where the group that holds political power decides the allocation of resources. For high discount factors, the economy converges to a first-best allocation where labor supply decisions are not distorted. For low discount factors, distortions do not disappear and fluctuate over time. Most importantly, the set of sustainable first-best allocations is larger when there is less persistence in the identity of the party in power (because this encourages political compromise). This result contradicts the common presumption that there will be fewer distortions when there is a “stable ruling group”.     

On Optimal Lifetime Redistribution Policy

In this paper, we examine various aspects of the optimal lifetime redistribution policy within a cohort. We characterize the optimal tax policy when society consists of individuals who do not differ only in productivity, but also in time preference. We extend Diamond's analysis on nonlinear taxation of savings into the three-type and four-type models. To gain a better understanding of the lifetime redistribution, the problem is also solved numerically. Our results provide a rationale for distortions (upward and downward) in savings behavior in a simple two-period model where high-skilled and low-skilled individuals have different nonobservable time preferences beyond their earning capacity. If we interpret our model so that instead of private savings there is public provision of pension in the second period, then in the three-type model, we find a nonmonotonic pattern of the replacement rates. The numerical results suggest that retirement consumption is less dispersed than the first-period consumption in a paternalistic case. Paternalistic government policy also increases second-period consumption compared to the welfarist case.