Differential Provision of Solid Waste Collection Services in the Presence of Heterogeneous Households

A model of household refuse production is presented in which individuals differ in their distaste for the waste stock and the supply of waste collection services is continuous in pick-up frequency. The inclusion of pick-up frequency into household solid waste management analyses has already been shown to have policy implications. In fact, even in the absence of the waste stock externality, a system of uniform consumption taxes and legal (or curbside) disposal and recycling subsidies has been found to be necessary (and sufficient) to induce households to socially optimally allocate their resources when illegal disposal (or simply dumping) incentives exist but a per unit punishment system for dumping is lacking. This policy is here concluded to be no longer feasible; instead, a system of differential consumption taxes and recycling subsidies and uniform legal disposal subsidies is found to be optimal (but possibly nonimplementable). In the presence of heterogeneous households, which are however identifiable on the basis of their relative location to the landfill site, an optimal and implementable policy is then shown to require a differential provision of collection services.     

Recycling of plastics: A materials balance optimisation model

At present the volume of solid waste produced in modern consumer societies is increasing, requiring policy measures to reduce the volume of waste to be dumped or incinerated. In this article a materials balance optimisation model for the recycling of plastics is developed to analyse the impact of policy measures that stimulate recycling. The study presents the structure of the optimisation model and it gives the results of a charge imposed on the dumping and incineration of plastics. The calculations show that considerable effort should be made to reach the recycling targets for plastic that have been set by the public authorities for the year 2000.     

ILLEGAL DISPOSAL AND WASTE COLLECTION FREQUENCY

A model of household refuse production is presented in which the implications of the presence of dumping incentives for the public choice of garbage collection frequency under a user fee system are analysed. Insofar as governments wishing to balance their waste collection service budgets can set the marginal benefit of collecting garbage equal to its marginal cost, no externality arises through pick‐up frequency. However, when the expected punishment for dumping is zero or independent of its extent, the public provision of refuse collection frequency turns out to be negatively affected by the amount of garbage that individuals dump and, therefore, intervention in the management of household waste is required. The optimal policy is found to consist of taxes on consumption goods and subsidies for curbside (or legal) disposal and recycling that are directly linked to collection costs.     

Waste management regulation: policy solutions and policy shortcomings

A model of packaging waste management is presented to explore the policy options available to governments to implement waste regulation in light of the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR ). Our model endogenizes the packaging design as an additional determinant for the overall amount of waste jointly with consumers’ sorting effort and producers’ output decisions. The model shows that the policies that yield the first‐best allocation may not find public support. Furthermore, if the set of available policy instruments is limited, production and consumption of the good is likely to settle on a sub‐optimal level even though the optimal allocation may be achievable. Finally, the model demonstrates that a landfill tax may actually increase landfill waste in the presence of tradable credits for recycling activities. The results shed light on some shortcomings of existing regulatory schemes such as the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations of the UK .     

Advance disposal fee vs. disposal fee: A monopolistic producer’s durability choice model

This study examines how the timing of waste disposal fee collection affects the producer’s choice of built-in product durability and social welfare in a durable-goods monopoly model. We categorize the waste disposal fee policies into two: advance disposal fee (ADF) policy and disposal fee (DF) policy. We show that a DF policy has two opposing effects on durability. Firstly, a DF policy gives the producer an incentive to increase durability in order to delay the households’ waste disposal and to discount future payments of the disposal fee (the payment-discounting effect). Secondly, a DF policy creates an incentive for consumers to dump waste illegally in order to mitigate the payment of the disposal fee, and gives the producer an incentive to reduce durability in order to avoid market saturation and the associated future price cuts (the illegal-dumping effect). When the disposal fee is low, the payment-discounting effect dominates the illegal-dumping effect under a DF policy, leading to the enhancement of durability. In this case, from a social welfare viewpoint, a DF policy may be more desirable than an ADF policy if the environmental damage associated with illegal dumping is not serious. However, when the disposal fee is high, a DF policy induces more illegal dumping, reduces durability, and inflicts more environmental damage. Therefore, an ADF policy is more socially desirable than a DF policy when the disposal fee is high. Moreover, we consider an oligopoly case and find that an ADF policy is more socially desirable in an industry with smaller market power.     

Optimizing production technology choices: conventional production vs. recycling

The present study examines the optimal use of renewable resources and how optimality is linked to the accumulation of waste stock. Production technology choices are based on a maximization of a discounted stream of net utility over time with respect to constancy of environmental services. When adopting a socially optimal tax-subsidy scheme to price produced goods, the ultimate utility level is determined by how tax revenues and subsidies compensate each other in monetary terms. Therefore, the constraints imposed on the optimal use of economic instruments in promoting recycling when a government budget is balanced are also studied. The materials balance structure of the model yields steady-state comparative statics and dynamic envelope results with interesting policy implications.     

An economic analysis of the Packaging waste Recovery Note System in the UK

In order to cope with the increasing scarcity of final dump sites for household wastes, the UK recently introduced an environmental policy targeted at the firms that produce and sell products that generate packaging wastes. This policy requires such businesses to hold predetermined numbers of tradable credits called “Packaging waste Recovery Notes” (PRNs). This article provides insights into the economic implications of such a policy through a simple analytical model of a recyclable product and the PRN markets. Our analysis yields two particularly interesting results. First, an increase in the required recycling rate dampens the output and landfill waste levels, while the effect on the level of recycling activities is ambiguous. Second, an increase in the landfill tax always leads to an increase in the landfill waste. We also discuss how the socially optimal landfill tax in the presence of the PRN market should be chosen.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation

Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting. This question has mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the second-best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first-best value, marginal social damage (MSD). On closer examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second-best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the Pigouvian rate. Given these observations, the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first-best value, the second-best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements. Even in cases where the second-best environmental tax is lower than its first-best value, the welfare gains may be greater than in a first-best setting. These results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit (revenue recycling effect) exceeds the marginal fiscal cost (tax base effect) over a range of environmental tax rates that, for benchmark models, extends above the first-best Pigouvian rate. These findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods.     

A Comparison of Household Recycling Behaviors in Norway and the United States

This paper investigates empirically the determinants of household recycling in Norway and compares the results with a similar, recently published, study of households in the United States. The comparison focuses on the relative importance of user fees on waste disposal, community recycling programs, and socioeconomic factors. Both data sources are nationwide, material-specific, and at the household level. One major finding is that a disposal fee provides a significant economic incentive to Norwegian households, whereas its effectiveness in the United States is still up for debate. Providing households with convenient recycling options, such as curbside and drop-off recycling, appears generally effective, but less so in Norway than in the United States. Socioeconomic characteristics are less important predictors of behavior in Norway than in the United States. Qualifications on the comparison are provided throughout and two extensions for future research are suggested at the end.     

Incentive roles of fringe benefits in compensation contracts

The purpose of this paper is to establish a new insight into the potential benefit of fringe benefits used by firms in compensation contracts. We show that fringe benefits have a role to provide incentives and reduce agency costs. In an agency model with moral hazard, we examine the optimal incentive package that involves salary, equity shares, and fringe benefits. Based on the notion that fringe benefits are imperfect substitutes for salary and (weakly) complementary to effort, we show how the optimal package may include an excessive provision of fringe benefits that exceeds the first-best level, and why it involves a distortion towards overconsumption of fringe benefits in terms of the manager's preferences.     

Landfilling Versus ``Backstop' Recycling When Income Is Growing

The paper considers a dynamic model in which an income stream,growing over time, is optimally divided into consumption andexpenditures on waste disposal, the latter being optimally dividedbetween ``recycling'and ``landfilling.' Recycling is thoughtof as a ``backstop' waste disposal technology – it does notrequire landfill space but is a relatively expensive method ofwaste disposal. Landfilling uses up scarce landfill capacity. While conserving landfill space is the major reason themunicipality recycles, another motive for recycling might be thatrecycling itself generates utility. Our analysis suggests thatthe optimal recycling program varies considerably with bothlandfill capacity and initial income. For example, richermunicipalities are likely to introduce recycling much earlier inthe planning period than poorer municipalities. Thus whenlegislating recycling, national or regional governments must besensitive to the differences between municipalities.     

Wasting Time? Recycling Incentives in Urban Taiwan and Japan

What makes recycling work? We study the factors driving household waste disposal and recycling in 18 cities in Taiwan and Japan in order to understand the impact of alternative waste management incentives. We show that this depends on the effect of distinct policies on the relative costs of the main alternative disposal methods: recycling, disposal to landfill and illegal dumping. The willingness both to recycle and to dispose to landfill depends on the relative costs of the waste collection regime, and these are dominated by the time cost of alternative disposal methods. The higher the frequency of waste collection, the less recycling and the more disposal to landfill there will be. This is because frequent collection reduces the marginal time-cost of disposal to landfill. Curbside collection of recyclable material, and the frequency of that collection, has a similar effect on the recycling rate. Although direct incentives, such as unit pricing are important in the waste disposal decision, recycling depends primarily on management of the time-costs it involves.     

我国废纸循环利用的适度水平研究

废弃物循环利用的适度水平是构建循环经济的一个重要问题。以废纸的再利用为例,在界定废纸循环利用的社会效益与社会成本的基础上,综合运用生命周期分析方法与环境影响经济评估方法识别并货币化度量废纸循环利用的边际社会效益,构建了我国废纸循环利用的边际成本函数,进而分析我国废纸循环利用的适度水平。研究结果表明,2008年我国用废纸替代木材生产1吨纸浆的社会效益为14 037元,社会福利最大化下的废纸循环利用适度水平为60.1%,高于同期国内废纸循环利用的实际水平39.5%,适当提高现阶段我国废纸循环利用的水平可以增加整个社会的福利。     

Effects of Unit-Based Garbage Pricing: A Differences-in-Differences Approach

Using a unique 10-year dataset of all 458 Dutch municipalities, we apply a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of unit-based pricing on household waste quantities and recycling. Community-level studies of unit-based pricing typically do not include fixed effects at the local level. We find that failure to do so may substantially inflate the estimated price effect. We also find that unit-based pricing may be endogenous, and use instrumental variables to account for this. Our analysis shows that user fees depend on user fees in neighboring jurisdictions (policy interaction). Our estimate of the garbage reduction per $1 user fee is lower than any previous estimate bar one. The price effect depends on the pricing system: weight-based systems reduce garbage quantities more than volume-based systems. User fees increase recycling, especially of paper, but not nearly as much as they reduce garbage quantities. We find no evidence for waste tourism or illegal dumping.     

Optimal risk-sharing with effort and project choice

We consider first-best risk-sharing problems in which “the agent” can control both the drift (effort choice) and the volatility of the underlying process (project selection). In a model of delegated portfolio management, it is optimal to compensate the manager with an option-type payoff, where the functional form of the option is obtained as a solution to an ordinary differential equation. In the general case, the optimal contract is a fixed point of a functional that connects the agent's and the principal's maximization problems. We apply martingale/duality methods familiar from optimal consumption-investment problems.     

A Post-Consumer Waste Management Model for Determining Optimal Levels of Recycling and Landfilling

The present study examines the optimal recycling rate for municipal solid waste. First, an optimal control model is developed to account for the physical costs of recycling, the social costs of landfilling, and consumers' environmental preferences. Second, an optimal solution is simulated using waste disposal data from the Helsinki region in Finland. The benefits from recycling are included in the simulation using the results of a recent contingent valuation study. The results of the present research suggest that mandates for achieving 50% recycling in municipalities are not far-fetched and are both economically and environmentally justified.     

Resource and Waste Taxation in the Theory of the Firm with Recycling Activities

The management of solid waste has become an urgent problem in nations with a great population density. Accordingly, waste reduction through source reduction and recycling has become increasingly important. Our purpose is to show how prevention, recycling and disposal of waste could be part of a theory of the firm. We first derive efficient production functions from production processes with waste as a by-product. Waste obtained as new scrap can partially be recycled by using additional inputs in order to cut back the purchase of virgin material. Waste not completely recyclable will leave the firm as disposal which also entails cost to the firm. We use the dual cost function approach to develop a theory of the firm under solid residual management.Since the producer does not bear the full cost of disposal, there will be a bias toward virgin materials and away from recycling. The goal of the government is to stimulate the firms to recycle with respect to the preservation of exhaustible resources. An incentive to recycle is a tax on resources or on waste. In order to determine the tax levels the government maximizes welfare subject to the dynamic constraint for decumulation of land fill for waste deposits. This gives the user cost and its time profile for taxing waste disposal or virgin material.In a comparative statics analysis we compare the effect of taxes on waste vs. virgin material on effort to produce in a resource saving manner, on the quantity of recycled material, on output, and on the reduction of waste. Since the impact of environmental regulation on employment is important, our model detects seven effects on labor demand as part of resource conservation policy. We finally carry out a comparative statics analysis of waste intensive firms operating in different market structures. Of interest is the impact of a resource or waste taxation on market volume, on the number of firms, on resource saving effort, and on profit.     

Economic Incentives and Residential Waste Management in Taiwan: An Empirical Investigation

This paper presents an empirical study of how three waste management policies have affected residential waste generation and recycling behavior in Taiwan over the past decade. The three policies are unit-pricing of garbage in Taipei, a mandatory recycling program in Kaohsiung, and a nationwide policy of charging for plastic bags. We estimate policy effects on total waste, total recycling, and recycling of four specific materials, all measured by weight per capita. Unlike prior work, we find that unit-pricing and mandatory recycling policies lead to significant increases in recycling of most materials, as well as increased levels of total recycling and garbage reduction. The “plastic bag” policy is generally found to lower material-specific and total recycling rates, as well as total garbage volumes.